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Supervisor: Eduardo Casais 
ABSTRACT 
 
The present dissertation investigates the adequacy of relationship marketing 
concepts to markets for fast-moving consumer goods. Supporters of the relationship 
marketing approach urge companies to focus their marketing efforts on the retention of 
their most valuable customers. This recommendation flows from the belief that loyalty 
rather than penetration is the best way to grow a brand. 
Relationship marketing emerged in the context of service marketing, but in recent 
years its scope widened to the point where a number of authors consider it a new paradigm 
of marketing relevant for any company in any type of market. Namely, interest for 
relationship concepts has been growing among manufacturers of fast-moving consumer 
goods who try to overcome the limitations of traditional mass marketing approaches. 
However, in contrast to the dominant Howard-Sheth theory of consumer buyer behavior, 
the NBD-Dirichlet theory of purchase behavior predicts that, when repeat-buying behavior 
prevails, such relationship marketing strategies will not work as expected.  
In fact, given empirical evidence that: a) what basically separates a leading brand 
from the other brands in any given category is that is bought by more consumers; b) loyalty 
does not vary much from one brand to the other; and c) brands with higher penetration 
rates also command more loyalty, marketing programs geared toward increased loyalty run 
the risk of either not reaching their goal or doing it at an absurdly high cost. For these 
reasons, we wanted to test the hypothesis that relationship marketing programs are not able 
to generate increasing market share for fast-moving consumer goods. On the other hand, 
in case a positive impact was identified, we also wanted to know what specific behavioral 
variables were instrumental in bringing about that effect. 
Having obtained permission from a large multinational manufacturer of fast-
moving consumer goods operating in Portugal to examine the purchase data of both a test 
and a control group in the context of a relationship marketing program, we were able to 
follow their respective behaviors during a period of ten quarters. The behavioral variables 
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retained for analysis were market share, penetration rate, buying rate, purchase frequency, 
and expense per purchase occasion. The analysis was conducted at three different levels: 
corporate, division, and product. 
Thus, a comparison was established between behavior in the test group and 
behavior in the control group. The differences between both groups led to the creation of a 
new set of time-series whose evolution was analyzed in order to verify: 
a) Whether any positive evolution could be identified in the test group relative do 
the control group during the period under study; and 
b) Whether such effects could be related to the relationship marketing program. 
In short, our basic conclusion is that, on the basis of the available data, it is not 
possible to conclude that the relationship marketing program we investigated has had an 
irrefutable positive impact on the analyzed purchase variables whether at the corporate, the 
division or the product level. 
While our results cannot be interpreted as meaning that relationship marketing is 
absolutely ineffective in markets for fast-moving consumer goods, they nevertheless 
reinforce the suspicions raised by some authors regarding the applicability of relationship 
marketing principles to low-involvement repeat-buying, inasmuch as they seem to confirm 
the predictions of the NBD-Dirichlet theory of purchase behavior. Important implications 
follow for marketing theory, management practice, and future research. 
 
Key-words: Relationship marketing, CRM, repeat-buying behavior, fast moving consumer 
goods, loyalty programs, consumer panels. 
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Comportamento de Compra e Programas de Relacionamento com os Clientes 
Autor: João Pinto e Castro 
Orientador: Eduardo Casais 
RESUMO 
A presente dissertação investiga a adequação dos conceitos do marketing relacional 
aos mercados de bens de consumo correntes. Os adeptos do marketing relacional incitam 
as empresas a focalizarem os seus esforços de marketing na retenção dos seus clientes mais 
valiosos. Esta recomendação decorre da crença de que a fidelização é uma forma mais 
eficaz de assegurar o crescimento de uma marca do que a penetração. 
O marketing relacional emergiu no contexto do marketing de serviços, mas mais 
recentemente o seu âmbito alargou-se ao ponto de alguns autores o considerarem um novo 
paradigma do marketing relevante para qualquer empresa em qualquer tipo de mercado. O 
interesse pelos conceitos do marketing relacional cresceu designadamente entre os 
fabricantes de bens de consumo correntes empenhados em superar as limitações das 
tradicionais abordagens do marketing de massa. Todavia, em oposição à teoria dominante 
do comportamento de compra do consumidor de Howard-Sheth, a teoria NBD-Dirichlet 
do comportamento de compra prediz que, em situações de compra repetida, essas 
estratégias de marketing relacional não produzirão os resultados esperados. 
Na realidade, tendo em conta evidência empírica segundo a qual: a) o que 
basicamente distingue as marcas líderes das restantes numa dada categoria é o facto de ela 
ser adquirida por mais consumidores; b) a lealdade não varia muito de marca para marca; e 
c) as marcas com maiores taxas de penetração também registam maior lealdade, os 
programas concebidos para fidelizar os clientes correm o risco de ou não atingirem o seu 
propósito ou atingirem-no por um custo absurdamente elevado. Por essas razões, 
pretendíamos testar a hipótese segundo a qual os programas de marketing relacional são 
incapazes de gerar ganhos de quota de mercado para bens de grande consumo. Por outro 
lado, caso fosse possível identificar algum impacto positivo, gostaríamos de saber que 
variáveis comportamentais específicas seriam responsáveis por esse efeito. 
Tendo obtido autorização de um grande fabricante de bens de consumo correntes a 
operar em Portugal para examinar os dados de compra de um grupo de teste e de um 
grupo de controlo no contexto de um programa de marketing relacional, foi-nos possível 
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acompanhar os seus comportamentos respectivos ao longo de um período de dez 
trimestres. As variáveis de comportamento retidas foram a quota de mercado, a taxa de 
penetração, a taxa de compra, a frequência de compra e o gasto por ocasião de compra. A 
análise foi conduzida em três níveis distintos: empresa, divisão e produto. 
Assim, foi estabelecida uma comparação entre o comportamento no grupo de teste 
e o comportamento no grupo de controlo. As diferenças entre os dois grupos conduziram 
à criação de um novo conjunto de séries cronológicas cuja evolução foi analisada com o 
objectivo de verificar: 
a) Se seria possível identificar qualquer evolução positiva no grupo de teste em 
relação ao grupo de controlo durante o período escrutinado; e 
b) Se tais efeitos poderiam ser atribuídos ao programa de marketing relacional. 
Resumidamente, a conclusão fundamental é que, a fazer fé nos dados disponíveis, 
não é possível concluir que o programa de marketing relacional investigado tenha tido um 
impacto positivo irrefutável sobre as variáveis de compra analisadas, seja ao nível da 
empresa, das divisões ou dos produtos. 
Embora estes resultados não permitam concluir que o marketing relacional é 
absolutamente ineficaz em mercados de bens de grande consumo, eles contribuem no 
entanto para reforçar as suspeitas levantadas por alguns autores relativamente à 
aplicabilidade dos princípios do marketing relacional à compra repetida de baixo 
envolvimento, na medida em que parecem confirmar as predições da teoria NBD-Dirichlet 
do comportamento de compra. Decorrem daqui importantes consequências para a teoria 
do marketing e a prática da gestão, bem como para futuras investigações neste domínio. 
 
Palavras-chave: Marketing relacional, CRM, comportamento de compra repetida, bens de 
consumo de alta rotação, programas de fidelização, painéis de consumidores. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
1.1  - BACKGROUND TO THE RESEARCH 
The purpose of this investigation is to contribute to the understanding of the 
effectiveness of a variety of marketing strategies usually grouped under the designation of 
relationship marketing, an expression coined about two decades ago to describe certain 
practices that attempted to transform the way marketing was traditionally managed. 
Relationship marketing started as a reaction against what was considered by some 
as an excessively transactional approach, characterized by an almost exclusive focus on the 
moment when the buyer and the salesman meet each other to operate an exchange (Levitt, 
1983). Within the transaction marketing approach, critics said, the main marketing effort 
was concentrated on the sale itself, ignoring what happened after its conclusion. As Levitt 
(1983 )pointed out: “The relationship between a seller and a buyer seldom ends when a sale 
is made. Increasingly, the relationship intensifies after the sale and helps determine the 
buyer’s choice the next time around.” However, marketing departments tended to treat 
each buying occasion as if it were the first and last one and to ignore the peculiarities of the 
repeated buying process. 
Roughly at the same time, Berry (1983) complained that “efforts to retain existing 
customers are minimal” and added: “this view of marketing is needlessly restrictive and 
potentially wasteful”. He then went on to define (possibly for the first time ever) 
relationship marketing as “attracting, maintaining and – in multi-service firms – building 
customer relationships” (Ibid.). 
By 2001, a mere twenty years after Levitt and Berry had expressed these concerns, 
Customer Relationship Management (a concept akin to relationship marketing) had grown 
so big, that, according to some estimates (Varey, 2002, p.XV), the industry revolving 
around it was worth more than 20 billion £ (approximately 30 billion €) and two in three 
corporations were said to have at least attempted a CRM project. The European retail 
industry is said to have spent 2.5 billion euros in the management of loyalty card programs 
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(probably the most common type of CRM program) in 1999, while the number of cards in 
circulation amounted to 350 million in the same year (Wall Street Journal, 2000). A Google 
search of the World Wide Web for the expression CRM identified 142,000 pages in June 
2000; 552,000 pages in June 2002; 19,200,000 pages in November 2004; 24,500,000 pages 
in April 2005; and 72,100,000 pages in September 2005. A similar search for relationship 
marketing showed 63,600 pages in June 2002; 382,000 pages in November 2004; 548,000 
pages in April 2005; and 1,760,000 pages in September 2005. 
The companies that espouse relationship marketing principles are specially 
interested in its ability to protect the existing customer base from competitive attacks. 
Thus, in a general way, the last decades witnessed a tendency within marketing departments 
for a continuous move of money and effort from customer acquisition to customer 
retention, sustained by the belief that it is far more economical to make a new sale to an 
existing customer than to acquire a new one. In fact, according to Berry and Gresham 
(1986), “marketing costs per unit of sales are typically lower for existing customers than for 
customer prospects”. This growing concern with the protection of the existing customer 
base translates into an attempt to deepen and enhance the relationship of the company or 
brand with its customers, in order to create entry barriers to competitors who might try to 
seduce them. This explains the designation of relationship marketing adopted by this 
growingly accepted trend of contemporary marketing thought. 
Companies operating in the fast-moving consumer goods industries, among them 
some of the largest in the world such as Procter & Gamble, Unilever, Nestlé, Danone, 
Kraft General Foods or Master Foods, have grown increasingly interested in relationship 
marketing in the recent years. Having noticed that very often about 20% of their customers 
account for roughly 50% of their sales and an even larger proportion of their profits 
(Hallberg, 1995), they started experimenting with programs designed to induce the loyalty 
of their best customers. The purpose of these companies is to change the purchase 
behavior of consumers, getting them to buy more frequently, to increase their feed rate, to 
buy more at each purchase occasion or to reduce brand-switching. These programs in turn 
stimulated the collection of information on individual customers (something that had never 
been done before in this industry) and led to the building of huge marketing databases. 
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Relationship marketing – sometimes also known as CRM or one-to-one marketing1 
– has its origins in four main bodies of ideas active in the marketing profession. The first 
one is business-to-business marketing and specially the work of the Industrial Marketing 
and Purchasing Group (IMP), which has always stressed the importance of relationships in 
the interaction between buying and selling companies (Ford, 1980; Ford, 1990; Ford et al., 
2002). The second one is services marketing, with its emphasis on the intangibility of the 
offer and the importance it pays to service encounters at the moments when the actual 
brand performance is confronted with the expectations of its customers (Grönroos, 1990a; 
Grönroos, 2000). The third one is total quality management, starting with the evaluation of 
non quality costs and going on to the systematic identification of the main causes of 
customer dissatisfaction (Parasuraman, Zeithaml and Berry, 1985; Crosby, Evans and 
Cowles, 1990; Reichheld and Sasser, 1990). Finally, the fourth one is the old tradition of 
direct marketing (kept for a long time at the margins of mainstream marketing), with its 
insistence on the need for a personal relationship with each individual customer based on 
the understanding of his real value to the company (Wunderman, 1996). 
The fact that huge sums are nowadays being invested in CRM programs and 
systems urges marketing managers to justify these expenses. Is relationship marketing in 
fact a good idea? Do these programs really work? What kind of return on investment can 
be expected? Is purchase behavior significantly changed? Which behavior variables change 
more significantly in response to relationship marketing programs? Which variables should 
managers focus on? And finally: which relationship marketing strategies prove more 
effective in practice? 
In spite of the increasing acceptance of its basic concepts and of the growing 
interest that they have awakened in both business and academic circles, some skepticism 
has been voiced concerning the real effectiveness of relationship marketing (Fournier, 
Dobscha and Mick, 1998; The Economist, 2001), the most serious criticisms being those that 
question the specific ways in which these strategies can (or cannot) influence the buying 
behavior of the consumers involved in this type of initiatives (Dowling and Uncles, 1997; 
Dowling, 2002). 
                                                
1 For a discussion of these different designations, see Chapter 2, Section 2.4. 
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The debate on this subject revealed three different kinds of situations (Kumar & 
Reinartz, 2005): 
a) First, it is somewhat surprising to notice that many companies implementing 
relationship marketing programs do not care, or do not know how, to monitor 
properly its results, thus inhibiting an objective and rigorous evaluation of the 
selected strategy;  
b) Second, several cases have been reported of companies that abandoned 
relationship marketing programs after some years of frustrating efforts, having 
found them to be a complete waste of time and money; 
c) Finally, some companies feel perfectly happy with the results of their relationship 
marketing programs, yet are unable to identify precisely the factors that explain 
such success. 
1.2 – RESEARCH PROBLEM 
Any relationship marketing program – any marketing program, for that matter – is 
necessarily dependent on certain presuppositions about how consumers will react or not to 
certain kinds of stimulus. In other words, it is grounded on a theoretical model of 
consumer behavior. Marketing managers resort to certain strategies or tactics because they 
believe that they are able to generate appropriate responses from consumers. Thus, for 
instance, certain types of sales promotions are supposed to generate trial; advertising is 
supposed to induce favorable attitudes and brand-switching behavior; and customer 
satisfaction is supposed to increase brand allegiance. While some marketing devices have 
become so common that their effectiveness is now taken for granted, the truth is that they 
are all dependent on some hypothesis relating a certain cause to a certain effect or, in other 
words, on some implicit explanatory theory, even when the manager is unaware of the 
origin of his own beliefs. 
As it happens, we presently have not one, but at least two main alternative theories 
on the way marketing works: the Howard-Sheth theory (Howard and Sheth, 1967; Howard 
and Sheth, 1969), continuously and successively refined since it was first propounded in the 
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last century in the mid-60s, on the one hand; and the repeat-buying or NBD-Dirichlet 
theory2(Ehrenberg, 1972; Goodhart, Ehrenberg and Chatfield, 1984; Ehrenberg, 1988), or, 
shortly, Dirichlet theory (Goodhart, Ehrenberg and Chatfield, 1984), mostly available in the 
form of generalizations built on empirical investigations, on the other hand. Each of these 
theories has diametrically opposed consequences as to how marketing should be managed 
and how a relationship marketing program should be conducted (Ehrenberg 2002).  
As we will show in a later chapter, the Howard-Sheth theory admits in principle the 
feasibility and effectiveness of loyalty relationship marketing strategies. Loyalty programs 
can succeed or fail on their own merits, depending on the amount of competence and care 
invested in their planning. Encouraged by this lack of prevention, managers trained in this 
school of thought tend to see no basic conceptual problems in loyalty programs and to 
adopt them as a legitimate weapon when their purpose is to retain customers and induce 
repeat-buying. 
On the contrary, the NBD-Dirichlet theory flatly objects to certain ideas located at 
the very core of relationship marketing as it is usually taught and practiced. Among other 
things, the NBD-Dirichlet theory sustains that certain fixed relations exist between 
penetration and loyalty, such that the best-selling brand will also usually command higher 
loyalty from its customers. This well documented phenomenon, known as double jeopardy, 
disturbs whatever naive faith marketing managers might have in ill-conceived loyalty 
schemes. Should double jeopardy be interpreted as an iron law impossible to circumvent? 
Or is it rather the result of a lack of managers’ efforts to invest properly in the retention of 
their customer base? 
                                                
2 NBD stands for Negative Binomial Distribution. As will be later shown in Chapter 3, Ehrenberg 
has resisted presenting a comprehensive alternative theory of buyer behavior. He does it on the grounds that 
only empirical generalizations can provide us with genuine and relevant theories, and that, given the present 
state of the research, it is still too early to jump into definitive conclusions. However, Ehrenberg and his 
associates recently started using the expression “NBD-Dirichlet theory” to describe their own view (see, for 
instance, Ehrenberg, Uncles & Goodhart, 2002). We will therefor use it, while stressing that, for the time 
being, we only have some elements of the theory, not a complete and detailed model addressing all the issues 
that we would expect a buyer behavior theory to explain. As a consequence, its full implications have not yet 
been drawn out. 
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Therefore, while analyzing whether and how relationship marketing works, we will 
at the same time be testing those two alternative explanations of consumer behavior in the 
well defined context of fast-moving consumer goods markets. If relationship programs do 
work by increasing loyalty, the NBD-Dirichlet theory would have to be considered 
defective. On the other hand, if we were to find no proof of their effectiveness, the NBD-
Dirichlet theory would be corroborated and the Howard-Sheth theory would be found at 
the very least incomplete. 
In the first place, we want to know whether relationship marketing programs work 
at all, that is, whether they are able to increase the sales or the market share of a given 
company or of a given brand. We also want to investigate the magnitude of the changes 
that those programs can trigger and, if possible, compare the extra profits that they 
generate with the costs incurred to obtain them. This would give us at least some idea of 
what kind of cost-benefit relation can be expected. 
Then, in case those macro-effects are found to exist and to be significant, we want 
to identify the chain of effects that leads to them. In order to do so, we will have to 
decompose market share into its underlying variables, such as penetration, buying rate, 
purchase frequency and expense per occasion, and then see in what direction and by how 
much they change as a result of a relationship program. This information would be 
invaluable, since it would allow managers to know where their efforts should be 
concentrated in order to maximize the efficiency of relationship strategies. In fact, it should 
be noted that, at the present time, the available theory provides no practical guidelines as to 
what behavior variables are more likely to induce the desired results whether in terms of 
sales or in terms of profitability. 
Finally, we want to know how those effects evolve in time. More specifically, how 
fast do they show up? Are they immediate and sudden, or do they go on growing slowly 
and cumulatively for a long time after the program starts? Moreover, how does the time 
pattern of the effects of relationship marketing programs compare with the ones of 
advertising and sales promotions? 
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1.3 – JUSTIFICATION FOR THE RESEARCH 
As previously mentioned, relationship marketing strategies, initially tested and 
developed in services and business-to-business markets, have lately become increasingly 
popular in fast-moving consumer goods. In Portugal alone we can mention at least four 
important long term programs: Unilever, Nestlé, Marterfoods, and Pescanova. This list 
leaves aside other initiatives aimed at a similar target group, undertaken in recent years by 
retailers like Pingo Doce (Dominó) and Intermarché (Clube Qualité), for instance. 
The startling fact, however, is that not only in Portugal but also in the world at 
large, there is a remarkable scarcity of empirical quantitative research on the alleged 
effectiveness and efficiency of relationship marketing programs in general and in particular 
of loyalty programs. Sharp and Sharp (1997, 1999) pioneered this line of research  
examining a major loyalty program in Australia, soon to be followed by Nako (1997), who 
studied frequent-flyer programs. Dowling and Uncles (1997) voiced a number of criticisms 
based on a wealth of published data concerning loyalty programs in several industries , but 
the evidence they use is mainly anecdotal and unsystematic. Bolton et al. (2000) further 
explored the implications of loyalty program membership, while Verhoef (2003) specifically 
addressed the implications of customer relationship management principles for consumer 
markets regarding customer retention and customer share development. Meanwhile, 
Dowling (2002) discussed the conditions that might recommend the application of 
relationship management principles to consumer markets. But the most remarkable 
contribution came from Meyer-Waarden (2004), who assessed the impact of a French 
retailer loyalty card by analyzing single-source panel data. 
Most of the existing empirical research on the effects of loyalty programs on buyer 
behavior reports mixed results. As a rule, it has been found that their effectiveness is far 
from guaranteed, and that their measured impact is rather weak. In these circumstances, 
many authors advise managers to avoid taking the initiative of launching relationship 
programs and to resort to them only as a defensive tactic to protect its customer base 
whenever the competition moves first. Furthermore, with the exception of retailers’ 
programs, practically no research addressed consumer markets, since no proper panel data 
could be obtained, thus restricting the available information to single company sales data. 
As noted by Sharp and Sharp (1999), researchers have encountered difficulties in 
constructing classical experimental designs which require a control benchmark, either in 
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terms of a set of consumers not exposed to the program, or data on what buying behavior 
was like prior to the program launch. 
In July 2002, the Marketing Science Institute (2004) included the assessment of the 
impact of customer relationship management among top-tier priorities after conducting 
focus groups of senior marketing executives and leading academic researchers and 
organizing a formal vote by member companies. The establishment of such priorities by 
the Marketing Science Institute signals which issues leading corporations see as important 
for improving business practice through academic research and guides decisions on 
research projects, reports, and conferences. 
On the other hand, Day and Montgomery (1999) mention the understanding of 
how customers really behave as a fundamental issue that research should focus on, specially 
as the emphasis of marketing shifts from transactional to relational exchanges. In their 
view, specific questions about brand loyalty take central place in this new setting such as: 
“Is observed loyalty shaped more by inertia and situational factors than by strongly held 
preferences? Is divided and polygamous loyalty more reflective of actual behavior than clear-cut 
allegiance to a single brand? (...) What can be claimed about the extent of loyalty and the payoff 
from efforts to induce greater loyalty?” 
1.4 – METHODOLOGY 
We chose to study a CRM program launched by a major manufacturer of fast-
moving consumer goods that has been running in Portugal since the beginning of 2001. 
Among the major reasons for this choice were the innovative features and the complexity 
of the marketing concepts and techniques involved. However, the decisive factor was no 
doubt the quantity and quality of the available information and the extent to which it fitted 
the purpose of our investigation. 
The main empirical source of the data used in our research is the consumer panel 
of TNS, a multinational market research company operating in Portugal, and the sub-panel 
specifically created to track the CRM program of XXX in this country. At the time of our 
investigation, this panel covered 1,826 households chosen to represent the universe of 
3,594,279 households that according to the INE Census existed in Portugal in 2001. The 
TNS panel belongs to the self-administered diary type, requiring from its members the 
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registration in writing of its weekly purchases in a number of product categories. It 
provides frequent, continuous, complete, detailed and reasonably accurate information on 
the actual behavior of consumers. 
Since special care was taken to register information on purchase patterns before the 
program launch in period “zero”, it is possible to compare the situation prior to the start of 
the experience with the subsequent behavior of the same customers. Furthermore, panel 
members were classified as either “exposed” (test group) or “non-exposed” (control group) 
to the program. As the exposed sample, with a mere 200 members, was much smaller than 
the non-exposed one, a sub-sample of the latter was chosen whose profile closely matched 
the profile of the former in order to ensure that like was compared with like. The 
experimental design thus involves the comparison between, on the one hand, pre and post-
launch periods and, on the other hand, exposed and non-exposed customers. The control 
group provides a benchmark against which we can evaluate the differences in behavior that 
occur in the test group. Assuming both groups are affected by the same sampling errors, 
this scheme allows us to isolate the true effects of the relationship program, since the only 
difference between the test group and the control group is that the former was exposed to 
the program while the latter was not. 
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Figure 1.1 
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Following the Organization Chart displayed in Figure 1.1, the analysis was 
conducted at three different levels: 
a) Corporate level – The first level of analysis aggregates all XXX brands 
included in the program. 
b) Division level – The second level of analysis aggregates XXX brands 
participating in the program at the division level. Four XXX divisions 
are considered: A, B, C, and D. 
c) Brand or product level – The third level of analysis considers separately 
each of the twenty-two XXX brands or products involved in the 
program. 
A total of five behavior variables were tracked: market share, penetration share, 
buying rate, purchase frequency and purchase per occasion. Three data series were 
considered in each case: control group, test group and differences between both. As a 
consequence, a total of 405 time-series were initially inspected using data from the 
consumer panel. Of course, not all of them are equally trustworthy, especially because the 
sample of the exposed group of households turns out to be very small in the case of some 
products. 
1.5 – OUTLINE OF THIS THESIS 
Chapter 2 presents in a structured and synthetic way the central ideas and concepts 
of the relationship marketing paradigm and discusses its relevance for marketing 
management in the prevailing competitive conditions in which companies operate in the 
beginning of the 21st century. We start with a historical overview of the transition from 
transactional to relationship marketing using as an illustration the case of the automobile 
industry. This helps us understand how the marketing environment was gradually 
transformed as the 20th century progressed and how those changes called for new business 
practices, among them relationship marketing. We review the key concepts underlying 
relationship marketing and confront them in a systematic fashion with the more traditional 
perspectives in order to highlight their originality and to discuss their relevance. Next, real-
world applications of relationship marketing in several industries in the last twenty years are 
briefly presented and its future prospects considered. We note that relationship marketing 
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faces new challenges when managers try to apply it to fast-moving consumer goods, 
specifically regarding the possibility of creating strong relations between brands and 
consumers when low involvement prevails. To conclude, we present some of the most 
important criticisms that have been directed to relationship marketing, both on a practical 
and on a theoretical level, paying special attention to skeptical views on its alleged impact 
on consumer buying behavior. 
The purpose of Chapter 3 is to confront two basic theories of buyer behavior: the 
Howard-Sheth theory and the NBD-Dirichlet theory. The importance of this confrontation 
comes from the fact that, since they make different predictions about what results should 
be expected from loyalty programs, they cannot be both simultaneously right. The chapter 
starts with a broad historical perspective of the process that, beginning with certain 
practices initiated by some large American manufacturing companies in the second half of 
the 19th century, gave birth to the principles of modern marketing as an attempt to 
systematize those practices in order to facilitate its dissemination and teaching. Practice 
thus preceded theory by several decades, and, when theory started to catch up, a need was 
felt for a satisfactory model of buyer behavior that could lay the foundations for solid and 
knowledgeable marketing practice. The marketing mainstream adopted a cognitive theory 
whose central piece is the Howard-Sheth model (Howard and Sheth, 1967; 1969) presented 
in detail in this chapter. An alternative view developed by Ehrenberg (1972, 1988), based 
on empirical generalizations challenged the prevailing view and gradually came to be seen 
as a serious alternative. We show how the Howard-Sheth theory plays a central role in the 
dominant paradigm of marketing, over-determining other parts of prevailing marketing 
theories and practices. We follow with the identification of the precise way how the 
building of a consumer behavior theory allowed the creation of a complete marketing 
theory, and then go on to show how those ideas in turn influenced the practices that had 
originated them in the first place. Next, the markedly divergent NBD-Dirichlet theory put 
forward by Ehrenberg is presented and discussed in some detail and its consequences to 
brand loyalty strategies and tactics are made explicit. Ehrenberg believes to have shown, on 
the basis of the analysis of consumer panel data, that many accepted ideas on buying 
behavior are mere fantasies. Those ideas are, however, deeply ingrained in current theories 
propagated by the marketing textbooks currently in use. In this chapter we present the 
main results obtained by Ehrenberg in decades of investigations, suggesting how they can 
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be used to correct the traditional perspective on buying behavior, while putting forward a 
certain number of hypotheses that might help to redirect marketing and communication 
strategies. This task is not made easier by the fact that Ehrenberg himself has proved more 
effective in the demolition of rival theories than in the proposition of a comprehensive 
alternative theory that might dispute the leading role of the Howard-Sheth model. We 
finish the chapter by confronting both theories point by point, laying the ground for the 
specification of the hypothesis of our investigation. 
Chapter 4 summarizes the ideas discussed in the previous chapters and formulates 
the hypotheses to be tested. We start by discussing the implications of the NBD-Dirichlet 
theory for relationship marketing. Several authors have in particular questioned, in the light 
of Ehrenberg’s findings, the ability of loyalty programs to work as expected. All this 
amounts to ask if customer retention is in fact a good way to grow a brand. The literature 
also helps us to formulate some hypotheses on how relationship programs might work. In 
order to outline specific hypotheses, we need to understand the determinants of market 
share and how they relate to loyalty. We review in this chapter the inter-brand migration 
model (Rossiter and Percy, 1987; 1997), the Parfitt-Collins formula (Parfitt and Collins, 
1968) and the sales equation used by Ehrenberg (1972, 1988). The chapter closes with the 
presentation and justification of the research hypotheses regarding the general impact of 
loyalty programs on sales and market share, on the behavioral variables that govern market 
share and on the time pattern of that hypothetical impact. 
Chapter 5 introduces and explains the adopted methodology. We begin with a short 
description of the XXX CRM program for reference purposes, including a discussion of its 
origins, motivations, objectives, overall design, infrastructure and metrics. Next, consumer 
panels are introduced and their merits as a toll of data collection are discussed. The 
reliability of panel data depends crucially on the methods of panel recruitment and 
management. For this reason, we explain in some detail the workings of consumer panels 
in general, and in particular the organization of the TNS panel that supplied the data for 
this investigation. Of course, the sub-panel created to track the behavior of the exposed 
group of households is also given special attention because of its critical importance. To 
conclude, the statistical methods used are briefly reviewed and justified. 
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Chapter 6 presents at length the results of the investigation at each of the levels of 
analysis: company, divisions and individual brands. For this purpose, tables and graphics 
are used to summarize in an easily understandable way the vast amount of data collected 
during the investigation. Descriptive statistical tools are combined with analytical ones to 
provide a complete and balanced perspective of the results of the research. Whenever 
necessary, the limitations of the available data are pointed out and its consequences to the 
robustness of the conclusions are discussed. 
Finally, Chapter 7 explicitly relates our empirical findings to each of the hypotheses 
of the research and states our main conclusions regarding the research problem. We discuss 
the implications for theory and suggest how policy and practices could be affected by our 
results, with due care to the methodological limitations that became apparent in the course 
of our work. We conclude by proposing future research on several topics in order to 
improve the current state of our knowledge. 
1.6 – DELIMITATIONS OF SCOPE AND KEY ASSUMPTIONS 
The choice of the area of fast-moving consumer goods was determined by several 
different reasons. Fast-moving consumer goods played a leading role in the development 
of the mass marketing techniques that came to epitomize marketing itself for decades. But 
manufacturers of this type of goods were relative latecomers to relationship marketing and 
there is considerable curiosity to see how successful its concepts and techniques will prove 
useful in this domain. The largest companies operating in consumer market goods are 
known to spend heavily in traditional media advertising. If they would come to embrace 
the new marketing paradigm, this would entail a major change with significant 
repercussions to advertising agencies and to the media that depend on the source of 
revenue that advertising provides them. 
As previously noted, there is a considerable lack of research regarding the success 
or relationship marketing programs in this type of markets. Possible explanations of this 
failure are that either researchers were denied access to the information generated by the 
existing programs for reasons of confidentiality or, after careful scrutiny, that information 
proved inadequate to conduct a scientific investigation. 
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Once we decided to focus on this particular type of market, the range of options 
was immediately restricted to a small number of relationship marketing programs. 
Moreover, only one of them, the CRM XXX program, had created metrics that met the 
criteria required by a scientific experimental design. However, after careful inspection of 
the available data, several limitations became clear, of which the most significant were: a) a 
relatively limited time-span; b) the small sample used to represent the test group; c) the 
variables retained for analysis; d) the impossibility of reworking the basic data in order to 
classify it and analyze it in different ways. We will discuss each of them in turn: 
a) Limited time-span. The available data covers a relatively short time period of 
only ten quarters or, in other words, two years and a half. This makes it 
impossible to determine the seasonality of the data and very difficult to fit a 
trend line. After ten quarters, XXX decided to reconstruct the data according to 
a different methodology, which means that the time-series was in fact broken, 
becoming useless for our purposes after that date. 
b) Small sample of the test group. The test group was found by crossing the list 
of panel members with the list of customers enrolled in the program. As should 
be expected, only a small number of households met both criteria, leading to an 
overall sample of no more than 200 members. At the company and division 
level this creates no problem, since a large proportion of the sample purchased 
at least once one of the relevant brands at any given quarter. However, in some 
low penetration categories it became impossible to get accurate estimates of 
some variables since sometimes no more than four or five households bought 
the XXX brand under analysis in some quarters. As a consequence, we do not 
have complete and reliable information in several product categories. 
c) Variables retained for analysis. The variables retained for analysis by XXX do 
not match fully our needs. One of the main limitations is that, within the test 
group, only information regarding the purchase of XXX brands was collected. 
For this reason, it was not possible to perform certain analysis regarding the 
adequacy of the Dirichlet model to describe the observed data or test some laws 
of purchase put forward by Ehrenberg (1972, 1988). On the other hand, some 
loyalty measures, such as the feed rate (also called share of requirements or share 
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of wallet), could not be calculated. 
d) Impossibility of reworking the basic data. Some of the previous problems 
might have been solved by regrouping the available data in different ways, were 
it not for the fact that, by the time our investigation started, the original data 
files were no longer available. The reason for this was that, after the publication 
of the INE Census of 2001 in 2002, the composition of the panel used by TNS 
was changed because it no longer reflected adequately the structure of the 
country’s population. 
1.7 – CONCLUSION  
This chapter summarized the purpose, justification and methodology of this 
research. Additionally, it outlined its general structure and organization, as well as its key 
assumptions. Having laid the foundations for our dissertation, the report can now proceed 
with a detailed description of the research and of its results according to the plan discussed 
in this chapter. 
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Chapter 2 
The New Paradigm of Relationship 
Marketing: Concepts and Theories 
 
2.1 - INTRODUCTION 
The interest in relationship marketing has grown steadily in business and academic 
circles in the last few decades (Sheth and Parvatiyar, 2000). However, large differences of 
opinion remain concerning its meaning and scope, not to mention all too common 
misunderstandings of the definition of the concept itself (Brown, 1994; Brown, 1999; 
Brown, 2000; Brown and Maclaran, 1994). Is relationship marketing a mere passing fad like 
so many others, or has it come to stay? In the second alternative, which particular 
circumstances determined its emergence and recommend its use? Does it really differ from 
direct marketing, one-to-one marketing and CRM? And, above all: is it really effective? 
It seems that the expression relationship marketing was used for the first time by 
Berry (1983), although it would be fair to note that his ideas concur largely with those 
previously presented by Levitt (1983) in a seminal article. The concept of relationship 
marketing was formerly used to stress the specificity of services marketing: if services are 
by nature intangible, the marketing manager should therefore direct his attention to the 
administration of the relationship with the customer (Gummesson, 1987; Grönroos, 
1990b). On the other hand, it also served to criticize the limitations of the 4 Ps (or 
marketing-mix) model, introduced by Neil Borden (Borden, 1964) in the late 40s and until 
very recently generally accepted as the dominant paradigm of marketing management 
(Berry and Gresham, 1986; Brownlie and Saren, 1992). 
The present chapter lays the basic ground for our investigation. We show through a 
historical case-study how relationship marketing emerged gradually as an alternative to pure 
transaction-led marketing. We then investigate the origins of this transformation by linking 
them to the new marketing environment in which companies now compete. Next, the key 
concepts of relationship marketing presented in the literature are briefly reviewed and 
discussed in connection to their real life applications. The chapter concludes with an 
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introduction to some contentious issues that have contributed to raise doubts regarding the 
effectiveness of relationship marketing. 
2.2 – FROM TRANSACTIONAL TO RELATIONSHIP MARKETING: THE 
CASE OF THE AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY 
It should be stressed that this renewed interest in the relational dimension of 
marketing represents a total inversion in the orientation and priorities of modern 
marketing, which, by emphasizing the anonymity of the customer inherent to the large 
scale commercial systems created in the aftermath of the Industrial Revolution, was 
precisely characterized by the prevalence of transactions over relationships (Wunderman, 
1996). However, looking back to the emergence and evolution of modern relationship 
marketing, it has been noted that, taking a long historical view, transaction marketing looks 
like a short hiatus of no more than a century and a half, corresponding to the so-called 
industrial era, and was entirely determined by the very special economical and social 
conditions that came with it (Sheth and Parvatiyar, 2000). 
The automotive industry will be used as a case-study to illustrate a more general 
trend that brought about a transformation of the way marketing and sales activities are 
conducted, slowly but steadily replacing the traditional transactional approach by a 
relational one as the 20th century progressed. 
2.2.1 – Ford Motors 
The first cars equipped with internal combustion engines were built in France and 
Germany in the 80s of the 19th century.3 However, the motor car remained during the 
following decades inaccessible to common mortals, only at the reach of millionaires and 
aristocrats. Each car was built to order in small workshops where groups of skilled workers 
joined efforts to craft the vehicle. The production system was artisan, slow and costly. In 
the year 1895, for instance, Peugeot and Panhard Levassor only produced 72 cars each, and 
Benz 135 cars, a remarkable figure for those times (Tedlow, 1990).  
                                                
3 This section is based mainly on Drucker (1955, 1973), Pine II (1993), and Tedlow (1990). 
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Mass production and mass commercialization 
By launching the Ford T in 1908, Henry Ford revolutionized this situation in such a 
way that he deserves to be considered the true creator of the car industry. His strategy was 
based in the reorganization of the production process, structured around the assembly 
chain along which the vehicle was moved as the parts were successively adjusted to the 
main body. When Ford’s engineers introduced the assembly line to Model T production in 
October 1913, the amount of labor time spent making a single car dropped from 12 hours 
and 8 minutes to 2 hours and 35 minutes(Pine II, 1993). Six months later, Model Ts could 
roll off the assembly line at the rate of 1,000 a day, with the average labor time dropping to 
just over an hour and a half (Ibid.). The principle of flow embodied in the assembly line 
must be considered the guiding concept of mass production. 
Naturally, this method demanded the previous standardization both of the parts 
fitted into the car and of the final product itself, being an indispensable step to mass 
production and the subsequent reduction of production costs. Furthermore, as the 
efficiency of the system grew and the scale of production expanded, the cost compression 
went on, in such a way that, vindicating the initial bet of Henry Ford, Ford T’s sale price 
decreased to the point where the average American citizen could in fact afford to buy a car. 
As revolutionary as the transformation operated by Ford in the organization of 
manufacturing might have been, this was but a small, although essential, part of the whole 
story. In fact, mass production demanded mass commercialization, and Ford was also a 
radical innovator in this respect. 
To begin with, in the first years of the 20th century the potential of the car market 
was in no way obvious. On the contrary, the prevailing opinion regarded the automobile as 
no more than a luxury toy for the lucky few, and denied that things might ever be 
otherwise. Following this line of thought, president Woodrow Wilson stated that the 
automobile would lead directly to the triumph of socialism, given that everybody wanted it 
but only the rich could afford it (Tedlow, 1990). However, Ford was not alone in his 
conviction that it would be possible to lower the price of the automobile until it could be at 
the reach of the masses, nor was he the first industrialist who tried to build inexpensive 
cars in large quantities. Olds Motor Works of Ransom E. Olds started the production of 
the “Merry Oldsmobile”, of which 600 where made in 1901 and 5,000 in 1904, proving 
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that there was a significant demand for a vehicle at a price tag of 650 dollars – about a third 
of the average price then prevalent in the market (Ibid.). However, financial problems 
made worse by conflicts among the owners kept the company from achieving its purpose 
of market massification. In 1907, another entrepreneur, Alanson P. Brush, launched the 
Brush Runabout at a very low price of just 500 dollars, but the quality of the car was so 
obviously flawed, namely by using wood parts instead of metal ones, that it was rejected by 
the public, and the project was definitely abandoned in 1912 (Ibid.). 
The “Universal Car” 
Henry Ford chose a different way. Although he believed, as the previously 
mentioned pioneers also did, in the possibility of building a car “for the great multitude (...) 
so low in price that no man making a good salary will be unable to own one” (cit. by 
Tedlow, 1990), he also believed, unlike them, that it should be “constructed with the best 
materials, by the best men to be hired, after the simplest designs that modern engineering 
can devise” (cit. by Tedlow, 1990). Thus, besides rejecting the lowering of the product 
quality as the most appropriate strategy to reduce costs, he also approached the task of car 
massification in a methodic and rational way. There is nothing strange in this attitude, 
specially coming from an engineer by training. However, Henry Ford’s method largely 
transcended the perspective of a merely competent engineer. He understood clearly that 
the first thing to do would be to specify the features that a Universal Car (as he was fond to 
call it) should have, and to project the vehicle in conformity with those attributes, believing 
that only in this way the objective of the low production cost might be correctly addressed. 
He started by listing the attributes that the “universal car had to have”: (1) “quality in 
material to give service in use”; (2) “simplicity in operation – because the masses are not 
mechanics”; (3) “power in sufficient quantity”; (4) “absolute reliability”; (5) “lightness” to 
carry on “through sand and mud, through slush, snow, and water, up hills, across fields, 
and roadless plains”; (6) “control – to hold its speed always in hand”; (7) economy, as a 
result of its lightness (cit. by Tedlow, 1990). 
On the other hand, Ford also thought that “the way to make automobiles is to 
make one automobile like another automobile, to make them all alike – just like one pin is 
like another pin when it comes from a pin factory” (cit. by Tedlow, 1990). Therefore, cost 
reduction would not be the result of poor quality materials or sloppy assembly, but of the 
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standardization of the parts used and of the operations process itself. His great goal was 
simplicity of design and execution: “the less complex an article, the easier it is to make, the 
cheaper it may be sold, and therefore, the greater number may be sold” (cit. by Tedlow, 
1990). It is seldom mentioned that, in his search for the idealized product obeying the 
above mentioned list of attributes, Ford spent five years testing eight different models (A, 
B, C, F, K, N, R and S) until he finally hit on the right product: the Ford T. When he finally 
launched it, the price was still 850 dollars, much higher than his target of 600 dollars which 
he estimated to be the maximum that would allow the massification of the automobile 
(Tedlow, 1990). Four years later, in 1912, he at last reached that target; and in four more 
years, he had already managed to bring it down to 360 dollars. Meanwhile, demand reacted 
as Henry Ford predicted, with sales jumping from 5,986 units in 1908 to 577,036 in 1916 
(Ibid.). The full measure of his triumph can only be evaluated by knowing that, in 1914, the 
competitive product closer in quality to Ford T was sold at the double of its price (Ibid.). 
Henry Ford as a marketing man 
While Ford took no interest in commercial activities as such, the truth is that, as 
can be seen, the business system he conceived fits perfectly the modern definition of the 
marketing concept. To begin with, he identified carefully the needs of a large mass of 
American citizens; then, he translated them into detailed specifications; finally, he 
organized the production process in order to ensure that the car might be sold at a suitable 
price. Once this process was concluded, “the product sold itself”, as Peter Drucker (1955) 
predicted it would whenever marketing reaches a level of excellence. At the same time, 
fordism can be regarded as a prototype of mass marketing. In fact, Ford designed a master 
strategy aimed at the absolute concentration of the resources in one single product: the 
“Universal Car”, the car for everybody that, taking advantage of economies of scale and 
experience, could be marketed at a very low price, a key weapon to stimulate demand and 
increase continuously the company’s market share (Tedlow, 1990). The effort to maximize 
profits through the expansion of the scale of operations – selling a very large number of 
units at a low margin instead of selling few units at a high margin – is the essence of the 
production and commercialization system that Americans created and spread worldwide. 
The democratization of consumption, in line with the cultural foundations of the American 
society, was no doubt its final purpose. 
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2.2.2 - General Motors 
In 1920, when the Du Pont Company, a chemical giant corporation, took over 
General Motors, this company was no more than a collection of bankrupt factories4. The 
new President Pierre Du Pont, who had neither the patience nor the inclination to manage 
an automobile company, appointed Alfred Sloan Jr. to the job, at that time general manager 
of Hyatt, a factory of roller bearings that was part of the group. Sloan had started his career 
as a manager when he bought a fledgling manufacturer of auto parts that, after eighteen 
years of dramatic growth, was resold to General Motors – with Sloan as part of the 
package. As to General Motors, it had been created by the visionary but chaotic genius of 
William Durant in 1908, when he merged Buick, which he already controlled, with 
Oldsmobile and Cadillac, together with a number of parts and accessories manufacturers 
such as roller bearings, rims, radiators, horns, and starting, ignition and lighting systems. 
With Durant at its head, General Motors went on to absorb Chevrolet and attempted 
repeatedly but unsuccessfully an association with Ford. 
After the take-over of General Motors by Du Pont, its Executive Commission 
charged Sloan with the task of designing a plan to save the company, with a special 
recommendation to consider the best way to imitate the strategy of Ford (Drucker, 1955; 
Sloan, 1971).  Like Ford, Sloan was a skilled engineer for whom the automobile industry 
had no secrets. According to his habit, he proceeded to study in depth all the multiple 
angles of the problem at hand. He concluded very shortly that the imitation of the Ford 
strategy was not a good idea. In 1920, Ford commanded a 56% market share with its Ford 
T – still the only model produced by the company (Tedlow, 1990). As to General Motors, 
in spite of being the number two company in the industry, its sales of cars and trucks 
amounted to less than 13% of the total market (Ibid.). Sloan was therefore convinced that 
it would be a mistake to attack directly a competitor several times more powerful (Sloan, 
1971). 
                                                
4 This section is based on Chandler (1962), Drucker (1955, 1973), Pine II (1993), Sloan (1971), and 
Tedlow (1990).  
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Changes in the marketing environment 
On the other hand, Sloan was also conscious that, although the basic strategy of 
Ford had stayed the same between 1908 and 1920, the market and the consumers had 
changed radically. The first (and the most important) of those changes was the relationship 
between the public and the automobile. While in 1908 the car was still a new and exciting 
product, in 1920 it was already owned by a third of American families, and, given the rapid 
growth of the penetration rate, very soon, in 1923, half of the American families would be 
in that situation (Tedlow, 1990). At the time when the Ford T was launched, the possibility 
of acquiring a basic convenience of motor transportation at a miraculous price seemed to 
everybody an irresistible value proposition. Twelve years later, however, many things had 
changed. The market was drawing close to the point of saturation. In itself, the ownership 
of a car has ceased being a status symbol. Drivers were no longer beginners: they were 
more knowledgeable and therefore considered critically the offers available in the 
marketplace. The extension and quality of the roads had improved extraordinarily. Car 
support services, from repair workshops to gas stations, not to mention the dealers 
themselves, had proliferated throughout the country. The substitution market had 
outgrown the first buy market, originating a vast market for used cars. 
Giving in to the “whims” of the consumer 
Sloan deducted correctly from this premises that the Ford T would very soon be an 
obsolete product and that, accordingly, it was necessary to understand where the market 
was heading to in the 20s. If there was anything worth copying in Ford, that would be his 
effort to understand the underlying forces at work in the market, not his later and stubborn 
persistence in sticking to a rigid concept of the business during a long period of twelve 
years. At Ford Company, the slogan was: “Do not give in to the whims of the consumer” 
(cit. by Tedlow, 1990). Seen under this light, the famous words of Ford – “the consumer 
can choose whatever color he likes, as long as it is black” (Ibid.) – acquire a new meaning. 
It was no longer simply a matter of refraining the introduction of disturbing factors that 
could destroy the simplicity and economy of the production process, but a wish to deny the 
necessity of adaptation to the new times. As James Couzens, the main architect of the Ford 
distribution system, wrote, the project of Henry Ford was now that of “standardizing the 
client” (cit. by Tedlow, 1990). 
 24 
Sloan saw very clearly this weakness of the Ford system, and also understood that 
the new realities of the market environment gave General Motors the opportunity to 
challenge its gigantic rival. He decided, in consequence, to “give in to the whims of the 
consumer” in three key points: creation of a differentiated product line directed to the 
different types of consumers; introduction of an annual model in order to accelerate the 
obsolescence of the competitive products; very attractive credit offers (Tedlow, 1990). To 
our purpose – the understanding of the development of the modern marketing concept – 
the first point is the crucial one. Sloan opposed to the ideal of the “universal car” a new 
slogan: “a car for every purse and every purpose” (Sloan, 1971). By doing this, he not only 
admitted openly that the market was fragmenting into several sub-markets, each of them 
with different preferences and choice factors, but also tried to take advantage from the 
main distinctive feature of General Motors: the diversity of its factories and the subsequent 
offer of a varied product line to the market.  
A new product policy 
In the past, however, that variety had been a weakness, not a strength. First, 
General Motors had no model that could compete successfully with Ford in the low price 
segment. Second, in the middle segment, General Motors offered a large variety of makes 
and models that competed with each other on features and prices, in fact making life easier 
for its competitors. Third, most makes, with the exceptions of Buick and Cadillac, lost 
money in 1921. All these facts revealed the absence of a comprehensive strategy and, most 
of all, the lack of a clear product policy. 
Sloan proposed as an alternative a strategy based on the segmentation of the 
market and a compatible definition of the product line (Sloan, 1971). According to him, the 
company should offer a different car for each price level, starting at the lowest level and 
going up to a car with superior features but still produced in large quantities, thus avoiding 
the tiny luxury market. The gaps between the different prices should be neither too wide 
nor too narrow, because the first option would leave some space to the competition, and 
the second one would increase the number of models on offer and prevent economies of 
scale. Finally, the company should not offer two different models in the same price 
segment. 
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Six different price brackets were defined to implement this general orientation: (a) 
$450 - $600; (b) $600 - $900; (c) $900 - $1,200; (d) $1,200 - $1,700; (e) $1,700 - $2,500; (f) 
$2,500 - $3,500 (Ibid.). The new price structure meant that General Motors would have a 
complete line of cars, and that it would be such that each car would be designed according 
to its position in the total product line. In addition, each car should be positioned closely to 
the top limit of its price bracket and its quality should attract not only customers willing to 
pay somewhat more than they had planned in order to have a better car, but also buyers 
attracted by a price perceived as very low considering that its features were very similar to 
those of the cars in the segment immediately above. They would thus be able to compete 
on quality against the cheaper models and on price against the more expensive ones. 
Coherently with this strategy, General Motors would not try to sell any car at a price 
identical to Ford. It would instead endeavor to produce a much better car than Ford and 
sell it at a slightly higher price. 
From mass marketing to segmentation 
The strategy conceived by Sloan turned out to be an unqualified success. While the 
Ford Motor Company, still tied to outdated notions, entered a declining phase, the 
renewed General Motors surpassed its direct rival and became the new leader of the 
industry. Sloan stressed repeatedly the importance of preserving the basic principles of 
mass production and commercialization in the context of the new strategy, because, in his 
mind, the return to the workshop system was not an option. On the contrary, according to 
him the new challenge would be to take advantage of the spectacular growth of the market 
to explore economies of scale within each market segment. Be that as it may, the decisive 
point of the strategic maneuver conceived and implemented under Sloan’s direction was no 
doubt the segmentation of the market into relatively homogeneous sub-groups as an 
alternative to the undifferentiated marketing that had previously been presented as the sole, 
universal and indisputably valid doctrine. 
In the same way that Ford revealed the frightening power of mass marketing as the 
natural and indispensable complement to mass production, the surprising recovery of 
General Motors from its ashes announced the new era of segmented marketing. It should 
be noted, however, that beyond the different approaches chosen by each company, both 
illustrate perfectly the relevance of the modern marketing concept. 
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2.2.3 - Toyota 
In 1929, Kiichio Toyoda visited the Ford factory in Baton Rouge to become 
acquainted with the new production methods invented in that plant5. At that time, 
however, Toyota was a textile company that, following the instructions of the Japanese 
military government, wished to learn how to build automobile vehicles. Many years later, in 
1950, the total accumulated number of cars produced by Toyota still did not amount to 
more than 2,685 vehicles, while in the same year Ford turned out an average of 7,000 cars a 
day (Womack, Jones and Roos, 1991). 
Just-in-Time Management 
The peculiarities of the Japanese economy and society urged Toyota to develop a 
very original approach to the automobile market, revolving around just-in-time methods of 
managing the assembly line and total quality management. One of the most relevant 
consequences of this approach is the flexibilization of the production process. While the 
efficiency of Fordism was dependent on the large scale manufacturing of uniform 
products, the system developed by Toyota strived to reduce as much as possible the cost of 
variety through a continuous effort to bring down the minimum economically viable 
quantity. In the late 40s, setups for large processes took from two to three hours. It took 
until the mid-50s to reach the hour mark, with most processes achieving a fifteen minute 
setup by 1962 and three minutes by 1971 (Pine II 1993). Leaving aside the details of the 
matter, irrelevant for our present concerns, the important point to stress is that, unlike the 
American system, the Japanese one lends itself marvelously to be guided, not by the 
rhythms of production unilaterally decided by the manufacturer according to standards of 
technical excellence, but by the fluctuations and whims of demand, that is, by the tastes 
and preferences of the consumers. As soon as the early 90s, Toyota managed to offer five-
day delivery of customer-ordered cars in Japan (Pine II 1993). 
Therefore, one should not be too surprised that the distribution and 
commercialization system created by Toyota differed markedly from the ones idealized by 
                                                
5 The main sources for this section were Deming (1986), Pine II (1993), Womack, Jones and Roos 
(1991). 
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either Henry Ford or Alfred Sloan. In the American system, the cars produced in the 
factories are pushed through the distribution channels, pressing dealers to get rid of them 
as fast as possible by using all the familiar promotional tools of the hard-sell school of 
marketing. On the other side, the Japanese system gives priority to the understanding of 
the needs to be satisfied in any particular moment, without forgetting the occasional 
pressure to respond to special and unusual requests. This of course demanded a much 
more intimate contact with existing and prospective clients. 
Toward relationship marketing 
To begin with, Toyota created six different distribution channels, each one of them 
specialized in a part of the product line (Womack, Jones and Roos, 1991). One channel 
dealt only with luxury cars, another one with sports cars, and so on. Naturally, the 
employees at the point of sale were better prepared to dialogue with well defined segments 
of clients. In addition, the salesmen did not just wait for the clients to walk into the 
dealership: they went after them and visited them in their homes (Ibid.). They could thus 
define in detail the profile of each family: how many cars of each type does the family own? 
Who drives them? When where they bought? What space is available for parking? What 
kind of use is given to the cars? How large is the family? When is the family planning to 
replace its cars? And so on. 
Under these conditions, the sale of a car turns out to be the logical conclusion of a 
relationship between Toyota and its customers. What is at stake is not an occasional 
transaction between two strangers, but a well planned effort to maximize the flow of 
revenues that a given customer can bring to the company in the long term. Because each 
customer was from the start treated as a member of the Toyota family, the adoption of 
information technologies in this context was quite easy. Each “member” has a personal 
card that he can insert in any of the ATM-type machines of Toyota where he will be able to 
add, change or eliminate the information that the company has on himself (Ibid.). As early 
as 1990, door-to-door contact was already complemented by distance customized contact, 
allowing the customer to access interactive databases on product features, financial 
conditions, etc. 
What we witness here is a clear evolution away from a marketing system that we 
can describe as massified, anonymous, product-centered and transaction-oriented toward a 
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new one that is customized, one-to-one, interactive, customer-centered and relationship-
oriented. In a word, from transaction marketing to relationship marketing. This trend 
became even clearer during the last decade. According to Maxton and Wormald (2004), the 
automobile industry is presently being transformed by some powerful forces. One of them 
is the fragmentation of the market, leading to lower production runs. Another one is 
dissatisfaction with the costly system of building cars for stock, not to order. A third one is 
innovative modular construction, in which a larger part of the car is put together by parts 
suppliers. 
The proliferation of models and variations is in fact making the automotive 
business increasingly complex to manage, as the number of combinations of style and 
fittings in some vehicles run into billions, a situation that Henry Ford would have found 
hard to imagine (The Economist, 2004). Given the huge range of models that car 
companies now offer, they had to design factories that are completely flexible, able to 
switch instantly from one model to another, using common platforms that serve as a basis 
for a whole range of models. So the new approach to manufacturing means that, instead of 
figuring out in advance which models and which variants will be sold, cars should ideally be 
built to order. 
To summarize, this brief overview of the automobile industry in the 20th century 
shows four major trends at work: 
1. On the demand side, markets became increasingly fragmented into smaller 
and smaller segments as the growing affluence of consumers stimulated the 
emergence of more specialized needs and tastes; 
2. On the supply side, producers responded through the differentiation of 
their goods and the proliferation of product variants and options; 
3. Management principles and techniques were adapted to the new situation in 
order to satisfy the new need for variety while keeping unit costs under 
control; 
4. Information and communication technologies were developed to help 
transform production and marketing away from uniformity and toward 
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flexibility and customization. 
In the next section we will describe in more detail the new marketing environment 
that emerged as a consequence of the demise of mass production and mass marketing. 
2.3 – THE NEW MARKETING ENVIRONMENT 
A number of authors6 view relationship marketing as a new era of marketing, 
driven by the transformation of economic, social and technological conditions at work 
during the last decades. Among the most frequently mentioned causes of this 
transformation are: (a) more knowledgeable and demanding customers; (b) ever greater 
segmentation of the markets and proliferation of products and brands; (c) increasing 
bargaining power of distributors; (d) media fragmentation and saturation; (e) mass 
customization; (f) application of information technologies to marketing management; (g) 
emergence of interactive communications. Let us now see in turn how each of these 
factors contributed to undermine the effectiveness and efficiency of mass transaction 
marketing and pave the way to relationship marketing. 
2.3.1 - More knowledgeable and demanding customers 
The education level of the population in most countries increased continuously 
during the 20th century, namely through the generalization of basic schooling. In a group 
of selected countries including France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, the United 
Kingdom and the USA, average schooling increased from 6.4 to more than 11 years 
between 1913 and 1987 (Maddison, 1991). As a consequence, consumers are now better 
equipped to search, understand and interpret the information they need to evaluate 
correctly the adequacy of the products on offer to their specific needs. Moreover, they also 
have more choice options as a consequence of the introduction of free competition in 
more and more industries and markets. Two main results derived from this: on the one 
                                                
6 Among them Rapp and Collins (1987, 1991, 1994), McKenna (1991, 1995), Peppers and Rodgers 
(1993, 2004, 2005), Pine II (1993), and Grönroos (2000). On the other hand, Mayer (1991), Weilbacher 
(1993) and Corstjens and Corstjens (1995), among others, present a particularly lucid diagnosis of the present 
marketing situation, largely coinciding with the preceding authors, even if, unlike them, their analysis does not 
lead to an explicit recommendation of a relationship marketing approach. 
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hand, companies are forced to offer products tailored to the specific needs of smaller 
groups of consumers; on the other hand, consumers are now less vulnerable to false 
advertising promises. 
Mitchell (2001) talks about the “organized customer”, someone who uses new 
technologies, namely the internet and the new forms of digital intermediation, to take 
control of the situation. As soon as consumers became aware that they have the ability and 
the capacity to look for and find by themselves the best offers available, they started 
exercising that power. Therefore, in the new era, the dominant form of marketing will 
revolve around helping buyers to buy, instead of helping sellers to sell. Consumers are now 
in the process of creating their own media on the internet (Blackshaw and Nazzaro, 2004), 
using it to educate one another about products, brands, services, personalities and all kinds 
of issues. 
As a consequence, consumers have moved “from isolated to connected, from 
unaware to informed, from passive to active” (Prahalad and Ramaswamy, 2004). 
Interactions of customers among themselves and with firms create new possibilities 
previously unknown. The creation of value is no longer the exclusive province of suppliers 
in isolation from consumers. The typical situation now tends to be one where suppliers and 
customers are jointly involved at points of interaction in the creation of value that is unique 
to the individual consumer (Prahalad and Ramaswamy, 2004; Peppers and Rogers, 2004, 
2005). The relationship between both parties takes central stage. The market becomes a 
forum where dialogue among the consumer, the firm, consumer communities, and 
networks of firms take place and evolve on a continuous basis. Nowadays, the brand can 
best be defined as the total experience that results from the relationship considered as a 
whole (Pine II, 1999; Schmitt, 1999). 
2.3.2 - Segmentation of markets and product proliferation 
One of the main side effects of economic development was the launch of new 
products aimed at ever smaller groups of consumers, as we saw in the case of the 
automobile industry. Henry Ford thought that a single universal product aimed at a 
homogeneous and undifferentiated market would be quite enough; unlike him, Alfred 
Sloan glimpsed the first stages of a general trend toward the fragmentation of the market 
into different segments according to the wishes of a customer base, itself differentiated in 
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economic and social terms; finally, Toyota started a new path leading to the systematic 
fragmentation of markets into subcategories or niches: family cars, luxury cars, sports cars, 
station-wagons, four-wheel-drive, mixed passenger-cargo, monovolumes, sport utility 
vehicles, pick-up trucks, mini-vans and so forth, not mentioning different colors, motors 
and accessories. 
This trend was by no means limited to the automobile industry. Some authors 
believe segmentation “is the market-oriented company’s creed” (Corstjens and Corstjens, 
1995). It is a natural reaction against the commoditization of their offer and the price-based 
competition that it implies. Segmentation is generally believed to reduce competitive 
pressure as it makes competitive products less substitutable. 
On the other hand, this tendency for a growing segmentation of the markets 
mirrors the evolution of society itself in the late 20th century. According to Lyotard (1979, 
1993), we now live in the Postmodern Era, characterized as a period of dissolution of 
traditional large social groups (namely social classes), breakup of all-embracing ideologies 
and extreme individualism. At the same time, we observe the recomposition of social links 
in new terms, sometimes likened to a new kind of tribalism (Maffesoli, 2000). The word 
“tribe” refers to the re-emergence of a number of apparently archaic values, whose 
common denominator is the communitarian dimension. These modern urban tribes are 
however not defined in ethnic or local terms, they exist mainly under the form of symbolic 
and ritual commitment. On the other hand, tribe membership is not exclusive or stable: 
individuals belong to different tribes at the same time and jump frequently from one to the 
other during their lifetime. The tools of traditional sociological analysis are believed by 
some authors to have become less relevant to classify properly modern individuals, and the 
same can be said of socio-demographic segmentation analysis (Cova, 1996). Tribal 
marketing supersedes segmentation strategies as individuals and communities based on 
cultural affinities take center stage (Cova, 1999; Cova and Cova, 2002). 
In line with these social transformations, consumer needs and wishes tend to 
specialize, and thus large categories and segments break down to smaller and less stable 
units in order to satisfy the consumer’s desire for variety (Corstjens and Corstjens, 1995). 
Product categories tend to fragment into ever smaller subcategories, whose exiguous 
dimension makes it harder, or even impossible, to apply the usual techniques of mass 
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marketing. In fact, markets nowadays fragment faster than they expand. Each new 
segment, sub-segment and sub-sub-segment is, on average, smaller than the previous ones. 
When this happens, markets have reached the hyper-segmentation stage (Corstjens and 
Corstjens, 1995). The launch and consolidation of new brands is for these reasons 
increasingly difficult, creating a pressure to extend the range of existing brands instead of 
promoting new ones. The profit margins generated by niche brands are simply too low to 
warrant advertising in the mass media. As a consequence, traditional methods of brand and 
product management, and perhaps of marketing itself, are sometimes said to be in crisis 
(Brown, 1994; 1999). 
2.3.3 - Bargaining power of retailers 
In the traditional marketing system, producers of goods tended to consider retailers 
as their natural allies in the process of bringing the products to the consumers. However, as 
the concentration of retailing increased in more and more markets, this cooperative attitude 
came to an end. At best, retailers now behave as the hardest of clients, taking advantage of 
their bargaining power to force increasingly exacting conditions; at worse, they compete 
directly against them offering consumers their own private brands. Very often, the top 3-5 
major national accounts of a producer may control 50% or more of the market in most 
industries. Even a very large corporation such as Procter & Gamble may be in trouble 
when 18% of its worldwide sales (and 25-30% of its US sales) go through Wal-Mart. 
Distribution and shelf space often have to be purchased, particularly for new product 
introduction. Manufacturers have a hard time controlling promotional merchandising and 
may even be banned from visiting the stores at will. In a word, retailers no longer behave 
neutrally toward the competing brands; on the contrary, they are now an interested party in 
the process of consumer choice (Seth and Randall, 1999; Wileman and Jary, 1997). 
Retailers have three main advantages over manufacturers when it comes to 
influencing consumers (Corstjens and Corstjens, 1995). The first is their direct, physical, 
contact with consumers: the supermarket has come to be understood as a powerful 
medium in itself. The second is their control of the point of purchase marketing-mix 
variables, including presence and prominence in store, promotions, prices, sampling, 
merchandising and special displays. The third is their access to data on consumer buying 
behavior, providing valuable insights into what makes customers buy. 
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As a consequence, the interaction with customers at the point of sale became more 
difficult for the manufacturers, and the effectiveness of mass media advertising was 
reduced. The allocation of marketing expenses was substantially altered, with a larger part 
being diverted to trade promotions that bought shelf-space, while the advertising efforts 
were reduced proportionally. 
Referring specifically to fast-moving consumer goods, Corstjens and Corstjens 
(1995) state: 
“Students should not be taught that distribution is a marketing mix variable to be bought (e.g. via 
sales force pressure), just like advertising, when this is no longer the case. Pricing, promotions and 
merchandising are no longer controlled by the manufacturers. Manufacturers have to consider 
retailers as a separate force on the market.” 
As a consequence, retailers have managed to capture a larger share of the value 
created, increasing significantly their margins at the expense of the producers’ profits as the 
balance of power changed in their favor. This situation is not sustainable in the long term 
for manufacturers, and demands, therefore, a radical reformulation of their marketing 
strategies. 
2.3.4 - Media fragmentation and saturation 
The phenomenon of audience fragmentation can be illustrated by the example of 
TV broadcasting in Portugal, which only started as late as 1956. Twenty two years passed 
by until a second TV channel was launched in 1978. During the 80s, affluent families 
already had access to foreign TV programs through satellite. In the beginning of the 90s, 
two private TV broadcasters started operating, and soon cable TV brought to Portuguese 
homes a choice of 50 different channels. Besides the generalist channels, there are now 
channels for different viewer interests (news, sports, movies, history, arts, music, 
biography, nature, etc.) or aimed at different target groups (women, youths and children). 
The evolution of the other media classes followed a similar pattern, as the offer tried to 
match the specialized demands created by the proliferation of different publics whose 
identity is mainly determined by common cultural interests.  
Of course, the fragmentation of mass media audiences is merely a special case of 
the above mentioned general trend toward market segmentation. It has been gaining 
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ground in television, with the explosion of cable and satellite generalist or thematic 
channels, but also in other media classes like press or radio. Media fragmentation offered 
marketers the chance to target specific groups. Yet, it also made mass communications 
increasingly expensive and less attractive. This phenomenon directly threatened the cost-
benefit combination that used to make the mass media so attractive to advertisers. As each 
individual insert is now aimed at fewer and fewer consumers and therefore impacts a 
decreasing share of the target audience, its cost per contact becomes relatively more 
expensive when compared with the alternatives. 
This point was duly emphasized by Unilever Chairman Niall Ferguson: 
“In the 1960s you could reach 80 per cent of women in the US between the ages of 18 and 49, 
which is our main target audience, with three minutes of network television per week. And you got 
your three minutes largely by buying cheap airtime during the day. If you wanted to replicate that 
coverage today, you would have to buy 250 advertising spots at various times of the day at 
astronomical cost, and at least 40 per cent of them would have to be at primetime.” (Fitzgerald, 
1998) 
WPP, one of the world’s largest marketing and advertising groups, expresses a 
similar idea in its 2004 Annual Report and Accounts: 
“In the US, for example, prime-time network television used to reach 90% of households. A few 
years ago it was 50%; today it is perhaps only 33%. There are, of course, still programs with 
significantly increased reach, like the Super Bowl or Academy Awards. But they remain in relatively 
fixed supply and their prices are bid up as a result. That is why a 30-second Super Bowl ad costs $2.4 
million and an Academy Award slot $1.5 million. This is not a situation that can last, particularly 
when significant segments of the population seem to go missing. For instance, US audience ratings 
indicate that young men have disappeared on Monday nights – perhaps gaming on the internet or 
watching out-of-home in bars – and housewives have defected from soap operas.” (WPP, 2004) 
The saturation of the media space reinforces the previously mentioned negative 
consequences of media fragmentation, since it also contributes to make advertising less 
effective and less efficient. It has been reported, for instance, that between 1996 and 2000, 
the marketing costs per vehicle of the three largest American automakers increased by 87% 
to $2,900 per vehicle, while their combined market share declined by 4% during the same 
period (McKinsey Report, cited by Kumar and Reinartz, 2005). It is interesting to note that 
this phenomenon is a direct consequence of the previous success of traditional marketing. 
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In fact, as the word went out that marketing really worked, not only the pioneering fast-
moving consumer goods or automobile manufacturers, but also more and more industries, 
including banks, telecommunications or retail chains, not to mention not for profit 
organizations, gradually adopted these commercial practices. In spite of an expanding offer, 
demand grew much faster, turning advertising space into a scarce commodity; therefore, 
not only real prices increased, but media vehicles also allotted a larger share to advertising 
space as a proportion of total editorial space. Even if we do not take in consideration the 
possible irritation of consumers when faced with such heavy advertising bombing, this 
maneuver could not help reducing the impact of each individual insert by dispersing 
consumer attention solicited by a growing number of ads and commercials. 
It should be understood that media fragmentation and media saturation reinforce 
each other. In fact, as reach decreases as a result of fragmentation, media planners try to 
compensate for this by buying increasing frequency, so as to insure the same level of GRPs 
(gross rating points), providing the advertiser has the financial means to pay for the effort. 
But, of course, this leads to higher levels of saturation, which in turn creates the conditions 
for the launch of new media vehicles. Advertisers find themselves locked in a situation of 
negative feed-back where media effectiveness and efficiency get worse and worse as time 
passes. 
2.3.5 – Mass customization 
The new production methods are no longer designed to turn out standardized and 
uniform products or services in large quantities for homogeneous markets, with a focus on 
predictability, stability and control. The joint application of information technology and 
new management methods promoted the emergence of a system that creates variety and 
customization through flexibility and quick responsiveness (Pine II, 1993). 
The incorporation of electronic devices in the assembly line, combined with flexible 
management techniques, allowed a dramatic reduction of the costs associated with the 
offer of variety. This came about as a complete reversal of the principles of production 
management as Henry Ford or Frederick Taylor understood them. In the beginning of the 
20th century, the main way to reduce costs was to produce very large runs of homogeneous 
goods, exploring scale and experience effects (Conley, 1970), which in fact meant reducing 
variety to an absolute minimum. The extension of this principle to the distribution sphere 
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brought about a likewise massive and undifferentiated approach to the market: occasional 
differences between consumers would be disregarded in the face of restrictions imposed by 
large-scale uniform production. 
With flexible production, the minimum “economic order quantity” is gradually 
reduced through the effort to bring down set-up times to the point when it eventually 
equals one single unit. In some modern factories, no two similar products come out of the 
assembly line. The ideal of customized production becomes a reality in more and more 
industries, thus creating, for the first time since the Industrial Revolution, the possibility of 
organizing production according to the needs and whims of the individual customer, that 
is, of fully organizing the company in agreement with the marketing concept. In due time, 
mass customization7 – “a synthesis of the two long competing systems of management: the 
mass production of individually customized goods and services” (Pine II, 1993) – emerged 
as the distinctive feature of contemporary modes of production. This system was designed 
to provide simultaneously “variety and customization through flexibility and quick 
responsiveness” (Ibid.). Once again according to Pine II, it incorporated four basic 
management innovations: 
• Just-in-time delivery and processing of materials and components; 
• Reduction of setup and changeover times; 
• Compression of cycle times through all processes in the value chain; and 
• Production upon receipt of an order instead of a forecast. 
2.3.6 – The application of information technologies to marketing 
Before the invention of computers, the manual retrieving and processing of 
information on individual customers became materially impossible as soon as its number 
exceeded a few dozens. For that reason, detailed customer files played only a minor part in 
some business-to-business markets – and virtually none in consumer goods markets. The 
technological revolution transformed radically this situation. As late as the mid-90s, the 
                                                
7 The term “mass customization” seems to have been coined by Davis (1987). 
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whole Western economy had around one petabyte (1,024 terabytes, where 1 terabyte 
amounts to 1 trillion bytes) of data storage available; in 2005, half of that is used to develop 
a single oil field. In the late 90s, one gigabyte of PC memory was considered outstanding; 
in 2004, most computers came with at least 100 gigabytes of hard disk storage. At the same 
time, storage prices have fallen at an average of 40% annually over the years (Kumar and 
Reinartz, 2005). 
As the computer revolution, driven by Moore’s law8, reduced the cost of gathering, 
registering, storing, processing, analyzing, connecting and transmitting information, more 
and more companies started considering seriously the possibility of building marketing 
databases of their clients, including in them all the information they needed to manage the 
marketing process. In the words of Rapp (1991) the computer revolution has brought to 
marketing “three awesome powers”: the power to record, the power to find, and the power 
to compare. This transformation originated a new type of marketing management, more 
concerned with the management of the client portfolio than with the management of the 
product portfolio. As a consequence, the focus of marketing management gradually moved 
from the product to the customer. 
The plummeting costs of information processing mean that what was impossibly 
expensive yesterday becomes trivial today. Companies can keep and instantly retrieve the 
memory of the full history of its relationship with each individual customer. At the same 
time, technology created new and previously undreamed of possibilities. First, it allowed 
the creation of information-rich products and services of all kinds, from cars to clothes. 
Second, personalization, customization and interactivity became common place. Third, 
consumer databases moved to the center of virtually every business. 
                                                
8 In 1965, Moore predicted that the number of components which could be packed onto a chip 
would double every twenty-four months. Moore’s law, as it is called, has governed the rate of development of 
electronic devices during the past three decades. For instance, the Intel 8080 chip of 1974 had fewer than five 
thousand transistors; two decades later, the Pentium II had over five million (Jonscher, 1999). 
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2.3.7 – Emergence of interactive communications 
Digitalization of information – that is, the coding of any kind of information into a 
language that uses only ‘zeros’ and ‘ones’ – has a number of far-reaching consequences. 
When media become digital, two things happen: a) bits mix effortlessly with other bits, 
making it easy to change and adapt information from different sources according to needs 
and circumstances; b) bits can inform us about other bits, which makes it possible to 
classify and organize information at will according to different principles, if necessary 
simultaneously, allowing each piece of information to include information on itself. 
Traditional media concentrate intelligence on the transmitter side; digital media moves 
some or much of it to the receiver. On the other hand, fiber created virtually infinite 
transmission capacity. As a consequence, the price of distributing digital information 
plummeted, thus creating a situation without precedents in the history of media. Receiving 
equipment (television sets, for instance), that used to be dumb, is now designed to interpret 
the large amounts of digital information it can access, and select only the relevant bits 
according to the needs and tastes of its owner. Smart TV sets become computers and each 
computer is connected to virtually all other computers in the world through the internet. In 
the end, however, the internet is less about information than about network communities 
(Negroponte, 1995). 
The power of networking grows exponentially as indicated by Metcalfe’s law9: the 
more people join a network the more its members stand to gain from the interaction. 
Interactivity is therefore a crucial feature of the revolution operated in information and 
communication technologies in recent times. Naturally, interaction with customers has 
always been possible, either through personal contact or at a distance by mail or telephone, 
as mail-order companies used to do. However, this kind of interactivity was not only 
expensive but also unpractical. Although the greatest hopes of relationship marketing 
practitioners were, as late as the early 90s, directed to interactive television, the real turning 
point came about rather unexpectedly as a consequence of the massification of the internet 
                                                
9 Metcalfe’s law states that the value of a network goes up as the square of the number of its users. 
If there are n people in a network, and the value of the network to each of them is proportional to the 
number of other users, then the total value of the network to all users is proportional to n × (n – 1) = n2 – n 
(Gilder, 1996; Shapiro and Varian, 1999). 
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after 1993. 
The information and communication technologies changed the rules of 
competition in the networked economy in a fundamental way. Information remains costly 
to produce, but it is now cheap to reproduce and distribute, because multiple copies can be 
produced at very low and roughly constant costs. In the absence of significant distribution 
barriers at a world scale, firms that produce information commodities can only survive if 
they manage to build a monopoly. The other option is, of course, differentiation. Happily, 
the digitalization of the economy opens new opportunities for differentiation strategies. On 
one hand, digitalization makes versioning (that is, offering information products in 
different versions for different market segments) easier. On the other hand, interactivity 
stimulates the collection of information on the situation and tastes of each individual 
customer. Therefore, more and more companies tend to offer customized products and 
services to their customers based on the specific customer knowledge acquired in the 
course of their previous relationship (Shapiro and Varian, 1999). 
2.4 – KEY CONCEPTS OF RELATIONSHIP MARKETING 
2.4.1 - Definitions 
Christian Grönroos put forward the following definition of Relationship Marketing: 
“(The purpose of relationship) ... marketing is to identify and establish, maintain and enhance, and 
when necessary terminate relationships with customers (and other parties) so that the objectives 
regarding economic and other variables of all parties are met. This is achieved through a mutual 
exchange and fulfillment of promises.” (Grönroos, 2000, p. 26). 
Another definition, this one proposed by Gummesson (2002b) , is also cited 
approvingly by Grönroos (2000, p. 243): 
“Relationship Marketing is marketing seen as relationships, networks and interactions”. 
Completing his own definition, he adds: 
“Identifying and establishing, maintaining and enhancing customer relationships implies, 
respectively, that the process of marketing includes the following: 
1. market research to identify potentially interesting and profitable customers to contact; 
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2. establishing the first contact with a customer so that a relationship emerges; 
3. maintaining an existing relationship so that the customer is satisfied with the perceived quality 
and the value received and is willing to continue to do business with the other party of the 
relationship; 
4. enhancement of an ongoing relationship so that the customer decides to expand the content of 
the relationship by, for example, purchasing larger quantities or new types of goods and 
services from the same seller; and 
5. terminating a relationship (…)” (Grönroos, 2000, pp. 243-4) 
It is important to note that, in this approach, things like the direct contact with 
customers or the building of a marketing database are clearly considered secondary or 
tactical (Grönroos, 2000, p. 27). The main emphasis is placed on the decision to manage 
primarily relationships and not transactions. Another definition by Parvatiyar and Sheth 
points in the same direction: 
“We define relationship marketing as the ongoing process of engaging in cooperative and 
collaborative activities and programs with immediate and end-user customers to create or enhance 
mutual economic value at reduced cost” (Sheth and Parvatiyar, 2000). 
Among others, Gummesson (2002b) believes relationship marketing must be 
understood as a paradigm change. The expression “paradigm” has been given a specific 
technical meaning within the philosophy of science by Kuhn (1962). A paradigm is, in this 
sense, a broadly defined and generally unquestioned theory or set of beliefs, within which 
scientists conduct their research during a certain period of time. Paradigms are a positive 
phenomenon inasmuch as they provide a clear direction to the research efforts of the 
scientific community. However, they also tend to create a certain blindness toward both 
facts and opinions that do not easily fit into the prevailing theories. As a consequence, 
dominant paradigms – what Kuhn calls “normal science” – resist fundamental strategic 
changes until their internal contradictions reach a point when the whole structure crumbles 
and a new and revolutionary paradigm emerges. 
According to Gummesson, relationship marketing offers a new and much needed 
foundation for marketing, including new values, new assumptions and new methods: 
“Relationship Marketing in many ways offers a fresh view of marketing. (...) The paradigm shift has 
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partially taken place in the real world of marketing, but the shift is not properly echoed in theories, 
textbooks and education.” (Gummesson, 2002b) 
The expression relationship marketing is currently used as synonymous to CRM, 
one-to-one marketing, database marketing, direct marketing or loyalty marketing. Properly 
understood, the CRM concept is indeed very close to the relationship marketing concept: it 
points toward a different way of organizing a business from top to bottom, a management 
philosophy directly connected to an updated version of the marketing concept itself 
(Brown, 2000). In practice, however, CRM has come to refer to the technological side of 
relationship marketing, possibly because the concept was in the beginning heavily 
promoted by providers of computer systems and software. 
As to the other expressions – one-to-one marketing, database marketing, direct 
marketing or loyalty marketing – all of them designate important but secondary or merely 
one-sided perspectives of relationship marketing. One-to-one marketing deals with those 
special limit situations when it makes sense to create relationships with segments of one 
customer each (Peppers and Rogers, 1993; Peppers, Rogers and Dorf, 1999). Database 
marketing is a sub-domain of relationship marketing related to the use of a specific tool, 
the customer database, in the context of more general marketing strategies (Shaw and 
Stone, 1988; Hughes, 1996). Direct marketing grew out of mail order to embrace a vast 
area of direct communications that, under the impact of new technologies, evolved 
gradually into relationship marketing (Bird, 1989; 1993). 
2.4.2 - Motivations for the adoption of relationship marketing  
According to some authors (Sheth and Sisodia, 1995), contemporary marketing was 
unable to keep up with the efficiency gains of the other management functions. Grönroos 
(2000, p. 12) subscribes to this point of view: “there have been no major productivity gains 
in marketing during this 50-year period [from the 40s to the 90s of the last century]”. And 
he goes on to explain: 
“The mass marketing approach is now less effective and less profitable. More and more markets are 
mature and over-supplied. New customers are more and more difficult to find. Therefore, it is 
becoming increasingly important to keep a firm’s existing customers. In many businesses, customers 
become profitable only after they have remained customers for some time.” (Grönroos, 2000, p. 23) 
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In other words, transaction marketing is believed to be inefficient because it spends 
proportionally too much money in the acquisition of new customers and not enough in the 
retention of existing ones, an approach inverse to the one preached by relationship 
marketing. Customer loyalty thus seems to be one of the main reasons why a growing 
number of companies takes an interest in relationship management. Although loyalty was 
always prominent among the preoccupations of direct marketing practitioners and authors 
(see, for instance: Bird, 1989; Hughes, 1996; Vavra, 1992; Hochman, 1992; Nash, 1993; 
Bird, 1993), it was Frederick Reichheld who succeeded in the task of focusing the attention 
of top management on the subject (Reichheld and Sasser, 1990; Reichheld, 1994, 1996). 
The data collected and presented by Reichheld tried to establish that companies that show 
higher levels of customer loyalty and retention also reveal higher levels of profitability and 
grow faster as well. This increase of profitability is caused both by cost reduction and 
revenue growth. On the side of costs, companies more effective in retaining their 
customers spend less money going after new clients. On the side of revenue, positive 
effects are more varied and complex. First, a company that retains its customers grows 
faster, which allows it to benefit from scale economies. Second, the margin generated by a 
customer is believed to be a function of the number of years that he remains as a customer. 
Reichheld gives five reasons for that: 
a) Acquisition costs, that, by definition, only happen once, are diluted among a 
larger number of sold units; 
b) If a customer remains loyal, there will be more opportunities to sell him other 
products or services (cross-selling) or to sell him more valuable options, 
features or complements (up-selling); 
c) A loyal customer means lower pre and post-sale service costs; 
d) A loyal customer recommends the company’s products or services to family 
and friends, thus becoming a valuable ambassador and source of new customer 
acquisition; 
e) A loyal customer is ready to pay higher prices for the company’s products or 
services, since this loyalty is caused by equally large satisfaction levels. 
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For all these reasons, Reichheld stated that, according to his experience, an increase 
of 5 percent points in the customer retention rate might generate a profit increase 
somewhere between 25 and 75 percent points, depending on the economics of the industry 
in question. 
2.4.3 - Operational definitions of brand loyalty 
Reichheld measured brand loyalty by the duration of the time period during which 
a customer kept buying it. Although useful in many circumstances (for example: ownership 
of a credit card, car insurance, software utilization or provision of advertising services, all 
of them services that imply a contractual setting) this measure is not always appropriate. 
Reinartz and Kumar (2000, 2002) conducted extensive and detailed research to test the 
propositions according to which improved customer retention (1) increases profitability, (2) 
increases profits over time, (3) decreases the costs of serving customers, and (4) persuades 
customers to accept higher prices. None of them was found to hold in non-contractual 
settings. In the opinion of these authors, the reason why the link between loyalty and 
profits was weak had a lot to do with the crudeness of the methods, such as the RFM tool, 
commonly used to decide whether or not to maintain certain customer relationships 
(Reinartz and Kumar, 2002). When a different and more sophisticated method was used to 
score customers, it became possible to select which specific segments should be targeted 
for retention efforts, thus promising more profitable results than an indiscriminate loyalty 
strategy (Reinartz and Kumar, 2000). 
The word loyalty has a number of different meanings. Thus, a brand loyal person 
may: 
• Feel well disposed toward the brand – this is brand attitude 
• Buy the brand more often than other brands in the category – this is a 
behavioral measure of actual preference 
• Continue to buy the brand over long periods of time – this longevity of 
purchase corresponds to the Reichheld definition and may be understood as 
allegiance to the brand 
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Common sense tends to suggest that these different forms of loyalty are usually 
found together, that is, that the more people like a brand, the more they will prefer it to 
others and the longer their allegiance will last. Jacoby and Olson (1970) proposed a 
definition of loyalty that requires all the previously mentioned types of loyalty to be 
present. In accordance with this demand, Jacoby and Chestnut (1978) settled on the 
following definition of brand loyalty: 
1. The biased (i.e. non-random), 
2. behavioral response (i.e. purchase), 
3. expressed over time, 
4. by some decision-making unit (e.g. household, person) 
5. with respect to one or more alternative brands, 
6. which is a function of psychological processes (decision-making, evaluation) 
In line with this view, Dick and Basu (1994) also sustain that the concept of loyalty 
implies positive attitude as well as positive behavior. Behavior without attitude would in 
their opinion be spurious loyalty caused by mere inertia or lack of choice. As a rule, loyalty 
is believed to materialize or reveal certain propensities of customers toward a brand. Some 
of these propensities are expressed through behavior, others through attitude (East, Sinclair 
and Gendall, 2000). Loyal behavior can thus be evaluated by different factors, such as: 
a) Total duration of customer retention 
b) Share of needs of the consumer in the product category satisfied by the brand 
(variously known as share of category requirements, share of wallet or feed rate) 
c) Number of brands bought or used by the customer during a certain period of 
time 
Apparently, the measurement of loyal behavior would be enough, since this is in 
fact the final goal of the efforts aimed at customer retention. However, as previously noted, 
there are situations when the behavior loyalty indicators are high, not as a result of true 
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attachment to the brand, but as a consequence of the lack of alternatives or of awareness 
by the customer that they exist. This situation can happen, for instance, when a given 
supplier benefits from a monopoly position; when a customer is contractually bound to a 
supplier for a minimum period of time; or even when, because of distribution failures, 
other brands are nor available when the corresponding need arises. In all these 
circumstances, measures of behavioral loyalty are of scarce value, since this “loyalty” to the 
brand is in fact forced and will disappear instantly as soon as the factors that inhibit free 
choice are removed. On the other hand, behavioral loyalty is sometimes very difficult to 
measure directly and accurately. For all these reasons, it is sometimes considered useful to 
resort to some kind of attitudinal measure, such as: 
a) Satisfaction level of the customer with the brand 
b) Trust level of the customer in the brand 
c) Dedication level of the customer to the brand 
d) Attitudes of the customer toward the brand 
e) Recommendation of the brand to other persons 
The use of attitude variables to predict loyalty behavior in situations of free choice 
of the consumers is closely related to the theory according to which consumer buyer 
behavior is pre-determined by their attitudes, an idea that, as we will see in the next 
chapter, although central to the dominant theory of marketing, is open to considerable 
criticism. Some authors (East, Sinclair and Gendall, 2000) have in fact argued that, even 
when clients do have freedom of choice, no significant correlation between attitudinal 
loyalty and behavioral loyalty is found. Furthermore, it is also common to find a low 
correlation between the several behavior loyalty variables themselves. East, Harris and 
Lomax (2000), for instance, concluded, in a study of retail brands, for a low association 
between loyalty measured by the share of category requirements and loyalty measured by 
the duration of the retention period. 
Therefore, not only there is no universally satisfactory single measure of loyalty, as 
it can also be insufficient to retain one measure of attitudinal loyalty on one side and one 
measure of behavioral loyalty on the other. In the present state of knowledge, it is 
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indispensable to ponder in a case by case basis which metrics will be more indicated, taking 
in account the strategic marketing objectives previously defined. 
2.4.4 - Customer lifetime value (CLTV) 
The impact of the loyalty of the customer base on the company’s profitability is a 
consequence of the possibility of capturing a larger share of each customer lifetime value 
(Reichheld, 1996). In fact, each client generates a profit (or loss) flow during the time he 
goes on buying the company’s goods or services, which, at least in theory, can in some 
markets extend through his entire biological life10. This flow of profits depends 
simultaneously on the revenues generated and on the costs incurred, and it is commonly 
accepted by practitioners that loyalty affects both in a way that benefits the company. 
Finally, to make calculations more accurate, it is necessary to discount the future stream of 
revenues using an adequate interest rate. 
The customer lifetime value (CLTV) can therefore be represented by this 
somewhat simplified formula11: 
CLTV = ∑ { ∑ [ Qjt (Pj – Cj) / (1 + r)t ] } - Ca                                            (2.1) 
Where: 
CLTV – Customer lifetime value 
t – Time periods (1 a ∞) 
j – Products acquired 
Qjt – Quantity of product j acquired in period t 
                                                
10 Instead, in those markets where the duration of the relationship is, by the very nature of things, 
ephemeral (babies’ diapers, for instance) one of the main retention objectives will be to obtain the 
recommendation of the brand to other prospective clients so as to minimize the cost of the periodic renewal 
of the customer base. 
11 More complex versions of this formula can be found in the literature. See, for instance, Wayland 
and Cole (1997), and Blattberg, Getz and Thomas (2001). 
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Pj – Price of sale of product j 
Cj – Cost to produce and service product j 
Ca – Cost of acquisition of the client 
r – Discount rate 
The formula makes it clear that, setting aside the discount rate, which cannot be 
controlled by the company, the customer lifetime value can be increased in six different 
ways: 
a) Increasing the number of years during which he buys the goods and services of 
the company (t) 
b) Increasing the quantity bought of each product (Qj) 
c) Increasing the number of products and services bought (j) 
d) Increasing the price of the products bought (Pj) 
e) Decreasing the cost of production and of service to the customer (Cj) 
f) Decreasing the cost of client acquisition (Ca) 
The calculation of the customer value – the gold number in the terminology of direct 
marketing practitioners – also allows the determination of the maximum investment that 
can be made to acquire a new customer, and thus provides the basic building block of the 
relationship economics. If the investment is higher than the CLTV, the customer will 
always generate a loss; if it is identical to the CLTV, the company will barely break even; if 
it is lower, the positive rate of return can be easily computed dividing CLTV by Ca (cost of 
acquisition). 
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2.4.5 – Differentiation and segmentation of the customer base 
The traditional marketing management approach focuses on creating single or 
multiple-exchange transactions, and their profitability is determined by cost and price. 
Managers are usually concerned with the profitability of products, not with the profitability 
of customers. Consequently, they manage product portfolios (using tools like the BCG 
matrix, for instance,) not customer portfolios. 
Instead, when the attention of managers is reoriented from products to customers, 
customer value becomes a central concern. But the mere calculation of the average 
customer lifetime value is in itself of limited relevance, since it can vary extraordinarily 
from one customer to another. Therefore, on a customer-base level, the key tool for 
analysis is the distribution of profitability within the customer base (Storbacka, 2000). 
Multiple studies conducted in entirely different market settings reveal that, while a relatively 
small number of customers account for a large proportion of the profits, many other 
customers only generate losses (Hallberg, 1995). Thus, some relationships in any customer 
base are profitable and some are unprofitable. Cooper and Kaplan (1991) state that in 
certain industrial markets 20% of the customers account for 225% of the total customer-
base profitability. Empirical evidence from retail banks has shown that 20% of those 
banks’ customers account for between 130% and 200% of the total profits (Storbacka, 
1994).  The Stobachoff index was created to measure the degree of deviation of a specific 
customer-base from a balanced “ideal” customer-base where each customer is equally 
profitable. 
The understanding of the general pattern of distribution of the customer-base must 
be complemented by the scoring of each individual customer according to his value to the 
company or brand12. This operation of differentiation of customers is then followed by 
their classification into specific value segments. The revenue generated by a particular 
customer is usually only a fraction of the total value bought by him in the market or 
markets under consideration. Therefore, the value captured by each competitor depends on 
two factors: a) the total demand of the customer in the relevant category (generic demand) 
                                                
12 We leave aside the very considerable practical problems of identifying each customer’s value given 
that the available information is almost always scarce. 
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during a specific time frame (say, a year); b) the share of this demand addressed by the 
customer to the company’s brand or brands during the same period (selective demand as a 
proportion of the generic demand). Thus, it is highly revealing to decompose each 
customer’s lifetime value into two independent factors: 
a) Customer status relative to the product category. It reveals each customer’s 
situation regarding his more or less intensive consumption or use, in order to 
determine his full potential value to the company. In fact, if only the actual 
customer value (that is, the current sales value) is taken in account, there is a 
definite possibility of wrongly classifying as low value customers some 
individuals simply because they are not buying from us at a given moment. The 
simplest classification distinguishes between heavy consumers, average 
consumers, light consumers and non consumers. 
b) Customer status relative to the brand. It expresses in a synthetic way the 
behavioral loyalty to the brand. Ideally, it should be evaluated by the 
percentage of the customer’s needs in a specific area that are satisfied by the 
brand (share of customer requirements), although, due to lack of information, 
it is very often necessary to resort to proxy variables such as, for instance, the 
duration of the relationship with the brand. The choice of the proper variable 
will have to take in account the situation at hand, including the characteristics 
of the buying process and of the competition environment. 
The Value Spectrum model (Figure 2.1) uses these two dimensions of value to 
analyze the customer portfolio of a company or brand13. The vertical axe orders customers 
according to their potential value to the organization, regardless of its capacity to 
appropriate it at the moment, with the low value customers placed close to the bottom and 
the high value ones close to the top. On the other hand, the horizontal axis differentiates 
                                                
13 The Value Spectrum was invented in the 80s by Rodney Wright, at the time a Director of Ogilvy 
& Mather Direct. To the best of our knowledge, this model was never presented to the public either in article 
or book form. However, it has circulated widely under several guises in marketing circles. Two slightly 
modified versions of this model, the Customer Loyalty Cube and the Profit/ Potential Grid, are presented by 
Hougaard and Bjerre (2002). 
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customers according to their loyalty, that is, according to the degree of their attachment to 
the company, moving from extremely loyal at left to absolutely disloyal at right. In this 
manner, the model suggests an intuitive way to segment the base of existing and 
prospective customers in four large groups. It is however possible to zoom in, going down 
to as many levels of disagregation of the data as necessary, leading to the identification of 
smaller and smaller segments or niches according to our wishes. 
Figure 2.1 
The Value Spectrum Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Ogilvy & Mather Dataconsult (1993). 
Customers of high value and high loyalty, located in the northwest quadrant of the 
matrix, are clearly the most valuable to a company, given that they combine a high potential 
value with a high attachment to it. They are the Most Valuable Customers that must be 
retained at all costs through strategies conceived to increase their satisfaction levels and 
reward their loyalty, thus immunizing them against the competitive attempts to persuade 
them to switch. Besides their immediate value, Most Valuable Customers can also, by 
generating positive word-of-mouth, help attract new and profitable customers. When we 
consider the customer-base as the key asset of a company, the investment in its most 
valuable customers should provide the main thrust to the marketing strategy. 
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problem. On one hand, they are potentially interesting; on the other hand, however, the 
effort of stealing customers from the competition is not only expensive but also sometimes 
ineffective. Whenever these customers are satisfied and very well disposed toward some 
competitor, their conversion will probably demand very expensive promotional offers, 
therefore increasing the costs of acquisition on such a scale that they will probably never 
become profitable customers, even if we consider a very large time horizon. Moreover, 
some of these customers can also be intrinsically unstable, switching continually between 
suppliers, which means that they are not attractive prospects either. This reasoning suggests 
that the attempts at conversion (brand-switching) must be carefully oriented to customers 
whose profile likens them to our existing best customers. 
We face a different dilemma in the case of the low value but high loyalty customers 
located in the southwest quadrant. They are already our customers, and should for this 
simple reason receive some attention; but their value is apparently too low to justify 
significant investments in their conservation and development. Once again, it is 
recommendable to identify those whose potential value might grow in consequence, for 
example, of foreseeable changes of their economic or social situation. This might come 
about as a consequence of the implementation of cross-selling (sale of other products or 
services) or up-selling (sale of higher value products or services) initiatives. The customers 
that fit this description are called Most Growable Customers. 
Finally the low value and low loyalty customers create no doubt as to what should 
be done with them. Except in the extreme case of loss-making customers (so-called Below-
zeros) the company wants them to go on buying its products, but has no incentive to invest 
in them. It is better to avoid spending money to retain them, saving it for more productive 
initiatives aimed at its most valuable customers. In a general way, these customers are not 
targets for relationship building or enhancement marketing activities. 
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The following diagram summarizes the strategic recommendations for each 
quadrant of the Value Spectrum: 
Figure 2.2 
Value Spectrum: Strategical Recommendations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Ogilvy & Mather Dataconsult (1993). 
2.4.6 - Moments of truth 
The concept of moment of truth, originally coined in 1987 by Jan Carlzon, at the 
time President of SAS – Scandinavian Air System, became a key idea of services marketing 
(Norman, 1992) and, through the influence of Grönroos (1990, 2000), of relationship 
marketing itself. According to Carlzon (1987), a moment of truth occurs whenever a 
customer, by entering in contact with some aspect of the supplier company, uses that 
opportunity to make a judgment on the quality of the service offer. Literally, it is “the time 
and place when and where the service provider has the chance to demonstrate to the 
customer the quality of its services” (Grönroos, 2000, pp. 72). In consequence, a moment 
of truth, sometimes also called “service encounter” (Shostack, 1985, 1987), is the instant 
when the company is confronted with the needs and expectations of its customers. 
Explaining his ideas, Carlzon wrote: “Last year, each of our 10 million customers 
came in contact with approximately five SAS employees, and this contact lasted an average 
of 15 seconds each time”. Thus, SAS is “created 50 million times a year, 15 seconds at a 
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time”. These 50 million “moments of truth are the moments that ultimately determine 
whether SAS will succeed or fail as a company. They are the moments when we must 
prove to our customers that SAS is their best alternative.” (Carlzon, 1987) Naturally, 
moments of truth are not restricted to contacts with the company’s employees. They can 
also be the result of encounters with equipments and resources (examples: machinery, 
documentation, facilities and waiting rooms), with systems (examples: queuing systems, 
planning of operations, current procedures and claim handling) or even with other 
customers (Eiglier and Langeard, 1987) On the other hand, it can also be the result of 
explicit attempts to communicate with the customer, including communication in service 
(guiding signs, instructions, advice) and traditional communication (Eiglier and Langeard, 
1987; Grönroos, 1990a; Grönroos, 2000). 
Moments of truth are unavoidable encounters of the company with its customers, 
therefore appearing as unique opportunities to create, develop or save relationships. This 
demands the previous identification of existing moments of truth or the creation of new 
ones, in order to understand what happens or can happen during them and consider the 
ways in which they can be positively influenced (Grönroos, 1990a; 2000). 
2.4.7 – The Customer Relationship Cycle 
A relationship is the totality of transactions and encounters between suppliers and 
customers that occur in a given length of time. It is made up of episodes (of which the 
most important are moments of truth) that come together as sequences of service delivery 
(Shapiro, Rangan and Sviokla, 1992). It can be said that the brand concept is already an 
attempt to go beyond transaction marketing in its most extreme form, given that, through 
the brand, the customer is related to the supplier in a lasting, meaningful and closer way. 
Unlike a simple product, which lacks identity as well as personality and values, a brand is 
something that customers can connect and bond with (Kapferer, 1997; Fournier, 1998). 
Relationship marketing takes this intuition somewhat further, including in the brand 
experience the totality of the encounters or service episodes. 
The relationship cycle comprises an articulated sequence giving form to a complete 
chain of moments of truth. This process is circular in nature, with some moments of truth 
being repeated over and over. We should not expect, however, a mere repetition, because 
the relationship is transformed and deepened as the customer experience grows and the 
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interactions between him and the brand become more complex through the adding of new 
layers. A relationship involves several types of cycles. The most important of them is the 
customer relationship life-cycle (Grönroos, 1990a; Grönroos, 2000; Blattberg, Getz and 
Thomas, 2001; Hougaard and Bjerre, 2002), which intends to trace the path followed by 
each and every customer in his involvement with the brand as it progresses along time, and 
to evaluate the solidity and stability of such relationship. Accordingly, the relationship of 
customers with a brand or organization typically goes through a certain number of steps, 
each of them comprising a certain number of characteristic moments of truth14. According 
to Ogilvy & Mather Direct (1992) the four main stages are: 
a) Acquisition. It refers to the stage immediately preceding the beginning of a true 
relationship. The prospective customer feels more or less attracted by the brand. 
On his side, the supplier tries to take advantage of this potential of attraction to 
convince him to make a first buy. We call suspects those individuals who, 
although probably motivated to buy have not manifested in any way the wish to 
do so. We call prospects those individuals who already made some kind of step 
toward the brand, such as asking for information, visiting the store or asking for 
a cost estimate. Finally, a hot prospect is someone who declared an intention to 
buy. 
b) Retention. In relationship marketing, this is the crucial stage where the main 
efforts are concentrated, in the belief that this is where the return on the 
marketing investment will be higher. Instead of leaving the customer to himself 
as soon as the sale is closed, the marketing manager initiates a process that has in 
view knowing more about his needs, wishes and preferences in order to respond 
more adequately to his expectations in the future. Customer retention is not 
some type of cosmetic operation: what really is at stake is the possibility of 
increasing satisfaction levels through the improvement of the value offer. 
Customized communication is just a part – although an important part – of a 
more general process of really getting closer to the customer. 
                                                
14 The Customer Relationship Life-cycle model was inspired by psychological research (see, for 
instance: Levinger, 1983). 
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c) Recovery. Before being undone because of a negative experience, a relationship 
usually goes through a phase of deterioration. If it is possible to identify the 
symptoms associated to this deterioration, its detection through predictive 
systems should trigger initiatives directed to the recovery of the relationship. 
Relationship marketing practitioners are convinced that the highest levels of 
satisfaction occur precisely in the aftermath of moments of crisis that companies 
manage to handle properly, not among customers that never had reasons to feel 
dissatisfied. This explains the importance usually attributed to systems that deal 
adequately with customers’ complaints. 
d) Reacquisition. Against the common practice, it has been found that, even after 
a customer abandons a brand with serious reasons of complaint, it is still 
comparatively more profitable to invest in his reacquisition than to acquire an 
absolutely new customer to the organization. This demands the understanding 
of the causes that created the situation in the first place, in order to prevent its 
repetition, and the providing of an appropriate compensation to the defaulting 
customer.  
The following diagram illustrates in a simplified form the customer relationship 
life-cycle. 
Figure 2.3 
Customer Relationship Life-Cycle 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Ogilvy & Mather Direct (1992). 
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2.4.8 - The strategic process of relationship marketing 
The implementation of a relationship marketing strategy follows a logical process 
along five different steps (Ogilvy & Mather Direct, 1992)15. None of them can be started 
before the previous one is completed: 
1. Segmentation of the customer base according to value. The first step consists 
in the analysis of the customer portfolio using the Value Spectrum or any other 
equivalent methodology. The concept of customer lifetime value provides us the 
starting point to the classification of customers in groups of different value. Both 
the content of the relationship and the amount to be invested in each group will 
depend on the value of the customers, which explains the importance of this 
operation of segmentation. The choice of the customer lifetime value as a basic 
criterium of segmentation is a distinctive feature of relationship marketing in 
comparison with more traditional marketing approaches where social and 
demographic criteria tend to guide the segmentation process. Before starting to 
segment the customer-base it is necessary to define exactly what is meant by a 
customer. Are we dealing with an individual or with a family aggregate? In a 
business market, is the customer a production unit of a company, a company or a 
group of companies, and which individuals represent them? 
2. Identification of the customers of each value segment. The classification of 
customers leads us to the identification of the most valuable customers to the 
company – usually a small percentage of their total – , which is the basis of all 
subsequent activities. It is not an easy task to decide what is meant precisely by a 
high value customer. Do we mean the largest customers in terms of sales measured 
in a quantitative or in a monetary scale? Or those that generate the largest absolute 
or relative margins? And what weight should we attribute to the actual versus the 
more decisive but uncertain future long term value, given that we know for how 
long a customer has been with us but ignore how long he will remain loyal in the 
                                                
15 Several strategic sequences have been suggested by other authors, similar to this one in its general 
features but differing in detail. See, for instance, Peppers and Rogers (1993, 2004), who prefer a four stage 
sequence called IDIC, including Identification, Differentiation, Interaction, and Customization. 
 57 
future? Sometimes it is more advisable to use a combination of factors, resorting to 
a multi-dimensional definition of each customer’s value. If and when it proves 
necessary to summarize all this information in one single indicator, each factor will 
be given a specific weight. This is the process known as customer scoring, which 
can be made more complex by including factors such as the instability of certain 
customers regarding their propensity to be lured by competitive offers, thus 
opening the way to predictive models designed to identify those customers that 
might defect. 
3. Profiling each value segment. It is very useful to know what special 
characteristics, either demographic, life-style or personality, are shared by high 
value customers, as they not only help us to understand what type of relationship 
should be created, but also allow us to predict the value of prospective clients on 
the basis of certain easily observable traits. When we understand which factors 
single out the best customers, we can go after new ones with similar profiles. The 
first level of segmentation, based on customer value, is thus complemented by a 
second one, more common in mainstream marketing. This is specially important 
because, as a rule, companies do not have the information necessary to classify 
directly the large majority of its customers according to their value, which means 
that they will usually have to look for indicative methods to solve this problem by 
choosing proxy variables. If, for instance, a producer of certain fast-moving 
consumer goods is not capable of knowing directly how much his customers spend 
in each of the product categories in which he competes, he might still infer their 
value by knowing how many children are there in the family if he finds out through 
research that this is the crucial factor to explain value. 
4. Development of relationships with the several types of customers. Once the 
first three stages are completed, we are finally ready to launch the foundations of a 
relationship marketing strategy comprising three key dimensions: value added to 
the brand; objectives for each customer segment; and investment in each 
considered segment. The strategy to add value to the brand must be based on the 
understanding of how a personalized relationship can bring the customers closer to 
the brand. The Value Spectrum model suggests that different relations should be 
created according to the kinds of objectives appropriate to each segment: retain, 
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convert or stimulate the increase of value. Finally, the level of investment in each 
customer will depend on his contribution to the profitability of the brand. 
5. Enhancement of the relationship with high value customers. The first level of 
any personal relationship is the result of establishing contact with someone on an 
individual basis. It is simply called recognition, which means giving someone 
enough importance to acknowledge that the person exists and has a name, to begin 
with, and then go on to communicate with that person with some frequency, both 
regularly and occasionally, thus maintaining an open channel of communication. 
Although elementary, this is an indispensable foundation of any relationship, 
corresponding to what Jakobson (1993) called factic communication. Among the 
main tactics most commonly used to enhance a relationship we should mention: 
frequent surveys to determine satisfaction levels; offer of additional and 
complementary services relevant to the target group; provision of useful 
information to users; addition of an emotional element to the relationship; reward 
of loyalty and deterrence of defection; and, finally, addition of an entertainment 
dimension to the relationship. 
2.5 – APPLICATIONS OF RELATIONSHIP MARKETING 
2.5.1 – Relationship Marketing programs in practice 
The first large scale relationship marketing program in modern times16 seems to 
have been launched by American Airlines in 1981 (Kumar and Reinartz, 2005). 
AAdvantage – such was the name of this program aimed at frequent flyers – attributed to 
the airline’s passengers points in proportion to miles traveled that could later be exchanged 
for free flights. American Airlines captured and stored information on individual customers 
in marketing databases, a pioneering initiative in the application of modern technology to 
marketing. Frequent flyers were given free miles, discounts and gifts that rewarded their 
loyalty. This model was promptly imitated not only by airlines such as Lufthansa, British 
Airways and Air France – probably there is not nowadays a single one that does not offer 
                                                
16 Some authors mention the S&H Green Stamp initiative in 19th century America as a distant 
forerunner of contemporary incentives programs. 
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some kind of miles program – but also by other companies operating in undifferentiated 
and highly competitive markets in which systematic excess capacity occurring in certain 
days of the week or months of the year, something very common in service industries, 
allow the offering of rewards that cost next to nothing to the supplier. Such is the case, 
among others, of hotel chains and rent-a-car companies, which explains why Holiday Inn 
(Priority Club program), Marriott (Honored Guest program) and Hertz soon adopted the 
same model of rewarding heavy users (Wansink and Seed, 2001). This type of program 
arrived to Portugal in the mid-1990s through the initiative of BP (Premierplus program) 
and Shell (Smart program), soon to be copied by Galp with its FastGalp program. The 
popularity of this kind of programs is understandable: they are well accepted by customers, 
because they are easy to understand and easy to use; they are easily embraced by 
companies, because they do not require innovative marketing skills or know-how, being a 
mere extension of the very familiar continuity promotional techniques. However, they are 
demanding regarding the underlying support infrastructure, including database 
management, information systems, channel integration, logistics and coordination, favoring 
large companies (especially multinationals that can import know-how and resources already 
developed in other countries) at the expense of smaller local players. 
Already in 1988, air travelers carried an average of 2.3 loyalty cards, a figure that 
increased to 3.1 five years later (Dowling and Uncles, 1997). This piece of information is 
somewhat disturbing, since the ownership of several cards at the same time suggests that 
maybe the loyalty purpose is not being attained after all. Even so, a second wave of 
relationship programs mobilized large retailers, namely those operating in fast-moving 
consumer goods, among which the pioneers were Tesco’s Club Card, Sainsbury’s Reward 
Card, and Safeway’s ABC Card, all of them in the UK. Soon followed Quelle in Germany 
and Leclerc, Super U and Auchan in France, among others. Sometimes, the launch of a 
loyalty card was the starting point to more sophisticated strategies, often in cooperation 
with a network of partner companies, made possible by the creation for the first time of 
gigantic marketing databases organized around individual customers. The automatic 
registration of each customer’s buying behavior through the reading of bar codes by POS 
scanners brought an important bargaining advantage to retailers in their eternal 
confrontation with producers (Wileman and Jary, 1997). In the last few years, with Tesco at 
their head, retailers started experimenting with online direct sales, taking advantage of their 
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detailed knowledge of consumers and of their newly acquired competences in the area of 
information and communication technologies. 
Threatened by this accelerated trend toward a growing control of the marketing 
process by large retailers, multinational corporations such as Procter & Gamble, Danone, 
Nestlé, Coca-Cola, PepsiCo or Unilever decided it was high time for them to experiment 
also with relationship strategies directed to individual consumers. In the second half of the 
90s, all of them had already started more or less ambitious projects, supported by mega 
marketing databases, in all their main American and European markets. 
Besides these high visibility initiatives, the acceptance of relationship marketing 
concepts in the day-to-day practice of marketing departments is notoriously progressing in 
other trivial but nevertheless important aspects, such as a new eagerness to consider the 
possibility of building direct relationships with consumers and to capture individual 
information on them. The trend is obvious when we consider how common consumer 
communication centers have become in the last few years in consumer markets, including 
computer-assisted call-centers, email communications, SMS messaging and all kinds of 
interactive communications through the internet. 
2.5.2 - Relationship marketing in consumer markets 
As previously stated, although relationship marketing started in services and 
business-to-business markets, it is now hailed as a strategy generally applicable to all kinds 
of markets and goods. There is, however, some dispute about the suitability of relationship 
marketing to consumer markets, as a part of a more general debate on its scope and future 
development (Payne, 1997). Only recently have the benefits of relationship marketing for 
consumer markets been explicitly considered (Sheth and Parvatiyar, 1995), reflecting the 
fact that the companies operating in them were late adopters of the concept. Although 
admitting a lack of studies on relationship marketing in consumer markets, Sheth and 
Parvatiyar professed to be optimistic regarding its possibilities, based on both the superior 
economics of consumer retention (Reichheld and Sasser, 1990) and the competitive 
advantage that relationship marketing brings to the adopting firms (Vavra, 1992): 
“Recently in consumer marketing, the focus has shifted from creating brand and store loyalties 
through mass advertising and sales promotion programs toward developing direct one-to-one 
relationships. These relationship marketing programs include frequent-user incentives, customer 
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referral benefits, preferred customer programs, aftermarket support, use of relationship databases, 
mass customization, and customer involvement in company decisions. In most cases, consumers are 
also willing to accept such relationships with marketers. Evidence for this is found in the growth of 
membership in airline and hotel frequent-user programs, the use of store membership cards, direct 
inquiries, and registration with customer service hotlines established by manufacturers.” (Sheth and 
Parvatiyar, 1995) 
At the same time, they concede that the advantages of relationship marketing only 
benefit the firm “if, and only if, consumers are willing and able to engage in relationship 
patronage” (Sheth and Parvatiyar, 1995). The focus of relationship marketing in consumer 
markets should be on establishing and enhancing a long-term, mutually beneficial 
relationship between the consumer and the marketer, which assumes that the latter is 
oriented toward customer retention and the development of a unique relationship with 
each individual customer. Benefiting from the advantages of customer retention and 
cooperative and efficient customer response, marketing efficiency might in fact improve 
significantly. However, all these positive effects depend on the premise that consumers are 
motivated to reduce their choice set, that is, that they can be induced to become loyal 
(Sheth and Parvatiyar, 1995). 
It seems clear that long-term relationships are not always interesting to customers 
(Blois, 1996; Barnes, 1994, 1995, 1997; Benapudi and Berry, 1997; Fournier, Dobscha and 
Mick, 1998), and that the efforts of marketers can even irritate them: 
“Ironically, the very things that marketers are doing to build relationships with customers are often 
the things that are destroying those relationships. (...) Perhaps we do not understand what creating a 
relationship really means; that is, how customers’ trust and intimacy factor into the connections we 
are trying to forge. Relationship marketing is powerful in theory but troubled in practice.”(Fournier, 
Dobscha and Mick, 1998) 
There are many reasons for customers’ dissatisfaction. Many marketing initiatives 
seem trivial and useless instead of unique and valuable. Companies ask for customers’ 
loyalty but do not pay them back in kind. The priority given to so-called best customers 
creates conflicts with other customers that do not fulfill the same requirements. As a 
consequence, relationship marketing as it is practiced very often increases the distance 
between marketers and customers instead of bringing them closer (Fournier, Dobscha and 
Mick, 1998). Grönroos (1997) distinguishes three categories of consumers according to 
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their willingness to get involved: those that actively engage in a relationship, those that only 
do it passively, and those that reject any type of relationship whatsoever. 
It is not easy to understand how some central ideas of relationship marketing 
formerly developed in service industries – namely, the service encounters or moments of 
truth – might be usefully transferred to many consumer goods markets, since they seem to 
presuppose a high involvement of the customer with both the product category and the 
brand, which precisely is by definition absent from fast-moving consumer goods (Iacobucci 
and Ostrom, 1996). 
Fournier (1998) went on to explore the idea that brands are in themselves 
relationships of a special kind, thus extending the understanding of brand dynamics beyond 
existing concepts of brand attitude, satisfaction, loyalty, and brand personality. This 
suggestion was taken up and developed by Dall’Olmo, Riley and de Chernatony (2000). 
Meanwhile, Fournier (1998) put forward a typology of sixteen consumer-brand 
relationships: “arranged marriages”, “marriages of convenience”, “best friendships”, 
“casual friends/buddies”, “committed partnerships”, “kinships”, “compartmentalized 
friendships”, “childhood friendships”, “courtships”, “rebounds/avoidance-driven 
relationships”, “secret affairs”, “dependencies”, “flings”, “enslavements”, “enmities” and 
“love-hate relationships”17. They are characterized by differences regarding seven 
relationship dimensions, each one of them defined by a pair of opposed concepts: (1) 
voluntary vs. involuntary; (2) positive vs. negative; (3) intense vs. superficial; (4) enduring 
(long-term) vs. short-term; (5) public vs. private; (6) formal (role- or task-oriented) vs. 
personal; and (7) symmetric vs. asymmetrical. All brand relationships are subject to change 
because of personal, environmental, and managerial factors. They proceed through cycles 
of initiation, growth, maintenance, and deterioration, similar to those described in the 
general customer relationship cycle. This should create some scope for relationship-
oriented one-to-one marketing strategies, combining a functional and utilitarian dimension 
with a psychosocial and emotional one. 
                                                
17 Fournier (1998) recognizes that these sixteen types of relationships can be classified into four 
main macro-types: friendships, marriage, “dark-side” relationships and temporarily oriented relationships. 
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It is fitting to remind that marketers have long recognized that exchanges can 
involve social and psychological resources as well as economic ones (Bagozzi, 1979). These 
extra-economic resources include status, esteem, understanding, affect, information and 
time (Foa and Foa, 1976). This line of thought looks promising for marketers trying to 
build relationships in fast-moving consumer markets (Bagozzi, 1995). Bhattacharya and 
Bolton (2000) predict that, according to standard buyer behavior theory, consumer’s 
propensity to engage in relational behaviors will be higher in categories characterized by 
higher perceived switching costs, higher levels of perceived risk, and greater heterogeneity 
among alternatives. This seems to imply that packaged goods categories do not seem 
primary candidates for the relational approach. 
2.5.3 - Typology of relationship marketing programs 
Relationship marketing allows a large variety of program types. We will next 
mention some of the most common, keeping in mind that they can be combined to create 
new alternatives. 
a) Incentives. To many people, relationship marketing is synonymous to point 
collection programs. The most obvious examples include frequent flyer airlines’ 
programs and petrol companies’ programs. They are more common in those 
situations where products are not differentiated and brands can be easily 
substituted. They are more effective when the perceived value of the incentives 
is higher, something easy for airlines that always have vacant seats to offer in 
certain days of the week and in certain months of the year. Incentive programs 
that reward the consumption of high quantities of the product are easy to 
understand for consumers. They are also self-selective, since heavy users have a 
built-in incentive to participate. 
b) Clubs. Customer clubs – of which Harley Davidson’s Harley Owners Group 
(HOG) is a prime example – can be successful whenever natural psychological 
links tend to bring customers together owing to some affinity factors that result 
from the need satisfied by the product or by a common lifestyle. These 
community feelings can be reinforced by exclusive offers to members, such as 
the admission to restricted events, the acquisition of products of reserved access, 
or the provision of useful information or advice. 
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c) Preferred customers. Certain programs are designed to reward and retain the 
best customers, offering them some kind of advantage. The programs created in 
Portugal by both Unilever and Nestlé in recent years fit into this category. Their 
purpose is to cater to special needs or expectations of the Most Valuable or 
Most Growable Customers. Whenever the core product or service is not very 
differentiated, the relationship component becomes indispensable to improve 
the value offer, thereby inducing the provision of recognition and useful 
additional services.  
d) Continuity. Book clubs and record clubs where pioneer examples of the 
evolution from occasional sales to ongoing transactions, transforming the 
product into a service of advice and home distribution for clients willing to 
commit themselves to certain minimum levels of buying. Subscriptions in 
general, whether of newspaper and magazines, or of cultural and sports events, 
are also continuity programs. So-called subscription goods include, for instance, 
telecoms, insurance products and credit cards. Nestlé recently turned coffee into 
a subscription good by creating Nespresso. Of course, for this relationship 
model to be viable, there must be an inherent regularity in the consumption of 
the product or service. 
e) Package of benefits. The offering of additional benefits can be used to 
stimulate the rebuy in order to induce the creation of a habit. An example of this 
technique can be found in the Mil Folhas books collection of Público, sold at a 
low price for those who also buy the newspaper. These offerings can be alluring 
if they increase the utility of the basic product and if they facilitate the access to 
products that otherwise would probably not be bought. 
f) Discount card. The discount card is often used as a loyalty device by all kinds of 
retailers, who offer it to customers that fulfill certain conditions, usually related 
to the amount bought or to the buying frequency. They are sometimes also used 
as credit cards or as way to entitle their owners to special advantages, such as 
access to special sales or free parking. The customer (or membership) card 
intends to make him less price-sensitive in all those market situations in which 
low differentiation and strong competition are prevalent. Delta successfully 
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applied this technique to improve its relationships with owners of coffee shops, 
restaurants and hotels. 
g) Informal communities. The coming of age of the Internet and SMS messaging 
helped promote the new phenomenon of tribal marketing. Unlike the clubs 
previously mentioned, a formal affiliation is not required in this case. Customers 
organize themselves in groups in order to have access to certain advantages or to 
participate in competitions organized by the brands during more or less long 
periods. Informal affiliation is especially attractive for consumers in low 
involvement categories. Among the brands that have resorted successfully to 
these techniques are Nokia, Coca-Cola and Sagres. 
2.6 - CRITICISM OF RELATIONSHIP MARKETING 
During the last few years, relationship marketing programs have been criticized on 
various accounts, following allegedly disappointing experiences by some companies. 
According to some sources, at least half of the running programs have been complete 
failures, generating understandable doubts regarding the soundness of the marketing ideas 
that encouraged them (The Economist, 2001). Of course, the failure of certain programs, 
regardless of their number, cannot be taken as proof that relationship marketing is a bad 
idea, because the problem might have its roots in poor implementation. In this respect, the 
detailed discussion of selected case studies can contribute significantly to improve our 
understanding of the sound principles of relationship marketing and to identify the 
mistakes that are most likely to jeopardize them. 
2.6.1 – Dubious benefits of relationship programs 
As previously indicated, Reichheld (1996) helped promote the idea that loyalty 
reduces the cost of serving customers, makes them less price sensitive, increases the 
average customer revenue and induces brand recommendation to other customers. 
Dowling and Uncles (1997), however, question these allegations: “The contention that 
loyal customers are always more profitable is a gross oversimplification. Each company 
needs to use its customer data to determine the truth of these assumptions.” 
Reinartz and Kumar (2000, 2002) undertook a large scale investigation in order to 
verify the claims of Reichheld linking customer retention to profitability. Their verdict was 
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that the correlation is usually weak or non-existent, as they discovered little or no evidence 
that customers who purchase steadily from a company over time are necessarily cheaper to 
serve, less price sensitive, or particularly effective at bringing new customers. 
2.6.2 – Customers’ unwillingness to get involved 
Are customers willing to enter into a closer relationship with companies or brands? 
Customers apparently have more important things to do than loosing their precious time 
with matters of small relevance to their lives. The growing lack of discretionary time that 
everybody complains about has in fact been attracting people toward so-called convenience 
goods, that is, toward products and services more convenient to buy and to use.  
According to some authors, it is absolutely clear that consumers are not motivated 
to develop relationships with the vast majority of the products that they purchase, either 
for lack of time, interest or emotional energy (Dowling, 2002). A relationship demands 
mutual trust, commitment, sharing of information, dialogue and partnership, all of them 
things that we reserve for the more important areas of our personal lives, not for repeat-
purchase of trivial goods. Taking into consideration all these arguments, Dowling and 
Uncles (1997) sustain as appropriate a basic distinction between high- and low-involvement 
situations: 
“We suggest that loyalty programs will be more effective for high- than low-involvement products 
and services, primarily because low-involvement products are often bought by consumers out of 
habit, while, for high-involvement products, consumers might form a relationship with the supplier 
(the difference between the habitual purchase of Nescafé, say, and joining ClubMed).” 
Dowling (2002) further developed this idea: 
“In markets where psychological and social value dominate function (such as luxury goods, 
cosmetics, and lifestyle brands), there may be a significant ‘brand component’ that drives choice and 
commitment. Some consumers may attribute a personality to the brand and want a relationship with 
it. For example, if you are Harley-Davidson selling big motor cruisers and the feeling of being free 
and somewhat rebellious, the forming a relationship with your customers makes sense. Here, much 
of what is being bought is social and psychological in nature. The motorbike is really a ‘ticket to 
entry’ to one of the various Harley-Davidson subcultures. The company creates much of the 
‘product’ by fostering the core values of personal freedom, machismo, patriotism and American 
heritage.” 
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2.6.3 – Role and cost of rewards 
An often hotly debated point of loyalty programs is the effectiveness and efficiency 
of the rewards offered by relationship schemes in order to induce repeat-purchase. A good 
deal of these programs offer rewards whose connection to the value-offer of the brand is 
tenuous or non-existent. In these circumstances, it seems reasonable to state that, when 
some kind of loyalty is created, it will be directed to the program, not the brand; as a 
consequence, that so-called “loyalty” will evaporate as soon as the program ends. Another 
problem emerges in connection with the value of the rewards, which has to be sufficiently 
high to motivate the customers, but low enough to guarantee that the program’s costs do 
not escalate. This is a difficult and often not very well solved problem. The recommended 
rewards, both for economical and brand consistence reasons, are those that reinforce the 
long-term value proposition of the product itself and its basic positioning (Dowling and 
Uncles, 1997, p. 76). 
O’Brien e Jones (1995) believe that the value of a program is not restricted to the 
money value of its rewards. They therefore suggest five different elements that combine to 
determine a program’s value: 
a) The cash value of the redemption rewards (e.g., the ratio of the cost of an airline 
ticket to the dollar purchases necessary to accumulate frequent-flyer points) 
b) The range of choice of these rewards (e.g., choice of flight destinations) 
c) The aspirational value of the rewards (e.g., exotic free travel is more desirable 
than a cash-back offer) 
d) The perceived likelihood of achieving the rewards (e.g., how many points are 
required to qualify for a flight) 
e) The scheme’s ease of use 
To this, still according to Dowling and Uncles, should be added the psychological 
benefits of belonging to the program and accumulating points, specially the benefit of 
recognition whenever a customer has to fulfill certain conditions in order to join the 
program. 
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2.6.4 – Unrealistic assumptions 
But not all of those criticisms concentrate in matters of detail. Some of them go 
much deeper, questioning the very foundations of relationship marketing. Some authors 
state unambiguously: “most [loyalty] schemes do not fundamentally alter market structure” 
(Dowling & Uncles 1997). Therefore, while admitting that “they might help to protect 
incumbents and might be regarded as a legitimate part of the marketer’s armory” (Ibid.), 
they hasten to add that this only happens “at the cost of increasing marketing 
expenditures” (Ibid.). In theses conditions, it is sensible to ask if it would not be possible to 
reach the same results by other means: “does a customer loyalty program offer a better 
return than an alternative such as a price cut, increased advertising, or increasing 
distribution coverage?“ (Ibid.) 
2.7 - CONCLUSION 
Relationship marketing is viewed by its proponents as a new marketing paradigm 
designed to supersede a purely transactional approach. Marketing practices evolved 
continuously during the 20th century in the direction of increasingly segmented and targeted 
strategies. Mass marketing was abandoned because the new economic and social conditions 
determined that it was no longer an appropriate way to meet in an economic way the needs 
and wishes of the consumers. Modern societies became increasingly wealthy and complex, 
but also more fragmented. Marketers reacted to the segmentation of markets by offering 
customers a wider range of products and services, but the costs of traditional mass 
marketing techniques escalated as an increasing number of brands and products competed 
for a decreasing number of customers in each given segment. This created a renewed 
interest in targeted marketing approaches, especially as the digital technological revolution 
promised to make them much more cost-effective than in the past. 
The literature provides us with a variety of definitions of relationship marketing. 
The most enlightening ones focus on interactions with customers as the distinguishing 
feature around which this new way of doing marketing revolves. According to this very 
broad definition, expressions like relationship marketing, CRM, one-to-one marketing, 
database marketing or direct marketing refer to the same basic reality viewed from different 
angles. Be that as it may, the main motivation that led many companies to adhere to the 
relationship marketing paradigm was the belief that customer retention was not being given 
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sufficient attention, specially considering its contribution to overall profitability. Hence the 
new emphasis on loyalty efforts intends to make marketing more efficient. 
At the core of relationship marketing management are concepts like customer 
lifetime value, differentiation of the customer base and the customer relationship cycle. The 
combination of these tools leads to an altogether different way of managing the marketing 
function, whose center moves from the management of product portfolios to the 
management of customer portfolios. Since applications of relationship marketing have 
grown continuously during the last twenty-five years, we now benefit from a large number 
of business cases that can be analyzed and investigated, and from which much can be 
learned. In consumer markets however, and specially in fast-moving consumer goods, the 
available experience is still scarce. A number of authors have even questioned the adequacy 
of relationship concepts in the case of low involvement goods, since most consumers 
might not want to waste time with what they perceive as trifle matters. On the other hand, 
some of the basic ideas behind relationship marketing have been criticized for a number of 
reasons, which include skepticism regarding its alleged benefits, unwillingness of customers 
to get involved with relationship programs, the high cost of rewarding loyalty and the 
unrealism of some basic assumptions. This last criticism is specially disturbing, because it 
questions the very possibility of significantly and economically improving customer loyalty. 
This leads us to conclude that in order to decide whether relationship marketing programs 
really work (and how they do) we should begin by understanding what the theory of buyer 
behavior has to teach us on this account. 
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Chapter 3 
Two Conflicting Marketing Theories 
 
 
3.1 – INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter introduced us to the main issues of relationship marketing. In 
its conclusion, some questions were raised regarding the feasibility of loyalty programs, 
since some buyer behavior theories predict that loyalty cannot be manipulated at will by 
marketing managers. 
In the present chapter, we will compare two competing market theories derived 
from different and incompatible models of buyer behavior: the Howard-Sheth model and 
the NBD-Dirichlet model. We will start by describing the evolution of modern marketing 
practices since the Industrial Revolution in order to identify its main distinctive features. 
Next, we will see how the need for a comprehensive marketing theory gradually emerged, 
and how the model of buyer behavior presented by Howard and Sheth provided the basic 
foundation of that theory. The cognitive theory developed by these authors is presented in 
detail and its implications for practitioners are outlined. Special attention is given to the 
empirical problems of the theory. 
An alternative theory of repeat-buyer, developed by Ehrenberg, is then introduced. 
Unlike the previous one, its focus is strictly empirical. Stochastic models are applied to 
consumer panel data to identify universal buying patterns and predict behavior. The rich 
body of empirical findings generated by this approach is presented in a systematic way, and, 
to conclude the chapter, its methodology, predictions and recommendations are 
confronted with the ones of the more traditional Howard-Sheth model. 
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3.2 – MARKETING AS PRACTICE 
3.2.1 – The origins 
The word “marketing” is used indistinctly to designate both a practice and a theory. 
Very broadly understood, marketing as a practice has been around for a long time; as a 
theory, however, it is barely six decades old. Of course, commercial or marketing practices 
exist since markets started emerging thousands of years ago. But it is undeniable that those 
practices have evolved considerably as history progressed, in line with the transformations 
that took place not only in the techniques of production, but also in the forms of social and 
economical organization, following the gradual expansion of the market activities until they 
reached the present state where they include the near totality of economic life in 
contemporary societies (Polanyi, 1944; Polanyi and Arensberg, 1957; Braudel, 1979). 
To make things clearer, we will use the expression “modern marketing” when 
referring to the commercialization system that, starting with the British Industrial 
Revolution of the 18th century, reached its full maturity in the second half of the 19th 
century in the US and thereafter was imitated all over the world. In brief, the 
mechanization that was a central feature of the Industrial Revolution stimulated mass 
production and the exploration of scale economies that it made possible. The production 
methods typical of the Industrial Revolution where then applied to a growing number of 
industries, starting in the textile industry and moving on to iron, cutlery, ceramics and 
chemicals (Landes, 1969). 
3.2.2 – The massification of distribution 
Before the Industrial Revolution, markets were as a rule geographically confined to 
a small region around the production center, and products were transacted according to the 
local conditions of offer and demand18. As mass production became the rule, however, 
local markets were gradually diluted and integrated in larger national markets, and these, in 
turn, in even larger international markets. The extension of the geographic scope of the 
market system originated a growing estrangement between producers and consumers. 
                                                
18 There were of course important exceptions to this general rule, since long distance commerce is 
one of the oldest forms of market exchange (Polanyi and Arensberg, 1957). 
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Soon, the individual consumer became an entirely anonymous entity, a mere abstraction 
lost in the middle of another abstraction of colossal dimensions – the market. Slowly but 
surely, the paradigm of the large-scale mass industry came also to dominate the large-scale 
distribution, as a consequence of the new possibilities opened by the development of 
modern transportation (railways, sea and river navigation, and roads) and financial systems. 
“Around 1840”, Alfred Chandler writes, “the traditional commercial firm, following century old 
practices, was still trading and distributing goods in the United States. In the space of a generation it 
was substituted by modern forms of commercial companies in the selling of agricultural products 
and consumer goods. (…) The full line and full service wholesaler gradually took in his hands the 
sale of the majority of standardized consumer goods. Thereafter, during the 1870s and 1880s, the 
mass retail distributor – the large warehouse, the retail chain or the mail order company – started 
substituting the wholesaler.” (Chandler, 1988, p. 233) 
Chandler stressed that this transformation brought with it an extraordinary 
opportunity for the manufacturers: 
“The integration of mass production with mass distribution gave the industrialists the possibility of 
reducing their costs and increasing their productivity thanks to a more effective management of 
production and distribution, made possible by the coordination of the flows of products between 
these two stages of their activity.” (Chandler, 1988, p. 233) 
3.2.3 – The diffusion of the new commercial practices 
At the same time, however, a completely new problem for the manufacturers 
emerged: how would they guarantee the preference and loyalty of their customers, now that 
they had lost any kind of direct contact with them? And, as a corollary of this problem, a 
second one that came with it: how could they avoid the transfer of customer loyalty from 
the manufacturers to the distributors, and especially to the retailers, if they were the ones 
who in fact knew their tastes and preferences? 
Chandler (1988, pp. 323-5) showed how the tobacco industry played a pioneering 
role in the adoption of commercial practices suited to this new situation. Thus, James 
Buchanan Duke installed in 1884 two Bonsack machines, each one of them with the 
capacity to produce 120,000 cigarettes a day, more than enough to saturate the American 
market. In order to drain their whole production, they promptly intensified their national 
advertising effort, while at the same time their sales force distributed large quantities of 
prospects exalting the products. They created a national network of sales offices under the 
 74 
direction of company executives in all the largest American cities. These persons had full 
responsibility to supervise the commercialization and distribution of the product and the 
control of local advertising. Their sale representatives visited regularly the middlemen 
serving the tobacconists, the grocers and the drugstores, as well as the largest retailers, to 
get their orders. Later, in 1890, Duke merged with four competitors to create the American 
Tobacco Company. 
These innovations came to the attention of other large industrial companies 
confronting similar problems. The factory of oatmeal built in 1882 by Henry P. Crowell 
was the first to join under the same roof the operations of selection, cleaning, peeling, 
grinding, packaging and expedition to all markets in the United States. Unlike his 
competitor Schumacher, who insisted on selling the product in bulk to wholesalers, 
Crowell decided to package it and advertise his Quaker Oats brand nationally, positioning it 
as a breakfast cereal (Chandler, 1988, pp. 326-7). H. J. Heinz and Campbell Soup Company 
also adopted the new mass production techniques of the automatic tin packaging line, set 
up national sales organizations and started advertising to promote their brands (Chandler, 
1988, p. 328). 
3.2.4 - The Procter & Gamble story 
Another company, Procter & Gamble, later to epitomize marketing itself, embraced 
the new commercialization techniques at approximately the same time in response to 
similar challenges. Because of its central role in the evolution of marketing for a period of 
more than a century, their case will be described in more detail19. The company was 
founded in August 1837, when William Procter, manufacturer of candles, and James 
Gamble, manufacturer of soap, decided to associate themselves to benefit from economies 
of scale in the acquisition of animal fat, the main raw material in both industries. Until the 
mid-19th century, the production of soap was a mere sub product of the meat industry, and 
the companies that transformed animal fat confined themselves to their local markets. 
Procter & Gamble, however, soon began its expansion to other cities, advertising 
occasionally in local newspapers their candles and soaps under the trademark of Procter, 
Gamble & Company, and offered its consumers “Palm Soap, nº 1”, “Resin Soap, nº 2” and 
                                                
19 The source of this section is Advertising Age (1988). 
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“Pure Tallow Candles”. Around 1850, the packages of Star candles were already “branded” 
with an “X”, later changed into a star. 
In 1878, Procter & Gamble managed to produce for the first time a white soap 
with a satisfactory degree of purity. An occasional mistake during the production process 
originated a variety of soap that in fact floated when plunged into water, a feature much 
appreciated by consumers who reacted promptly and enthusiastically to it. In the beginning 
the product was plainly called “White Soap P&G”, but Harley Thomas Procter, inspired by 
a reading of the 45th Psalm of the Bible, decided to rename it “Ivory”. Thus was born the 
first true manufacturer’s brand – and also the most enduring one, as it survived to our days. 
Thanks to the modern equipment used by the company, soon 200,000 soaps were 
being produced per day. In order to drain such a large volume of production, the company 
started advertising nationally in 1882, and created a network of sales offices all over the 
country. Ivory’s first advertisement was published in The Independent, a religious weekly 
paper, and said: “The Ivory is a Laundry Soap, with all the fine qualities of a choice Toilet 
Soap, and it is 99 44/100 per cent pure.” The white color, the definition of a quantitative 
standard of purity and the allegation that Ivory floated were the three pillars of the brand’s 
positioning, jointly concurring to its success among the consumers. As soon as the first 
national magazines appeared – Good Housekeeping, Harper’s Monthly e Ladies’ Home 
Journal – Procter & Gamble immediately chose them as a major vehicle to communicate 
directly with housewives. 
Many years later, Procter & Gamble established one of the first departments of 
market research in business firms under the direction of Paul Smelser, PhD in Economics 
at the Johns Hopkins University. Although Smelser had been hired with the intention of 
merely studying the fluctuations of prices in the markets, he soon launched the basis for 
the analysis of consumer’s buying behavior and transformed the department into one of 
the key elements of the successful marketing methods that made Procter & Gamble 
famous. Up to this day, the company is known for the emphasis it puts on the thorough 
and quantitative investigation of the factors that can facilitate or inhibit the success of its 
brands in the marketplace. 
In 1931, another decisive date in the history of Procter & Gamble, Neil McElroy 
proposed in a celebrated memorandum the adoption of a new form of organization 
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revolving around the product manager, someone whose responsibility consisted in the 
coordination of all the tasks pertaining to the marketing of a given brand. This idea was so 
successful that it was rapidly embraced by every manufacturer of fast-moving consumer 
goods, and was also later adopted by companies operating in business-to-business and 
service markets. 
3.2.5 – Distinctive features of modern marketing 
The Procter & Gamble case-study illustrates vividly how modern marketing came 
into existence, what it is and how it works. Three main elements characterize this 
commercialization system when compared with the ones that it superseded: 
1. The idea of branding products, thus identifying the origin of the product and 
signaling value to the consumers. Before the invention of brands, consumers 
had no way of knowing who had produced the goods they bought, something 
that inhibited the manifestation of a preference through repeated buying. All 
goods were in practice undifferentiated commodities, hindering the production 
of quality goods. The responsibility for the selection of the merchandise on sale 
was entirely in the hands of the retailer, which meant that the consumer chose 
between retailers, not between producers, thereby inducing loyalty toward the 
former, not toward the latter. The producers would have to brand their goods 
with some identifying sign if they wished to change this situation; but, since 
many of those goods did not lend themselves easily to carry physical marks (e.g., 
oat meals or beer), the support of this identification would have to be the 
individual package. The packaging techniques, whether of wood, paper, glass or 
metal materials, underwent a period of fast evolution during the second half of 
the 19th century; as a result of this transformation, the environment at the point 
of sale was completely changed, with packaged goods becoming the rule rather 
than the exception. These packages could now be taken directly by the 
consumers from the shelves, with no need for help from employees previously 
occupied with weighing, cutting or measuring the quantities demanded by the 
customers. The way was open to the emergence of the first supermarkets, a 
system invented in the 1930s in the US that inaugurated a direct relation 
between the buyer and the brand. 
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2. Analysis and evaluation of markets using the principles of statistic inference 
to select representative samples to survey the total universe of consumers. The 
application of these techniques was justified by the practical impossibility of 
contacting individually all the customers in mass markets, not only because they 
lived in very far away places, but also because they were anonymous citizens that 
had no need whatsoever of connecting directly with the manufacturer of the 
goods they bought regularly. In the prevailing conditions of those times, mass 
marketing made manufacturers less aware of the changes taking place in the 
market, a dangerous phenomenon given that wholesalers and retailers tended to 
monopolize the knowledge of consumers’ needs and wishes. In the beginning of 
the 20th century, Karl Pearson (1857-1936) and Ronald Fisher (1890-1962) 
established the foundations of statistical inference, thus making possible the 
collection of important information on the behavior and preferences of a large 
number of individuals by inquiring a small sample of them. These new 
techniques were soon adopted by companies and advertising agencies, in the US 
and in Europe, starting from the 1920s. A satisfactory solution had been found 
to the problem of the study of markets and consumers in the era of mass 
marketing. Market research has been since those times one the basic pillars of 
modern marketing. 
3. Direct communication with customers overlapping the distribution channel 
with the purpose of promoting the brand among them. This maneuver is the 
very essence of modern advertising. For millenniums, marketing communication 
had been basically personal. Now, with the break of the direct relation between 
producers and consumers, this too was changed. Advertising, an impersonal 
form of communication that uses mass media to convey a message to 
consumers, grew with the expansion of printed media starting with the 
invention of Gutenberg, but only in the US, at the turn of the century, did it 
become a vital phenomenon to large-scale commercialization in connection with 
the explosion of the circulation of newspapers. 
To conclude, the system of modern marketing was solidly implanted in the US by 
the turn of the 20th century, and some of its elements were being transferred more or less 
faster to Europe. Mass marketing offered a solution to the demands of mass production, a 
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system based on the exploration of economies of scale, that is, on the reduction of unit 
costs as a by-product of the expansion of production, so that more and more products 
were at the reach of more and more people. Provided that the articulation of the sphere of 
production with the sphere of distribution was properly managed, the system would allow 
enormous productivity gains and, as a consequence, a very significant improvement of the 
life conditions of the population. This system compressed the margins of production and 
commercialization, but a proper return of the invested capital was guaranteed by the 
accelerated rotation of the goods at all stages of the economic process. 
However, as previously stated, this commercial revolution left the producers at the 
mercy of the distributors, inasmuch as they lost contact with the markets and the 
consumers. Modern marketing developed as a reaction to both the opportunities and the 
challenges of this new situation. One after the other, the main producers of fast-moving 
consumer goods adopted the new system, branding their packaged goods, researching their 
markets with the help of sample surveys, advertising heavily their main brands and 
establishing marketing organizations trained in the new and more sophisticated commercial 
techniques. 
3.3 – MARKETING AS THEORY 
3.3.1 – Marketing as a specialized discipline 
Although marketing progressed very fast as a business practice, the theorization of 
its foundations was much slower. Starting with David Ricardo (1772-1823), economics 
grew increasingly abstract, disregarding the analysis of empirical situations of the type we 
can find in Adam Smith (1723-1790) with his famous illustration of the division of work 
based on the example of pin manufacturing. Alfred Marshall (1842-1924) was perhaps the 
last of the great classical economists who took an interest in the specific workings of 
industries and markets. 
It is therefore not surprising that commercial innovations were initially neglected by 
economic teaching, if not in its consequences regarding macroeconomic efficiency, at least 
regarding its implications at the level of business organization and management. More 
specifically, it was not deemed necessary to develop a specialized body of knowledge in this 
area, an attitude that goes a long way to explain why no marketing theory emerged in the 
immediate aftermath of the major changes taking place in the commercial sphere (Jones 
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and Shaw, 2002). 
In contrast with the Anglo-American tradition, however, the German 
institutionalists of the Historic School usually paid attention to the concrete forms and 
processes of economic organization, and their pedagogical methods (including the analysis 
and discussion of case studies) strongly influenced the first attempts to teach marketing in 
the USA (Jones and Monieson, 1990). In Wisconsin University and in Harvard, under the 
orientation of economists of the American institutionalist school, students used historical 
studies, statistics and descriptions of marketing problems, with a special emphasis on the 
efficiency of marketing processes and on the understanding of the basic marketing 
functions. These pioneering initiatives led to the accumulation of a remarkable body of 
information on marketing facts and experiences, but not to the building of a 
comprehensive theory based on them. 
According to Bartels (1988), the word “marketing” was used for the first time 
around 1910 to designate a discipline with a distinctive object of study.20. He also indicates 
the Report of the Industrial Commission on the Distribution of Farm Products of 1901 as the first 
book published on general marketing problems21. Until 1916, the marketing course of the 
Ohio State University had several designations, among them “Mercantile Institutions”. 
Given the lack of study materials, teaching was often based on information collected by 
students themselves from local businessmen. Only much later were the first textbooks 
published : The Elements of Marketing, by Paul Cherington, in 1920; Marketing: Methods and 
Policies, by Paul Converse, in 1921; and Principles of Marketing, by Fred Clark, in 1922, with 
four editions, the last one in 1962. All of them adopted a markedly descriptive perspective, 
centered on the functioning of the institutions participating in the distribution process and 
in the development of the relevant marketing functions (buying and selling, transportation, 
warehousing, advertising, research, credit, product standardization). The American Journal of 
                                                
20 However, some recent investigations suggest that the teaching of marketing might have started in 
Germany at a previous date (Fullerton, 1988; Jones and Monieson, 1990). 
21 It should be noted, however, that at this time there was already an abundant literature on 
advertising: 10 titles were published previously to 1895, 4 more between 1895 and 1900, and an astonishing 
number of 75 volumes between 1900 and 1910 (Jones and Shaw, 2002). 
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Marketing (the direct predecessor of the Journal of Marketing) started publication in 193422. 
All this confirms the progressive coming of age of marketing as an academic discipline23. 
During the first half of the 20th century, the teaching of marketing was influenced 
by the new ideas developed in the context of the emergence of management itself as a field 
of academic study, with the corresponding emphasis on the integrated planning and control 
of the firm as a whole, to which marketing was required to give its specific contribution. 
Although ignored for a long time, it is now clear that advertising agencies played a central 
role not only in the diffusion but also in the conceptualization of the ideas of the new 
marketing in the first decades of the century (Schultze, 1982). 
Lasker (1990), a pioneer of the advertising industry, offers a first-hand account of 
the creation of the full-service advertising agency in the first years of the 20th century and 
shows that, at the time, “full-service” really meant handling all the aspects of the marketing 
function, including market research, distribution, advertising, sales promotion, and 
sometimes even product development, on the behalf of the advertiser. Similarly, Hopkins 
(1990), a partner of Lasker, arguably outlined for the first time a synthetic and coherent 
view of the marketing concept in his two ground-breaking books published in the 1920s 
that inspired generations of advertising professionals (Ogilvy, 1982). 
3.3.2 – The contribution of Wroe Alderson 
The main turning point towards a more consistent conceptualization of marketing 
only took place, however, in 1950, with the publication, under the orientation of Wroe 
Alderson, of a volume significantly titled Theory in Marketing, a collection of essays 
discussing modern commercial practices from a variety of perspectives, including, among 
                                                
22 Between 1936 and 1952, approximately half of the published articles were written by marketing 
executives, that is, by marketing practitioners, not by teachers or researchers. The dominant theme was 
marketing research, followed by the organization of wholesale trade (Jones and Shaw, 2002). 
23 The National Association of Teachers of Advertising, founded in 1915, changed its name in 1926 to 
National Association of Teachers of Marketing and Advertising, and, even later, in 1935, to National Association of 
Teachers of Marketing (Jones and Shaw, 2002). This seems to confirm: a) the premature coming of age of 
advertising as a profession and a discipline when compared with marketing in general; b) the relatively late 
identification of advertising as one of the marketing functions. 
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others, the economic, psychological, demographic and organizational ones. This new line 
of thought was combined by Alderson himself in his next work of 1957, Marketing Behavior 
and Executive Action, with the previously mentioned marketing management orientation in 
order to produce the first and clearly articulated attempt to create a modern marketing 
theory. 
A new research program 
In a classical article published in that very same year, Alderson (1958) summarized 
his research program. Although starting with the admission of the relevance of economics 
to marketing studies, he immediately introduced an essential distinction between both 
areas: economics assumes the homogeneity of consumers, whereas “the aim of marketing 
is to cope with the heterogeneity of both needs and resources” (Alderson, 1958, p. 23), and 
this is the basic fact from which follows the need of a marketing theory distinct from 
economics. Marketing regards the consumer as an active subject who enters the market as a 
problem-solver who, consequently, makes a choice between alternative offers (Alderson, 
1958, p. 24). Alderson establishes a parallel between this situation and the one analyzed by 
economists such as Schumpeter, Chamberlain and J. M Clark, who emphasized innovative 
competition, product differentiation and differential advantage. And he goes on to state: 
“The basic assumption is that every firm occupies a position which is in some respects unique, being 
differentiated from all others by characteristics of its products, its services, its geographic location or 
its specific combination of these features. The survival of a firm requires that for some group of 
buyers it should enjoy a differential advantage over all other suppliers. The sales of any active 
marketing organization come from a core market made up of buyers with a preference for this 
source and a fringe market which finds the source acceptable, at least for occasional purchases.” 
(Alderson, 1958, p. 24) 
Marketing and monopolistic competition 
To Alderson, the relevant competitive paradigm for a theory of marketing was not 
perfect competition but monopolistic competition, as can be deduced not only from the 
economists he invokes, but also from the competitive factors he deems more important: 
innovation, differentiation and positioning. This admission must of course have profound 
consequences on the way companies manage their marketing activities: 
“Competition for differential advantage implies goals of survival and growth for the marketing 
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organization. The firm is perennially seeking a favorable place to stand and not merely immediate 
profits from its operations. Differential advantage is subject to change and neutralization by 
competitors. In dynamic markets differential advantage can only be preserved through continuous 
innovation. (…) The existence of the core position helps to explain the paradox of survival in the 
face of the destructive onslaughts of innovative competition.” (Alderson, 1958, p. 25) 
Furthermore, Alderson recognizes that the working of markets brings with it 
considerable transaction costs as a consequence of the efforts undertaken by both 
producers and consumers in order to discover the most beneficial solutions (Alderson, 
1958, p. 25). Under these circumstances, the reduction of transaction costs in itself can 
become an objective of marketing, since it is a valid way of making the value proposition 
more attractive to customers. Alderson makes a distinction between strategic and routine 
transactions, according to the level of negotiation involved; but he promptly adds that the 
fully negotiated or strategic transaction is the prototype of all exchange transactions, of 
which the routine transaction must be considered a special case. The rationale for this 
option is as follows: when a transaction seems to be routine, this only happens because the 
rules that apply to it have already been previously established in detail; as a consequence, 
routine is really an illusion, since it necessarily follows the strategic phase. As he also writes: 
“Negotiation is implicit in all routine transactions” (Alderson, 1958, p. 25). 
Among all the factors involved in the negotiated exchange, price plays a central 
role, not because it is the most important one, but because it is “the final balancing and 
integrating factor which permits the deal to be made” (Alderson, 1958, p. 25). In the 
heterogeneous markets that matter to the marketing manager, “price plays an important 
role in matching a segment of supply with the appropriate segment of demand” (Alderson, 
1958, p. 26). All these observations are readily framed into economics. At most, they 
recommend that mainstream microeconomics should pay more attention to some features 
that it tends to underestimate or ignore.  
The role of sociology and psychology 
Alderson believed however that a proper theory of marketing should go further, if 
necessary overcoming the barriers that economics traditionally imposed itself and treading 
fearlessly into the domains of sociology and psychology. Even if they frequently mention 
the consumers’ “tastes and preferences”, economists are not curious to understand: a) how 
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they are formed and evolve; b) how their change can alter the pattern of demand in a given 
market. 
Besides, Alderson writes, diverging clearly from mainstream microeconomics: 
“Market behavior is primarily group behavior. Individual action in the market is most 
characteristically action on behalf of some group in which the individual holds membership.” 
(Alderson, 1958, p. 26) 
Hence the need to resort to sociology to understand group behavior and 
particularly the behavior of organized systems, among which the family deserves a special 
attention (Alderson, 1958, pp. 30-31). To conclude, Alderson discusses the functional and 
non-functional dimensions of family buying and suggests that the thorough study of 
consumer behavior is an essential condition for more effective marketing decisions 
(Alderson, 1958, p. 31). 
3.3.3 – The marketing concept and marketing management 
The thesis of Wroe Anderson already contained, in a more or less explicit way, all 
the core concepts of the marketing canon. At the same time, the word “marketing” is given 
two very different senses: on one side, marketing as a management function of the firm; on 
the other side, marketing as a management philosophy. 
Marketing as a business function  
The first one – marketing as a distinct function of the firm – relates to tactical or 
operational management, and its first manifestation was the marketing-mix model (later 
popularized as the 4 Ps model) taught by Neil Borden starting from the late 40s (Borden, 
1964). Marketing management is understood as an optimization problem whose dependent 
variable (sales, market share, gross margin or ROI) is a function of product, pricing, 
promotion (advertising, sales effort, sales promotions, etc.) and distribution (Webster, 
2002). It is assumed that the form of this function is an elongated S, where a first phase of 
growing returns is followed by another one of decreasing returns as the effort allocated to 
each individual variable of the marketing-mix is gradually increased. In theory, the general 
microeconomic principle applies according to which the optimal mix occurs when, for all 
factors considered, marginal cost equals marginal revenue. 
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Marketing as management philosophy 
Turning to the second meaning – marketing as a management philosophy – its aims 
are necessarily more ambitious. The marketing concept seems to have been advanced 
clearly for the first time by Peter Drucker: 
“Because it is its purpose to create a customer, any business has two – and only these two – basic 
functions: marketing and innovation. They are the entrepreneurial functions.” (Drucker, 1955, p. 53) 
And also: 
“Actually marketing is so basic that it is not just enough to have a strong sales department and to 
entrust marketing to it. Marketing is not only much broader than selling, it is not a specialized 
activity at all. It encompasses the entire business. It is the whole business seen from the point of 
view of its final result, that is, from the customer’s point of view. Concern and responsibility for 
marketing must therefore permeate all areas of the enterprise.” (Drucker, 1955, p. 54) 
Drucker humbly denied the paternity of the idea, attributing it instead to General 
Electric, whose Yearly Report of 1952 proposed a very similar formulation. Robert Keith, 
then vice-president of Pillsbury Company, found this marketing concept idea so appealing 
that, based on the experience of his own company, he suggested a chronology according to 
which the production orientation era, lasting until the 1930s, was then superseded by the 
sales era, only to be overcome by the marketing oriented era in the beginning of the 1960s 
(Keith, 1960). The explanation of this major revolution should be found in the transition 
from a historical period when, due to the scarcity of resources and the poverty of the 
population, everything that could be produced would necessarily find a customer, to a new 
one whose distinctive characteristic was the excessive capacity of production. In these new 
prevailing conditions, firms would have to dedicate ever-larger efforts to stimulate the 
demand directed to its own products. This naive version of the history of marketing is 
totally unfounded, both because this golden age of commercial prosperity never existed 
and because, the commercial practices typical of modern marketing had emerged much 
earlier than Keith imagined (Hollander, 1986; Chandler, 1988; Fullerton, 1988). 
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The acceptance of the marketing concept 
The fact remains however that the marketing concept proposed by Drucker (1955), 
Alderson (1958), McKitterick (1957) and Levitt (1962) was extremely well accepted in the 
business world. It would seem logical to ask: how do we know that it works? At the time 
very little was in fact known about its true virtues, leaving aside some circumstantial and 
anecdotal evidence. Today, we benefit from a substantial body of research tending to 
confirm that firms focused on their environment (as opposed to firms focused on their 
inner workings and procedures) tend to perform better (Webster, 2002). But it should be 
noted that the orientation toward the external environment demands not only attention to 
its market, but also to its competitors, and concern over the profitability of its decisions. 
3.4 – THE COGNITIVE THEORY OF BUYER BEHAVIOR 
3.4.1 – The first models of buyer behavior  
The success of the marketing concept prompted an awareness of its strategic 
relevance and also a growing interest in themes such as the segmentation of the markets 
and the positioning of the offer24. In spite of all the advances registered in these areas, the 
lack was still felt for a crucial element to complete a marketing theory really worthy of this 
name: a theory of the buying behavior of customers and businesses. The fact is that the 
marketing concept is in itself an incomplete idea (Webster, 2002): It does not specify in 
which customers should a company concentrate its efforts, and therefore requires a theory 
of segmentation. It does not tell us how should a company satisfy the needs of its 
customers, and therefore demands a theory of offer positioning. Finally, it does not say 
how customers are expected to react to the marketing stimulus addressed to them, and 
therefore lacks a theory of buyer behavior. This was a serious problem, since marketing 
managers and researchers cannot help making assumptions about how consumers make 
their choices and about how these choices can be influenced by marketing strategies and 
tactics. 
                                                
24 Although the word “positioning” was only coined much later by Ries and Trout (1972), as we 
have seen Alderson already had a very clear notion of the relevance of the concept for strategic marketing. 
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When a marketer changes the price of his product, increases his advertising budget 
or decides to undertake a brand extension, he does so because he believes that the 
consumers will respond favorably to these marketing stimuli, because the success of such 
initiatives depends on the extra sales generated by them. This question can be answered by 
conducting experiments that help us identify simultaneously relations of cause and effect 
and the degree of these effects, that is, the effectiveness and the efficiency of each 
individual option. However, since marketing practitioners cannot be expected to conduct 
experiments all the time, they must rely on some previous body of commonly accepted 
marketing principles to guide their actions. 
The overcoming of this problem started only in the mid 60s. After reviewing the 
findings and theories relevant to the interpretation of consumer behavior, Nicosia (1966) 
decided to change the focus of study from the act of buying itself to the decision processes 
that take place both before and after this act. According to him, “the act of purchasing is 
only one component of a complex, ongoing process of decision making – a process of 
many interactions among many variables over time” (Nicosia, 1966). As we will see, this 
insistence on the importance of the decision process turned out to be one of the defining 
characteristics of the mainstream marketing theory. Two major consequences flowed from 
here (Lunn, 1974): 
1. A clear tendency to view buying as rational behavior oriented to some well-
determined purpose, whose outcome is an optimal or nearly optimal choice; 
2. The notion that the general process of decision can be represented as a 
sequential reduction of the options at the disposal of the consumer, starting with 
very vague propensities and ending, by a process of search and evaluation, with 
the choice of a specific brand. 
Later contributions, namely by Howard and Sheth (1967, 1969), Engel, Kollat and 
Blackwell (1968), and Webster and Wind (1972a, 1972b), gave the theory of buyer behavior 
its final form, similar to the one we still find today in most marketing textbooks. 
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3.4.2 – The emphasis on the decision process in the Howard-Sheth model 
Two different types of factors condition the buyer decision process located at the 
very center of the Howard-Sheth theory: 
a) External factors, including different environmental influences that condition the 
customer’s behavior, such as economic, social, cultural, familiar or personal 
factors studied by economics, sociology and anthropology; 
b) Internal factors, related to the consumer himself, such as his personality and self-
image, attitudes, motivations and involvement, learning and memory and, finally, 
his ability and disposition to process information, areas studied by psychology 
and psychiatry. 
Three different buying situations 
It is within this pre-defined frame that the consumer is targeted by certain 
marketing stimuli originated in competing companies that try to obtain his preference. 
These stimuli include, for instance, advertising promises, promotional offers, payment 
conditions, post-sale service, product options, availability in certain retail channels, etc. As 
to the desired responses, they comprise, obviously, the sale of the brand, but also less 
ambitious intermediate objectives such as a visit to the store, the trial of a free sample, a 
favorable disposition toward the brand or the request of additional information. 
It should be noted that the authors of the standard buyer behavior model were 
from the beginning perfectly conscious that it is unrealistic to expect consumers to go 
through an exhaustive and rational process of brand selection in trivial buying situations. 
Howard and Sheth therefore distinguished among three different types of situations: 
(a) extensive problem solving; 
(b) limited problem solving; 
(c) routine problem solving. 
In situations of extensive problem solving, the consumer is confronted with an 
unknown brand in a product category he is not completely familiar with. He ignores what 
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benefits and attributes are more relevant in the given situation; therefore he is not sure 
either which choice criteria should be used or what weight should be given to each one of 
them. Under these circumstances, he looks actively for information to support his decision, 
being specially interested in information that comes from impartial and trustworthy 
sources. 
In limited problem solving, on the other hand, the buyer does not know the brand, 
but the product category has no secrets for him. He is aware of the relevant criteria that 
should guide his decision, but ignores how well each brand satisfies them, and is therefore 
ready to invest some time and effort in the collection of information, specially whenever he 
is not very satisfied with the brands he currently uses. 
Finally, in routine problem solving the consumer chooses between familiar brands 
in a familiar product category setting. Under these conditions, he does not actively search 
new information. Instead, he tends to develop behavioral routines that possibly will favour 
loyalty to a given brand. 
Obviously, the two first situations fit in the perspective of a reasonably rational and 
structured choice. The same cannot be said of the last one, that is, of routine buying. 
Notwithstanding, in spite of admitting this anomaly, the dominant marketing theory insists 
on keeping the decision process at the center of the explanation of buying behavior. The 
well informed and pondered decision is presented as the typical situation and its absence is 
seen as a deviation from the norm or as a special case that in no way disqualifies the general 
model that interprets buying as a problem solving process. The presupposition seems to be 
that, if we understand the most complex case – extensive problem solving – we will be able 
to deal also with the most elementary one – routine buying –, since the latter it is no more 
than a special instance of the former. 
The dominant cognitive paradigm 
That is why, in spite of all qualifications, warnings and precautions, the hard core of 
the so-called Howard-Sheth model has essentially dominated the teaching and professional 
training of generations of marketing managers in the last four decades. Among the best 
known marketing management and strategy textbooks that place choice and problem-
solving at the center of the understanding of consumer behavior we should mention Kotler 
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(2003), Urban and Star (1991) and Lambin (1993). And the same can be said of textbooks 
specifically designed to teach buyer behavior, such as those by Loudon and Della Bitta 
(1988), Wilkie (1994), Howard (1994), Evans, Moutinho and van Raaij (1996), and 
Schiffman and Lanuk (2003). All these authors recognize the need to separate situations of 
complex buying from situations of routine buying and low involvement25, but few of them 
dedicate at least a few pages to the analysis of routine behavior. Assael (1992), East (1997), 
and Foxall, Goldsmith and Brown (1998) are the main exceptions to this pattern. In the 
case of Assael, after deploring the excessive importance given by teachers and marketing 
managers alike to the study of the complex buying situation, he dedicates a full chapter of 
his book to low involvement buying. As to East, he offers a balanced view of consumer 
behavior theories, giving due emphasis to behavioral evidence, measures, instances of 
absence of choice, non-voluntary actions, learned behavior and the role of habit in 
purchasing. 
We are therefore in a position to state that the cognitive paradigm has dominated 
marketing theory in the last four decades. According to it, decision making is the central 
phenomenon of buyer behavior. This decision making is the result of a process of rational 
calculation which consists in the exhaustive comparison of the existing alternatives among 
them and comes after the collection and processing of all the available information in order 
to secure the best possible outcome. As a consequence, the theory urges marketing 
managers to communicate useful information about their products and to persuade 
consumers of the excellence of their brands by way of structured arguments. 
3.4.3 – Attitude and behavior 
Attitudes are “what we feel about a concept which may be a brand, a category, a 
person, an ideology or any other entity about which we can think and to which we can 
attach feeling” (East, 1997) Thus, an attitude toward a brand is the buyer’s overall 
evaluation of the brand’s potential to satisfy his needs and wishes, and includes the 
                                                
25 Involvement is a key concept of consumer behavior theory popularized by Krugman (1965) in 
order to explain different levels of cognitive activity created by advertising and purchase situations. It is 
commonly treated as a matter of degree, but some authors dispute this idea arguing that it either exists or 
does not exist (East, 1997, p. 19). 
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confidence with which that evaluation is held (Ibid.). Attitudes structure the way a person 
relates to the goods and services on offer. They can be measured on a scale ranging from 
“I like this brand very much” on one side, to “I hate this brand” on the other. Being a 
predisposition, attitude leads directly to the intention to buy and, indirectly, due to the 
possible interference of some kind of inhibitor, to the observed behavior (Fishbein, 1967). 
Attitude research has had the most profound impact on the modeling and understanding of 
consumer behavior. This approach provides the theoretical basis of the Howard-Sheth 
model thinking, which tends to view product attributes as the drivers of the consumer 
decision process and underlies a large part of common market research. 
Attitudes originate in a variety of factors: (a) direct experience, resulting from 
previous situations of acquisition, consumption and use of the brand; (b) experience of 
others, either family, friends or members of some other reference group that the 
consumers value; and (c) commercial information prepared and distributed by the suppliers 
themselves to influence the consumers. As to the content of these influences, it can be 
based either on factual and objective arguments or on predominantly symbolic or 
emotional messages. 
Marketing managers generally expect to change the buyer behavior of consumers 
by acting on their attitudes through communication efforts. However, the hypothetical 
causal relation leading from attitude to behavior has been often challenged (LaPiere, 1934; 
Skinner, 1953; Vroom, 1964; Wicker, 1969), given that research on this topic seems at best 
inconclusive, especially in low involvement decisions (Bird and Ehrenberg, 1966; Beatty 
and Kahle, 1988). Fishbein himself admits that causality might run in the opposite 
direction, that is, from behavior to attitude: 
“What little evidence there is to support any relationship between attitudes and behavior comes 
from studies showing that a person tends to bring his attitude into line with his behavior than from 
studies demonstrating that behavior is a function of attitude.” (Fishbein, 1973) 
3.4.4 – The formation of attitudes 
Attitude models specify how individuals form judgments and preferences about 
products based on their perceptions of how those products perform on several key 
attributes (Edwards, 1954; Fishbein, 1963; Fishbein, 1967; Lancaster, 1966). These 
subjective expected utility decision models presume that the consumer evaluation processes 
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are cognitively oriented, that is, they see the consumer as forming product opinions largely 
on a conscious and rational basis. The most currently used models sustain that attitudes are 
determined by the combination of two types of judgments on each of the relevant 
attributes of the product under consideration: (a) classification of the relative importance of 
each attribute for the consumer; and (b) evaluation of the performance of each brand 
regarding each specific attribute. The set of beliefs that a consumer holds about a particular 
brand is its brand image and the synthetic attitude of the consumer toward the brand 
results from aggregating the evaluations of all the attributes through some kind of 
weighting system that reflects the importance of each attribute to him. 
General formulation of the problem 
The general formulation of the problem of attitude formation admits several 
different solutions. One of the best known and most commonly used was pioneered by 
Rosenberg (1956) and tested by Fishbein (1963) using the beliefs and attitudes of fifty 
subjects. It is represented by the following formula: 
Αo = ∑i bi ai                                                                                                   (3.1) 
where 
Αo = attitude toward a brand 
bi = belief (subjective likelihood) that the brand possesses attribute i 
ai = evaluation (goodness or badness) of attribute i  
In this multi-attribute model, the overall attitude toward the brand is viewed as the 
product of the beliefs about the brand along a particular attribute and the value of the 
attribute, summed up over all attributes. It is believed that people consider more attributes 
into consideration when important decisions are taken, especially when circumstances 
extend the decision-making period. This model is compensatory in the sense that the poor 
performance of the brand on one of the attributes can be compensated by exceptional 
performance on others. Nakanishi and Bettman (1974) suggested that such an evaluation 
process can be too complex for many consumer goods, and that therefore it would be 
more realistic to hypothesize that consumers may evaluate brands on two or three key 
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attributes and simply eliminate brands that are not adequate on any one of them, thus 
applying a non-compensatory decision rule. This raises the question of deciding which 
attributes should be chosen, given that all consumers may not agree on that topic. The 
choice of attributes is usually established through elicitation: the beliefs that come easily to 
mind are recorded and those that occur frequently in a group (called modal salient beliefs) 
are then used in a questionnaire. 
An alternative way of looking at attitudes is to consider that, instead of resulting 
from a rational process of looking carefully at each attribute in turn, they are rather a 
summary of past reinforcement effects. From this standpoint, attitudes can have predictive 
value even when individual consumers do not bring specific attributes to mind when 
making a choice. 
The Theory of Reasoned Action 
Marketing managers care about consumer attitudes because they are supposed to 
influence their behavior. The presumed “attitude-leads-to-behavior” relationship 
recommends the use of attitude measurements as predictors of behavior toward the brand. 
If this causation relationship does not hold as expected, the current importance attributed 
to the measurement of attitudes should instead be considered as a source of confusion and 
misguided marketing efforts. Therefore, the failure to establish a clear relationship between 
attitude and behavior led Fishbein in a new direction in his investigations. According to his 
Theory of Reasoned Action (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975), the prediction of the purchase of a 
specific brand demands the measurement of the person’s attitude toward performing that 
purchase, not just the overall attitude toward the brand. This is equivalent to saying that the 
measurement of buying intentions (or attitude toward a purchasing action) should in fact 
substitute the measurement of attitudes toward the brands. 
The Theory of Reasoned Action may be understood as a diluted form of the 
cognitive paradigm. First, a “reasoned action consumer” has limited knowledge of the 
outcomes of his actions and takes account of only those outcomes that can be easily 
brought to mind; second, actions are done partly in response to the normative influence of 
other people and groups; third, people have limited power to realize their preferences, 
which explains why it is their intentions rather than their actions that are predicted in the 
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Figure 3.1 
The Theory of Reasoned Action 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted by the author from East (1997). 
 
As can be seen in the diagram, the attitude toward a certain behavior is derived in 
part from its expected outcomes. However, another variable – subjective norm, which 
measures the overall propensity to act as other persons (who are important to the 
consumer) think the consumer should act – now determines intention jointly with attitude 
toward behavior. The relative strength of attitude and subjectively valued social norms in 
determining a given action is measured by the weights w1 and w2, which will vary from case 
to case, and must be established empirically. 
According to the theory of reasoned action, evaluation is carried on beliefs (either 
related to expected outcomes or normative ones) and therefore all change in attitude and 
behavior must be caused by the acquisition of new beliefs or the modification of existing 
beliefs (East, 1997). Belief changes are thus a sufficient cause for downstream changes in 
attitude, subjective norm, intention and behavior. However, this principle – termed by 
Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) as the ‘sufficiency principle’ – cannot accommodate the well 
known fact that past experience has a direct effect on intention and sometimes on behavior 
(Bagozzi and Kimmel, 1995). 
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3.4.5 – Segmentation and positioning 
The multi-attribute attitude model has brought new credentials to segmentation26 
and positioning27, two hot topics of marketing strategy that have been widely accepted as 
sound business practice in the last forty years. 
The multi-attribute model and benefit segmentation 
It is commonly acknowledged that different consumers place different emphasis on 
different benefits or product attributes (the ai variable in Fishbein’s model). Within the 
context of attitude theory it is straightforward to identify benefit segments in terms of 
different patterns of evaluation attached to attribute dimensions. As a consequence, a 
market can be partitioned into smaller segments according to the distinctive preferences of 
different groups of consumers, each one of them being relatively homogeneous (Haley, 
1968). Segmentation properly conducted should allow marketing managers to identify 
consumer groups that: (a) share the same preferences; (b) have different preferences from 
those of the consumers in other groups; (c) behave in a markedly different way. 
The fact that it is possible to identify segments in a generic market doesn’t 
necessarily mean, however, that it is advisable to choose a segmented marketing strategy. 
Everything depends on the degree of preference fragmentation. If preferences are not very 
differentiated, or if the consumers with special preferences are too few, the market is 
basically homogeneous, and segmentation is not the best choice. On the other extreme, 
preferences can be so diffuse that either specificities are disregarded and the market is 
treated as homogeneous, or else a one-to-one approach is chosen. Finally, if preferences 
are polarized around a few central points distant from one another, we face clustered 
                                                
26 The original formulation of the segmentation strategy belongs to Smith (1956). According to him, 
“segmentation is based on developments on the demand side of the market and represents a rational and 
more precise adjustment of product and marketing effort to consumer or user requirements”. Years later, 
Haley (1968) gave the theory of segmentation a much more solid base. 
27 We owe the notion of positioning to Ries and Trout (1972), who later developed their ideas in 
more detail (Ries and Trout, 1982). The concept was adopted by many authors, although it is not always clear 
if they use it in the same sense as Ries and Trout. Among the most significant efforts of theorization must be 
included Johnson (1971) and Green and Wind (1975). 
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preferences and segmentation is clearly the best strategy. 
Positioning through key attributes 
When a market is properly segmented, the manager can select a particular target 
group on which to focus so as to maximize his chances of success by concentrating on 
those consumers that value more highly the brand’s offer. Besides being more effective, 
segmentation is also supposed to be more efficient because the allocation of resources to 
relatively smaller groups of consumers reduces waste. Segmentation theory thus prescribes 
that each company or brand should select that segment where it is stronger and 
concentrate its efforts on it, instead of trying to please everybody. It follows logically from 
this that the brand should also be positioned according to the benefits or attributes most 
valued by the members of the segment. In terms of the Fishbein multi-attribute model, the 
brand should own the key attribute of the segment where it chooses to compete, meaning 
that consumers must above all believe that it really possesses that attribute. Therefore, a 
brand will have a strong strategic positioning if: (a) it chooses a significantly large and 
preferably growing segment of the market; (b) the consumers in that segment believe that 
the brand in fact possesses the attribute that they most value; (c) the brand is, as a 
consequence, the preferred brand for those consumers. 
Some varieties of the segmentation theory (Johnson, 1971) try to identify the ideal 
point where a brand should be positioned in order to dominate the category. The ideal 
point can be interpreted as an indication of what the ideal product should be like in order 
to meet the preferences of the average consumer, that is, a product whose combination of 
attributes comes closer to the relative importance that the consumers in fact attach to 
them. In a market of homogeneous preferences, the ideal point represents the ideal 
positioning that all brands strive to occupy; in a market of clustered preferences, however, 
there will be as many ideal points (or ideal positionings) as segments of consumers. 
It is by now clear that these segmentation and positioning theories are intimately 
related to other ideas on which they depend, namely: (a) the idea that a product is a bundle 
of attributes (Lancaster, 1966); (b) the idea that consumers actually make choices when they 
buy products (Howard and Sheth, 1967; 1969); (c) the idea that this choice follows the 
reasoned action model of Fishbein and Ajzen (1975). The original formulation of the 
theory postulated that segmentation should be based on benefits. Later developments, 
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however, allowed the consideration of other kinds of attributes, namely those created by 
marketing communication itself like, for instance, emotional attributes or brand image. 
Behavioral predictions 
According to this interpretation each consumer has a favorite brand in each 
product category, and this brand should be the one whose attributes nearly fit his 
preferences. Furthermore, different customers buy different brands for different reasons, 
otherwise they would all buy the same brand all the time. The only reason for the survival 
of more than one brand in each product category is that each one of the competing brands 
somehow manages to cater to the specific needs of a segment of consumers with a clearly 
differentiated profile. We would therefore expect consumers to stick to their favorite 
brands, that is, to be loyal to them, as long as nothing happened that might trigger their 
dissatisfaction or change their situation, whether in socio-demographic or psychographic 
terms. Such is the rational foundation of brand loyalty strategies. 
3.4.6 – The Lavidge-Steiner hierarchy 
When they proposed their buyer behavior model, Howard and Sheth integrated in 
their theory the work previously done by Lavidge and Steiner (1961) on how advertising 
acts on consumers. Apparently, advertising theory had got there first. 
As already stated, the Howard-Sheth model predicts several types of responses 
conductive to a favorable decision to the brand as a reaction to the marketing stimulus 
aimed at them. Specifically, it concentrates on a sequence of response variables – attention, 
comprehension, attitude toward a brand, intention to buy and purchase behavior – very 
similar to the one postulated by the Lavidge-Steiner model. What we obviously have here is 
a crucial link between the more general consumer behavior theory and the explanation of 
how advertising influences that very same behavior. 
The origins of hierarchical models 
Since the 1920s, the prevailing opinion had been that advertising should best be 
understood, in the expression coined by John E. Kennedy, as “salesmanship in print”, 
(Lasker, 1990), meaning that its effects are similar to the ones commonly attributed to 
personal sales efforts.  This conviction led to the adoption of the AIDA model to direct 
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the choice of marketing communication tasks. According to it, any sales presentation 
should include four steps: (1) Attention, in order to be heard by the receiver of the 
message; (2) Interest, so that the receiver is involved; (3) Desire, to motivate him to really 
want the product; and (4) Action, triggering some kind of commitment to buy. 
While recognizing the general validity of the AIDA model, Lavidge and Steiner tried 
to outline a sequence of effects more appropriate to the specific definition of advertising 
tasks, in line with the pioneering contribution of Colley (1961), whose foremost merit 
consisted in the clear-cut distinction between marketing objectives and communication 
objectives, noting that, unlike the former, the latter are the direct and natural outcome of 
the satisfactory fulfillment of a communication task. As such, they can at least in principle 
be rigorously controlled, no matter how difficult it might be to do it in practice, and can 
therefore be regarded as operational objectives. 
The seven stages of the decision process 
Admitting that a least part of the advertising effects are long-term, but refusing an 
attitude of “wait and see”, Lavidge and Steiner broke down into seven logically articulated 
steps the process that eventually leads to the desired sales results, starting with unawareness 
of the mere existence of the brand and going on to its final acquisition. In their own words: 
“if something is to happen in the long run, something must be happening in the short run” 
(Lavidge and Steiner, 1961). Each of the steps in the following hierarchy of effects 
summarizes the psychological situation of the consumer at a given moment, the task of 
advertising being to attract the consumer to the brand through efforts suited to the stage 
where he is located at any given moment: (1) Unawareness: prospective clients ignore 
everything about the brand, including its mere existence; (2) Awareness: prospects know 
that the brand exists, but nothing else; (3) Knowledge: Prospects know what the product 
has to offer; (4) Liking: Prospects have favorable attitudes toward the brand; (5) 
Preference: Prospects prefer the brand to any other alternative; (6) Conviction: Prospects 
intend to buy the brand; and, finally, (7) Purchase: The sale is concluded. 
Stages (2) and (3) try to generate a cognitive response, first through simple awareness 
that the brand exists and fits into a given family of products (the product category), then by 
conveying information on its benefits and attributes. Stages (4) and (5) belong already in 
the affective or emotional realm, and aim to create favorable attitudes – beginning with 
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mere simpathy and then moving to preference – toward the brand. Finally, stage (6) links 
favorable attitudes and propensities to the final purchase that should take place in step (7). 
The functions of advertising 
Advertising therefore accomplishes three main functions. The first one, related to the 
transmission of information and ideas, is predominantly cognitive or rational. Examples of 
this type of advertising are to be found in the launch of new products or in classified ads; 
as to the relevant techniques, we should mention slogans and jingles. The second one 
relates to the creation or consolidation of attitudes and feelings of sympathy and 
preference, and deal primarily with the affective dimension. It is the domain of persuasive 
advertising and image advertising, but also of comparative advertising. The third and last 
one aims to induce action – actual purchase of the product – and is therefore behavioral in 
kind. It often takes place at or near the point of sale and resorts to promotional offers or 
testimonials to induce the consumer to make an immediate decision. 
The authors of the model were perfectly aware of its very generic nature, and, as 
such, found it unsuited for some situations, namely when psychological involvement is very 
low. Even so, they didn’t think these particular circumstances invalidated the proposed 
hierarchy of effects. In their own words: 
“The various steps are not necessarily equidistant. In some instances the «distance» from awareness to 
preference may be very slight, while the distance to purchase is extremely large. In other cases, the 
reverse may be true. Furthermore, a potential purchaser sometimes may move up several steps 
simultaneously.” (Lavidge and Steiner, 1961) 
However, it would remain true that, whatever the situation: (a) the seven stages 
would remain valid, provided we allowed for the fact that the relative importance of each 
one of them would change; (b) the sequence of stages would always be the same, although 
some stages might be “shortened”. The general relevance of the model can be upheld 
provided low involvement situations are seen as a simplified version of the general case. 
The ideas of Lavidge and Steiner were understandably integrated into the Howard-Sheth 
model given that they likewise presuppose the existence of a reasonably complex decision 
process, or at least assume that such is the general case. 
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3.4.7 – Criticism of the Lavidge-Steiner model and alternatives to it 
The limitations of the Lavidge-Steiner model were clear from the outset to their own 
authors, as they themselves agreed that many situations did not fit easily into it. Even so, 
the importance of these anomalies was underestimated because they believed they could be 
dealt with as extreme situations reducible to the general scheme, situations, that is, where 
the simplification of the purchase process would make the hierarchy of effects less 
conscious and its sequence faster, but not less real. 
Which is the right sequence of effects? 
The practice of advertising suggests that, whenever low involvement prevails, high 
levels of awareness can be enough to induce trial. Even so, it is not clear how things really 
work. Is it that awareness somehow improves immediately attitudes toward the brand 
before the trial purchase, something that, indicating a mere compression of the duration of 
some stages in the sequence of effects, would in fact confirm the validity of Lavidge-
Steiner model and protect the prevailing marketing paradigm? Or is it possible that the 
purchase takes place in the absence of any change of attitudes, an alternative that would 
threaten the very foundations of the theory? 
As soon as the late 1960s some researchers claimed that in some markets the change 
of attitudes followed instead of preceding the purchase experience (Joyce, 1998). According 
to this point of view, consumers appear to develop favorable or unfavorable attitudes 
toward brands after testing them personally and not as a result of advertising efforts. There 
simply was no theory capable of accounting for these facts, which explains why researchers 
that were confronted with them tended to consider such situations as anomalies. 
The FCB Planning Grid 
The first attempt to make sense of these phenomena is due to Vaughn (1980, 1986). 
Being a researcher at the FCB agency at the time he developed his model, it became known 
as the FCB Planning Grid. Vaughn assumed that the sequence of communication effects 
depends on the specific situation, which in turn is determined not only by the level of 
involvement, but also by the type of reaction of consumers to advertising itself. The 
combination of both criteria allowed him to identify four different types of situations, and 
therefore four fundamental communication strategies, each of them corresponding to a 
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given sequence of effects: 
1. High Involvement – Think. Examples: purchase of a car, a house, furniture or 
life insurance. The relevant sequence is “learn-feel-do”. Consumers actively 
search information, compare features and prices, ponder strengths and 
weaknesses and finally make a conscious decision. Recommendation: 
informative strategy, that is communication of facts and data that might 
influence the final decision. 
2. High involvement – Feel. Examples: purchase of jewels, cosmetics, fashion 
clothes or motorcycles. The relevant sequence is “feel-learn-do”. Consumers 
feel irresistibly attracted by the product, they gather information on it, and, 
finally, make a decision. Recommendation: affective strategy, that is lure the 
consumers by bringing to his mind relevant emotions that might attract him 
irresistibly to the brand. 
3. Low Involvement – Think. Examples: purchase of food and more common 
household products. The consumer is not very interested in the product, he tries 
it to see if he likes it, then evaluates its performance and can eventually develop 
some emotional bond with it. The relevant sequence is “do-learn-feel”. 
Recommendation: strategy of habit creation, that is induce routines that lead to 
habitual behavior. 
4. Low Involvement – Feel. Examples: Purchase of cigarettes, chocolate bars, 
beer or soft drinks. Consumers try the product through impulse and only 
become involved with it afterwards, first emotionally, then rationally. Sometimes 
social pressure can also be the key factor that triggers the purchase. The relevant 
sequence is “do-feel-learn”. Recommendation: hedonistic strategy, aimed at 
promoting self-indulging and self-gratifying attitudes. 
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The typification of these fundamental four situations resulting from the joint 
consideration of those two variables – level of involvement and type of intended reaction – 
then leads to the so-called FCB Grid: 
Figure 3.2 
The FCB Grid 
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Source: Vaughn (1980). 
Instead of a single sequence of effects we now have four, each of them being 
relevant to a different kind of situation. The inference is that the Lavidge-Steiner model 
only applies in situations of high involvement when a rational response is looked for, which 
means that in the other three cases other sequences of effects should be considered. 
The Rossiter-Percy Planning Grid 
Rossiter, Percy and Donovan (1991) later proposed an improvement to the FCB 
Grid, consisting in the substitution of the dichotomy between informational motivations 
on one side, and transformational motivations on the other, for the opposition beween 
thinking and feeling. According to Wells (1984), informational motivations are those that 
aim to solve a problem or remove factors of discomfort, while transformational 
motivations drive the individual to a more pleasant stage, even if the starting point is not 
altogether disagreeable. This welcome modification clarifies the four basic situations, since 
instead of consumer responses we now consider the motivations that originate those 
different responses. 
The abandonment of the alleged universality of the Lavidge-Steiner model seriously 
challenges many ideas and practices prevalent in mainstream marketing. Even so, it has not 
yet lead to a comprehensive reevaluation of the associated concepts and models; more 
specifically, it did not foster a revision of the current interpretation of purchase behavior. 
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In fact, both the FCB Grid and the Rossiter-Percy Grid can be interpreted as ad-hoc 
solutions to a deeper and more serious problem pertaining to the unrealism and inadequacy 
of the generally accepted theories on how marketing works. 
3.4.8 – The cognitive theory in a nutshell 
We are now in a position to summarize the main theses of mainstream modern 
marketing as they have been taught and practiced around the world since the 1960s28. 
According to this doctrine, the brand is the central element of the marketing process. 
Companies make and commercialize products or services, that is, things with certain 
physical and chemical properties, in the case of products, or activities with desired 
functional properties, in the case of services, but consumers buy brands, that is, bundles of 
benefits or utilities. Consumers look for two different kinds of benefits: functional benefits 
that can be rationally apprehended; and symbolic benefits, emotionally apprehended. 
Brands have a life of their own, determined both by their intrinsic features and the 
associations of ideas and feelings that come with them. As a consequence, it makes sense to 
talk of brand personality and brand values as deeper and inner foundations of its identity. 
In each given market, consumers compare the functional and symbolic benefits of the 
competing brands and choose those they feel more identified with. Different consumers 
will prefer different brands according to the benefits and attributes they most value, 
making it possible to identify distinct segments within the same market. So, to deserve the 
preference of a given group of consumers, companies should design their products in line 
with the tastes and preferences of well defined segments, taking in consideration all the 
elements of the marketing-mix that can influence the final decision, including the core 
product, the enlarged product, distribution, price, and so on. This operation is called 
marketing strategy. 
The main purpose of marketing communications is to create brand preference. 
Resorting to persuasive arguments, it aims to convince the public that the advertised brand 
suits best the situation of a certain target group, possibly a segment of a larger market. In 
                                                
28 One of the clearest and better articulated presentations of the key ideas that nowadays dominate 
the theory and the practice of marketing is to be found in Corstjens and Corstjens (1995), specially in Part I. 
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some cases, it uses mainly rational arguments, in others emotional ones are more 
appropriated. In both cases, the brand should project a consistent, positive, and, above all, 
appealing image as far as its core target is concerned. In some limit situations, when the 
competing brands are very similar, brand image can in fact become the sole choice factor. 
It is believed that in general advertising works by changing the public’s attitude 
toward the promoted brand. This change in turn leads, by a gradual but steady process, to 
the transformation of the structure of brand preferences and to the modification of 
purchase behavior. In short, advertising causes new attitudes and these in turn induce new 
behaviors. 
As the process of persuasion tends to be somewhat slow, sales promotions – and, 
among them, price promotions – are used to speed up the process of customer conversion 
(that is, the brand-switching process), by offering consumers extra incentives to change 
their brand allegiance. This explanation of how advertising works is known as the 
Awareness – Attitude – Behavior (AAB) model according to the particular sequence of 
effects that is believed to be appropriate. Marketing communications are committed to 
fulfill four general communication tasks described by the inter-brand migration model: (a) 
attraction of new users to the category, (b) brand-switching, (c) increased use, and (d) 
increased loyalty to the brand. 
It follows that strategic marketing management should focus on: 
a) Creating customer preference 
b) Increasing brand loyalty among acquired customers 
This way of understanding the aims of marketing management – nowadays so 
pervasive that it became almost indisputable – faces a number of problems, as already 
mentioned in the course of this exposition. Under its most extreme form, it is no longer 
accepted by many marketing researchers and practitioners, although it still dominates 
teaching and influences the most common public perceptions regarding what marketing is 
and how it works. Little by little, however, a still insufficiently articulated alternative 
approach has been gaining ground. In fact, the fragments of the new marketing theory 
have yet to be integrated into a comprehensive and coherent body of doctrine that might 
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rival the one that the successive editions of Kotler’s textbook have made so immensely 
popular. 
3.5 – THE NBD–DIRICHLET THEORY OF REPEAT-BUYING BEHAVIOR 
3.5.1 – Taking a closer look at the facts 
Following the neo-classical microeconomic theory, traditional buyer behavior 
models start from the premise that customers do make choices and that these choices are 
based on conscient decision processes. As a consequence, they aim to explain these choices 
and decisions, without questioning for a single moment their very existence. 
At the same time when Nicosia (1966), Howard and Sheth (1967, 1969), Engel, 
Kollat and Blackwell (1968), and many others were busy developing models of buyer 
behavior based on the analysis of choice and decision-making, Ehrenberg, a British 
statistician, chose a diametrically opposed research program: first of all, he started 
observing what consumers really do, collecting a large amount of data and looking for 
stable patterns of behavior (Ehrenberg, 1959; 1969). The explanation of this behavior 
should only be attempted later in the process29: 
“The repeat-buying theory developed here is descriptive. It describes how (rather than perhaps why) 
consumers behave as they do, and on what factors this does (or does not) depend. Before one can 
explain the individual consumer’s decision-process and behavior, one needs to know and understand 
the overt behavior that has to be explained – what generalisable regularities there are and what 
apparent inconsistencies. And knowing the factors from which one can successfully predict 
consumer behavior (and especially also the factors which do not matter in this respect) does in fact 
already provide major insights into its nature.” (Ehrenberg, 1988, viii) 
During a time span of several decades he patiently accumulated a considerable 
amount of information on the purchase and consumption of various products in various 
countries, allowing him to detect and study the occurrence of certain patterns of buyer 
behavior. Ehrenberg’s attention was focused on the regularities of the so-called repeat-
buying behavior, a situation typical not only of fast-moving consumer goods such as food, 
                                                
29 Detailed presentations of the research undertaken and of the empirical conclusions reached are to 
be found in Ehrenberg (1972, 1988), Ehrenberg, Goodhart and Barwise (1990) and Ehrenberg (1991). The 
ideas of Ehrenberg are also summarized and discussed by Jones (1986), McDonald (1992) and East (1997). 
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beverages, house cleaning or personal hygiene, but also of certain industrial goods markets 
where routine buying prevails, such as fuel, packaging or office products. This analysis 
excluded durable consumer products infrequently purchased (cars, appliances, furniture or 
books, for instance), as well as industrial equipment and machinery30. 
Consumer markets where repeat-buying is to be found share a certain number of 
features. In most of them, demand is stable or grows moderately. In these typically mature 
categories the benefits offered by the products are very well known by the consumers, who 
therefore have no need for additional information on them. The competition is usually 
oligopolistic because the market is disputed by a relatively small number of established and 
familiar brands. The degree of functional differentiation between the competing brands is 
never very large. The products are mainly sold in large retail shops, such as supermarkets 
and hypermarkets. But, above everything else, the frequency of purchase is very high: in 
some exceptional cases it can be daily (bread, cigarettes, newspapers), more often it will be 
weekly or bi-monthly (milk, margarine, edible oil), in even more cases it will be monthly or 
quarterly (detergents, shampoos, soluble coffee). Finally, a low involvement relationship 
commonly prevails for all these categories and brands, meaning that they are not related to 
serious choices for the life of the consumers that require their conscious attention or their 
effort. 
Repeat-buy markets lend themselves better to the detection of purchasing 
regularities because it is possible to observe a single person buying more than once the 
same product during a short period of time – whether that period is a week, a month, a 
quarter, or even a year. Inasmuch as the consumer deals with low involvement products of 
a low unit price he tends to exhibit in repeat-buying a tendency to develop buying habits 
that crystallize into routines. 
                                                
30 The full list presented by Ehrenberg of markets where the empirical patterns and theories were 
found to hold include: aviation fuel, biscuits, breakfast cereals, butter, canned vegetables, cat and dog foods, 
cocoa, coffee, confectionery, convenience foods, cooking fats, cosmetics, detergents, disinfectants, flour, 
food drinks, gasoline, household soaps, household cleaners, instant potatoes, jams and jellies, margarine, 
motor oil, polishes, processed cheese, refrigerated dough, sausages, shampoos, soft drinks, soup, take-home 
beer, toilet paper, toilet soap, TV programs (Ehrenberg, 1988). 
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The key feature of these markets is stationarity, which means that they do not 
change much, either in total sales volume or in their structure. Of course, some changes 
take place, such as global decline of the category, launch of new brands or changes in 
market share, but they are usually slow and take years to unfold. Markets may also show 
sudden changes because of promotional activity, but the subsequent gains and losses do 
not last for long. Such brief convulsions have no impact in the medium to long term, 
typically from three months to a year. This can be interpreted as meaning that exogenous 
variables such as marketing stimulus only play a secondary role in consumer behavior, thus 
justifying the choice of stochastic models to analyze buying behavior. 
In repeat-buying stable markets we therefore expect people to form stable 
propensities or habits of purchase that they change only under exceptional circumstances. 
One of the shortcomings of the models we will be reviewing is that they leave aside the 
problem of what these special circumstances might be. 
3.5.2 – The key variables 
The total sales of a brand are a consequence of the value taken by a number of 
variables, as shown in the following formula known as the sales equation31: 
Sales of the brand during a given time period = Total number of households in the 
country (A) 
 x Absolute penetration rate (B) 
 x Average purchase frequency (C) 
 x Average number of packs  bought by 
purchase occasion  (D) 
 x Average dimension per pack (E) 
 
The basic building block of the analysis is the purchase occasion, which takes place 
anytime a consumer buys one or more packs of any brand. In most situations consumers 
buy one pack at each purchase occasion, but of course it does not have to be that way. 
Since the number of households is a given, total sales of a brand during a certain period of 
time are the result of absolute brand penetration (proportion of households that bought 
the brand at least once during the period), average purchase frequency (average number of 
                                                
31 This equation was inspired by the decomposition of the determining elements of market share as 
put forward by Parfitt and Collins (1968). 
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purchase occasions of the brand during the period) and average purchase (which is in turn 
determined by two other factors: average number of packs purchased on each occasion and 
average dimension per pack). 
By definition, the total number of households (A) is the same for every brand 
competing in a given product category. As to the number of packs bought in each occasion 
(D) and the average dimension of the pack purchased (E), Ehrenberg reports that they do 
not change significantly from one brand to another, given that, on average, people tend to 
buy the same quantity on every purchase occasion, regardless of the chosen brand. Setting 
aside, as irrelevant for our purpose, variables (A), (D) e (E), we therefore conclude that the 
sales of any single brand are primarily determined by two factors: 
a) Its penetration rate, that is, the proportion of households that purchase the 
brand at least once during a certain period of time; 
b) Its purchase frequency, that is, the average number of times that the brand is 
bought during this same period by each consuming household. 
Ehrenberg therefore focused his attention on these two dimensions of buyer 
behavior. On the other hand, instead of asking people what brands they bought, he decided 
instead to observe their actual behavior, analyzing data from consumer panels, that is, from 
samples of housewives that agreed to register in writing their purchases during relatively 
long periods of time. Thus was created an extensive database covering decades of 
information of dozens of diversified markets in the United States, in Europe, and in Japan. 
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3.5.3 – Buyer behavior patterns 
The main conclusions of Ehrenberg will be briefly summarized in the following 
sections32: 
Universality of purchase patterns  
The purchase processes of coffee and prescription drugs differ substantially in their 
motivations, involvement, buying influences, circumstances and point of sale, not to 
mention the diversity of marketing strategies and tactics used in those markets. Among 
these differences, the most significant one is that coffee purchase is a free decision of the 
consumer, while in the case of the prescribed drug purchase the decision about the 
opportunity of the purchase and the brand choice are entirely in the hands of the doctor, 
given his special professional qualifications. Even so, it has been found that the purchase 
patterns of both situations are remarkably similar (Stern and Ehrenberg, 1995). 
The repeat-buying behavior of consumers follows a pattern that remains 
unchanged from one category to another, that is, it is not dependent on the type of good 
under consideration, on the brand itself or on other external factors such as advertising, 
pricing or distribution33. Likewise, it doesn’t change from one country to another – it seems 
to be reasonably unaffected by habits, cultures or diversified commercial practices – or by 
the passing of time. The same pattern is found whenever a “stationary” situation prevails in 
the market, with flat sales showing no definite tendency to increase or decrease, a very 
common situation in most fast-moving consumer markets. 
                                                
32 These results are described and explained by East (1997), specially in Chapter 3: “Stationary 
markets”. For a synthetic presentation by Ehrenberg himself see Ehrenberg (1991). 
33 It has been found that similar patterns also apply to supermarket visits (Keng and Ehrenberg, 
1984; Wrigley and Dunn, 1984) and television viewing (Goodhart, Ehrenberg and Collins, 1987). 
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Patterns of repeat-buying 
Whenever two adjacent sales periods are compared, we find that a number of the 
buyers of the brand who purchased it in the first period do not return in the second period. 
These ‘lapsed’ buyers are usually replaced by a similar number of so-called ‘new’ buyers, 
both being mostly light buyers who do not purchase the product very often. In the third 
period again approximately the same proportion of buyers drop out and are replaced by 
others. This intermittent pattern of purchase is not caused by a real loss of customers. It 
only means that a very large proportion of customers buy a brand so infrequently that they 
sometimes or very often do not do it in any given time period. This explains, by the way, 
why repeat-purchase rates are determined mainly by purchase frequency and only 
secondarily by penetration. 
Consumers tend to create certain purchase routines, such as shopping once every 
week or once every month and doing it preferably at a given day of the week or even at a 
given time of the day. We might call this kind of behavior loyalty to a particular day or a 
particular time of the day. Yet, despite the routine timing of visits to the supermarket, 
brands are usually bought at basically irregular intervals. For this reason, the specific 
purchase of a specific brand appears quite random, following approximately a random 
Poisson statistical distribution, especially whenever the length of the analyzed period is 
equal or larger than the average category inter-purchase interval. 
On the other hand, buyers differ markedly regarding the quantities of a given 
product that they acquire during a year, which is approximated by their purchase 
frequencies. The frequency distribution of the amount of product purchased by a sample 
of consumers has a Gamma distribution where the large majority of them are located close 
to the low purchase frequency range. Very few people in each market can be classified as 
heavy consumers, although these usually account for a relatively higher proportion of total 
purchases: as a rule of thumb, the light consumers buying 50% are responsible for about 
20% of all purchases while the heavy consumers buying 50% account for the other 80%. 
This breakdown suggests that heavy buyers are a particularly attractive target for marketing 
initiatives. 
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Single brand purchase and the NBD theory 
The shapes of the Poisson and Gamma distributions of a given brand depend only 
on its penetration rate and purchase frequency. This means that two brands competing in 
two completely distinct product categories (coffee and prescription drugs, for instance) will 
exhibit similar repeat-buying patterns provided their penetration rates and purchase 
frequencies are identical. However, it has been found that, in fact, the repeat-buying 
patterns depend mostly on purchase frequency and not much on penetration. 
The Negative Binomial Distribution34 (NBD) is a mathematical model that allows 
us to predict the purchase repetition of a brand and other measures based on the 
knowledge of penetration, purchase frequency and the time period. The so-called NBD 
theory put forward by Ehrenberg (1959, 1969, 1972, 1988) and others (Morrison and 
Schmittlein, 1981; 1988) is based on the presuppositions that the total sales of a brand are 
stable, that the individual purchases follow a Poisson distribution, and that the long term 
average buying rates of the individuals follow a Gamma distribution (see Table 3.1 bellow). 
The NBD model is adequate to analyze the behavior of a single brand, but we must resort 
to the Dirichlet model, which will be covered later, when a group of brands is at stake. 
Table 3.1 
A Stochastic Model Over Time Yielding the NBD in Any Given Period 
 
Successive Time-Periods Consumer 
1 2 3 4 5 . 
Long-run 
Averages  
Horizontal 
distribu-
tions 
A x X X x x x µ Poisson 
B x x X x x x µ Poisson 
C x x X x x x µ Poisson 
D x x X x x x µ Poisson 
D x x X x x x µ Poisson 
E x x X x x x µ Poisson 
. x x X x x x µ Poisson 
Mean m m M m m m M  
Vertical 
distributions 
NBD NBD NBD NBD NBD NBD Gamma  
Source: Ehrenberg (1988). 
                                                
34 The Negative Binomial Distribution is covered in standard introductory and intermediate level 
statistics textbooks, such as Hoel (1971), Mood, Graybill and Boes (1974) or Pestana and Velosa (2002). 
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The knowledge of a brand’s penetration rate and purchase frequency allow very 
precise estimates of the remaining variables that characterize the behavior of its customers, 
not only in the observed period but also in the following one. The possibility of predicting 
the purchase repetition rate is probably one of the most interesting features of the NBD 
model. If, for instance, 10% of consumers buy on average 1.5 times brand X during a given 
time period, then 45% of these people will buy it again an average of 1.8 times during the 
next time period; as to the other 55%, they will not be lost forever, because they are mostly 
regular but infrequent customers. Among the dependent variables predicted by penetration 
and frequency are also the number of customers that buy the brand one, two or more times 
during one time period, the proportion of customers who also buy other brands and the 
proportion of customers that, having abstained from purchasing the brand at a given time 
period, will do so again in the next period. These figures are estimated with the help of the 
NBD model. 
The repeat buying patterns are not specific to the individual brand or even to the 
product category. Any two products with similar average purchase frequency will exhibit 
the same repeat buying patterns; as a consequence, as all brands in the same market display 
very similar purchase frequencies, their repeat buying patterns will also be approximately 
the same. The NBD model confirms that, as a rule, repeat buying patterns show no 
tendency to erode as time passes: the fact that a certain proportion of customers who 
bought brand A in period 1 do not buy it in period 2 does not mean that they switched 
permanently to competing brands, only that they do not purchase the item frequently 
enough to buy the brand in all periods; under normal conditions, they will very likely buy it 
again in periods 3 or 4.  There is therefore no need to panic, as very often happens when 
wrongly interpreted data is taken as proof that the brand is loosing customers to the 
competition as a result of poor loyalty. Likewise, nearly all of the so-called “new 
customers” are just infrequent customers who, for this very reason, did not show up at the 
supermarket during the previous time period. The essential stability of markets reveals itself 
very clearly when longer periods are analyzed, thus proving that the “leaking bucket” 
theory, according to which brands should continually strive to conquer new customers in 
order to make up for the lost ones, is basically flawed. The detection of really anomalous 
situations of conquest or loss or customers can only be confirmed by comparing the 
 112 
number of clients apparently “won” or “lost” with the theoretical values predicted by the 
relevant statistical distribution. 
Brand loyalty 
Research on brand loyalty began with work by Copeland (1923) on sole brand 
loyalty, an extreme situation where 100% of preferences go to a single brand. Only much 
later could consumer panels replace questionnaires, a notoriously unreliable method, as the 
prime source of information on loyalty behavior. Brown (1952, 1953) found four different 
patterns of purchase behavior: 
1. Single (sole) brand loyalty 
2. Divided (multiple) brand loyalty 
3. Unstable loyalty (continuous switching from brand to brand) 
4. No brand loyalty 
After analyzing sequences of brand purchases, Brown concluded that the majority 
of consumers showed single or divided loyalty. Cunningham (1956) confirmed the 
existence of multi-brand loyalty and defined first-brand loyalty as the proportion of 
purchase directed to the household’s most popular brand. 
Ehrenberg (1988) insists that brand loyalty must be considered an absolutely 
exceptional phenomenon, if we understand by loyalty the exclusive purchase of a single 
brand during a long period of time (that is, single brand loyalty). There are very few 
exceptions to this rule. For most grocery items, between 80 and 90 % of the consumers of 
a given brand do not buy another brand in any given week; but, if we observe a period of 
half a year, that proportion decreases to 30 %; and, if we further increase it to a full year, it 
decreases even further to something like 10 %. Sole brand loyalty therefore decreases as the 
number of purchases of the category increases. These figures reflect the fact that the large 
majority of sole brand buyers are, in fact, light users whose consumption rates are so low 
that they only buy the product once in a full year. Thus, this so-called loyalty is not a 
consequence of brand allegiance but of a total lack of opportunities to be disloyal. For any 
brand, both the number of exclusive buyers and the number of buyers that it shares with 
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other brands only depend on the penetration rate of that brand. 
Therefore, it only makes sense to talk about the brand loyalty of a certain consumer 
as a propensity to buy it more often than its rivals during a certain time span. Brand loyalty 
can at most be viewed as a relative and probabilistic phenomenon, not as an absolute and 
exclusive relationship of the consumer with a preferred brand. 
East and Hammond (1996) designed an experience to measure allegiance (i.e. the 
tendency to stay with the same brand for a long period of time) in fast-moving consumers 
goods. They report that, when sales are stationary, a typical brand is losing and 
simultaneously gaining 15% of its buyers each year and that brand leaders showed lower 
brand erosion than other brands. In other words, 85% of customers are still loyal at the 
end of a year and the erosion in loyalty falls off after the first year. According to these 
findings, although customer erosion is relatively weak, marketing managers must conduct 
double-edged strategies aimed at retaining existing customers while at the same time 
recruiting new ones. 
Share of category requirements is a useful measure of the bonding between 
customers and the brands they usually buy35. Hammond and East (1997) found that market 
share, share of category requirements, repeat purchase and first-brand loyalty are 
correlated, which means that the leading brand tends to perform better on all those scores. 
As will be confirmed when we will mention the phenomenon of “double jeopardy”, the 
bigger the brand the more loyal are the customers according to those measures. This 
normal pattern precludes the observation of strong niche effects in mature markets, in 
other words, it is not common for brands with modest market shares to show exceptionally 
high loyalty levels. 
                                                
35 The share of category requirements (SCR) should not be confused with the previously mentioned 
first-brand loyalty (1BL), because SCR includes all buyers of the brand whereas the 1BL is calculated only for 
those buyers who place the brand first. 
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The brand repertory 
Consumers tend to stay with a repertory of brands (two, three, or more) that they 
deem satisfactory in each product category, and thereafter to choose in each purchase 
occasion among this pre-established set in a reasonably random fashion. Besides, heavy 
consumers tend to exhibit, given equal time periods, larger brand repertories than light 
users. As a consequence, the concept of brand preference must also be relativized – it 
would be more appropriate to speak of preference for a set of brands as compared to the 
remaining ones competing in the category. The selected brand repertory shows a highly 
stable pattern, very likely because of a tendency to stick to established habits. As to the 
ongoing alternated purchase of several brands, it might be motivated either by the 
recognition of different functional features that recommend them to different use 
situations, or by the pure and simple wish for variety in order to counter boredom 
provoked by habitual behavior. 
In any case, there are no signs that brand-switching might be a common and 
relevant phenomenon. In a market where three brands compete (say A, B e C), if brand-
switching took place we would expect the sequence of choices in successive purchase 
occasions to follow a pattern such as, for instance: A-A-A-A-B-B-C-B-B-B-B, reflecting the 
fact that a regular buyer of brand A would at a certain point in time change his preference 
to brand B, in spite of having also occasionally bought brand C, which clearly did not 
please him. In the real world, however, the purchase sequence is more likely to resemble 
this one: A-A-B-C-A-C-C-C-B-A-B-A-C (Ehrenberg, 1988). 
The importance of the penetration rate 
The main factor separating the performance of one brand from another is the 
penetration rate, since, unlike purchase frequency, it varies widely from brand to brand. It 
is very common for the top selling brand to have a penetration rate six, seven or even eight 
times larger then the weakest brand in the market; but it is very rare for a brand to manage 
a purchase frequency twice as large as the next one. It follows from this that loyalty is not  
usually a major factor in the performance of a brand. 
It is interesting to note that the levels of purchase frequency settle very fast after 
the launch of a new product to a level common to other brands in the category. Ehrenberg 
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calls this “near-instant loyalty”, thus stressing that empirical observations also dispel 
allegations that brands slowly develop a closer and stronger bond with consumers as time 
goes by (Ehrenberg and Goodhart, 2000). In this case, what might be the role for loyalty 
programs if consumers spontaneously tend to reach the loyalty patterns that can be 
possibly attained in the specific conditions of each market? 
The similarity of purchase frequencies among brands is in itself a surprising fact, 
dismissing as irrelevant common marketing practices aimed at inducing increases in 
purchasing frequencies of brands, and, as a consequence, increases in consumer loyalty, 
which apparently produce no results whatsoever. The very idea of niche markets – very 
small groups of consumers whose high consumption rate allow their survival in spite of a 
minimal penetration rate – is challenged as the conditions of its viability apparently seldom 
occur. 
The market share of a brand therefore depends mainly on its penetration rate in 
households that are part of the target market. The main difference between the leading 
brand and the lesser brand in a market is that many households buy the first one, while 
fewer households buy the second one. 
Double jeopardy 
Another interesting phenomenon: although, as previously mentioned, the 
frequency of purchase varies very little from a brand to another, whatever difference there 
is seems to favor the leading brands, since brands with higher market shares, and 
particularly the top brand, also show a frequency of purchase clearly superior to the average 
of the remaining brands36. This additional advantage benefiting high penetration brands 
was variously named “double jeopardy” (McPhee, 1963) or “penetration supercharge” 
(Jones, 1986). The sociologist William McPhee is credited with being the first one to note 
this phenomenon in 1963 in very diverse contexts, namely readers of comic strips and 
listeners of radio shows (East, 1997). Compared to the most popular comic strip, those 
followed by fewer readers were also less appreciated by the few people that used to read 
                                                
36 All these results were confirmed by more recent research. See namely McQueen, Sylvester and 
Moore (1998), reporting a study of 1,251 brands during two years using data from a pannel of 82,000 homes. 
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them. McPhee thereafter named this effect “double jeopardy”: less popular brands are not 
only bought by fewer people (lower penetration) but are also bought less often (lower 
frequency) by those who do buy them. In other words, they enjoy both fewer customers 
and less loyal ones. 
Heavy consumers 
All brands competing in the same market tend to show the same proportion of 
heavy consumers. Furthermore, the proportion of sales accounted for by heavy consumers 
is also similar across brands. For instance, if approximately 20% of the consumers of brand 
A are heavy, and if these consumers account for say 50% of that brand’s sales, we can be 
reasonably sure that the other brands will match very closely these proportions. Therefore, 
it is not obvious what brands will gain from segmenting their markets according to how 
heavy consumers are. Finally, as previously stated, for purely arithmetical reasons, the 
heavier a consumer is the larger the probability that, in a given period of time, he will have 
purchased a larger repertory of brands. 
The duplication of purchase law 
The number of brands integrating the consumer repertory is a function of the wish 
for variety. In the American market of instant coffee, for instance, the average share of 
category requirements was found to be about 30% for each competing brand; in the British 
market for gasoline, this figure came down to 20%; in the markets of breakfast cereals in 
both countries, where variety is specially valued, it was even lower. Commenting these 
figures, Ehrenberg remarked: “your buyers are the buyers of other brands who occasionally 
buy from you” (Ehrenberg, 1988). 
What does this tells us about how people move from one brand to another? 
Looking at data on cross-purchasing of brands, it is possible to see in what proportion 
buyers of brand A also buy the remaining brands B, C, D, and so on. The evidence shows 
that the frequency of purchase of other brands is directly proportional to the penetration of 
those other brands. Ehrenberg calls this the “duplication of purchase law” (Ehrenberg, 
1988). A logical implication of this law is that there is no segmentation in such markets, 
given that, if such segmentation existed, people would tend to consider some brands as 
closer substitutes than others as a consequence of perceived similarities among them. 
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Ehrenberg sustains that traces of segmentation can only be detected when there are real 
and clear differences of product formulation (powder versus liquid detergents, or leaded 
versus unleaded gasoline, for instance) or pricing; but he strongly denies any relevance to 
intangible factors such as brand image. 
Ehrenberg’s duplication of purchase law also implies that brand-switching does not 
play an important role in consumer purchase behavior. If consumers did in fact compare 
brands and, in this process, developed and consolidated brand preferences, a tendency 
should be evident for some brands to substitute for others. Stochastic models of brand 
choice were precisely adopted by marketing academics and practitioners to describe these 
brand-switching processes. 
Markov models of the first order assume that the last brand chosen affects the 
current purchase. Probability transition matrixes can therefore be used to forecast future 
market shares on the basis of the present ones. Several critical assumptions are present in 
Markov models, including purchase timing (one purchase per time period), homogeneity, 
and stationarity (Lilien, Kotler and Moorthy, 1992). Panel data is currently used to estimate 
transition matrixes on an aggregated level. 
Learning models, on the other hand, are based on the idea that present brand 
purchases depend not only on the last one, but on the whole story of past choices. At the 
individual level, each brand purchase increases the chance of future purchases (Lilien, 
Kotler and Moorthy, 1992). This reinforcement model was originally developed when 
Kuehn (1962) applied a learning model to a consumer choice problem. 
The last class of stochastic models (called zero-order) assumes, on the contrary, 
that no purchase-event feedback exists, which means that the probability that a certain 
brand is chosen at each given moment is constant and does not depend on previous 
purchases (Ehrenberg, 1972). Ehrenberg’s duplication of purchase law clearly favors zero-
order over Markov or learning models (Kalwani and Morrison, 1977; Bass et al., 1984). 
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Multi-brand purchase and the Dirichlet model 
The NBD model is adequate to analyze the behavior of a single brand, but we must 
resort to the Dirichlet model (based on the Dirichlet or multivariate Beta distribution37) 
when a group of brands is at stake. To the assumptions of the NBD model a new one must 
be added: that no partition exists in the market, or, in more common language, that there 
are no clear-cut market segments. The Dirichlet model, a stochastic formulation of buyer 
behavior at the individual consumer level, was anticipated by Chatfield and Goodhart 
(1975) and later developed by Bass, Jeuland and Wright (1976). It received its final form in 
Goodhart, Ehrenberg and Chatfield (1984). 
The inputs to a Dirichlet analysis are: 
a) The penetration of the product category 
b) The purchase frequency for the category as a whole 
c) The number of competing brands and the market shares of the individual 
brands 
The output of the model includes predictions of penetration, purchase frequency, 
sole buyers, sole buyer purchase frequency, proportions of buyers at different frequencies 
and sales distributions for single brands or for the whole category. These figures give us the 
theoretical market position of a brand in relation to other brands and is therefore very 
useful to evaluate the brand performance. In most studied cases the observed values come 
very close to the ones predicted by the Dirichlet model, except if one or more of its 
presuppositions are violated  - for instance, if the conditions of market stability or non-
partition are absent (Ehrenberg, Goodhart and Barwise, 1990). When discrepancies show 
up they can usually be explained by certain special and temporary circumstances. 
We would expect marketing strategies and tactics to create significant deviations 
from the theoretical values predicted by the Dirichlet, as a result, for example, of loyalty 
                                                
37 Regarding the Dirichlet distribution, the multivariate extension of the beta distribution, see 
Balakrishnan and Nevzorov (2003). 
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programs, but the fact is that such deviations seldom or never happen. Excess behavioral 
loyalty is really very difficult to find (Fader and Schmittlein, 1993), a result that raises 
serious doubts regarding marketing strategies designed to attain that result. 
3.5.4 – Attitudes revisited 
The role of attitudes 
If brands do not differ much from one another from the point of view of the 
purchasing behavior associated to them, except that some have more customers than 
others, then no large differences regarding motivations, perceptions and attitudes toward 
them should be expected. That is precisely what seems to happen. 
Attitudes vary considerably when we compare users with non-users of a brand, 
being consistently more positive among the former – which means very simply that, as 
should be expected, consumers like best the brands they use. It is interesting to note, 
however, that attitudes hardly change from brand to brand when we only question each 
brand’s users. The following example is mentioned by Ehrenberg (1974): “67% of users of 
Brand A say that it has the “right taste”, with only 6% of nonusers of A saying so about it, 
and 69% of users of Brand B say that B has the “right taste” with only 5% of nonusers of 
B saying so, and so on”. In other words, giving an evaluative response about a brand 
largely depends on whether or not a consumer is using it. Given that, in the previous 
example, the penetration of Brand A is much larger than the penetration of Brand B, a 
general survey of the market will necessarily conclude that brand A is favored by 
consumers over B – a flawed interpretation as a consequence of looking at the data from 
an exclusively aggregated perspective. Usually, it will be found that stating that a brand is 
the preferred one is identical to stating that it is the best-selling one (Bird, Channon and 
Ehrenberg, 1969; Bird and Ehrenberg, 1966; Bird and Ehrenberg, 1970 ). 
Do people buy a brand because they prefer it, or do they instead prefer it because 
they use it? The traditional view favors the former alternative, but there seems to be good 
grounds to choose the latter one (Ehrenberg, 1974). 
 120 
Attitude transformation 
In clear contrast to the prevailing marketing theory, Bird and Ehrenberg (1966) did 
not confirm that people must change their attitudes previously to the purchase of a brand. 
Thus, no attitude change takes place before a brand is bought for the first time; attitudes 
only change later, specially after the customer starts using it regularly. Moreover, there is a 
causal process from usage to stated intention of purchase, but not reverse causality that 
leads from intention to purchase. 
Barnard, Barwise and Ehrenberg (1986) found that the percentage of people stating 
that a brand had an attribute was constant, but that only half of the people who credited a 
brand with an attribute maintained that opinion on the next occasion. This stochastic 
pattern mimics the irregularity of purchase. Delving further into the matter, Barnard (1987) 
reported that people were more likely to associate positive attitudes with brands they were 
currently using, and that a large part of the variation in brand attributions is associated with 
usage. 
The examples usually cited to support the opposite claim, according to which 
advertising would have the power to affect powerfully the predispositions of consumers 
toward brands, reveal themselves, after careful scrutiny, not entirely convincing. The 
celebrated Marlboro campaign, for instance, is frequently cited as a highly commendable 
example of how the transformation of attitudes through advertising can produce 
spectacular commercial successes. This is how Assael explains the phenomenon: 
“In the mid-1950s, Philip Morris, the brand’s producer, decided to reposition Marlboro from an 
elite cigarette aimed at women smokers to a new filtered cigarette aimed at men who were heavy 
smokers. The company needed a symbol to attract the blue collar male segment that was the 
heaviest-smoking group. In a stroke of genius, the company decided on the cowboy, a figure that 
male smokers associated with dominance and masculinity. As the advertising campaign ran, smokers 
began to learn to associate Marlboro with the cowboy. Many of them tried the brand. The 
association of the product with the cowboy established a positive attitude toward the Marlboro and 
led these consumers to try it again. Repetitive advertising reinforced use of the brand. As a result, 
many consumers became brand loyal.” (Assael, 1992, p. 66) 
As it happens, however, this report ignores some key aspects of the facts. The 
success of the Marlboro brand began with the modification of three different features of 
the product: (a) a new type of filter that helped preserve the original flavor of the cigarette; 
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(b) a new type of flip-flop crush-proof box; and (c) a new and distinctive package design. 
On the other hand, the re-launch of Marlboro benefited enormously from the expansion of 
the overall filter cigarettes market, fueled by emerging concerns over the health problems 
derived from tobacco. As a consequence, the filter segment grew from 1% of the general 
cigarette market in 1950 to 60% in the mid-1960s (Ehrenberg, 1974).  
Therefore, this much vaunted case of success of the power of advertising to induce 
major changes in attitudes seems instead to confirm that the use experience, stepped on 
real and preferably differentiating product features, is really the key to transform the 
attitudes of consumers toward brands. 
Promotions 
Price promotions are commonly justified by their ability to attract new customers. 
It is expected that these, after trying the brand, change their attitudes and, as a 
consequence, become regular users. Promotions would therefore also have a long term 
effect, different from and much more valuable than their short term impact. 
However, the available empirical evidence refutes these allegations (Ehrenberg and 
Hammond, 2001), first and foremost because promotions launched by established brands 
fail to attract new customers. In the case of a promotion launched by a brand of detergent 
in the United Kingdom, 96% of the buyers had already bought it at some point of time 
during the previous five years. In another instance (Ehrenberg, Hammond and Goodhart, 
1994) 93% of those responding to price-cutting promotions for major brands had bought 
the brand in the previous 2½ years. As very few genuine triers are attracted by these special 
offers, it is not surprising that no long term enduring positive effect is detected either. To 
conclude, price promotions can benefit smaller, latecomer and thus relatively unknown 
brands that strive to increase their penetration, but are almost always negative for 
established and powerful brands. 
 122 
3.5.5 – The role of advertising 
The discoveries of Ehrenberg and his followers also bear on the role played by 
advertising in the transformation or reinforcement of purchase behavior. We will next 
review some of their most relevant findings. 
The crucial fact to note is the remarkable short-term stability of consumers’ 
attitudes toward brands, suggesting that they remain strangely indifferent to the intense and 
almost frantic marketing activity of the several competing brands, a typical phenomenon in 
repeat-buying markets. At least in the short term, the continuous advertising and 
promotional campaigns and counter-campaigns appear to be rather ineffective regarding 
their stated purpose of influencing brand preference. 
Advertising and attitudes 
As previously stated, the attitudes of consumers toward brands seem to be mainly 
determined by their direct use experience, not by what advertising says about them. How 
can we then harmonize this with the importance usually attributed to the sequence 
          Awareness  Attitude  Behavior 
to explain the influence of advertising on purchase behavior? In Ehrenberg’s view, 
there is no alternative but to substitute another model for this one. The new model states 
that advertising works in a very different way from what is commonly accepted. Therefore, 
an alternative sequence of effects is in order (Ehrenberg, 1974):  
 Awareness  Trial  Reinforcement 
According to this conjecture, in the markets where low involvement prevails the 
mere awareness that a brand exists may be sufficient to stimulate trial, given that, on one 
side, curiosity stimulates the consumer to try something new, and that, on the other side, 
no relevant inhibitions exist that might dissuade him from doing so, as the risks involved 
(whether economical, technical, psychological or social) are truly insignificant. 
If the product is good, trial will stand a good chance of satisfying the consumer and 
stimulating him to repeat the experience, so that it will be thereafter included in the brand 
repertory. Advertising will from then on accomplish the modest but valuable task of 
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reinforcing the use experience, namely by adding emotional values to the brand. This 
conjecture is consistent with the well known fact that consumers pay more attention to the 
advertising of the brands they use than to the advertising of those they don’t (Engel, 1963). 
On the other hand, it is only too natural that people tend to be skeptical of the alleged 
superiority boasted by brands before having had a chance to try them. On the contrary, 
they commonly change their minds afterwards in order to reduce the discrepancy between 
what they do and what they think. This phenomenon is known as “cognitive dissonance” 
(Festinger, 1957; 1964). 
A weak and deffensive force 
As can be seen, advertising clearly plays in this theory a secondary role when 
compared with the merits of the product itself. For Ehrenberg (1974) advertising has two 
main features: 
1. It is a weak force. This in turn means two things: on one hand, it is powerless 
if the product itself is no good; on the other hand, it is much more powerful 
when it strives to reinforce behavior than when it aims to transform it. 
2. It plays a predominantly defensive role. Instead of persuading people to trade 
one brand for another based on alleged superior features, its true vocation is to 
stimulate them to go on purchasing a brand they already use and enjoy. 
These hypotheses are affiliated to a school of opinion according to which 
rationality (although of a special kind) really drives the behavior of consumers, who should 
not be considered ignorant fools. In the case of frequently purchased goods, consumers 
know intimately the products they currently use; besides, they hear their family and friends 
comment favorably or unfavorably on the competing brands. Ehrenberg vehemently 
summarized this point of view: “The average housewife is far more experienced in buying 
her normal products than the industrial purchaser buying an atomic power station. She is 
also far less likely to make a mistake” (Ehrenberg, 1974). 
Consumers do not ignore that, sometimes, the differences among competing 
brands are really small. In this kind of situation the rational attitude consists in choosing a 
small number of brands that in the past proved satisfactory and then in purchasing them 
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alternatively in order to satisfy their wish for variety, that is, in order to avoid boredom. 
This desire for variety also stimulates them to try a new brand from time to time, even if 
this random deviation from routine seldom sticks and becomes a new habit. 
Awareness – Trial - Reinforcement 
The repeat-buying phenomenon and the way consumers usually behave can be 
described by a simple sequence of three events: (a) acknowledgement that a brand exists; 
(b) first trial; (c) reinforcement of the initial trial that thereafter becomes a habit. 
Some kind of brand awareness must always come first, even if only when the 
consumer becomes acquainted with it either on the supermarket shelves or at some family 
or neighbor’s home. Awareness can be created in many ways, advertising being only one of 
them. In turn, the recognition that a certain brand exists can induce someone to look for it 
in the supermarket, to search for information about it or to ask someone else for his 
opinion on it. 
The next step, trial purchase, does not imply a previous intention to buy, much less 
the conviction that the proposed brand is excellent or better than its competitors. It should 
not be forgotten that we are dealing with low involvement products, therefore the risk of 
buying something that does not prove to be entirely satisfactory is insignificant. The trial 
purchase can occur for a number of reasons: stock depletion of the usually purchased 
brands, launch promotion of a new brand, wish to break the routine, and so on. 
People however tend to go back to their habitual brands as if nothing had 
happened after having tried a new brand, specially if they were moved by a mere 
opportunistic motivation of taking advantage from an alluring price promotion. This return 
to the norm is common even when the level of satisfaction generated by the trial purchase 
was reasonable but not exceptional. The second purchase is therefore the crucial moment 
that decides the future growth outlook of a brand and, in consequence, its long term 
success. As it happens, the possibility of creating a purchase habit is decisively influenced 
by the capacity the brand shows to reinforce and enhance that experience. 
Obviously, advertising can play a role in any of the before mentioned three steps of 
the sequence Awareness – Trial – Reinforcement. First, it can create, awaken or reinforce 
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awareness. Second, it can stimulate trial concurrently with a simultaneous improvement of 
the product or of its packaging, with a price reduction or with some special and temporary 
promotional offer. Finally, it can help turn trialists into regular customers, and it can also 
induce existing customers to stay loyal to the brand. It is in this last capacity that 
advertising truly plays a unique role. 
Repetitive advertising thus plays a predominantly defensive role in the promotion 
of established brands. Its main purpose is to reinforce consumption habits and attitudes 
that were formed through the repeated use of the brand. In stabilized repeat-buying 
markets advertising is definitely not effective when it comes to change attitudes, and for 
this reason its main role should be to reinforce the existing perceptions and attitudes. The 
available research does not confirm that regular buyers of Brand A value it more than the 
regular buyers of Brand B value the brand they usually purchase. Consumers are perfectly 
happy to know that a brand they buy has all the qualities that a good product is expected to 
have. As a consequence, it is useless to try to differentiate brands artificially from one 
another. 
3.6 – CONFRONTATION OF THE THEORIES 
3.6.1 – Criticism of the cognitive paradigm 
As stated in the previous chapter, the cognitive paradigm, according to which a 
purchase is the result of a decision process, although sometimes admittedly a very 
simplified one, has dominated contemporary marketing. The consumers are supposed to 
develop well-structured opinions on brands, collect information, evaluate the outcomes, 
compare them and sometimes change their preferences according to a rational and to a 
large extent conscious process. Foxall summarizes in a few words the cognitive paradigm 
implicit in the Howard-Sheth model: 
“Consumer behavior is widely understood as a problem solving and decision-making sequence, the 
outcome of which is determined by the buyer’s goal directed processing of information. The 
‘cognitive’ consumer is credited with the capacity to receive and handle considerable quantities of 
information, to engage actively in the comparative evaluation of alternative products and brands, 
and to select rationally among them. Belief in the cognitive consumer underpins not only marketing 
but a good deal of economic analysis. It is also central to the analysis of managerial strategy.” 
(Foxall, 1992) 
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The truth, however, is that the empirical evidence collected by Ehrenberg and other 
researchers does not corroborate this interpretation of purchase behavior, not even in a 
softer version obtained by classifying a good number of buying situations as “limited 
problem solution”. On one hand, labeling repeat-buying as “problem solving” seems in 
itself excessive; on the other hand, the recognition that habitual behavior is after all so 
prevalent calls for an explanation, absent from this theory, of how this habit is created and 
sustained. 
Olshavsky and Grabois (1979) hinted that, in fact, “for many purchases a decision 
process never occurs, not even on the first purchase”, and they mentioned a number of 
examples to illustrate their point of view: 
“Purchases can occur out of necessity; they can be derived from culturally mandated lifestyles or 
from interlocked purchases; they can reflect preferences acquired in early childhood; they can result 
from simple conformity to group norms or from imitation of others; purchases can be made 
exclusively on recommendations from personal or nonpersonal sources; they can be made on the 
basis of surrogates of various types; or they can even occur on a random or superficial basis.” 
Furthermore, 
“Even when purchase behavior is preceded by a choice process, it is likely to be very limited. It 
typically involves the evaluation of few alternatives, little external search, few evaluative criteria, and 
simple evaluation process models.” 
What is suggested here is not only that routine buying should be considered the 
normal situation, but also that “extensive problem solving” is probably no more than a 
myth of scarce relevance outside marketing textbooks. Authors commonly agree that some 
consumer behavior is controlled by factors in the consumer’s situation and environment 
while in other cases their behavior is deliberate and purposeful, but there is disagreement 
about the relative relevance of each type of explanation.  
It has been noted that even in purchases implying reasonable levels of involvement 
such as durable consumer goods consumers hardly spend any time or dedicate any effort to 
the evaluation of alternatives. Beatty and Smith (1987) found little search before the 
purchase of consumer durables. According to Lapersonne, Laurent and Le Goff (1994), 
even when the purchase of a car is at stake as many as 17% of buyers limit their 
consideration set to the marque last bought. Wilkie and Dickson (1985) discovered that 
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two-thirds of the purchasers of white-goods appliances had bought the brand before. If 
this situation were found to be common, this would hint that real decisions are after all 
confined to relatively rare first purchases, given that most durable consumer goods are 
bought to substitute other previously acquired items. 
No matter how rare, there is no reason to doubt that first time buyers do exist. But, 
even in this case, the cognitive consumer model might not be very useful. Herbert Simon, a 
harsh critic of some of the basic axioms of neo-classical economics, sustained that 
consumers do not in fact try to maximize utility, given that they have neither the facts, nor 
the consistent value structure, nor the reasoning power needed to apply the principles of 
expected subjective utility, not even in relatively simple situations (Simon, 1956; 1959; 
1969; 1983). If they tried to do it, they would end up paralyzed. Therefore they opt instead 
for pragmatic strategies characterized by bounded rationality, which do not strive to attain 
the best possible result in theory, but only a ‘satisficing’ (i.e., good enough) outcome on the 
given conditions. This means that, when the consumer finds a brand that suits him, he will 
not want to waste more time looking for more advantageous alternatives; furthermore, it 
should be expected that in the future he will persist in the same behavior. If this hypothesis 
is confirmed, the moment when a consumer first meets the available brands might be a 
decisive factor, since he will tend to stop his search immediately after he finds the first 
brand or brands that satisfy him. In other words, the order in which brands are evaluated 
might be of the utmost importance. Unfortunately, Simon’s ideas have not been 
systematically tested in their possible applications to marketing management. 
3.6.2 - Summing up the NBD-Dirichlet Theory 
Let us now summarize the alternative view put forward by the NBD-Dirichlet 
theory of how repeat-buying works and how advertising can influence it. 
The first important thing to note is that, as our own experience as consumers tends 
to confirm, excepting some special situations, consumers do not prefer a brand, but a set of 
brands that they use regularly. Thus, they choose brand repertories instead of individual 
brands, benefiting from the combined advantages of habit and variety. A brand does not 
have to be considered the best in order to be included in the repertory. All that is needed is 
that: (a) the customer is looking for more variety than he presently enjoys and is therefore 
eager to integrate a new brand into his current repertory; (b) the aspiring brand is seen as 
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acceptable by the consumer. This is not of course a utility maximization behavior, as 
predicted by neoclassical economics, but a satisficing behavior, more in line with the 
previously mentioned ideas of Herbert Simon. 
On the other hand, once consumers get used to a certain behavior it proves very 
difficult to change it, as this behavior tends to remain stable for a long time. The force of 
habit seems therefore to be a very powerful factor when we try to explain consumers’ 
purchasing behavior. The rule is, if a rule works, do not change it (Hoch, 1984).We will 
return to this topic in the next section in order to examine the rationality of this type of 
behavior. 
A brand’s market share is determined by four variables: penetration rate, purchase 
frequency, number of units bought by purchase occasion, and average quantity bought per 
pack. Behavior research shows that the three last variables are extremely similar across 
brands (with one single exception we will mention in the next paragraph). Penetration rate 
is therefore the main factor that explains the apparent differences among the performances 
of competing brands. 
As a rule, the best-selling brand (and, sometimes, also the second brand) shows a 
purchase frequency clearly higher than the remaining brands. This does not seem to be 
caused by specific marketing environments or particular marketing strategies – it just 
happens independently of marketing managers’ will and should as a consequence be 
considered a general law of repeat-buying. It is probably the result of the higher salience 
that a brand enjoys by the simple fact of displaying the highest penetration rate. Ehrenberg 
(1988) called this phenomenon “double jeopardy” – a hint to the disadvantage of not being 
the leading brand – while Jones (1998) preferred to call it “penetration supercharge” – a 
hint to the advantage of being the market leader. 
At the same time, there appear to be no large differences among the profiles of 
consumers who purchase brands aimed at different market segments. The segmentation 
efforts based on differing consumer’s characteristics seem misguided. These observations 
apparently challenge two of the basic principles of marketing strategy: differentiation and 
segmentation. 
The first purchase of a brand is not generally preceded by a perceptible change of 
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attitude. People apparently adopt a brand first and only later change their attitude as a 
consequence of their personal experience, an observation that agrees with Feistinger’s 
cognitive dissonance theory. Consumer’s attitudes toward brands are therefore mainly 
determined by their direct use experience, not by what advertising says about them. 
An alternative hypothesis on how advertising works, known as the Awareness – 
Trial – Reinforcement (ATR) model, emerged from the previously mentioned empirical 
evidence. According to it, the simple acknowledgment that a brand exists may in certain 
circumstances be enough to stimulate trial, given that curiosity induces the consumer to 
test something new whenever no relevant inhibitions refrain him from doing so. This will 
happen with the condition that the risks involved (whether economical, technical, 
psychological or social) are insignificant. 
To summarize, we face two very different paradigms of marketing and marketing 
communications, leading to markedly divergent or even conflicting recommendations on 
how the marketing function should be managed regarding both its objectives and 
strategies. 
3.6.3 – Reinforcement, habit and rationality 
The cognitive paradigm focuses on the modification of consumer behavior and 
thus tries to explain the changes that take place in purchasing. But, most of the time, 
consumers just do what they previously did during long periods of time, repeating over and 
over the same behavior. The facts revealed by the empirical investigations of Ehrenberg 
corroborate the enormous importance of habit in consumer buying behavior, which 
sometimes translates into very stable relations between consumers and brands in the long 
term. Habitual behavior makes life simpler to consumers, helping them saving time that 
otherwise would be spent dealing with matters of small importance in the general context 
of their lives. If consumers were forced to loose hours comparing products, prices and 
promotional offers anytime they visit the supermarket, not much time would be left for 
anything else. Thus, this kind of behavior should be considered absolutely rational, 
specially because it leaves people free to concentrate their attention on the really important 
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issues of their private lives, possibly including infrequent high involvement purchases38. 
Economists usually expect consumers to be rational in a different and peculiar sense, that 
is, in the sense that they are supposed to evaluate systematically the advantages and 
disadvantages of each possible alternative, presuming, among other things, full information 
and rational expectations. In the absence of these unrealistic presuppositions, a really 
rational strategy for consumers must instead be pragmatic, allowing them to obtain 
satisfactory results in a reasonably short time period. 
However, habit can also play an important role in new purchase situations. For 
instance, a person who buys a car for the first time is usually somewhat familiar with cars, 
has visited dealerships or car exhibitions, has already purchased other high ticket items, has 
learned how to deal with salesmen, has some experience of negotiation, and so on. In other 
words, the experience acquired in one domain can be at least partially transferred to other 
domains. As a consequence, habitual buyer behavior is valid in an enormous variety of 
situations, although requiring some adjustments to account for the novelty of each specific 
case. 
Habitual behavior excludes advanced planning or conscious problem solving. But it 
does not preclude some reasoning effort on the part of the consumer, namely after the 
purchase is concluded, when for some reason an unpleasant experience suggests that it 
might be a good idea to challenge some ingrained habit. The paradigm of habitual behavior 
thus predicts that people will go on buying the same brands that ensure certain satisfaction 
levels, and that it will be difficult to drive out these brands even if some objectively 
valuable new alternatives appear in the market. Therefore, habitual behavior inhibits 
change and makes consumers less eager to try new products and brands. It restricts 
experimentation. 
                                                
38 However, although there can be few more important and high-involvement decisions in life than 
those concerning getting married and having children, Richards (1985) found out that the majority of the 
couples in a study sample had not considered the possibility of not aiming to marry and raise a family (though 
many did consider alternative times to having children). 
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3.6.4 – Consequences for the theory and practice of marketing 
Whatever its limitations, the discoveries of Ehrenberg are of the utmost theoretical 
and practical importance. As he repeatedly reminds us, traditional buyer behavior theory 
takes small notice of observed phenomena; in some cases, its predictions squarely 
contradict the available statistical evidence. The Howard-Sheth model is specially criticized 
by Ehrenberg, who accuses it of ignoring the hard facts of buyer behavior. 
“In general then, these theories of consumer behavior do not seem to predict any of the quantitative 
findings described in this book, or even their qualitative nature. They do not even state whether 
there should be a single, general pattern at all. Nor yet do they seem readily capable of suggesting 
new hypothesis to test, in areas which have not as yet been explored empirically.” (Ehrenberg, 1988, 
p. 213) 
The multi-brand loyalty apparent in repertory brand buying should be considered a 
universal phenomenon. The traditional concept of loyalty as allegiance to a single brand 
should be abandoned as it contradicts all the available evidence. On the other hand, the 
usefulness of communication programs aimed at the change of preferences in order to 
induce brand-switching is at best highly questionable. A brand does not have to be the 
preferred one in order to be included in the brand repertory – it is sufficient for it to be 
considered equally acceptable. Thus, there is no need to try to prove that it is the best, all 
that is needed is to make the customers believe that it is ‘good enough’, or, in other words, 
that it meets the expectations that the customer has grown used to. 
Another important conclusion has to do with the recommended basic orientation 
of the marketing effort. The data collected by Ehrenberg suggest that, in general, brands 
grow mainly through the increase of penetration. This is especially true in the case of the 
lesser brands in a given market. Now, the increase of the penetration of these brands 
depends crucially on the possibility of convincing a large number of homes to include them 
in the repertory of acceptable brands. All the priority should therefore be given to 
initiatives designed to reach broader levels of acceptance, including large-scale sampling. 
Whenever the market share is very low, efforts to increase loyalty or use rate will be 
practically useless. Only leading brands in a given product category – or those brands that, 
in spite of not being leaders, boast a market share of at least 20% – can expect good results 
from a strategy oriented to increase purchase frequency by taken advantage of the 
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phenomenon known as penetration supercharge or double jeopardy. 
On a more general level, Ehrenberg states 
“…one of the main lines of traditional thinking in marketing has been that the different brands in a 
given product-field have to possess different properties or attributes in order to appeal to their 
consumers. These differentiating properties may either be real, or be more of the “brand-image” 
type (i.e. attributes with which a brand is invested by its advertising, and general promotion, 
including packaging).” (Ehrenberg, 1988, p. 250) 
However, 
“…all the evidence indicates that as far the consumer is concerned, different brands in general 
induce the same kind of buying behavior, both in terms of repeat-buying and in terms of brand-
switching. Furthermore, the same kinds of attitudinal responses tend to occur. In general, the only 
substantive difference between one brand and another in terms of consumer response seems to be 
that one brand has more buyers than another (except where some real difference in product 
formulation exists). In addition, some earlier experimental results suggest that the common forms of 
brand-loyalty as described here may perhaps be generated without special marketing efforts such as 
advertising. There appears to be no evidence that one brand needs to differ from another in order to 
sell more.” (Ehrenberg, 1988, pp. 250-1) 
And he concludes: 
“As for the consumer, it is clear that his buying behavior generally follows simple and predictable 
patterns. It seems to be characterized by regular habits, rather than by constant search or by 
uncertainty. The implication is that the consumer is less affected by the content of advertising and 
marketing action as such than is often claimed, but responds in a “reasonable” way to any imbalance 
of marketing inputs. For example, when two brands are similar in all respects (and known to be so 
by consumers, many of whom will have tried both), the brand with the greater weight of advertising 
and greater retail availability will tend to be bought more. There is no evidence that repeat-buying 
behaviour and the general structure of brand-choice can be influenced by factors other than perhaps 
real differences in product-formulation, or price, or retail availability. This is not to say that 
advertising, promotion and selling have no effect, but only that they influence the level of brand-
shares (mostly by keeping them where they are), rather than the general structure of buyer behavior 
or the “image” of the brand. In general, there is less segmentation of markets than seems often to be 
thought.” (Ehrenberg, 1988, p. 251) 
On the same line of thinking, he stated: “Sustained growth, brand differentiation, 
and persuasive advertising are romantic fantasies” (Ehrenberg, 2002). In his opinion, 
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survival, and not growth should be the main purpose of brand management, as protecting 
its current market position is all that it can reasonably hope for. Anything more, like 
gaining share benefiting from competitor mistakes, should be considered an unpredictable 
bonus. Second, significant competitive advantage seldom exists in fast-moving consumer 
goods, and, if it does, it is rarely sustainable. The basic fact of competition is that it consists 
of not letting competitors be effectively different or better, thus preventing each other 
from staying for very long ahead of the pack. In these conditions, tossing a penny is a 
method as good as any other of picking a brand in each purchasing occasion. As Jeremy 
Bulmore, former Vice-President of J. Walter Thompson used to say: “I know all these 
brands are the same. I just have to decide which is best.” (Bulmore, 1998) Finally, “there is 
no generalizable evidence on any lasting persuasive effects of advertising” (Ehrenberg, 
2002), and it is also true that sales and images seldom change. Once again, advertising lacks 
consistently dynamic effects because of competition, as the efforts of the competitors tend 
to cancel each other. Advertising possibly works as paid-for creative publicity. Advertising 
can “create and refresh memory traces and associations”, thus making the brand “salient, 
familiar, and reputable” (Ibid.). To conclude: “The more alike two brands are, the more 
effective creative publicity can be” (Ibid.). 
To sum up, the NBD-Dirichlet theory developed by Ehrenberg introduces us to a 
picture of purchase behavior that stands in marked contrast to the more familiar Howard-
Sheth model. To conclude this section, the following table summarizes the differences 
between both approaches regarding research methodologies, key concepts, predictions, and 
recommended strategies. 
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Table 3.2 
The Howard-Sheth and NBD-Dirichlet Theories Compared 
 Howard-Sheth NBD-Dirichlet 
What people say they do What people do 
Cognitive constructs Behavioral constructs 
Research 
methodology 
Consumer samples Consumer panels 
Leaking bucket Limited brand erosion Purchase patterns 
Buying patterns affected by 
marketing management 
Stable long-run buying 
patterns 
Problem-solving Routine 
Choice Reinforcement/ Habit 
Decision process No decision process 
Information search before 
purchase 
Post-purchase evaluation 
Consumer behavior 
Pre-purchase evaluation Cognitive dissonance 
Product as attribute bundle Product as indivisible entity Attitudes and 
behavior Attitudes determine brand 
purchase 
Brand usage determines 
attitudes 
Brand preference Brand repertory 
Brand switching Brand rotation 
Brand choice 
Independence between 
penetration and loyalty 
Correlation between 
penetration and loyalty 
Customer segments Benefit segments 
Differentiated positioning Irrelevance of differentiation 
Brand strategy 
Possibility of growth through 
loyalty 
Absence of excess loyalty or 
niches 
Persuasive advertising Familiarity advertising 
Advertising changes attitudes Advertising promotes salience 
Advertising changes brand 
preferences 
Advertising reinforces habits 
Advertising promotes brand-
switching 
Advertising protects status 
quo 
Advertising is strong Advertising is weak 
Advertising 
Awareness – Conviction – 
Purchase 
Awareness – Trial – 
Reinforcement 
Source: Author. 
3.6.5 – Problems with repeat-buying theory 
Neither the methodology nor the general results obtained by Ehrenberg have been 
seriously challenged to this day. However, his favorite interpretation of the reported 
findings is open to considerable controversy. We will now review some of the most 
important issues at stake. 
Validity conditions 
A frequent objection is leveled at the scope of validity of the results (East, 1997 pp. 
79-80). In fact, it is not possible to ignore that the adequacy of the NBD and Dirichlet 
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models depends crucially on the joint verification of a number of circumstances: (a) repeat-
buying; (b) low involvement; (c) market stationarity; (d) market maturity; and (e) absence of 
functional segmentation. What happens with new markets in a stage of impetuous growth? 
What happens with infrequently purchased goods or with goods implying a higher 
involvement level? What happens with subscription goods, such as financial or 
telecommunication services, that, by their very nature, tend to imply stronger bonds 
between suppliers and customers? What happens when product differentiation is at work? 
These remarks cannot really be interpreted as criticisms since the models 
themselves point to these drawbacks, at the very least as preventions against any 
temptation to use them unwittingly out of the proper context. Any attempt to apply the 
NBD or Dirichlet models out of the conditions where their suitability has been clearly 
warranted should therefore be carried with the utmost caution. 
Having said that, it must be added that several features of the models have in the 
last few years come to prove valid in rather unexpected circumstances. For instance, the 
analysis of the repeated but infrequent purchase of cars in the French market has revealed a 
pattern of double jeopardy (Colombo, Ehrenberg and Sabavala, 2000), meaning that small 
brands also benefit from lower loyalty. On the other hand, the Australian credit card 
market – a typical subscription market – has been shown to follow very closely the pattern 
of purchase behavior predicted by the Dirichlet model (Sharp and Wright, 2000). 
Deviations from the Dirichlet model 
Although not very often, some deviations of the observed behavior from the values 
predicted by the NBD and the Dirichlet models have now and then been reported. What 
significance should be attributed to these deviations? Do they prove the models wrong? Or 
should we instead interpret them as instances of particularly well-succeeded marketing 
strategies (Dyson, Farr and Hollis, 1997)? 
If, for instance, a brand shows an average purchase frequency clearly above its 
competitors (a phenomenon known as “excess loyalty”), and thus also above the values 
predicted by the model, how can we account for this situation? Is this brand’s manager 
applying a particularly well-conceived loyalty strategy? As it happens, when significant 
deviations are found between observed and predicted values it is usually relatively 
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straightforward to identify the causes of these inconsistencies: existence of functional 
segmentation, product differentiation, absence of brand repertories, more or less persistent 
distribution problems or restrictions to free competition, for instance (Sharp and 
Driesener, 2000). 
Description or explanation? 
One of the most serious problems raised in connection with these models relates to 
their explanatory power. Can the NBD-Dirichlet model be regarded as a real theory, as 
opposed to a mere description of the facts (Rossiter, 1994)? Some critics argue, namely, 
that it is not at all clear what the NBD-Dirichlet model has to offer to marketing managers 
in order to improve their daily performance. For instance, what should brands do to 
become bigger, or, to put it differently, to increase their penetration rate? 
It should be acknowledged that, by refusing to go beyond the plain facts uncovered 
by research, Ehrenberg himself has contributed to restrain the scope and the applicability 
of his own discoveries. He often underlines the similitude between his own approach and 
Newton’s scientific method – hypothesis non fingo (‘I do not feign hypotheses’) – to justify his 
refusal to propose bold generalizations (Ehrenberg and Sharp, 2000). In his opinion, theory 
should emerge naturally from the facts themselves, through an inductive process resulting 
from the accumulation of experimental evidence. 
3.7 - CONCLUSION 
Managers educated in the Howard-Sheth tradition cannot help being surprised by 
the findings reported by Ehrenberg and his associates, since they question directly some of 
their most cherished beliefs. Traditional approaches described in this chapter are based on 
research that aims to find out what people say they do, rather than what they in fact do. As 
such, attention is directed to mental processes and cognitive constructs. Attitudes are 
believed to govern behavior and persuasive advertising is used to promote brand switching. 
Generating brand preference, and therefore loyalty, is the central goal of marketing 
management. Brand strategy revolves around the idea that a product is a bundle of 
attributes, and that different attributes appeal to different market segments. It is the 
marketing managers task to select target markets and to position his offer in a way that 
maximizes the brand’s appeal to each segment. Loyalty programs appear as a natural thing 
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to do in this context, especially as the underlying buyer behavior theory makes no specific 
predictions regarding its alleged effectiveness. 
On the contrary, the NBD-Dirichlet theory raises serious doubts regarding the 
relationship marketing paradigm in general and loyalty programs in particular. This 
approach favors observation of real behavior, and alleges that the known facts prove the 
existence of universal iron laws of purchase behavior that managers can only ignore at their 
peril. Contrary to the common view, this theory sustains that customer erosion is limited 
and that, therefore, tactics based on the so-called “leaking bucket” theory tend to over-
react to random events. Buying patterns are found to be basically stable in the long run. 
For this reason, brand managers are advised to keep cool and aim mainly to survive instead 
of devising ambitious growth strategies that never materialize. Buyer behavior is a routine 
matter. There is no real choice most of the time, but only habit and reinforcement. 
Attitudes are determined by usage, and not the other way round. Consumers are loyal to 
repertories of brands, not to single brands, among which they rotate as a matter of routine. 
Patterns of purchase behavior can be predicted by statistical distributions, which means 
that, as a rule, penetration is the only independent variable of the model. An especially 
disturbing phenomenon, known as “double jeopardy”, relates loyalty to penetration, 
suggesting that loyalty is not an independent variable of brand management, but a 
consequence of the penetration level reached by the brand. 
The next chapter will be devoted to clarify the consequences of the NBD-Dirichlet 
theory to the alleged effectiveness of relationship marketing programs.
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Chapter 4 
The Expected Effects of Relationship 
Marketing Programs 
 
4.1 - INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter confronted systematically two opposed marketing theories. 
The purpose of Chapter 4 is to present the research issues and to specify the hypotheses 
that will be subsequently tested. This will be done in three stages. First, we clarify the 
implications of the NBD-Dirichlet theory for relationship marketing and make a first 
attempt at understanding how relationship programs might improve the performance of a 
brand. In order to do that, we will formulate some general hypothesis on how they might 
contribute to increase market share. Second, we break down the general objective of 
gaining market share into more specific action objectives. The Parfitt-Collins formula has 
been used for decades for this purpose. We discuss its usefulness and compare it with the 
sales equation presented in the previous chapter. Finally, the chapter concludes with the 
statement of the research hypotheses that our investigation intends to elucidate. 
4.2 – THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE NBD-DIRICHLET THEORY FOR 
RELATIONSHIP MARKETING 
Each one of the two purchase behavior theories reviewed in the previous chapter 
implies logically certain recommendations on what will be the most advisable strategies and 
tactics in order to manage and retain a customer base, that is, on the way customer 
relationships should be managed. Specifically, the NBD-Dirichlet theory of repeat-buying 
behavior raises serious doubts about the usefulness of relationship marketing programs. 
Let us clarify why. 
4.2.1 – Is it possible to change repeat-buying patterns? 
Dowling and Uncles (1997) state unambiguously that “most [loyalty] schemes do 
not fundamentally alter market structure”, by which they mean that such initiatives are 
unable to change the universal repeat-buying patterns identified by Ehrenberg. While 
 140 
admitting that those programs “might help to protect incumbents and might be regarded as 
a legitimate part of the marketer’s armory” (ibid.), they haste to add that this only happens 
“at the cost of increasing marketing expenditures” (ibid.). In these conditions, it is sensible 
to ask if it wouldn’t be possible to reach the same results by other tested and possibly less 
expensive means: “Does a customer loyalty program offer a better return than an 
alternative such as a price cut, increased advertising, or increasing distribution coverage?” 
(ibid.) 
The justification for this skepticism lies in the discoveries of Ehrenberg and his 
colleagues on purchase behavior described in the previous chapter, namely those related to 
the consumers’ reluctance to remain loyal to a single brand, to the fact that purchase 
patterns hardly change from brand to brand and to the phenomenon of double jeopardy. 
The scarce available evidence suggests that it is very difficult, if not impossible, for 
relationship programs to change the fundamental patterns of buyer behavior. For instance, 
a study published in 1993 indicated that at that date more than 80% of European business 
airline travelers were members of more than one airline loyalty club and that the average 
membership of airline loyalty clubs was 3.1 per traveler (cited by Dowling and Uncles, 
1997). On the other hand, the launch of several national loyalty schemes in the British 
grocery market after 1995 seems to have left market shares reasonably steady (also cited by 
Dowling and Uncles, 1997). Apparently, consumers resist actively the efforts of marketing 
managers to reduce their usual levels of purchase variety, probably because they have good 
reasons for preferring divided loyalty, like for instance enjoying the benefits of different 
brands for different occasions or just enjoying variety for variety’s sake. To summarize 
their view, Dowling and Uncles write: 
“Given the amount of investigation that supports these patterns of buyer behavior [divided loyalty], 
it seems unlikely that a loyalty program could fundamentally alter this behavior, especially in 
established, competitive markets (where copycat responses are most likely). Even a path-breaking 
scheme may alter only short-run probabilities. Once the market has settled down again, or a 
competitor has launched a similar scheme, patterns of divided loyalty reemerge. The issue is whether 
the longer-run propensities settle at old or new levels.” (Dowling and Uncles, 1997, p. 74) 
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4.2.2 – Is it possible to violate double jeopardy? 
One of the central implications of the double jeopardy phenomenon is that, while 
loyalty measured by purchase frequency does not change significantly from brand to brand, 
whatever variation there is is largely determined by market share (which in turn is explained 
by penetration), as shown in Figure 4.1. Brands become big by increasing their penetration 
rates, and tend thereafter to have more frequent buyers than their weaker competitors. The 
bigger the brand, the larger the number of loyal buyers it attracts. Conversely, the smaller 
the brand the less buyers will want to purchase the brand frequently. Consequently, it is not 
very realistic to expect that a brand might significantly increase its market share by 
promoting customer loyalty. This implication of the NBD-Dirichlet theory contradicts 
flatly the main promise of relationship programs aimed at improving customer retention. 
Figure 4.1 
Double-Jeopardy and Exceptions to the Rule 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Dowling and Uncles (1997).  
As shown in Figure 4.1 above, most brands lie along the double jeopardy line. 
Therefore, the outlier brands will necessarily exhibit very unusual features. Some large 
brands might display super-loyalty (also called excess-loyalty by comparison with the 
norm), meaning that they have more frequent buyers than double jeopardy would predict, 
something very common with own label brands. Fader and Schmittlein (1993) submit that 
excess-loyalty might be a consequence of category segmentation that further harms smaller 
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brands. At the other extreme, a niche brand, although small, may also benefit from excess-
loyalty. Dowling and Uncles (1997) consider niche brands an ephemeral phenomenon: 
after a while they either grow through larger penetration and join the double jeopardy line, 
or stay small and die. On the other hand, Jarvis et al. (2003) found that niche strategies are 
more effective in categories where small brands form a substantial proportion of the total 
category. Finally, we should mention change-of-pace brands. Change-of-pace brands have a 
higher than expected market share but a less than expected proportion of loyal buyers. 
Low-alcohol beers fit rather well this description, because people tend to buy them only in 
special occasions (for instance, before driving). According to Dowling and Uncles (1997): 
“super-loyalty, niche, and change-of-pace brands are much less common than big or small 
double jeopardy brands”. Conventional marketing wisdom mistakenly assumes that niche 
brands and excess-loyalty brands are common phenomena in the real world, while the 
opposite is true. In a general way, marketing managers should be aware that such situations 
are really exceptional and therefore should not bet blindly on strategies exclusively aimed at 
building loyalty. 
4.2.3 – Is the increase of loyalty the best way to grow a brand? 
It should be remembered that, according to Ehrenberg (2002), the most efficient 
way of making a brand grow is to get more people to buy it instead of trying to persuade 
them to buy it more often, for the simple reason that the second option tries to force the 
consumers to do something they really do not wish to. Thus, Fader and Schmittlein (1993) 
found that one of the most effective tactics to get increased penetration and thus improve 
market share is simply to expand distribution to new outlets. To sum up, research on 
repeat-buying indicates that, in a good number of markets, the purchase of products and 
services follows very predictable patterns that should perhaps be accepted as universal and 
invariant laws of buyer-behavior. Relationship programs designed to increase loyalty 
somehow intend to violate these market norms by trying to increase purchase frequency 
beyond the theoretically predicted values. While this might sometimes be possible during 
short periods of time, it is highly doubtful that the results could endure and, more 
specifically, that a satisfactory cost-benefit balance might be reached. 
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4.3 - HYPOTHESES ON HOW RELATIONSHIP PROGRAMS WORK 
4.3.1 – The role of long-term retention 
According to the previously mentioned investigations of Reinartz and Kumar 
(2000, 2002), the customer long-term value depends less on the time that a customer 
remains loyal to the brand than on the monetary value that he spends on the acquisition of 
a company’s products. Dowling (2002) deduces from this: 
“Hence, marketing strategy should be focused on revenue generation (ARPU [Average Revenue Per 
User]) and transaction-cost management in preference to the creation of loyal customers. The tactics 
for this are quite different from those used to create loyal customers. For example, given a budget 
that would only support either a cross-selling or a customer-affinity program, the cross-selling 
approach would be preferred.” (ibid., p. 93) 
And he goes on to suggest: 
“One way to cross-check the findings of the Reinartz and Kumar study – and the recommendation 
that managers should focus on revenue enhancement as opposed to customer enhancement – is to 
look at the ability of customer loyalty programs to increase customer profitability. There is little 
argument that these programs keep their customers ‘on the books’ for an extensive period of time. 
However, the crucial question is ‘Are these customers more profitable?’” (ibid., p. 93) 
4.3.2 – The role of the share of customer 
Dowling argues that, contrary to what is usually believed, CRM programs are 
unable to increase share of customer (also called share of wallet or share of requirements): 
“If there are good reasons for customers to be loyal to multiple brands in a product category, then it 
will be a difficult and expensive process to try to convince them to behave otherwise. It will be even 
more difficult to achieve a return on this type of marketing investment when other major 
competitors are trying to do the same thing – such as the airline frequent-flyer programs. In many 
cases, seeking a high share-of-market is a more appropriate customer profitability strategy than 
seeking a high share-of-customer. In fact, the research on the polygamous loyalty of customers in 
stationary markets suggests that this is the best strategy to adopt. The support for this claim is based 
on one of the few empirical ‘laws’ in marketing, namely Double Jeopardy.” (Dowling, 2002; p. 98) 
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4.3.3 – An alternative approach 
Whenever relationship programs produce positive results, the explanation of this 
outcome should perhaps be looked for in the fact that the existence of the program in itself 
should be viewed as an additional attribute of the brand that might be attractive to a certain 
number of customers, thereby increasing its penetration rate. On the other hand, this might 
strengthen the brand profile in the market, at least while that program is not imitated by its 
competitors. The conjugation of those two effects enhances the salience of the brand, 
leading to an increase of the penetration rate and, as a consequence, of its market share. 
Dowling (2002) believes that, at bottom, relationship programs work exactly like traditional 
mass media advertising; hence, the option between one communication strategy or the 
other should be considered a simple matter of cost-benefit analysis. 
“When a Double Jeopardy Law is recognized, advocates suggest that a penetration (share-of-market) 
strategy is appropriate. The objective here is to increase the number of buyers of the brand, but not 
how often or how much they buy. (...) Marketing programs that increase the salience of the brand, 
such as more advertising and wider distribution, should be cost effective. Sometimes the publicity 
surrounding a new customer loyalty program (…) will also provide a temporary increase in salience. 
Another tactic is to increase the inherent value delivered to the customer. A better consumer value 
proposition can be delivered by enhancing the product/service (more features, better quality) or by 
reducing the ‘price’ (the amount paid, making it easier to buy the brand, reducing the perceived risk 
of the brand (relative to competing brands). These are traditional ways to allocate a marketing 
budget.” (Dowling, 2002, p. 100) 
4.4 – THE DETERMINANTS OF MARKET-SHARE AND THEIR RELATION 
TO LOYALTY 
4.4.1 – Market share as a relationship marketing objective 
What synthetic variable should be used to evaluate the effectiveness of a 
relationship marketing program? Profit is the most common goal of a business firm. The 
specific contribution of marketing to this goal comes from the sale of large quantities of 
goods at a profit. This is done through maximizing sales and prices and minimizing 
marketing costs. Marketing objectives therefore involve precise targets concerning those 
three variables.  
Company or brand sales, measured in volume or in value, are the most direct 
measures of the market behavioral responses. In practice, however, market share plays a 
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dominant role in the determination of marketing objectives. There are two main reasons 
for this: 
1. Sales must be evaluated against some pattern that puts it into perspective and 
clarifies its meaning. Increasing sales by 20% might not give a manager reasons 
to rejoice if the demand is growing at 40% a year. On the contrary, a sales 
decrease of 5% might not be of serious concern if the market fell by, say, 10%. 
Market share provides a simple way of comparing a brand’s performance with its 
competitors in the same reference market, thereby discounting the effects on 
sales of environmental factors. For this reason, it is probably the most useful 
single marketing objective, providing marketing managers with a synthetic 
measurement of the overall situation of their brands. 
2. A substantial body of research suggests, others things being equal, the existence 
of a strong correlation between market share and ROI, such that the larger the 
market share of a brand, the larger its profitability will be. This conclusion is 
mainly supported by the Profit Impact of Market Strategy (PIMS) database, 
covering 450 companies and 3,000 strategic business units, as well as a wide 
variety of industries, products/services and markets (Buzzell and Gale, 1987). In 
spite of some evidence pointing to important exceptions (most notably Porter, 
1980), the existence of the correlation is usually taken for granted in business 
practice. The causal relation linking market share to profitability is believed to be 
a consequence of several factors, including scale economies in production and 
distribution and larger bargaining power regarding distributors and clients. 
Therefore, market share is often considered a proxy for brand profitability. 
The calculation of the market share assumes that the reference market and the 
competing brands were previously identified. Once this has been done, market share is 
simply determined as follows: 
category the  insalesunit Total 
salesunit  A Brand
  shareMarket =                                              (4.1) 
What we have here is unit market share, that is, company or brand sales in volume 
expressed as a proportion of total sales in the relevant market during a certain period of 
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time. Value market share is also very commonly used, being calculated on the basis of 
turnover rather than sales in physical units. Although useful it is also more difficult to 
interpret given that it is the product of two different factors: volume sales and relative price 
levels. 
Although the information about a brand’s own sales are readily available, it is 
sometimes not easy to know how much the competition is selling. In fast-moving 
consumer goods this is usually not a serious problem, because all the necessary information 
needed to compute market shares is available through syndicated consumer or retailer 
panels. Fortunately, these sources also provide more detailed information on what is 
happening under the surface of market shares, allowing a more refined analysis that can be 
used to understand the factors that drive gains or losses of competing brands. 
4.4.2 – Market share and action objectives 
The same target market share can be obtained in several different ways. It can be 
reached by acquiring new customers, whether they presently do not buy the product at all 
or only buy from the competition, or by developing existing ones, for instance; or by trying 
to gain exclusivity from its customers as an alternative to persuade them to increase the 
use-rate of the product; or by targeting heavy users instead of average buyers. In principle, 
at least, all these options are equally acceptable, if not equally effective. The brand 
migration model, popularized by Rossiter and Percy (1997), helps managers detail their 
marketing objectives, clarify their target audiences and, finally, outline their action 
objectives. In this model, sales are seen as dependent on (a) product category sales and (b) 
the brand’s performance within that category. It shows that a brand can potentially be 
purchased by any of five buyer groups: 
1. New category users, who enter the category by buying our brand 
2. Brand loyalists, who regularly buy the brand 
3. Favorable brand switchers, who occasionally buy our brand but also buy 
other brands 
4. Other-brand switchers, who buy other brands but not ours 
5. Other-brand loyalists, who regularly buy a brand other than ours 
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Brand loyalists represent the core of our sales, our most frequent buyers. Favorable 
brand switchers are the fringe of our sales: they include our brand in their brand-repertory, 
but they buy it less frequently than our frequent customers. Sales may also be gained by 
attracting new category users to our brand, by inducing other-brand switchers to include 
our brand in their repertory, or, even more difficult, by drawing loyal customers away from 
other brands. No specific recommendation can be derived from the Howard-Sheth buying 
behavior theory regarding which alternative is best. On the contrary, the NBD-Dirichlet 
theory considers with some skepticism the loyalty schemes implicit in this model.  
4.4.3 – The Parfitt-Collins formula 
Parfitt and Collins (1968) created a formula that decomposes market share into a 
number of basic variables which help us explain what is causing changes in the market 
performance of each brand. On the other hand, it is also used to aggregate rough consumer 
panel data into meaningful variables.  
To begin with, let x denote the brand and c the relevant product category to which 
x belongs. Let us also adopt the following notations: 
Nx = Number of buyers of x 
Nc = Number of buyers of c 
Qxx = Quantity of x purchased by buyers of x 
Qcc = Quantity of c purchased by buyers of c 
We can now start by defining: 
Sales of brand x = Qxx = xxxx N / Q  N ×                                                          (4.2) 
and 
Total sales of category c = Qcc = cccc N / Q  N ×                                              (4.3) 
Both definitions explain sales as a function of two variables: total number of buyers 
during a given period and average sales per buyer. From this it immediately follows: 
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This simple arithmetic manipulation shows that the market share depends on one 
hand on relative penetration of brand x (Nx / Nc), and on the other hand on the 
comparison between the average sales of brand x per buyer (Qxx / Nx) and the average 
sales of the category per buyer (Qcc / Nc). 
Let us now introduce a new variable: 
Qcx = Quantity of c purchased by buyers of x 
Qcx refers to the total amount of product c bought by consumers of brand x. If we 
now multiply both the numerator and the denominator of the above fraction by Qcx /Nx, 
that is, by the average quantity of c bought by buyers of x, we will get: 
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This equation, currently known as the Parfit-Collins formula, can be interpreted as 
meaning: 
Market share = Penetration rate  Exclusivity rate39  Intensity rate             (4.6) 
These three variables can be used to interpret brand share movements by locating 
its origin in one or several of them. In short, this is their meaning: 
1. Penetration rate is the share of buyers, i.e. the percentage of buyers of 
brand x compared to the total number of buyers in the relevant product 
category (relative penetration) or to the total number of households in the 
country (absolute penetration). We have seen that, according to the NBD-
Dirichlet theory, this is the main variable when it comes to explain the 
differences in performance between competing brands. For the Howard-
Sheth theory, penetration is as useful as any other variable when we intend 
                                                
39 Also known as share of requirements, share of wallet, feed-rate or take-rate. 
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to make a brand grow. 
2. Exclusivity rate is defined as the share of total purchases in a product 
category reserved for brand x. This rate is a measure of the loyalty attached 
to brand x, given that buyers have the possibility of diversifying their 
purchases and acquiring different brands in the same product category. It is 
variously known as share of requirements, feed rate or share of wallet. The 
NBD-Dirichlet theory predicts that this measure will not vary significantly 
from brand to brand. However, because of double jeopardy, the bigger 
brands will show some advantage when compared with the smaller brands. 
The Howard-Sheth theory makes no specific predictions on the relative 
effectiveness of trying to increase the exclusivity rate. This is usually taken 
as an indication that this should be considered a perfectly sound strategy. 
3. Intensity rate compares average quantities purchased per buyer of brand x 
with average quantities purchased per buyer of the product category c. Once 
again, the NBD-Dirichlet is skeptical on the effectiveness of trying to 
increase the intensity rate by attracting heavy-users, because panel data 
suggest that all brands have roughly the same proportions of heavy, 
medium and light users, except that, owing to double jeopardy, big brands 
fare a little better. On the contrary, the Howard-Sheth theory makes no 
specific predictions on this. Therefore, people that adopt this standing 
consider the increase of the intensity rate a legitimate strategy to grow a 
brand. 
Finally, to express market share in value, a relative price index must be added: the 
ratio of the brand’s average price to the average market price. Let us adopt the following 
notation for prices: 
Px = Average price of brand x 
Pc = Average market price of c 
We can now incorporate relative price into the Parfitt-Collins formula, obtaining 
this new equation: 
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This definition of market share can be generally applied to all kinds of markets and 
can be used to identify the possible causes of observed movements in market share. The 
following are possible explanations for an increase in market-share: 
1. The brand is gaining new customers (higher penetration rate) 
2. The buyers are devoting a larger share of their purchases of the product to 
this particular brand (higher exclusivity rate) 
3. The buyers of the brand are purchasing larger quantities compared to the 
quantities bought on average by buyers of the product (higher intensity 
rate) 
4. The brand is commanding a higher relative price compared to the average 
market price (higher relative price) 
By tracking these market behavioral variables over time, it is possible to identify the 
underlying causes of market share changes and suggest corrective measures accordingly. 
4.4.4 – The sales equation revisited 
There are, of course, many other ways of decomposing the sales of a brand, and 
thus of decomposing market share into more basic explaining factors. The choice of a 
specific formula will depend on the particular problem at hand. 
We will now recall the sales equation introduced in the previous chapter in 
connection with the Ehrenberg analysis of panel data and the identification of universal 
invariants of repeat-purchase. On that occasion, we presented the following mathematical 
identity: 
Sales of Brand x = # Households  Absolute Penetration Rate  Average 
Purchase Frequency  Average # Packs per Purchase  Average # Units per Pack  
Price per Unit                                                                                                              (4.8) 
How does this formula differ from the Parfitt-Collins one? To begin with, it 
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includes the absolute penetration rate instead of the relative penetration rate. That is not 
however a significant difference, since it is possible to substitute one variable for the other 
without altering its basic meaning. In fact, both formulas attribute an overriding 
importance to the penetration rate. 
The product of the remaining terms of the sales equation equals, of course, the 
average sale per buyer of brand x (Qxx / Nx in the Parfitt-Collins equation). However, it 
decomposes it in an altogether different way. The sales equation used by Ehrenberg in the 
context of the NBD-Dirichlet theory ignores both the exclusivity rate (or share of 
requirements) and the intensity rate. On the other hand, the Parfitt-Collins formula ignores 
the average purchase frequency, the average number of packs per purchase occasion and 
the average number of units per pack.  
The elementary event taken in account by the sales equation is the purchase 
occasion, something that is absent from the Parfitt-Collins formula. The sales equation 
focuses on how many times a purchase is repeated during a given period of time and how 
much is bought on each occasion. Lumping together the variables “average number of 
packs per purchase” and “average number units per pack” something that can be done by 
simply multiplying them, we will obtain the new variable “amount purchased by purchase 
occasion”. Let us now introduce these new variables: 
Fxx = Frequency with which buyers of x purchase x 
Fcc = Frequency with which buyers of c purchase c 
Fcx = frequency with which buyers of x purchase c 
Axx = Average amount of x purchased by buyers of x on each occasion 
Acc = Average amount of c purchased by buyers of c on each occasion 
Acx = Average amount of c purchased by buyers of x on each occasion 
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We are now in a position to incorporate the sales equation into the Parfitt-Collins 
formula and obtain: 
c
x
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4.4.5 - How behavioral variables determine market-share 
In the formula we arrived at in the previous section, market share is a function of 
ten different variables. This means that a change in market share can be the product of an 
isolated change in any one of those variables or, more likely, of a combination of 
simultaneous changes in several of them. Provided we have access to the relevant data, we 
will be able to trace the ultimate sources of observed variations of a brand’s market share. 
This suits the purpose of our investigation, since we intend to elucidate not only if 
relationship marketing programs can benefit the relative overall performance of brands in 
fast-moving consumer goods, but also what specific variables are instrumental in bringing 
about those changes. 
As previously pointed out, the Parfitt-Collins formula shows that volume market 
share depends on penetration rate, exclusivity rate, and intensity rate. Furthermore, value 
market-share also depends on relative price. Loyalty strategies are specifically aimed at 
increasing the exclusivity rate, and possibly also the relative price, since some authors 
sustain that loyal customers tend to be less price sensitive. We would therefore like to 
confirm whether relationship marketing programs in fact contribute to increase the 
exclusivity rate and the relative price index. Moreover, the formula urges us to go even 
further and to investigate what factors might drive up the exclusivity rate. We expect the 
exclusivity rate to increase when the buying rate of the brand under study ( xxxx AF × ) goes 
up relative to the buying rate of the competitive brands. But our brand’s buying rate can go 
up either through the increase of its purchase frequency ( xxF ) or through the increase of 
the purchase per occasion ( xxA ). 
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To sum up, let us look once again at the formula, this time highlighting the 
variables that will be at the center of our investigation: 
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cx NN - Penetration rate 
xxxx AF × - Buying rate 
xxF - Purchase frequency 
xxA - Purchase per occasion 
cx PP - Relative price 
It might also be useful to represent in a diagram the flow of causation connecting 
the different intervening variables to the final desired effect of increasing market share.  
Figure 4.2 
Flow of Causation between Behavioral Variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author. 
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4.5 – DEFINING THE RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
The central purpose of our research is to clarify the ability of relationship marketing 
programs to alter the purchase behavior of consumers in a way that favors the brands that 
adopt them. We will now establish the specific hypotheses that will be later subjected to 
empirical test. 
In a very crude way, the central motivation of a marketing manager to resort to a 
relationship marketing strategy lays in its presumed capacity to stimulate the brand’s sales. 
However, if the overall market is declining, whether for structural reasons (v. g., declining 
stage of the product life-cycle) or for transitory ones (v. g., low phase of the economic 
cycle), it may be unrealistic to expect growing sales. Under those conditions, keeping sales 
at the current level might be a perfectly satisfactory objective. That is why market share is a 
more adequate measure of the effectiveness of relationship marketing programs than an 
absolute level of sales. Thus, the central hypothesis that we want to test is the ability of 
relationship marketing programs to consolidate and improve the relative performance of 
the involved brands as measured by their market shares. 
One of the chief problems that both practitioners and researchers confront when 
trying to evaluate the effectiveness of a specific marketing initiative is the difficulty of 
isolating its impact from the effect of other external and internal variables that can interfere 
simultaneously with the consumer’s buying behavior. In the context of this investigation, 
we want to know if an observed increase of the market share of a given brand can be 
reasonably attributed to the implementation of a relationship marketing program. More 
specifically, how can we be sure that this positive evolution was not caused instead by other 
circumstances, whether they pertain to the general marketing environment or to other 
initiatives of the brand itself? The solution of this problem is to be found in the 
simultaneous monitoring of the behavior of two separate groups of consumers: 
• Control group. Includes consumers not involved in the relationship marketing 
program. 
• Test group. Includes consumers whose characteristics match exactly those of 
the control group, except for the fact that, unlike the members of the control 
group, they participate in the relationship marketing program. 
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Thus, if the members of the test group are only distinguished from those of the 
control group by their enrollment in the program, in such a way that all the remaining 
factors that determine purchase behavior are common to both groups, we can be sure that 
eventual differences of behavior can only be caused by the program itself. For this reason, 
we will express the research hypotheses in terms of observed differences between the 
behavior of test group and the behavior of the control group. 
The null hypothesis will be thus formulated: 
H0 – The market share of the test group does not increase relative to the market 
share of the control group as a result of the relationship marketing program. 
In case this hypothesis is verified, we will conclude that the relationship marketing 
program under analysis did not prove to be effective. However, our purpose is to delve 
further, trying to understand the causes of such an outcome. Considering the alternative 
hypothesis that the market share does increase, we will wish to know which factors were 
responsible for the change. In case it remains stable or decreases, we will want to know if 
by chance some underlying variables moved in opposite ways, thus canceling each other. 
Consequently, we will define several alternative hypotheses regarding the effects of 
relationship marketing on the variables that characterize buying behavior: 
H1 – The penetration rate of the test group tends to increase relative to the 
penetration rate of the control group. 
H2 – The buying rate of the test group tends to increase relative to the buying rate 
of the control group. 
As noted, the buying rate in turn depends on the behavior of two independent 
variables: purchase frequency and purchase per occasion. Hypothesis H2 must therefore be 
complemented by two sub-hypotheses: 
H2.1 – The purchase frequency of the test group tends to increase relative to the 
purchase frequency of the control group. 
H2.2 – The purchase per occasion of the test group tends to increase relative to the 
purchase per occasion of the control group. 
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Finally, we will add a last hypothesis in order to elucidate the time horizon of 
relationship marketing programs, namely regarding its eventual cumulative effect as the 
relationship with the brand gets longer: 
H.3 – The observed behavioral differences between the test group and the control 
group tend to increase with time. 
4.6 - CONCLUSION 
In this chapter the research issues were analyzed in detail and the hypotheses were 
defined. The focal theory presented in the previous chapter anticipates several problems 
that might hinder the effectiveness of relationship marketing programs aimed at building 
brand loyalty. In fact, the NBD-Dirichlet theory sustains the existence of certain fixed 
repeat-buying patterns, among them double jeopardy and the duplication of purchase law, 
which raise doubts on the effectiveness of loyalty strategies. According to some authors, 
excess-loyalty brands and niche brands are very exceptional phenomena that seldom occur 
in practice. If this conjectures were found to hold, two outcomes would be possible: either 
(a) relation marketing programs are simply ineffective, or (b) in case they benefit a brand’s 
performance, this would result not from increased loyalty but from growing penetration. 
We selected market-share as the single most important indicator of a brand’s 
performance, and then proceeded to identify the main behavioral factors that drives it. The 
Parfitt-Collins’s formula was our point of departure, allowing the identification of the three 
main variables that determine market-share: penetration rate, exclusivity rate, and intensity 
rate. Using the sales equation presented in Chapter 3, we then found that the exclusivity 
rate is in turn determined by two other variables: purchase frequency and purchase per 
occasion. To conclude the chapter, we defined the null hypothesis and three alternative 
hypotheses, with the second one of the latter being sub-divided into two distinct sub-
hypotheses.
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Chapter 5 
Research Methodology and Data Sources 
 
5.1 - INTRODUCTION 
Having laid down in the last Chapter the hypotheses that will be subsequently 
tested, the present Chapter will present the selected research methodology, justify its 
choice, and describe the data sources used. We will start by briefly introducing the 
relationship marketing program that was selected for investigation. The first section of this 
Chapter will provide information on the company, its brands, and its strategic marketing 
objectives, as well as details of the program itself and its metrics. After this short 
introduction, our attention will turn to consumer panels, its origins, foundations, purposes, 
methods, and advantages as tools of marketing research. Next, we will concentrate on the 
TNS consumer panel in Portugal, explaining how the actual sample was created and 
managed, how information is collected and aggregated, and how a special sub-panel was 
created to monitor the impact of the relationship marketing program that is the object of 
our research. The final part of this Chapter will be devoted to the description of the 
statistic techniques that were used to analyze the panel data. 
5.2 - THE RELATIONSHIP MARKETING PROGRAM 
The test of the hypothesis formulated in the previous Chapter can only be carried 
in the context of a significant relationship marketing program aimed at consumers of fast-
moving consumer goods. Fortunately, a large multinational company operating in a 
number of consumer markets agreed to give us access to the information needed to 
conduct this research. 
This company has been conducting a large-scale pilot relationship marketing 
program in Portugal. It was started in 2000 and goes on at the moment this report is being 
written. The name of the company, as well as the names of its business units and brands, 
will not be disclosed for reasons of data confidentiality. It will be called hereafter the XXX 
company and its divisions will be named A, B, C, and D. The brands of the A business unit 
will be named A.1, A.2, A.3, etc., the brands of the B business unit B.1, B.2, B.3, etc., and 
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so forth (see Figure 1.1 in Chapter 1). 
Table 5.1 
Correspondence Between Products and Brands 
 
Division Product Brand 
A.1 A.1 
A.2 A.2 
A.3 A.3 
A 
A.4 A.4 
B.1 B.1 
B.2 B.2 
B.3 B.3 
B 
B.4 B.4 
C.1 C.1 
C.2 C.2 
C.3 
C.4 
Same  
brand 
C.5 C.5 
C.6 
C 
C.7 
Same 
brand 
D.1 
D.2 
D.3 
D.4 
D.5 
D.6 
 
 
Same 
brand 
D 
D.7 D.7 
 
Table 5.1 above shows that some brand names compete simultaneously in several 
product categories. Thus, a single brand name is used for products C.3 and C.4. The same 
happens with products C.6 and C.7, as well as with products D.1, D.2, D.3, D.4, D.5, and 
D.6. 
The choice of this particular program was based on seven basic reasons: 
1. Complexity of the marketing concepts and techniques involved. It is not a 
simple incentives program of the type described in section 2.5.3, whose 
weaknesses are by now well known due to its worldwide application to several 
types of markets and products (Dowling and Uncles, 1997). It is not either a 
merely defensive loyalty program designed to protect the company and its 
brands from similar initiatives undertaken by the competition. It is in fact a 
pioneering program based on innovative ideas seldom tested before on such a 
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large scale in markets for fast-moving consumer goods. 
2. Program target market. Relationship marketing strategies are still an 
exception in markets for fast-moving consumer goods, a situation that makes 
this program even more interesting. Relationship marketing initiatives are much 
more frequent in service markets (air transportation, credit cards or large retail, 
for instance) and also, on a smaller scale, in business markets. As to companies 
dedicated to manufacture and sell fast-moving consumer goods, only recently 
did they start to become interested in those concepts. 
3. Number and variety of product categories involved. The program covers a 
total of 24 different fast-moving product categories and 16 brands. This 
includes a variety of food products, household cleaning products and personal 
care products with different levels of frequency purchasing, variety-seeking 
behavior, prices, promotional activity, number of competitors and own label 
competition. 
4. Number of participating consumers. The program under examination is a 
large scale pilot program involving in Portugal about 300 thousand households. 
Of course, this scale makes it extremely significant when compared with other 
similar but much more limited initiatives previously undertaken in Portugal. 
5. Time span of the experience. The XXX relationship marketing program has 
already entered its sixth year of existence. While demonstrating a serious 
commitment toward the consumers enrolled, this also means that the data 
generated by the program should allow us to analyze the evolution of its effects 
over time. 
6. Quantity and quality of the metrics used to control the program. Unlike 
the overwhelming majority of relationship programs launched either in Portugal 
or abroad, the objective evaluation of the program’s results has been a major 
concern from its very beginning. For this reason, a complete battery of 
indicators was put in place. No other relationship program running in Portugal 
would, to our knowledge, allow us to perform an in-depth investigation of the 
kind we wished to undertake. 
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7. Willingness of the company to cooperate with the research project. Last 
but not least, the openness of the company and its readiness to give us access 
to the necessary data was, of course, the crucial factor in the choice of the 
program as the focus of this research. 
The rest of this section introduces and describes in some detail the relationship 
marketing program of XXX, including its objectives, strategies, action programs, 
metrics and general organization. 
5.2.1 - On the XXX Corporation 
XXX is one of the largest multinational companies operating worldwide in fast-
moving consumer goods markets. It has played since its foundation a leading role in the 
creation and development of the contemporary consumer goods industry as we know it. It 
was instrumental in the internationalization of this industry and pioneered and 
disseminated the principles and techniques of modern marketing. It has been operating in 
many countries for over a century, especially in Western Europe and the US, but also in 
Latin America and in large parts of Asia. In the last few years, like most of its direct 
competitors, it has been expanding rapidly in China, India and Eastern Europe. Owing to 
the importance of its brands, XXX is invariably one of the top advertisers in every market 
where it competes. 
XXX has been operating in Portugal since the mid-20th century, creating a number 
of powerful brands that became household names. At the same time, the company has also 
been a major force in the introduction of marketing concepts and practices in the country. 
It used to include four different autonomous business units (named here A, B, C, and D), 
but has recently acquired a new company. However, since its brands were not involved in 
the program, it will not be mentioned further. XXX presently competes in Portugal in 
dozens of product categories and its brands are market leaders in most of them. 
5.2.2 – The origins of the program 
XXX was inspired by certain experiences conducted in France by the Danone 
group since 1995 to launch its own relationship marketing initiatives. The Danoé program 
started as a long-term promotion (the Bingo program involving Danone brands), which 
invited consumers to try some brands and to collect purchase proofs in order to create a 
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deeper relationship between the group’s brands and the participating households. One of 
the central marketing objectives was to increase the penetration rate of the lesser-known 
brands of the group. Danone was so satisfied with the results of this initiative that they 
expanded it gradually until it covered around 4 million households, that is about 20% of 
the total number of French households. 
As to XXX, its first experimental program gave its first steps in France in the last 
quarter of 1997, involving several brands of five different companies owned by the group. 
In the UK, a different format was tested in cooperation with two other multinational 
companies (Kimberley-Clark and Cadbury’s) whose brands did not compete directly with 
XXX’s, but the French model has inspired most of the new experiences that have since 
been launched in other countries. 
In fact, encouraged by the results reached in France, XXX started considering the 
launch of similar initiatives in other countries in 1999. Similar programs were therefore 
started in Germany, Portugal and Spain in 2000. The French format oriented the creation 
of those programs, although several adaptations were introduced to attend the peculiar 
conditions of those countries and of their markets and consumers. 
5.2.3 – Start-up in Portugal 
XXX started preparing the ground in the last quarter of 1999 in order to launch its 
relationship marketing pilot project in Portugal. The first step included the inventory of the 
material and organizational conditions indispensable to the implementation of the project, 
including the selection of a relationship marketing agency and of other related local support 
services. At the beginning of 2000 a small group was created inside XXX to conduct the 
project and an agency was chosen. 
The set-up of the basic infra-structure was concluded during the Summer of 2000 
and the project was finally ready to start in the final months of the year. The first contacts 
with the target group took place near the end of 2000, and, some weeks later, the first issue 
of the program’s magazine was distributed. From then on, the program became known 
after the name of the magazine. 
5.2.4 – Basic features of the program 
Following the example of the French model that inspired it, the program has two 
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basic distinctive features: 
• It is a multi-brand program. In the past, too many relationship marketing 
programs in fast-moving consumer goods’ markets failed for a basic economic 
reason: the cost per contact of the most common direct marketing communication 
vehicles (mail and telephone) is exceedingly high when compared with advertising 
in the mass media, and specially with television. As the profit generated by each 
individual customer is admittedly very low in fast-moving consumer goods, this fact 
can in itself be enough to jeopardize any kind of direct relationship effort. In order 
to avoid this central problem, it was decided that several brands would join efforts 
in the context of the same program, so that they could share costs in a common 
effort to communicate with their customers. In this particular case, a total of eight 
core brands decided to team up to support the program. However, a dozen other 
brands owned by XXX were at a moment or another also involved in the program. 
• It is aimed at the Most Valuable Consumers (MVCs). There are two reasons 
for this strategic option. First, it is common knowledge that households vary 
enormously regarding their consumption potential. In any given market a 
significant proportion (sometimes a majority) of households are absolute non-
consumers, while heavy-user households buy several times more than light-user 
households. Therefore, not all consumption units are equally relevant for the 
performance of a brand in its target market, given that its success will depend 
essentially of the preference it will be able to command among heavy users. Second, 
it is easier to justify the high cost per contact of direct communications mentioned 
in the previous paragraph when the potential lifetime value of the customer we are 
targeting is higher. That is why XXX decided to focus their program on its Most 
Valuable Consumers (MVCs). 
5.2.5 – Objectives of the program 
The basic aim of the program is to strengthen the position of XXX‘s brands in 
their respective markets. Should this mean that the main objective is to increase market 
shares and that this will be done by protecting and increasing penetration, while 
simultaneously increasing the customers’ buying rate? 
 163 
Truly, XXX‘s long-term purpose is more ambitious. What really is at stake is the 
evolution toward a globally more efficient way of managing marketing than the one usually 
identified with mass marketing practices. Since the potential value of the households varies 
extraordinarily from one case to another, then the marketing and communication effort 
should be proportional to each individual customer’s lifetime value. Fortunately, the recent 
advances of the information and communication technologies created for the first time in 
history the possibility of solving this problem in a satisfactory way. 
A new way of doing marketing must therefore be tested against a more traditional 
one. The additional revenue generated by this relationship marketing strategy will then have 
to be compared with the additional marketing investment needed to implement it. In other 
words, the ROI (Return of Investment) of the program will have to be estimated as 
rigorously as possible. 
In order to meet that goal, the program would have to accomplish a whole set of 
marketing objectives, including: 
• Consolidation and growth of brand penetration 
• Stimulation of brand repeat-buying 
• Supporting the launch of new brands and products 
5.2.6 – Characterization of the best consumers 
Once it was decided that the main target of the program should be the Most 
Valuable Consumers, there was a need to define concretely the meaning of this expression. 
To begin with, the household was chosen as the basic unit of consumption, integrating a 
group of individual consumers with possibly distinct or even divergent tastes and 
preferences. There is nothing original with this choice, since it corresponds to the common 
practice of companies that produce and sell fast-moving consumer goods. 
Next, the consumers of each product category where XXX competes and of each 
XXX brand were studied in some detail using the information available in the database of 
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the TNS consumer panel. A consumer audit40 was conducted in order to establish the 
framework and benchmarks for building and maintaining the program’s consumer 
database. The analytical reports generated by this consumer audit provided a classification 
of the different consumer usage groups for each one of the existing brands, categories, 
business units and total XXX. This classification also enabled the profiling of all MVCs and 
heavy consumers. 
Consumers participating in the panel were classified according to their value, 
evaluated by their expenditure, into four categories: (a) heavy; (b) medium, (c) light, and (d) 
non-users. The audit confirmed that the consumer contribution to turnover varies widely 
from one household to another. Specifically, the Pareto distribution generally applies, with 
the top 30% of consumers typically generating 70% of turnover and the top 20% 
accounting for 50% of turnover. This rule was validated at the brand, category, business 
unit and total company levels. The results obtained in Portugal were predictably in line with 
those previously found in other countries, thus confirming the disproportionate 
importance of heavy consumers to the overall performance of a brand within its served 
market. The average overall value of customers on a brand, category, business unit and 
company basis became known, as well the average values of customers in each specific 
value segment. This knowledge is of the utmost importance for the future economic 
evaluation of the program at all levels. 
Understandably, the profiles of heavy consumers vary somewhat, but not too 
much, from market to market. In most of them, the main determining factor of the value 
potential of a household is the dimension of the family and, in particular, the number and 
age of sons living in the household. However, in some very traditional or very modern 
food categories, the age of the housewife, the family income and the habitat also play an 
important role. 
Taking into account these variations, the profile of the most valuable XXX 
consumers was defined by mapping the measured characteristics of the heavy user of the 
company’s brands as a whole. Once identified, this profile was used to orient the search for 
                                                
40 The guiding principles of a typical consumer audit are outlined in Hallberg (1995). 
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the consumers that ideally should be recruited to the relationship marketing program. The 
insights obtained from the consumer audit provided the foundations and benchmarks for: 
• Developing the appropriate consumer database structure 
• Populating and qualifying the database according to relevant segmentation 
criteria 
• Building and maintaining profitable relationships with the MVCs 
• Optimizing marketing communications allocation according to the potential 
value of each consumer, in order to improve the marketing ROI 
5.2.7 - The overall blueprint of the program 
The relationship program itself was structured around a number of communication 
tools of two main types: 
• Periodic communication initiatives – a magazine sent to participating 
households every three months 
• Occasional communication initiatives – initiatives specific to certain brands 
or directed to specific groups of consumers 
The main communication tool of the program is the magazine. Its editorial content 
is not advertising in disguise (in other words, it is not something we might call advertorial). 
It was conceived having in mind the interests of its mainly feminine target group, not only 
those interests strictly connected with house management, but also interests related to 
family life, professional life, and leisure, including travel, sports and culture. The magazine 
tries to compete on the quality of its content and graphic design with other magazines that 
its target group can find in the newsstand. It must be sufficiently appealing to encourage 
MVCs to read it and look forward to read it again on the next quarter, something that they 
would consider paying for if in fact a price was charged. 
As stated, the magazine does not accept advertising disguised as editorial matter. 
Sponsorship is the dominating marketing communication model used in the magazine: 
XXX brands sponsor this or that article according to their affinities to the themes covered 
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in it. Each brand has a well-delimited territory defined as much by its functionality and 
recognized competence as by the symbolic domain with which it is connected. Thus, it 
makes sense for brands to be associated with articles that match their spheres of influence 
or symbolic territories. For instance, a brand of shampoo can sponsor articles on the 
protection of hair against environmental aggressions, while a food brand will prefer to 
sponsor articles on the art of cuisine. The brand sponsorship is graphically signaled and 
explained by a so-called “sponsorship box”. 
Of course, the choice of the themes covered in each specific magazine is not 
innocent. Each magazine is designed having simultaneously in mind social trends, the 
interest and relevance of the proposed themes, and their promotional potential for each 
one of the core brands. Achieving an adequate balance between relevant content and 
targeted selling messages is crucial. The magazine was designed to build a personalized 
relationship with each MVC. It is a new non-shared medium for dialogue with the brands’ 
customers, being both cross-category and direct to consumer. The magazine also provides 
a means of delivering value-added brand information while supplementing traditional mass 
media advertising. 
The content of the magazine usually includes: 
• Articles covering a wide variety of themes of interest to its readers 
• Advice, information and services offered by the company and its brands (e.g. 
help-lines) 
• Brand-building high-involvement promotions related to specific themes 
• Personalized coupons and sample offers 
• Questionnaires designed to collect more useful information on the participating 
consumers 
The brand-building promotions usually require from consumers a significant effort 
in order to participate. The consumers or other family members (most notably children) are 
invited to perform some task that should enhance the value offer of the brand image, such 
as sending recipes, suggest new usage ideas, send commentaries, take photos, write 
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advertising slogans, and so on. Although the prizes are usually valuable, the participation 
rates tend to be low because of the effort that consumers have to put up in order to 
compete. Therefore, their main goal is to stimulate higher involvement with the brand. 
It is well known that price promotions often generate two different types of 
problems: 
• Price promotions may unnecessarily subsidize so-called hard-core loyal 
purchasers that would buy the brand anyway 
• Price reductions or free product promotions risk undermining loyalty among 
heavy consumers by encouraging them to purchase products only on 
promotion 
In order to avoid those problems, in the context of the program the distribution of 
coupon is guided by previously knowledge on the purchase habits of each individual 
consumer. Thus, each magazine comes with a small booklet of personalized coupons, 
aimed at stimulating trial or repeat-buying of several products and brands. Each consumer 
receives a particular selection of coupons according to what is known about her buying 
habits. Thus, if someone is believed to be a regular buyer of a competing brand of certain 
product, she might receive in successive quarters coupons aimed at inciting her to break 
her habitual buying behavior routine. However, if she is known to be already a frequent 
buyer of the company’s brand of that product, she will receive instead some coupons to try 
other products of the range whose penetration the company wishes to increase. 
Together with the magazine, consumers receive questionnaires that they are invited 
to fill and send back to XXX. As a reward for their time and effort, they get a chance to 
participate in sweepstakes with attractive prizes, such as holidays abroad for the family or 
high-value household appliances. These inquiries play a crucial role in the process of 
qualification and characterization of the individual profile of each consumer. The first aim 
is to collect enough information to classify each household as either heavy, medium or 
light-user. Starting from there, an effort is made to profile in detail each consumer and to 
identify the strength of his involvement with each category and brand. Once this basic 
information is obtained, the next step will be to collect information on secondary although 
important aspects of the consumer’s behavior and attitudes. The distribution of the 
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questionnaires is of course differentiated according to the specific stage of the relationship. 
The periodic component of the program also involves a communication center 
with the consumers, including a help-line for information as well as communication by 
mail, email and SMS. Since mid-2002 a special online internet site was created to support 
the program. The occasional communication initiatives were not very important in the early 
stages of the program, partly because the proportion of consumers duly qualified was not 
large, and partly because most brand managers were not very familiar with direct marketing 
communications. The few occasional initiatives included direct response press advertising 
to recruit participants, qualification mailings and special offers to selected groups of 
consumers. 
5.2.8 – The infrastructure of the program 
The basic infrastructure of the program is the marketing database specially created 
to support it.  The database contains the data and related files necessary to develop, 
implement and measure the results of the CRM program. It was designed to: 
• Store comprehensive data on consumers, their basic identification, socio-
demographic profiles, behavior and attitudes 
• Analyze consumer data in order to enable the identification of MVCs and heavy 
consumers according to the profiles defined by the consumer audit 
• Record direct communication actions 
• Evaluate and control the program’s results 
The marketing database that supports the program included four basic distinct 
modules: 
1. Personal identification elements: name of the household manager, address, 
postal code, phone and email 
2. Socio-demographic information: sex, date of birth, habitat, education, 
occupation, income, dimension of the family, number and age of sons, 
possession of certain household equipments (e.g. microwave oven, dish-
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washing machine, personal computer) 
3. Information on purchasing habits: stores visited regularly, monthly expenses 
on groceries, product categories habitually purchased, buying status in each of 
those categories, brands habitually purchased in each category 
4. Historic record of participation in promotional activities: coupon 
redemption, participation in brand-building promotions, replies to 
questionnaires, phone calls to the help-line, letters sent, recommendations of 
friends 
The population of the database created some difficult problems. To begin with, the 
Portuguese company had no previous experience whatsoever of direct marketing 
techniques. For that reason, no qualified consumer database existed that could provide a 
starting point for the task. Even so, the company owned 800 thousand individual records 
collected in recent years in the course of promotional initiatives of several brands that 
asked for the identification of participants, usually in order to participate in some kind of 
competition. 
As a rule, those records were poor, unreliable, and probably outdated. Most of 
them contained only the name and address of the person who had entered the promotion, 
as well as the organizing brand. With very few exceptions, no phone numbers were 
available. The mailing lists had never been previously used in direct marketing actions by 
the company, and so their true quality was unknown, especially because some of them had 
been compiled six or more years ago. Finally, the fields used to classify information varied 
from one case to another (some of them did not have a separate field for the postal code, 
for instance), not to mention the fact that some information had not yet been digitalized. 
Not only the available information was poor, but it also seemed likely that a good 
number of the records might prove to be useless because of changes of address and other 
problems. Besides, in the absence of data on consumption or other behavioral habits, it 
was impossible to tell if a given consumer was heavy, medium or light. After a merge and 
purge operation only about 290 thousand consumer records of the original 800 thousand 
were retained for further examination. 
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5.3 – CONSUMER PANELS 
5.3.1 – Origins and basic features of consumer panels 
Consumer panels are a dynamic analysis technique of market research that has been 
in use for a long time. Its origins are to be found in the work of Lazarsfeld and Jenkins 
during the 1930s (Lazarsfeld and Fiske, 1938; Lazarsfeld, 1940; Jenkins, 1938), but the 
incidences of World War II delayed somewhat its commercial application, which only took 
off during the late 1940s. Still in the 1930s, however, Art Nielsen had created one of the 
first retail panels in the world that would afterwards inspire many others. It consisted of an 
audit service based on a sample of visited stores every two months that supplied estimates 
of the sales and price levels of a brand and its competitors41. 
Meanwhile, General Foods created a panel technique designed to test food 
products, and Market Research Corporation of America launched in October 1941 the first 
continuous panel of consumer purchases with an initial sample of 2,000 families 
(Stonborough, 1942). In that very same decade, other panels were created to analyze 
purchase patterns in New York (Black, 1948), to evaluate merchandise offers (Quenon, 
1951), to evaluate readers’ interest in features of news magazines (Robinson, 1947) and to 
evaluate radio audiences (Dunn, 1952; Sandage, 1951; Silvey, 1951). The first discontinuous 
panel – i.e., a panel that over time asks questions on a broad range of different topics – was 
started by the National Family Opinion in 1946 with a sample of one thousand households. 
The consumer panel is a form of longitudinal analysis, aimed at the measurement 
and understanding of the variation of key marketing variables over time, including both 
attitudes and behaviors of buyers and sellers. Compared to other techniques, continuous 
consumer panels exhibit the following distinctive features: 
a) They work with disaggregated data on individuals’ attitudes and behavior; 
b) They measure repeatedly the same variables from a stable sample of individuals 
during a certain period of time. 
                                                
41 The information contained in this section is based mainly on Carman (1974) and Sudman and 
Wansink (2002). 
 171 
Carman proposed the following definition of a panel, which remains valid in spite 
of the technological advances of the last three decades: 
The panel design is one in which individual behavior or attitudes are studied by repeated 
measurements of the variables of interest obtained from a single sample of respondents (Carman, 
1974). 
In panel research, the same questions are usually asked over and over to the 
members of the panel in successive surveys, given that this is the best way to take 
advantage of the distinctive features of a panel. But sometimes it also happens that new 
questions are introduced more or less frequently. 
The creation and management of a panel is extremely expensive. For this reason, its 
costs are commonly shared by a large group of subscriber companies, each one of them 
accessing more or less substantial parts of the collected information according to its needs 
and financial means. It was in the fast-moving consumer goods industry that panels 
immediately benefited from a wider acceptance, but nowadays there are a large variety of 
panel types covering durable consumer products as well, including panels specialized in the 
automobile industry. Besides, marketing managers are very familiar with audience panels 
measuring the number of people that watch television channels and programs at different 
times of the day. 
The recruitment of panel members is a delicate operation, as their 
representativeness must be guaranteed both in terms of its overall dimension and of its 
socio-demographic composition. The panel must be continually renewed for a number of 
reasons: natural mortality of its members, lack of cooperation from some members, 
changes in the socio-demographic condition of members, changes in the socio-
demographic composition of the universe, etc. The members of the panel are usually 
rewarded with some small compensation for their work, consisting, for instance, in the 
attribution of points that can be later exchanged for a choice of gifts. The gifts should not 
be too valuable, in order to avoid attracting opportunists whose sole motivation to 
participate is to benefit from the rewards. 
 172 
5.3.2 – Advantages and disadvantages of consumer panels 
Consumer panels are distinct from retail panels, and less common than them. Retail 
panels collect sales information in selected stores and their main purpose is to follow the 
movement of goods as they progress through distribution channels. The collected 
information allows the supplier to track global and brand sales in each covered market. A 
very accurate evaluation of the variation of market shares of the competing brands can thus 
be obtained, especially at an aggregate level. Although they provide less reliable estimates of 
market shares, consumer panels offer marketing managers other types of very useful 
information, such as, for instance, trial rates, repeat-buying rates, purchase frequency, 
amount purchased per buyer or inter-brand migrations. 
In principle, the information provided by a consumer panel can also be obtained by 
means of independent surveys periodically undertaken with different samples of 
individuals. However, not only the method of independent sampling is more expensive, as 
it also has the considerable technical disadvantage of the variation from one experience to 
another of both the sampling error and its bias. On the contrary, consumer panels 
minimize the effects of the error and bias of the sample on the process of measuring 
change, given that those errors will have a systematic nature, that is, they are not expected 
to vary from one survey to the next. As a consequence, although panels may not be very 
efficient when it comes to estimate the parameters of the universe population, they are 
more accurate when it comes to evaluate the direction and dimension of the variations that 
take place. 
Consumer panels also generate more disaggregated information by market segment, 
as it is possible to analyze the behavior of specific groups of consumers classified according 
to their age, sex, habitat, educational level, social class or income, for instance. But the 
segmentation process can also group consumers according to their situation toward the 
product category or brand, classifying them as potential or real customers, and then 
distinguishing between light, medium and heavy customers, or between loyal and disloyal 
ones. Of course, the degree of segmentation depends on the dimension of the sample that 
is taken to represent each segment. The smaller the segments, the harder it will be to obtain 
accurate information truly representative of the universe. 
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Consumer panels are an ideal ground for planned experiences. Thus, a distinction 
can be drawn between before and after situations when evaluating the impact of certain 
marketing stimuli (a price reduction, for instance, or the launch of an advertising campaign) 
on the sales of a brand. More generally, it is possible to separate a test group from a control 
group in order to isolate the effect of an explaining variable from others that might also 
influence consumer purchasing behavior. 
5.3.3 – Panel recruitment 
Consumer panels commonly use stratified samples. As such, the sample selection 
involves two distinct steps. First, the total dimension of the sample is chosen according to 
the principles laid out by statistical theory in order to guarantee the desired confidence 
levels.  Second, the strata are selected taking into account key demographic variables like 
location, life cycle, social class or family type. For the sample to be truly satisfactory, the 
characteristics of the chosen individuals should match as close as possible those of the 
sampled population, so that this microcosm really behaves like the total universe. Thus, for 
instance, if 30% of the universe lives in locations of more than 50 thousand people, it must 
be guaranteed that 30% of the sample fulfils this condition, and the same must be true of 
all the key stratification variables. 
The plan for the regular substitution of the panel members is developed together 
with the sampling plan, given that, after a while, some or many of the panel members will  
not wish or will not be able to go on cooperating. Panel rotation must be considered as a 
necessary evil. It is indeed an evil thing, since it endangers the stability of the panel, which 
is, as previously noted, one of the main advantages of this technique when compared with 
the alternative of periodically surveying independent samples. Each time a member enters 
or leaves the panel, the sampling error is affected, and this makes it more difficult to 
compare the results of two contiguous surveys. Therefore, it is advisable to avoid large and 
frequent changes in the composition of the panel. But panel rotation is, on the other hand, 
absolutely necessary, because otherwise the representativeness will be destroyed in the long 
term, either in general terms or regarding each one of the segments that we wish to 
monitor. 
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The reliability of the panel depends crucially on the possibility of reducing to a 
minimum the panel bias. There are three main sources of bias: 
a) Bias caused by refusals. It is very frequent to observe a high number of 
refusals among people pre-selected to join a panel. When this happens, people with certain 
psychological tendencies will be systematically excluded from the panel; thus, the sample 
will not really be random. This problem is very common in market research, but it gets 
obviously more serious as the effort demanded from the respondents increases, as is the 
case with consumer panels. 
b) Bias created by subsequent defections. It can also happen that a certain 
number of people who in the beginning willfully accepted to join the panel give up after 
realizing that the tasks that they have to perform take them too much time, or are too 
complex, or force them to reveal opinions or behaviors that they had rather hide. This is 
known to happen especially among people belonging to either very low or very high social 
classes, a phenomenon that tends to increase the bias of the sample. Low class individuals 
might have trouble completing the tasks that are assigned to them, or be ashamed to admit 
that they do not purchase a large number of the products covered in the survey; as to 
upper class people, they might consider themselves too busy to waste their precious time 
with surveys. 
c) Bias created by habit. From the moment they join a panel, some individuals 
start feeling special, a situation that might induce them to start acting as if they were 
somewhat special or different from common consumers. This can make them even trade 
their previous purchase patterns for others that they consider to be more “normal”, that is, 
more in line with the behavior of what they believe to be the average consumer. In other 
cases, the same feeling of self-importance created by their new position as “opinion 
leaders” might induce them to send “messages” to the manufacturers. Finally, some people 
who obviously lack the time or the patience to take careful note of their purchases, instead 
of abandoning the panel may decide to report week after week the same alleged behavior, 
even when those records deviate significantly from the truth. 
5.3.4 – Methods of information collection 
The above-mentioned problems are especially acute when the diary method is used. 
 175 
In this system, people are given pre-printed books that they must fill manually and send 
back every week to the company that manages the panel. This demands from participating 
consumers not only a strong self-discipline in order not to miss the deadline, but also a lot 
of work and accuracy in the registration of all the purchases made in all the product 
categories covered by the survey. Some books are voluminous, often including dozens of 
pages, each of them covering a number of product categories. For each product category, 
consumers are invited to declare at least the amount and specific form of product 
purchased, the brand and option, the price, and the store where it was bought, not to 
mention the existence of any kind of promotional offer. It is not hard to imagine that this 
task might demand more than an hour of work per week, even after the panel member 
becomes reasonably proficient in the task of filling the diary. These problems can and do 
affect the readiness of consumers to cooperate, a situation that might induce them either to 
give up or to communicate information totally or partially false in order to avoid loosing 
too much time performing the task. 
In the 1960s a universal system of codification of consumer goods – the UPC 
(Universal Product Code) – was created. Those codes can be automatically read by 
scanners installed in the stores by the cash register, allowing easier tracking of the 
movement of the products through the distribution channels. Although the prime 
motivation for this innovative system was the improvement of the logistics of distribution, 
in the mid-1980s someone had the idea of turning product codification into a market 
research tool. By 1993, Nielsen Market Research and Information Resources, Inc (IRI) 
were already the two main world suppliers of information collected by electronic reading of 
bar codes and had started expanding their operations internationally (Totten and Duffy, 
1994). 
Panels based on scanners have many advantages over purchase diaries that must be 
filled manually. First, they reduce significantly the probability or even the possibility of 
error in the collection of information. Second, they reduce attrition caused by the frequent 
defection of panel members. Third, they allow large savings on the costs of introducing the 
collected information in the computer system. Fourth and last, these technologies favor the 
automatic overlaying of panel data with information obtained from other sources, such as 
retailer databases containing information on prices, use of coupons by consumers or 
special promotional activities on the point of sale (e.g., demonstrations or displays). The 
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integration of different information sources led to the creation of so-called single source 
panels, registering simultaneously, for instance, which advertising spots were viewed by 
panel members (McDonald, 2000). 
The wealth of information originated by consumer panels of all types is now 
inducing the development of more and more sophisticated tools of analysis, including 
complex statistic and econometric models. Although the control of market performance 
was the first driver of the growing demand for panel information, the attention and interest 
of marketing managers is now turning to its potential to help them understand better the 
relative effectiveness and efficiency of different marketing stimuli, hoping for a better 
overall return on marketing investments (Bucklin and Gupta, 1999). Not only is it easier to 
conduct market tests with the help of consumers panels, as it is also more economical to 
obtain reliable and accurate information on the real results of alternative courses of action. 
5.3.5 – Information aggregation 
As previously stated, panel information is, by its very nature, very disaggregated. 
The basis of the collected information is the individual purchase made by each individual 
(or, more precisely, by each household) on each given week; as a direct consequence of 
these records, it is possible to reconstruct the complete history of each consumer’s 
purchases on each product category. In itself, this disaggregated information is not, as a 
rule, very relevant for marketing managers. Thus, the first step in the treatment of the 
collected information consists in consolidating it at successively higher levels of 
aggregation. This consolidation is the result of grouping units of information that share 
certain common characteristics in some way relevant for the desired type of analysis. Here 
are some examples of aggregation sequences: 
• Time period: Week → Month → Quarter → Year 
• Geography: Location → Region → Country 
• Product: Dimension, Form, Flavor → Segment → Brand → Manufacturer → 
Category 
• Consumers: Individual → Niche → Segment → Market 
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The information directly collected by the panel concerns only the sample. This 
information must afterwards be projected to the universe in order to give its subscribers a 
global idea of what is going on at the scale of the overall market, usually referring to a 
certain country. The extrapolation process consists in simply multiplying the average values 
obtained for each stratum of the sample by the total number of households estimated to 
exist in each one of them in order to obtain the sales volume and the sales value of each 
category and brand during the time period under consideration, as well as the market share 
of each individual brand. 
The accuracy of this projection depends on the correction of the assumptions on 
which the stratification of the sample was based. In other words, it will only be valid if the 
breakdown of the sample is found to match the socio-demographic breakdown of the 
households that make up the country’s population. Whenever the data of the census are 
incorrect or outdated, possibly as a consequence of unusually fast social changes in the 
time period between two successive censuses, serious mistakes can take place when 
extrapolating the sample information to the universe. Market dimensions and market 
shares can in such cases turn out to be systematically under or overvalued. 
5.4 – THE TNS PANEL IN PORTUGAL 
5.4.1 – Creation and management 
The Nielsen retailer panel was for a long time the only panel survey in Portugal 
providing information on consumer markets. As previously mentioned, retail panels are 
very accurate in the evaluation of brand market shares, not to mention the estimation of 
the absolute and pondered distribution rates of each supplier. This effectiveness is a result 
of their capacity to register directly a very large proportion of sales by surveying a relatively 
small number of stores. Furthermore, the trend toward a growing concentration of the 
retail business that took place during the last decades contributed to improve even more 
the accuracy of retail panels. 
The first real consumer panel was created in Portugal in the mid-1990s by TNS 
(formerly Taylor Nelson Sofres), a multinational market research firm. More recently, 
Marktest established its own consumer panel in 2003, and Nielsen did the same in 2005. 
We will now describe in some detail the workings and the organization of the TNS panel, 
since it was the source of the data used in the present investigation. 
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Under its present form, the TNS consumer panel features two distinct parts: one 
focusing on fast-moving consumer goods, the other on textiles and apparel. Obviously, 
only the first one will concern us. Selected consumers receive quarterly a book of pre-
printed forms organized by weeks, each of a different color to make its identification easier. 
The four quarters are not of the same length: the first, second and fourth include each 
twelve weeks; the third, coinciding with the summer holidays, during which purchase 
patterns change significantly, includes sixteen weeks. 
This panel belongs to the self-administered purchase diary type: consumers are 
invited to register in writing their weekly purchases on each of the product categories 
covered by the survey. In case of doubt on how the diary should be filled, consumers can 
send the label of the product whenever this alternative is a viable one. In order to ensure 
the accuracy of the information, consumers should fill the diary at the precise moment 
when, entering their homes after shopping, they take the products out of their bags and 
stock them in the refrigerator or in any other appropriate place; moreover, they should 
copy from the sales ticket the price of purchase. These procedures of course cause some 
inconvenience to the consumers, but, when they are not followed, they may be later 
incapable of recalling correctly the information. All this shows that a considerable margin 
exists for errors of registration of the collected information. 
At the time when the XXX relationship marketing program was launched, there 
were no scanner-based panels operating in Portugal, because it was believed that the 
demand for this service did nor justify the high initial investment that this technology 
requires42. As previously mentioned, diary-type panels have problems of reliability, but, for 
the moment, there was no alternative source in the country that might allow us to conduct 
the present investigation with more accurate information. 
                                                
42 The situation changed recently, since TNS started testing in the beginning of 2005 a scanner-
based system of data collection in Portugal. The new consumer panel created by Nielsen in the same year is 
also scanner-based. 
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5.4.2 – Collection, verification and codification of the information 
The information collected from the sample of consumers used by the TNS panel 
on their weekly purchases is organized into seven main groups: 
• Products – Some categories are broken into subcategories. For instance, 
category “Frozen foods” comprehends: non-prepared fish and shellfish; 
prepared fish and shellfish; meat and fish pastries; frozen meat; vegetables and 
fruit; frozen cooked meals, pizzas, lasagna, etc; and other frozen. 
• Presentation – In many cases, such as “Olive oil” and “Margarine”, consumers 
must indicate their preferred type of packaging. 
• Brand and variety – Main brand and sub-brand or product variant. When 
purchasing “Olive oil”, consumers must indicate acidity degree; when 
purchasing “Beer”, they must report whether they purchased alcoholic beer, 
light beer or alcohol free beer; when purchasing “UHT Milk”, whether they 
purchased fat milk, half-fat milk or low-fat milk; and so on. 
• Purchased quantity – Number of units or packs purchased. 
• Weight or unit volume – Consumers are requested to specify the quantity of 
product contained in the individual pack, which can sometimes be, for instance, 
a group of six bottles or cans. The amount of product can be measured in 
either weight or volume. 
• Unit or total price. The consumer has the choice to declare either one or the 
other, since the computer will calculate automatically the one that is missing. 
This information allows the identification of those situations when the 
purchased product was benefiting from a price promotion. 
• Where the product was bought – Type and name of the store and number of 
register machines. This group of questions admits a large number of replies, 
comprehending both modern and traditional retail. Mail order buying is also 
considered, although this is only relevant for textile and apparel products. 
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Filling diaries is necessarily a slow task, requiring a considerable amount of patience 
and concentration from the panel members. The collected data can be distorted as a result 
of mistakes caused both by carelessness or excessive zeal. For this reason, operators check 
the accuracy of the information before it is codified and only afterwards is it introduced in 
the computer system. Whenever some kind of doubt arises, the inquiries are put aside for 
further confirmation, usually demanding a phone call to the panel member. The 
information is then automatically processed in order to produce several types of reports. 
5.4.3 – Panel organization 
The basic unit of information collection is the household. The diary must therefore 
register the purchases made by all members of the family, a requirement that is difficult to 
meet when the person in charge is not always the same. During the period under analysis, 
the panel sample included 1,826 households43 representing the total universe of 3,594,279 
households that, according to the INE Census existed in Portugal in 2000. The sample is 
stratified taken into account a variety of socio-demographic criteria: 
• Region of residence: Greater Lisbon (23.5%), Greater Oporto (10.9%), 
Coastland (38.7%), Inland North (13.3%), Inland South (13.6%) 
• Habitat: up to 2,000 inhabitants (37.7%), from 2,001 to 10,000 inhabitants 
(11.7%), from 10,001 to 1,000,000 inhabitants (16.2%), metropolitan areas 
(34.4%) 
• Number of persons in the household: 1 or 2 persons (46.8%), 3 persons 
(25.5%), 4 or + persons (27.8%) 
• Age of the housewife: up to 34 years (21.7%), 35 to 49 years (29.6%), 50 years 
and + (48.7%) 
• Presence of children: no children (70.5%), up to 5 years (14.6%), from 6 to 15 
years (14.9%) 
                                                
43 In 2005, the sample was expanded to include a total of 2,500 households. 
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• Social class: upper + medium upper (15.0%), medium (29.0%), medium lower 
(39.0%), lower (17.0%) 
Social class is not determined directly, that is, panel members are not asked what 
class they belong to. Instead, it is determined by a number of clues, such as the profession 
of the head of the family, the educational level of the head of the family and a number of 
life-style indicators (secondary home, house servants, number of bathrooms, cable TV, 
internet at home) and possession of certain equipments (video recorder, centrifugator, 
vacuum-cleaner, photo camera, PC, dish-washing machine, hi-fi, microwave oven, 
refrigerator, electric coffee machine, video camera, electric tooth-brush, mobile phone). 
The panel sample was significantly readjusted in 2003 after the results of the INE 
population census of 2001 where published. In fact, the country underwent a considerable 
social and economic transformation during the last decade of the 20th century, leading to 
rapid and meaningful population changes. As a consequence, the extrapolation of data 
based on the previous census was providing a very distorted picture of market reality and 
brand performance. 
The main trends taking place between 1991 and 2001 were the following: 
• Increasing proportion of households with 3 or less persons 
• Increasing proportion of households with just 1 person 
• Increasing proportion of households with no children 
• Decreasing proportion of lower class households 
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5.4.4 – Available information 
The TNS consumer panel provides its subscribers with two main types of standard 
information: Continuous and Diagnosis. The Continuous information (the one that will 
concern us directly) is presented as a single report. The Diagnosis information includes five 
different types of reports: 
• Loyalty study 
• Transfer study 
• New product launch study 
• Light, Medium and Heavy buyers 
• Duplication study 
We will now briefly summarize the contents of each one of the standard reports. 
Continuous report 
The information contained in the Continuous Report, typically issued every quarter, 
describes the situation of the brands competing in a given product category. The general 
information is detailed by specific target/profile, region, distribution channel, and retail 
chain. This information enables marketing managers to follow the evolution of the general 
market, of their brand and of the competing brands, both globally and by segments. 
They will get to know if the market increased or decreased in volume and value and 
how their brand performed in comparison to the others. Besides market share, they also 
become acquainted with their penetration rates, buying rates, purchase frequency and 
average purchase per occasion. The observed variations of market shares can thus be 
broken down and their causes traced and understood. 
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Loyalty study report 
The loyalty study is based on the comparison of the data of two successive periods 
of time. The subscribers are informed on how many consumer households repeated the 
purchase of the brand, how many traded it for competing brands and how many switched 
to the brand after having previously bought another one. After identifying the loyal 
consumers, the new customers and the lapsed customers, the study establishes their socio-
demographic profile, estimates their average intensity of consumption, indicates how their 
purchases are divided among the several brands and identifies the retail channels where 
they usually buy. 
Transfer study report 
The Transfer Study analyzes the gains and losses of the brands from one period to 
the next. The report presents a Markov-type matrix showing how consumers move from 
one brand to another. The marketing manager gets to know which brands are loosing sales 
to them (and by how much) and what brands are gaining sales from them (and by how 
much). When these movements are confirmed in successive periods, trends emerge that 
make some brands advance their market shares while others are left behind. On a tactical 
perspective, the Transfer Study also shows what happens when a brand implements some 
marketing initiatives such as advertising campaigns, price reductions or sales promotions. 
New product launch report 
As suggested by its name, the New Product Launch report aims to help marketing 
managers understand as soon as possible what is going on after they launch a new brand or 
a new product. 
This report provides information in three stages concerning trial rates and 
purchase-repeat rates after the launch, and also shows how buyer behavior changes after 
the first trial. Managers also receive information on the socio-demographic profile of 
trialists, repeaters and non-repeaters. 
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Light, medium, and heavy consumers study report 
The purpose of this study is to provide information that allows a better targeting of 
the marketing initiatives aimed at increasing market share by evaluating the differential 
behavior of consumers according to their consumption potential. This information can 
namely help pinpoint market niches of high potential. 
The report segments purchasers according to their market value, establishes their 
socio-demographic potential and describes the purchase behavior of each segment. 
Duplication study report 
As most consumers currently buy more than one brand, managers naturally wish to 
know which brands belong to their repertory and how they come to prefer one brand to 
others. The Duplication Study describes how buyers of each brand distribute their 
purchases between the remaining brands in order to know which are their more direct 
competitors as well as their strengths and weaknesses. Exclusive buyers and their socio-
demographic profile are identified as well as the degree of substitutability among brands. 
This report takes advantage of the Parfitt-Collins formula to break down market-
share into three main variables: relative penetration rate, feed rate (or share of 
requirements), and consumption index (intensity rate). 
5.5 – THE XXX SUB-PANNEL 
5.5.1 – Metrics of the XXX relationship marketing program 
XXX created a comprehensive battery of performance indicators to control the 
effectiveness of their relationship marketing program. The following five control variables 
were continuously monitored: 
• Proportion of households positively qualified as heavy consumers 
• Response rates to qualification questionnaires 
• Rates of participation in promotional initiatives 
• Coupon redemption levels 
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• Satisfaction generated by the magazine evaluated through phone surveys and 
focus groups 
However, no matter how important these indicators may be, none of them is really 
decisive for the program’s central purposes. The main criterion used to judge the goodness 
of the relationship marketing program was its ability to generate incremental turnover and 
gross profit and, as a consequence, to produce a satisfactory return on the marketing 
investment it required. This could only be done by creating a control device that allowed 
the company to isolate the impact of the program from other factors that might affect the 
sales of XXX brands, namely the marketing-mix stimuli of other brands competing in the 
market. 
In order to control the results of XXX’s relationship marketing program, a special 
sub-panel was created within the general TNS consumer panel. Its main purpose was the 
simultaneous and parallel control of the purchase behavior of two distinct consumer 
groups: on the one hand, those enrolled in the program (i.e., the customers exposed to it), 
and, on the other hand, those excluded from it (i.e., the customers non-exposed to it). 
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5.5.2 – Test group and control group 
This monitoring system was designed to compare a control group (consumers 
excluded from the program) with a test group (consumers enrolled in the program), with 
both groups having a similar socio-demographic profile. Ideally, the only known significant 
difference between both groups should lie in the fact that one is being impacted by a given 
marketing initiative while the other one is not. The fulfillment of this condition would 
allow us to conclude that the observed differences of behavior between both groups must 
necessarily have been be caused by the relationship marketing program. 
Figure 5.1 
Test Group and Control Group Selection 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author. 
This metric involves identifying control households (also known as “twins”) who 
are excluded from the relationship marketing program but who have the same profile as 
the households exposed to the program. Figure 5.1 shows the relationship between the 
program database, the consumer panel database, the test group (exposed consumers) and 
the control group (non-exposed consumers). The test group is located at the intersection of 
the program database with the consumer panel database, given that its members belong 
simultaneously to both of them. On the contrary, the control group is exclusively 
composed of consumers that can be found in the consumer panel database but not in the 
relationship program database. 
The XXX relationship marketing program included some 280 thousand consumer 
households, that is, roughly 7.7% of the total number of households existing in the country 
Panel 
Database 
Exposed consumers Non-exposed twins 
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according to the 2001 Census. By merging the program database with the panel database, it 
was possible to identify more than two hundred households common to both of them, of 
which precisely 200 were retained to integrate the test group. The next step was to create a 
control group with the same socio-demographic structure as the cross sample that served 
as test group. The selected control group included 1,626 households. 
Once this stage was concluded, the last quarter before the program began (the 4th 
quarter of 2000) was selected as the benchmark for future comparisons, establishing the 
reference parameters of purchase behavior both in the control group and in the test group. 
5.5.3 – The sample dimension of the test group 
The sample representing the exposed consumers – only two hundred households – 
is of course a small one. In practice, it is even smaller whenever we wish to consider 
separately the situation in each product category (slightly smaller in high penetration 
categories, but much smaller in low penetration categories). 
This problem must be considered having in mind the peculiar features of consumer 
panels. As previously mentioned, the fact that this research technique consists in surveying 
repeatedly the same group of individuals makes the dimension of the sample relatively less 
important since the sampling error and its bias are not expected to change from one period 
to the next. Thus, we must be ready to work with small samples, keeping in mind that, 
while the parameters will not be measured with the desired accuracy, the stability of the 
sample will allow us to identify unambiguously the direction of the observed changes. Even 
so, it was deemed necessary to define a minimum threshold under which the data obtained 
from the survey would not be accepted. As a rule of thumb, for each analyzed product the 
data of the test group were disregarded whenever less than 30 purchase occasions took 
place during a given quarter. In those cases, the data were considered “non-available”. 
5.5.4 – Length of the time-series 
The time-series used in our research includes one quarter before and nine quarters 
after the start of the program. This covers the period between the 4th quarter of 2000 and 
the 1st quarter of 2003. Why do we lack data after this last date if the program is still 
running at the present moment? The answer to this question has to do with the changed 
composition of the TNS panel decided after the publication of the results of the 2001 
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Census which took place in 2002. In fact, the Census showed that the composition of the 
panel sample no longer reflected adequately the situation of the country at the turn of the 
millennium. As a consequence a different stratification of the sample was called for. The 
necessary corrections were undertaken in 2003 and the results of the panel were 
recalculated for the previous years. As a consequence, the time-series for both the control 
and the test group were also reconstructed from 2001 on until the present (excluding the 
last quarter of 2000) which meant that the previous time-series were discontinued. 
So, we now have two different groups of time-series: 
• The first one starts in the 4th quarter of 2000 and end in the 1st quarter of 
2003, extending for two years and a half. 
• The second one starts in the 1st quarter of 2001 and continues up to the 
present time.  
Besides having ignored the benchmark quarter, the new time-series both for the 
test and the control groups are also different in that, unlike the previous ones, they are 
based on a different idea, that is, the comparison between the situation in the weeks 
immediately before and immediately after each issue of the magazine. Since the periodicity 
of the magazine was also changed from four times a year to three times a year, this means 
that the new data does not cover what happens during the full year. This is unfortunate, 
because it makes the new time-series doubly unsuitable for our purposes: on the one hand, 
because it ignores the zero time period; on the other hand, because in practice we no 
longer have a continuous time-series. For these reasons, we chose to keep the first time-
series and discard the second one at the cost of analyzing a shorter time period. 
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5.6 – EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND STATISTICAL TECHNIQUES 
The available data allowed us to conduct a scientific experiment in order to 
establish whether the XXX relationship marketing program had any impact on the 
observed behavioral variables, and it also allowed us to estimate how large that impact 
was44. In fact, as previously indicated, the data obtained through the consumer panel 
satisfies two crucial conditions: 
a) It includes a pre-program period that provided us with a benchmark, or baseline, 
that we will call period 0. The observed behavior of the enrolled consumer 
households occurring after the beginning of the program can therefore be 
compared with the situation previous to its start. In so-called time-series quasi-
experiments such as this, behavior is observed for some time, a marketing stimulus 
is then directed at customers, and sales are observed both during and after the 
program. In this case, the period previous to the stimulus is restrained to one single 
quarter, which of course is a limitation, for reasons that will later become clearer. 
On the other hand, we do not have a post-program period either, but that is not a 
serious concern, since we did not intend to study for how long the effects of the 
program remained after its conclusion. Now, if we only had a time-series describing 
the behavior of the test group before and during the launch of the program, this 
would not have been satisfactory from a scientific point of view, because we would 
not have a way of being sure that the cause of the behavioral variations taking place 
from period 1 until period 9 could be attributed to the program. In fact, since the 
marketing environment cannot be expected to keep still for such a long period of 
time, any kind of stimuli originating in it could be the right explanation for such 
variations. What this means is that comparing the situation after the program with 
the situation before it started is not enough to allow a proper test of the hypotheses 
laid out in the last chapter. 
b) Fortunately, we also benefited from the existence of a separate control group 
including only consumer households not exposed to the program. Since this 
                                                
44 This section is based mainly on Campbell and Stanley (1963), Banks (1974), Mills (1977), Aaker 
and Day (1980), Pyndick and Rubinfeld (1981), and Blattberg and Neslin (1990). 
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control group is also exposed to the general marketing environment, the 
comparison between the test group and the control group will allow us to factor 
out the behavioral variations extraneous to the relationship program. Since the test 
group and the control group only differ because the first one was exposed to the 
program while the second one was not, we can reasonably infer that any differential 
change in behavior that takes place in the test group relative to the control group 
after period 0 must have been caused by the program itself. Furthermore, it should 
be noted that neither the members of the test group nor those of the control group 
were at anytime aware that their behavior was being specifically monitored in 
connection with XXX’s relationship marketing program. Thus, there is no reason 
to suspect that they might have altered their usual behavior as a consequence of 
being under scrutiny for this particular reason. On the other hand, a matching of 
the two groups was performed before the start of the program in order to minimize 
the possibility that divergent behaviors might be caused by very different profiles of 
its members. Finally, the composition of both groups satisfies reasonably the 
demand of randomness in their formation. 
To sum up, our investigation benefited from a two-group pre-post experimental 
arrangement. We have a period 0 that surveys the situation of the behavioral variables 
before the start of the program, and we have nine periods after the start of the program 
(X). Then, we have the complete ten period time-series for both the test group and the 
control group. The general design of the experiment can be diagrammed as follows: 
Test Group:  O0  X  O1  O2  O3  O4  O5  O6  O7   O8  O9 
Control Group: O’0       O
’
1 O
’
2  O
’
3 O
’
4  O
’
5 O
’
6  O
’
7  O
’
8 O
’
9 
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Another way of representing this experimental design is shown in the following 
Figure. 
Figure 5.2 
Comparison Between Before vs. After and Test vs. Control 
 
to t1 t2 t3 t4 T5 t6 t7 t8 t9 
Test: Purchase behavior of exposed households 
Control: Purchase behavior of non-exposed households 
Source: Meyer-Waarden (2004). 
Graphical representation and visual inspection will give us a first idea on how a 
certain behavioral variable is moving as a consequence of the relationship program. In fact, 
we can represent in the same graphic the time-series of each of the relevant variables of 
both groups and fit to them a linear trend. If the samples are truly random, if their 
members have the same profile and if there is no sample error due to a special cause, we 
would expect any impact of the program to show up like this, with the full line representing 
the test group and the dotted line the control group: 
Figure 5.3 
Hypothetical Impact of the Program on the Behavior of the Test Group 
 
 
 
 
Source: Meyer-Waarden (2004). 
What this graphic means is that, if the marketing environment remains stable, we 
would expect to see no changes in the control group, while any positive impact of the 
program on the variable under examination would translate into a positive sloped trend line 
in the test group. Also note that the program effect, instead of being instantaneous, would 
in this case proceed in a cumulative way, working gradually from period 1 and improving 
continuously until period 9. Of course, in practice, we expect to find less tidy data, possibly 
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leading to graphic representations more like the following ones: 
Figure 5.4 
Different Patterns of Impact on the Behavior of the Test Group 
 
 
 
 
Source: Meyer-Waarden (2004). 
In graphic (a) the starting point is similar for both groups at moment zero. The 
marketing environment also causes a simultaneous improvement in both of them, but the 
positive trend is stronger in the test group than in the control group, an indication that the 
program would be producing results. In graphic (b) the test group starts bellow the control 
group, possibly because of a sampling error at period 0, but there is also a clear positive 
effect of the program. Finally, in graphic (c) the starting point is different, but the trend 
lines grow in paralel, suggesting that the relationship program had no impact whatsoever 
on the observed variable. 
The trend line will be determined by fitting the following equation to the data: 
Oxt = α + βt + ε                                                                                              (5.1) 
Where 
Oxt – Observed value of variable x in period t 
t – time (quarters 0 to 9) 
ε - random  error term 
The estimation of parameters α and β is done using the least-squares procedure. Of 
course, we need to know how well each trend line fits the analyzed time-series, or, in other 
words, how closely the variation of the variable is in fact related to the passing of time. 
This problem will be solved by inspecting the correlation coefficient associated to each 
a b c 
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trend equation, which will tell us how confident we can be that the variable under scrutiny 
is really changing in line with the passing of time after the start of the program. Thus, a 
high correlation coefficient will mean that the variable is moving consistently in a certain 
direction, while a low correlation coefficient will lead us to conclude that we cannot put too 
much faith in the trend line, since the variation in the time-series includes a significant 
irregular component. 
An alternative approach is to take the differences between the observed values in 
the test group and in the control group, and then analyze the trend of the differences 
instead of studying separately the evolution of each group. Thus, we would consider: 
Dt = Ot – O
’
t                                                                                                                                                                           (5.2) 
Where Ot (observed value in the test group) and O
’
t (observed value in the control 
group) have the same meaning as above and Dt is the difference between one and the other 
in period t. Now, recalling our research hypotheses, we want to know (a) whether the 
program changes the behavioral variables and by how much, and (b) whether its impact is 
instantaneous or increases with time. In order to clarify these issues, we will resort to the 
following linear regression model: 
Dxt = α + βPt + δt + ε                                                                                     (5.3) 
Where: 
Dxt – Difference between the observed values of variable x in the test group and 
the control group in period t 
Pt – Dummy variable that assumes the value 0 in period 0 (before the program is 
launched) and the value 1 in subsequent periods (when the program is active) 
t – Duration of the program since its beginning measured in quarters (t = 0, 1, 2, ..., 
9)  
ε - random error term 
When we analyze a time-series and fit a linear trend to it we are not actually 
explaining anything, since time is not really a cause of the observed variation. On the 
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contrary, the two-variable regression model represented by this equation actually tries to 
explain the variation in Dx as a function of P and t, that is, as a function of the program 
and of how long it has been running. The β coefficient tries to measure the impact of the 
program on the variable, and the δ coefficient tries to identify its cumulative impact as the 
relationship is gradually being built from quarter 1 to quarter 9. Further, in order to know if 
those coefficients can be trusted, that is, if we can reject the null hypothesis that they are 
not significantly different from zero, we will have to analyze the t statistics associated to the 
regression. On the other hand, the F statistics will allows to test the null hypothesis that 
none of the proposed explanatory variables help explain the observed variation. 
It is interesting to note that testing the null hypothesis that the β coefficient in the 
above model is not different from zero is equivalent to testing the hypothesis that the 
observed values of the behavioral variables before and after the launch of the program 
belong to the same random distribution and, therefore, even if some variation is displayed 
by the data, we cannot take it as a proof that the program had some kind of real impact on 
the exposed consumer households. 
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5.7 – CONCLUSION 
In this chapter we described in some detail the XXX relationship program, its 
objectives, strategies and metrics. We gave due emphasis to consumer panels as a specific 
tool of market research, and discussed both their advantages and shortcomings when 
analysing consumer purchasing behavioral patterns. We presented the TNS Portuguese 
consumer panel, and showed how it was used to monitor the relationship program that we 
intend to study. 
Given that the monitoring instrument of the program was designed before the 
beginning of this investigation, and that certain changes in the panel structure determined 
by the publication of the 2001 Census led to the abandonment of the control group used 
between the fourth quarter of 2000 and the first quarter of 2003 and to the break of the 
time-series after that date, we were unable to use more recent data. On the other hand, and 
for the same reasons, we were also unable to explore the data in ways that had not been 
previously considered by XXX. We could not, for instance, study the evolution of the 
share of requirements in the test group, nor, for that matter, analyze how the program may 
have affected the intensity rate or the duplication of purchase. 
Nevertheless, the available data allows the conduction of a proper scientific 
experiment based on a before-after and test-control design, although with some limitations 
pointed out in this Chapter. The next Chapter will present in detail the results of our 
research.
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Chapter 6 
Presentation of the Results 
 
6.1 – INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the results obtained from the application to the empirical 
data of the analytic methodologies described in Chapter 5, and discusses their relevance for 
the research issues. At each level of analysis (corporate level, business level, and product 
level), we prepared tables displaying the data of both the test and the control group used 
for the analysis, represented them graphically, identified time trends, computed correlation 
levels and performed regression analysis using the equations presented in the previous 
chapter. 
The analyzed purchase variables were market share, penetration, buying rate, 
purchase frequency and purchase per occasion whenever they were available, meaning 
whenever the number of observed purchase occasions during a certain quarter was large 
enough to classify the data as reliable45. For each one of those variables, the following 
operations were performed on the original data: 
1. The time-series were graphically represented, both for the test group and 
the control group describing its evolution along ten quarters 
2. Linear trends were fitted to those time-series, and the slopes of the 
equations were estimated 
3. Correlation coefficients between each analyzed variable and time were 
computed for each time-series 
                                                
45 As previously indicated, TNS used a rule of thumb according to which the data would not be 
trusted whenever less than 30 purchase occasions took place during the period under analysis. 
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Then, new time-series were constructed by calculating the differences between the 
values taken by each variable in the test group versus the control group during the same 
time period. Again, a number of operations were performed on these data: 
1. Linear trends were fitted to the time-series, and the slopes of the equations 
were estimated 
2. Correlation coefficients between each analyzed variable and time were 
computed for each time-series 
3. Linear multiple regression analysis was conducted taking as independent 
variables time and a dummy variable that equaled “0” before the program 
starts and “1” after it was launched 
The dummy variable allowed us to test the hypothesis that the values taken by the 
behavioral variables after the program started were significantly different from the ones 
measured before it began. The purpose of the time variable was to help us understand 
whether the effect of the program was instantaneous or if it increased with time instead. 
Thus, whenever the dummy variable appeared to be positive and statistically significant, we 
would expect the time variable to be null if the impact of the program was instantaneous 
and positive if it was gradual and cumulative. A significance level of p<0.05 was retained 
throughout our analysis. 
The results will be presented in three different sections of this Chapter, one for 
each level of analysis. Thus, results at the corporate level will be presented in Section 6.2, 
results at the division level in Section 6.3, and results at the product level in Section 6.4. 
In Section 6.2 the full results of our analysis will be shown. First, a synthetic table 
displays the evolution of the behavioral variables under consideration over time, from the 
beginning to the end of the quasi-experiment. Second, five different graphic 
representations (one for each behavioral variable: market share, penetration rate, buying 
rate, purchasing frequency, and purchase per occasion) compare visually the evolution of 
purchase behavior in the test group against purchase behavior the control group. Third, we 
will look at the trends and correlations associated with the time-series of the differences 
between the test group and the control group for all the purchase variables. To conclude, 
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the results of the multiple regression analysis will be introduced. 
This way of presenting the results has the advantage of making the reader familiar 
with all the basic data that underlie our research and with the calculations performed on 
them. However, the detailed presentation of the results level after level and variable after 
variable, besides being tedious, might make the reader loose sight of the overall picture. In 
order to keep the presentation of the results as straightforward and readable as possible in 
sections 6.3 and 6.4 the tables presenting the evolution of the behavioral variables, their 
graphic representation, trend equations and corresponding correlation coefficients will not 
be shown. This was absolutely necessary since a total of 246 time-series were analyzed46. 
The interested reader will find them in Appendix 1. On the other hand, the detailed results 
of the regression analysis are available for full inspection in Appendix 2.  
                                                
46 This figure includes the time-series of the behavioral variables in the test group, of the same 
variables in the control group and of the differences between both of them. A total of 159 incomplete or 
unreliable time-series had to be discarded from the original 405. 
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6.2 – RESULTS AT THE CORPORATE LEVEL 
6.2.1 – Evolution of the behavioral variables 
As indicated, we will start with the analysis of the overall behavior of XXX brands 
and products, aggregating all the markets in which the company presently competes. This 
will give us a general idea of the impact of the program. Table 6.1 below summarizes the 
evolution of the analyzed behavioral variables during the period covered by our research 
both in the test and in the control group. 
Table 6.1 
Corporation XXX – Evolution of the Behavioral Variables 
 Market share Penetration Buying rate     
(value) 
Purchase frequency Expense per 
occasion (value) 
 Test Control Test Control Test Control Test Control Test Control 
IV – 2000 28.70 27.7 94.1 93.0 25.7 20.2 5.7 5.0 4.51 4.04 
I – 2001 28.60 26.30 93.1 91.6 26.1 20.1 5.2 4.5 5.02 4.47 
II – 2001 32.80 27.70 92.5 94.6 29.4 21.6 4.5 4.4 6.53 4.91 
III – 2001 30.40 28.20 98.4 95.8 35.7 28.5 6.1 5.6 5.85 5.09 
IV – 2001 29.00 27.40 88.6 92.0 32.3 22.0 4.9 4.4 6.59 5.00 
I – 2002 29.80 27.50 95.7 91.3 23.9 21.3 4.6 4.3 5.20 4.95 
II – 2002 30.80 27.70 95.2 91.1 27.3 22.1 5.2 4.6 5.25 4.80 
III – 2002 31.00 27.50 95.6 91.0 28.5 21.5 5.4 4.5 5.28 4.78 
IV – 2002 30.60 25.60 96.4 90.6 28.6 20.6 4.9 4.2 5.84 4.90 
I – 2003 28.20 26.60 94.2 91.2 25.1 20.6 4.3 4.2 5.84 4.90 
Average 29.99 27.22 94.38 92.22 28.26 21.85 5.08 4.57 5.59 4.79 
Standard 
deviation 1.41 0.80 2.64 1.72 3.56 2.44 0.56 0.43 0.66 0.31 
% sd 4.71 2.92 2.80 1.87 12.61 11.18 10.97 9.40 11.85 6.49 
Source: TNS. 
For an easier and faster understanding of the data reproduced in Table 6.1, five 
different graphic representations were prepared (one for each variable under consideration) 
that will be shown under the following sub-headings. In each graphic trends have been 
fitted to the data series representing the parallel evolution of the situation in the control 
group and in the test group. The long-term trends of each group (or absence thereof) 
should emerge clearly from the visual inspection of these graphics. The equations 
underlying those trends and their R2 coefficients have been added to the graphics to 
provide a better understanding of the overall picture. For consistency and ease of 
understanding the trend equation and the R2 coefficient of the test group are displayed on 
the left of the figure, while those of the control group are shown on the right. 
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Market share 
As a consequence of the global importance of XXX brands in the Portuguese 
markets for fast-moving consumer goods, its overall average value market share during the 
period under consideration is estimated by the TNS consumer panel to have reached 
27.22% in the control group and 29.99% in the test group, as can be seen in Table 6.1. This 
difference between the control group and the test group probably means that heavy users 
are somewhat over-represented in the test group. However, both estimates show that XXX 
command a very strong market position in the served product categories. As a result, they 
have a significant bargaining power toward consumers and even some power toward 
retailers. 
Table 6.1 also shows that XXX’s overall market share underwent some erosion 
during the period under consideration, a point to which we will later return. We noted in 
the previous chapter that the variables pertaining to the test group were estimated from a 
much smaller sample than those relating to the control group. As a consequence, the 
former are of course less reliable than the latter. For that reason, the trend of the control 
group is usually much neater than the trend of the test group. This can be confirmed by the 
fact that the standard deviation around the average of the test group is both in absolute and 
relative terms larger than the standard deviation around the average of the control group. 
As should be expected this phenomenon occurs for all the variables considered and at all 
levels of analysis. 
Figure 6.1 shows the evolution of market share in both groups, together with the 
trend line of each time-series. The corresponding linear equations and R2 are also displayed 
in the figure: on the left, the ones relative to the test group; on the right, those of the 
control group (a similar arrangement will be followed in the next figures as well). 
 202 
Figure 6.1 
Corporation XXX - Market Share 
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Source: Author. 
A general trend can be noticed for the decrease of XXX’s overall value market 
share in the control group. The fall is slow but steady, amounting to a total of – 0.9378 
percent points in the period of 10 quarters covered by the data47. It is generally 
acknowledged that manufacturers of fast-moving consumer goods have been loosing 
ground in Portugal during the last few years to own brands of large retail chains, and 
especially to those of discount retailers. In other words, the general market environment 
has been moving in a direction rather unfavorable to XXX. However, XXX appears to 
have sustained or even increased very slightly its overall value market share in the test 
group during the same period. As a consequence, in the period of a year and a half as a 
whole the test group shows an increase of 1.0746 percent points relative to the control 
group. Considering that the average XXX value market share was estimated to be 27.22 %, 
this translates into a relative gain of 3.95% in value sales. 
                                                
47 We recall that the average decrease in one period is given by the inclination of the curve (- 0.1042 
in this case). Multiplying it by 9 we estimate the decrease for the whole 10 quarter period (- 0.9378). 
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Penetration rate 
The penetration rate provides us an even more impressive indication of the 
importance of XXX brands. According to Table 6.1, an average of 92.22 % of the 
households in the control group and 94.38 % of the households in the test group 
purchased at least once a brand of XXX during any given quarter. This means that XXX 
brands can be found in practically any Portuguese household irrespective of social class, 
location or any other socio-demographic characteristic. On the other hand, it also means 
that there was not much room for further growth of the overall penetration rate. Once 
again, the average penetration rate is higher in the test group than in the control group, and 
the same happens with the standard deviation both in absolute and relative terms. 
Figure 6.2 
Corporation XXX - Penetration Rate 
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Source: Author. 
Figure 6.2 reveals a clear tendency for a decrease of the penetration rate in the 
control group, meaning that less households buy at least one XXX brand during a given 
quarter.  As a whole, XXX brands are therefore loosing consumers. This is a much more 
distinct trend than the one previously spotted while analyzing the market share data: during 
the 10 quarter period under examination, the penetration rate in the control group was 
reduced by 3.05 percent points. However, this movement appeared to be countered by a 
favorable evolution in the test group, where a gain of 2.02 percent points in penetration 
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actually seemed to take place. The gain of the test group relative to the control group 
therefore amounted to 5.07 percent points, a significant change. Figure 6.2 also suggests 
that the penetration gains only emerged five quarters after the program began. 
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Buying rate 
The value buying rate was on average 21.85 euros in the control group, significantly 
less (-22.86%) than the 28.26 euros found in the test group, confirming that heavy users 
may have been over-represented in the latter group. The average purchase value is of 
course very low, something that would only come as a surprise for those who are not 
familiar with the realities of fast-moving consumer goods. It should be reminded that these 
are averages over a large number of very different individual households: a small number of 
heavy consumer households including a large number of members and benefiting from 
high incomes account for much higher purchase values than the average household during 
any quarter; in contrast, a very large number of light consumer households of one isolated 
low income person account for very small purchase values. 
Figure 6.3 
Corporation XXX - Buying Rate 
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Source: Author. 
The evolution of the value buying rate shows a similar pattern in both the control 
and the test group: it increased during the first year and decreased afterwards. Overall there 
is a slight downward trend in both groups. The value buying rate decreased on average –
0.73 euros in the control group and –1.42 in the test group. 
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Thus, unlike what happened with market share and penetration, the variation of the 
value buying rate was somewhat more negative in the test group than in the control group. 
This amounts to say that, overall, no significant loyalty effect seems to have emerged from 
the XXX relationship marketing program. 
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Purchase frequency 
The buying rate is the product of two independent factors: purchase frequency rate 
and expense per occasion. Table 6.1 shows that the quarterly average purchase frequency 
of XXX products is 5.08 for the test group and 4.57 for the control group. This means 
that, on average, members of the test group bought at least one product from XXX on 
5.08 different occasions during a quarter, while, also on average, members of the control 
group bought at least one product from XXX on 4.57 different occasions during a quarter. 
Figure 6.4 
Corporation XXX - Purchase Frequency 
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The evolution of purchase frequency again follows a similar pattern in both groups, 
with a negative trend showing up. The purchase frequency decreased -0.57 in the control 
group and -0.52 in the test group. Thus, no significant effect of the program could be 
identified. 
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Purchase per occasion 
The average expense per occasion is very low: no more than 5.59 euros in the test 
group and 4.79 euros in the control group. Once again, it should be reminded that these 
are averages of very unequal situations, lumping together a small number of heavy 
consumers and a very large number of medium and light consumers. 
Figure 6.5 
Corporation XXX - Purchase per Occasion 
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Source: Author. 
Purchase per occasion evolved favorably to XXX in both the control and the test 
group. In the control group there was an overall gain of 0.51 euros, while the gain in the 
test group was a bit lower: 0.45 euros. The evolution of purchase per occasion in the test 
group seems somewhat irregular: it appeared to grow steeply during the first year, but 
afterwards fell down coming closer to the control group. The purchase per occasion in the 
control group also increased at first and then reached a plateau and stayed there. Overall, 
no significant effect of the program on purchase per occasion was found. 
 209 
6.2.2 – Trends and correlations of the differences time-series 
As indicated in Chapter 5, after analyzing separately the evolution in the test group 
and the control group we also fitted trend lines to the time-series of the differences 
between the observed values in the test group and in the control group using the least-
squares procedure. We will now look at the temporal evolution of those differences. 
Table 6.2 
Corporation XXX  
Trends of the Differences between the Test and the Control Group 
 
  Market Penetration Buying Purchase Purchase per 
    Share   Rate frequency occasion 
XXX Variation 1.0746 5.0724 -0.693 -0.0711 -0.0594
 Average 27.22 92.22 21.85 4.57 4.79
 % Var. 3.95 5.50 -3.17 -1.56 -1.24
  Correlation 0.26 0.57 -0.11 -0.09 -0.04
Source: Author. 
The data included in Table 6.2 require a short explanation. As previously 
mentioned we adjusted a linear trend48 to the observed differences between the test group 
and the control group. Recall from Chapter 5 that the following equation was used: 
Dxt = α + βt + ε                                                                                              (6.1) 
Where 
Dxt – Difference between the observed values of variable x in the test group and 
the control group in period t 
t – time (quarters 0 to 9) 
ε - random error term 
For each variable the β coefficient indicating the slope of the fitted line provides us 
an estimation of the average quarterly variation during the examined period. When its sign 
is positive, the analyzed variable in the test group is of course improving relative to the 
                                                
48 We found no justification to fit non-linear trends to the data. 
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control group; when its sign is negative, the opposite is happening. By multiplying the slope 
coefficient by 9, we will estimate the total variation of the test group against the control 
group during the full 10-quarter period (period 0 plus the nine subsequent periods). 
Table 6.2 tells us that, since for company XXX as a whole the market share in the 
test group improved on average 0.1194 percent points relative to the control group in each 
quarter, during the whole period of 10 quarters there was a gain of 1.0746 (i.e., 0.1194 
times 9) percent points from the beginning to the end. As the average market share in the 
control group was 27.22% (see Table 6.1), in relative terms the above-mentioned positive 
variation amounted to 3.95% of that value. Finally, we found a positive correlation of 0.26 
between Dt (the dependent variable) and t (the independent variable). This means that 
there is a fair correlation between the passing of time and the increase of market share in 
the test group as compared to the control group. 
Thus, at the corporate level, the identified trend suggests that the program may 
have had globally positive results, since the overall market share in the markets served by 
XXX seems to have increased nearly 1.1% in two and half years. Having in mind the huge 
turnover of XXX in Portugal, this would have translated into very significant gains in sales 
and profits. According to data disclosed by XXX itself, its sales volume in Portugal in 2000 
amounted to 626 million euros. Considering that the company commands an overall 27.7% 
market share, we estimate that XXX competes for a total market worth about 2,300 million 
euros and that a gain of 1.0746 percent points translates into sales worth approximately 
24.72 million euros. 
When we try to trace the causes for this variation in market share, however, we 
discover that it does not seem to have been produced by increased customer loyalty. In 
fact, the correlation coefficients associated with the variables buying rate, purchase 
frequency and purchase per occasion are all of them negative and negligible. The apparent 
gain in market share seems to have been driven by increased penetration: a total positive 
variation of 5.0724 percent points, compared to an average value of 92.22% in the control 
group, shows a relative variation of +5.5 percent points. 
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6.2.3 – Regression analysis 
Descriptive statistical techniques of the kind we employed in the previous section, 
such as graphical analysis or trend fitting, give us a feel for what is going on. However, they 
do not allow us to draw definite conclusions on the hypothetical impact of the program on 
the observed behavioral variables. For that reason, we needed to conduct a regression 
analysis by fitting the model presented in section 5.6 of the previous chapter. It should be 
recalled that this model tries to explain the differences between the values of each variable 
observed in the test group and the values of the same variable observed in the control 
group as a function of two independent variables: a dummy variable representing the 
occurrence or not of the relationship program; and a time variable representing the passing 
of time since the program began. The F and the t-statistics associated to the regression 
then tell us if we have sufficient grounds to accept the hypothesis that the estimated 
coefficients are significantly different from zero at a 95% level of significance. 
The following Table 6.3 synthesizes the results of the different regressions 
performed on the time-series representing the differences between the test group and the 
control group. The column labeled “Overall” presents the result of the F-test: whenever 
the test is positive, a “Y” is shown, meaning that we can reject the hypothesis that the 
coefficients associated to the independent variables are not all zero; otherwise, i.e., 
whenever the test is negative, a blank is left in the Table. The three columns labeled 
respectively “Intercept”, “Dummy” and “Time” present the result of the t-test associated 
to each of them. Whenever the coefficient passed the test a “+” or “-“ sign is shown, 
depending on whether the related coefficient was positive or negative; otherwise, i.e., 
whenever the coefficient did not pass the test, the corresponding cell is left blank. 
Table 6.3 
Corporation XXX – Regression Analysis 
  Significance 
     Overall  Intercept Dummy Time 
XXX Market share     
 Penetration    + 
 Buying rate  +   
 Purchase frequency  +   
  Purchase per occasion         
Source: Author. 
According to Table 6.3, none of the statistics associated to the regression where 
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“market share” appeared as the independent variable proved significant. Therefore, the 
hypothetical impact of the relationship marketing program on the company’s market share 
was not confirmed, since neither the F-test nor the t-tests uphold that conclusion. 
In fact, it should be noted that none of the five regressions we performed at this 
level of analysis passed the F-test. Besides, only the time coefficient in the case of 
“penetration” and the intercept coefficients in the cases of “buying rate” and “purchase 
frequency” passed the t-tests. In no case did the dummy coefficient – the one that tries to 
measure directly the impact of the program – pass the t-test. Thus, although penetration 
during the period under analysis seems to be positively correlated with time, it was not 
possible to identify any connection between penetration and the program itself. 
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6.3 – RESULTS AT THE DIVISION LEVEL 
After concluding the presentation of the results at the corporate level, we will now 
move to the division level immediately bellow. Recall that four distinct divisions – 
designated for our purpose as A, B, C, and D – were considered. 
Unlike the previous section, where the results of the analysis performed at the 
corporate level were presented in considerable detail, regarding the division level we will 
not show in the main text the original data portraying the evolution of the behavioral 
variables separately in the test group and the control group, the graphical representation of 
those data and of the linear trends fitted to them, the estimated slopes of the equations, 
and the R2 coefficients between each analyzed variable and time. All this information can 
be inspected in Appendix 1. 
Instead, we will now focus exclusively on the temporal evolution of the differences 
between the values taken by each variable in the test group versus the control group during 
the period under examination. 
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6.3.1 – Trends and correlations of the differences time-series 
Table 6.4 
Divisions A to D 
Trends of the Differences Between the Test and the Control Group 
 
  Market Penetration Buying Purchase Purchase per 
    Share   Rate frequency occasion 
A Variation 2.8431 3.2562 1.566 0.2124 -0.21 
 Average 38.7 43.44 12.66 1.73 7.33 
 % Var. 7.35 7.50 12.37 12.27 -2.86 
  Correlation 0.24 0.23 0.30 0.32 -0.18 
B Variation 1.3023 12.54 -0.3375 -0.1036 -0.09 
 Average 20.01 36.81 5.68 1.75 3.25 
 % Var. 6.51 34.07 -5.94 -5.92 -2.77 
  Correlation 0.10 0.86 -0.07 -0.12 -0.06 
C Variation -1.6776 7.02 -1.6029 -0.2727 -0.2484 
 Average 27.73 83 9.67 3.6 2.68 
 % Var. -6.05 8.46 -16.58 -7.58 -9.27 
  Correlation -0.31 0.57 -0.42 -0.35 -0.43 
D Variation 3.4533 0.7965 -10.1214 -0.0549 -4.9743 
 Average 18.81 33.9 21.46 2.34 9.26 
 % Var. 18.36 2.35 -47.16 -2.35 -53.72 
  Correlation 0.24 0.07 -0.39 -0.08 -0.45 
Source: Author. 
At the business level, we found possible increases of market share in three divisions 
(A, B and D) and a decrease of market share in the remaining one (C). In all four divisions 
there are indications of possible penetration gains, while loyalty might have decreased in 
three of them. It should also be noted that, both regarding the corporation as a whole and 
each division separately considered, purchase per occasion shows signs of negative 
evolution, while the purchase frequency goes down in three divisions. The symmetrical 
behavior of the penetration rate, on one side, and of the buying rate, on the other, as if the 
loss in one variable compensated for the gain in the other, is interesting to note, especially 
because the former effect partially or entirely (in the case of C) offsets the latter one. 
Nevertheless, before starting to speculate too much on this phenomenon, we should point 
out once again to the rather low correlation coefficients that as a rule were estimated. 
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6.3.2 – Regression analysis of the differences time-series 
Table 6.5 
Divisions A to D - Regression Analysis 
  Significance 
    Overall Intercept Dummy Time 
A Market share     
 Penetration     
 Buying rate     
 Purchase frequency     
  Purchase per occasion         
B Market share     
 Penetration Y   + 
 Buying rate     
 Purchase frequency  +   
  Purchase per occasion         
C Market share     
 Penetration    + 
 Buying rate     
 Purchase frequency  +   
  Purchase per occasion         
D Market share     
 Penetration     
 Buying rate     
 Purchase frequency     
  Purchase per occasion         
Source: Author. 
With one single exception – penetration in B division – the F-test was always found 
to be non-significant49. This means that only in that case do we have grounds to accept the 
hypothesis that not all the regression coefficients are equal to zero. However, even in this 
specific regression, only the t-test related to the time variable was found to be significant, 
which means that the gain in penetration in division B cannot be attributed to an impact of 
the relationship marketing program. 
Furthermore, it should be noted that in none of the 20 regressions described in the 
Table above could a significant t-statistics be associated to the dummy variable. 
                                                
49 The detailed results of all the performed regressions can be seen in Appendix 2. 
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6.4 – RESULTS AT THE PRODUCT LEVEL 
In this section the presentation of the results will follow the same organization of 
the previous one. We will thus focus once again on the differences time-series. More 
detailed information on the original time-series describing separately the behavioral 
variables in the test group and the control group can be found in Appendix 1. 
6.4.1 – Trends and correlations of the differences time-series 
Products of Division A 
Table 6.6 
Products A.1 to A.4 
Trends of the Differences  Between the Test and the Control Group 
 
  Market Penetration Buying Purchase Purchase per 
    Share   Rate frequency occasion 
A.1 Variation 6.1263 -0.6651 3.5523 0.2232 0.72
 Average 43.09 29.76 14.04 1.55 0.08
 % Var. 14.22 -2.23 25.30 14.40 900.00
  Correlation 0.46 -0.06 0.58 0.52 0.34
A.2 Variation 10.0971 5.1057 -2.6028  
 Average 48.31 7.5 7.6  
 % Var. 20.90 68.08 -34.25  
  Correlation 0.30 0.42 -0.44    
A.3 Variation -5.4747 -1.3154 -1.44  
 Average 17.86 7.16 3.82  
 % Var. -30.65 -18.37 -37.70  
  Correlation -0.27 -0.13 -0.25    
A.4 Variation 12.7 7.1073 0.7533  
 Average 12.08 8.03 2.58  
 % Var. 105.13 88.51 29.20  
  Correlation 0.75 0.63 0.41    
Source: Author. 
Market share seems to have increased for products A.1, A.2 and A.4, and decreased 
for product A.3. In the cases A.2 and A.4, such increases are associated with penetration 
gains, but not in the case of A.1, where it is accompanied by loyalty gains as shown by the 
positive change of the buying rate. On the other hand, the decline of market share for 
product A.3 follows a similar decrease of penetration. This means that in three out of four 
products, the changes of market share, for better or for worse, are clearly driven by 
changes in penetration. 
 217 
Products of Division B 
Table 6.7 
Products B.1 to B.4 
Trends of the Differences Between the Test and the Control Group 
 
  Market Penetration Buying Purchase Purchase per 
  Share   Rate frequency occasion 
B.1 Variation 2.3058 9.126 -1.7424 -0.3267 -0.5454
 Average 8.57 7.76 4.71 1.36 3.4
 % Var. 26.91 117.60 -36.99 -24.02 -16.04
  Correlation 0.21 0.84 -0.45 -0.67 -0.29
B.2 Variation 12.52 3.0537 1.5723  
 Average 23.23 8.15 3.46  
 % Var. 53.90 37.47 45.44  
  Correlation 0.37 0.24 0.39    
B.3 Variation 0.8298 3.087 -0.8381  
 Average 6.77 6.42 2.93  
 % Var. 12.26 48.08 -28.60  
  Correlation 0.12 0.49 -0.40    
B.4 Variation -5.4306 1.1889 -2.4768  
 Average 16.49 5.89 5.56  
 % Var. -32.93 20.19 -44.55  
  Correlation -0.35 0.26 -0.43    
       
Source: Author. 
Again we find three cases (B.1, B.2 and B.3) where the fitted trend suggests an 
improvement of market share in the test group relative to the test group during the 10-
quarter period. And once again we also witness a similar trend of penetration. In one of the 
products that appear to gain market share (B.2) loyalty as measured by the buying rate also 
improves. In all the remaining cases loyalty declines, and in one of them (B.4), the3 
negative change is large enough to offset the observed gain of penetration. 
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Products of Division C 
Table 6.8 
Products C.1 to C.7 
Trends of the Differences Between the Test and the Control Group 
 
  Market Penetration Buying Purchase Purchase per 
    Share   Rate frequency occasion 
C.1 Variation -6.255 -5.0184 -0.7614 -0.1964 -0.0189 
 Average 30.4 28.35 8.96 2.05 4.37 
 % Var. -20.58 -17.70 -8.50 -9.58 -0.43 
  Correlation -0.38 -0.52 -0.16 -0.27 -0.01 
C.2 Variation 24.8994 9.153 0.1575 0.1309 -0.0027 
 Average 61.82 34.28 2.13 2.05 1.04 
 % Var. 40.28 26.70 7.39 6.39 -0.26 
  Correlation 0.71 0.56 0.17 0.20 -0.01 
C.3 Variation -29.38 -4.806 -3.9906  
 Average 12.45 5.79 2.63  
 % Var. -235.98 -83.01 -151.73  
  Correlation -0.83 -0.53 -0.81    
C.4 Variation -0.1053 7.6203 -1.2555 -0.4905 -0.117 
 Average 20.42 26.02 4.68 2.46 1.9 
 % Var. -0.52 29.29 -26.83 -19.94 -6.16 
  Correlation -0.01 0.57 -0.38 -0.46 -0.21 
C.5 Variation -2.9178 -7.0524 -0.3753 -1.3968 1.6911 
 Average 9.23 21.42 5.73 2.38 2.41 
 % Var. -31.61 -32.92 -6.55 -58.69 70.17 
  Correlation -0.39 -0.46 -0.06 -0.68 0.68 
C.6 Variation -22.9626 -3.5343 -0.9459  
 Average 35.44 8.09 4.47  
 % Var. -64.79 -43.69 -21.16  
  Correlation -0.62 -0.29 -0.33    
C.7 Variation 45.0837 7.6527 0.3195  
 Average 44.61 6.77 1.67  
 % Var. 101.06 113.04 19.13  
  Correlation 0.69 0.74 0.34    
Source: Author. 
Unlike the situation found in divisions A and B, we see more negative trends in 
division C regarding the evolution of individual products. Thus, we found only two 
instances of apparently increasing market share (C.2 and C.7) contrasting with five cases of 
decline (C.1, C.3, C.4, C.5, and C.6). However, with one single exception (C.4), market 
share and penetration always seem to move in the same direction. Loyalty, as measured by 
the buying rate, declined in five out of seven products. 
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Products of Division D 
Table 6.9 
Products D.1 to D.7 
Trends of the Differences Between the Test and the Control Group 
 
  Market Penetration Buying Purchase Purchase per 
    Share   Rate frequency occasion 
D.1 Variation -0.7146 -0.4041 -2.1825  
 Average 14.41 12.37 8.58  
 % Var. -4.96 -3.27 -25.44  
  Correlation -0.05 -0.06 -0.27    
D.2 Variation -5 -3.4803 -0.2889  
 Average 19.81 7.16 5.14  
 % Var. -25.24 -48.61 -5.62  
  Correlation -0.16 -0.33 -0.05    
D.3 Variation 18.675 2.7216 2.682  
 Average 31.13 3.39 7.63  
 % Var. 59.99 80.28 35.15  
  Correlation 0.55 0.50 0.20    
D.4 Variation 1.494 0.054 1.3113 -0.153 -0.549 
 Average 30.24 15.98 4.2 1.87 2.24 
 % Var. 4.94 0.34 31.22 -8.18 -24.51 
  Correlation -0.11 0.01 -0.49 -0.18 -0.42 
D.5 Variation 31.94 -4.6692 1.8783  
 Average 35.87 7.9 6.49  
 % Var. 89.04 -59.10 28.94  
  Correlation 0.73 -0.48 0.34    
D.6 Variation 7.155 0.6489 1.2204   
 Average 13.31 2.44 6.05  
 % Var. 53.76 26.59 20.17  
  Correlation -0.16 0.22 0.11    
D.7 Variation 16.2 -1.7019 -0.8946  
 Average 56.49 18.93 7.29  
 % Var. 28.68 -8.99 -12.27  
  Correlation 0.46 -0.18 -0.09    
Source: Author. 
A very mixed situation was found in division D, especially taking in consideration 
that in a good number of cases the correlation coefficients are very low. All in all, market 
share trends point up in five products (D.3, D.4, D.5, D.6, and D.7) and down in the 
remaining two (D.1 and D.2. With two exceptions (D.5 and D.7), penetration and market 
share move in the same direction. Loyalty as measured by the buying rate seemed to evolve 
positively in four out of seven products: D.3, D.4, D.5, and D.6. 
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6.4.2 – Regression analysis of the differences time-series 
Products of Division A 
Table 6.10 
Products A.1 to A.4 – Regression Analysis 
 
  Significance 
    Overall Intercept Dummy Time 
A.1 Market share     
 Penetration     
 Buying rate   -  
 Purchase frequency     
  Purchase per occasion         
A.2 Market share     
 Penetration     
  Buying rate         
A.3 Market share  +   
 Penetration     
  Buying rate         
A.4 Market share Y   + 
 Penetration     
  Buying rate Y   - + 
Source: Author. 
Only in two instances (market share and buying rate for product A.4) did the F-test 
uphold the conclusion that the regression coefficients are not all equal to zero. The t-tests 
were found to be significant in only a some number of cases, and in none of them did they 
confirm the existence of a positive impact of the relationship marketing program. In fact, 
in the two only occasions (buying rate for A.1 and buying rate for A.4) when the t-statistic 
associated to the dummy variable was deemed significant the coefficient showed a “wrong” 
sign (i.e. a negative one). There seems to have been a positive impact of time on market 
share and buying rate of A.4, but this effect is not relevant to our purpose. 
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Products of Division B 
Table 6.11 
Products B.1 to B.4 – Regression analysis 
 
  Intercept 
  Overall Intercept Dummy Time 
B.1 Market share Y  +  
 Penetration Y   + 
 Buying rate    - 
 Purchase frequency Y   - 
  Purchase per occasion         
B.2 Market share     
 Penetration     
  Buying rate Y   - + 
B.3 Market share     
 Penetration     
  Buying rate Y   -   
B.4 Market share     
 Penetration     
  Buying rate         
Source: Author. 
Five regression equations passed the F-Test: the ones concerning market share, 
penetration and purchase frequency for product B.1; buying rate for product for product 
B.2; and buying rate for product B.3. However, the t-statistic associated with the dummy 
variable (the one indicating whether the relationship program was “on” or ”out”) only 
proved significant in three cases; besides, there was but one case when the coefficient sign 
was positive, and that was in the market share regression for product B.1. In four instances 
the coefficients associated with the time variable passed the t-test. Once again, the situation 
is confusing, because the coefficients are positive in two cases and negative in the other 
two. However, the conclusion is clear: we found no confirmation of a positive effect of the 
relationship program on the behavioral variables under scrutiny regarding the products of 
division B. 
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Products of Division C 
 
Table 6.12 
Products C.1 to C.7 – Regression Analysis: 
 
  Significance 
     Overall Intercept  Dummy Time 
C.1 Market share Y + -  
 Penetration Y +   
 Buying rate     
 Purchase frequency     
  Purchase per occasion         
C.2 Market share Y -   
 Penetration     
 Buying rate     
 Purchase frequency     
  Purchase per occasion         
C.3 Market share Y +  - 
 Penetration  +   
  Buying rate Y +   - 
C.4 Market share     
 Penetration     
 Buying rate     
 Purchase frequency     
  Purchase per occasion         
C.5 Market share Y  + - 
 Penetration     
 Buying rate     
 Purchase frequency Y   - 
  Purchase per occasion       + 
C.6 Market share Y   - 
 Penetration  +   
  Buying rate         
C.7 Market share Y   + 
 Penetration Y   + 
 Buying rate     
 Purchase frequency     
  Purchase per occasion         
Source: Author. 
Ten regression equations out of thirty one for the products of division C passed the 
F-test. Confirmation of a positive impact of the program on the consumer’s behavior, 
though, is only apparent in the case of product C.5’s market share. In the other hand, the 
program appeared to have a negative impact on C.1’s share of market. We found situation 
where some variables improved with time (purchase per occasion for product C.5; market 
share and penetration for product C.7), but the origin of those effects could not be traced 
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to the program. Conversely, time is associated with in decline of some variables in other 
instances: market share and buying rate for product C.3; market share and purchase 
frequency for product C.5; and market share for product C.6. 
We can thus conclude for a lack of strong evidence regarding the presumed effect 
of the relationship program on customer behavior. 
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Products of Division D 
Table 6.13 
Products D.1 to D.7 – Regression Analysis: 
 
  Significance 
    Overall Intercept Dummy Time 
D.1 Market share     
 Penetration Y + -  
  Buying rate         
D.2 Market share     
 Penetration     
  Buying rate         
D.3 Market share     
 Penetration     
  Buying rate         
D.4 Market share Y + -  
 Penetration  + -  
 Buying rate     
 Purchase frequency  +   
  Purchase per occasion         
D.5 Market share Y   + 
 Penetration  +   
  Buying rate         
D.6 Market share     
 Penetration     
  Buying rate         
D.7 Market share     
 Penetration     
  Buying rate         
Source: Author. 
Only three regression equations in a total of twenty three passed the F-test, and the 
t-statistics associated to the dummy variable proved significant in just three cases, but with 
the “wrong” sign (i.e. a negative one) attached to the relevant coefficients. Besides, the only 
instance when a behavioral variable improved with time was market share for product D.5. 
As a consequence, no indication was found of a positive influence of the 
relationship marketing program on the enrolled customers. 
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6.5 – CONCLUSION 
In the present chapter we reported the results of the empirical research we 
conducted at three different levels of analysis: corporate, division, and product. Trend-
fitting, correlation and regression techniques were used to make sense of the data, 
consisting in time-series describing the evolution of behavior in the test and the control 
group and the differences between them. 
In short, the empirical evidence confirmed the null hypothesis that the relationship 
marketing program had no demonstrable positive impact on the behavior of the customers 
that were enrolled in it. Likewise, none of the behavioral variables that might have induced 
such impact appeared to change as a result of the adopted relationship strategy. 
In the next chapter we will sum up the conclusions about the research issues and 
the research problem. We will then conclude by drawing the implications of these results 
for theory and management practice and making suggestions for further research. 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusions and Implications 
 
7.1 – INTRODUCTION 
As indicated in Chapter 1, the general purpose of our research was to contribute to 
the understanding of the effectiveness of relationship marketing strategies in the particular 
case of the markets for fast-moving consumer goods. More specifically, we intended to: 
a) Conclude whether relationship marketing strategies are able to increase the 
market-share of a given company or brand; 
b) Identify the chain of intermediate behavioral effects (such as penetration rate, 
buying rate, purchase frequency, or expense per occasion) of relationship 
strategies that might lead to an increase in market-share; and, finally,  
c) To evaluate how long it takes for those effects to take place. 
By implication, we tried to clarify how useful the two main contending marketing 
theories – the Howard-Sheth theory (Howard and Sheth, 1967; Howard and Sheth, 1969) 
and the NBD-Dirichlet theory (Goodhart, Ehrenberg and Charfield, 1984; Ehrenberg, 
1988) – are when it comes to explain the way consumers relate to brands of fast-moving 
consumer goods, given that, as previously indicated, those theories make conflicting 
predictions regarding the possibility of increasing customer loyalty. In fact, whereas the 
Howard-Sheth theory says that loyalty is a perfectly sound marketing objective, the NBD-
Dirichlet theory disagrees and therefore discourages any attempt to pursue it. 
This last chapter is dedicated to clarify the contribution of our investigation to the 
advancement of our knowledge regarding those issues. 
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7.2 – CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE RESEARCH ISSUES 
It should be kept in mind that our research was focused on a number of markets of 
a particular kind, that is, on markets involving the purchase of fast-moving consumer 
goods. Furthermore, it dealt with several product categories and brands of a specific 
corporation (XXX) in a specific country (Portugal). What general conclusions can we draw 
from this particular situation? It is well known, for instance, that in markets for fast-
moving consumer goods buyers display a certain type of behavior that may differ from the 
one that will be found in other kinds of markets. On the other hand, can the results 
obtained for the analyzed product categories be generalized for other products? Finally, can 
we assume the behavior of Portuguese consumers to be similar to the behavior of 
consumers in other countries? 
The first two objections should not bother us too much. Our purpose was from 
the start restricted to the understanding of whether and how relationship marketing 
strategies can be applied successfully to fast-moving consumer goods. Besides, the NBD-
Dirichlet theory that we wanted to test was specifically developed to account for the 
purchase behavior of consumers in this type of market. Regarding the validity of our 
conclusions for fast-moving consumer goods as a whole, it can be pointed out that the 
product portfolio of XXX is vary large, including a wide range of penetration rates, buying 
rates, purchase frequencies and selling prices. As a consequence, given that similar results 
were found in all of them, we can be confident that our generalizations make sense. 
The possibility of inferring universal patterns of behavior in response to loyalty 
programs in fast-moving consumer goods from the behavior of Portuguese consumers is 
clearly another matter. In fact, a number of variables regarding culture, demography, 
competition levels, purchasing habits, peculiarities of the distribution systems, product 
variety, available brands, and so on, might in principle originate divergent behavior patterns 
among Portuguese consumers when compared with consumers in other countries. The 
possibility that our results are somehow peculiar to this particular country cannot be ruled 
out. More research will no doubt be needed in order to clarify this point. 
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7.2.1 – Impact of relationship marketing on market share 
We found no clear evidence that the relationship marketing program had a positive 
impact on market share, either at the corporate, the division or the brand levels. In fact, 
although the trend analysis we carried suggested that, besides the corporate level, an 
improvement might have taken place in 3 divisions out of 4 and in 13 products out of 22, 
the regression analysis only confirmed this in the case of 8 products: B.1, C.1, C.3, C.5, C.6, 
C.7, D.4, and D.5. Even so, only in 2 instances (products B.1 and C.5) could the effect be 
unambiguously attributed to the program. 
Such results seem to confirm the warnings of those authors who insist that 
relationship marketing strategies are not adequate to low involvement situations where 
customers have no special motivation to engage in demanding and time consuming long-
term relationships. Of course, a different explanation of this failure is possible. In fact, it 
might be the case that, although relationship marketing is generally a good idea, either the 
specific type of program chosen by XXX was inadequate or its implementation proved to 
be flawed. We will come back later to this point. 
7.2.2 – Impact of relationship marketing on the penetration rate 
The hypothesized impact of the program on the penetration rate was not 
confirmed either. In the first step of the research, the trend analysis suggested promising 
results at both the corporate and the division levels, since an upward trend of the 
penetration rate was identified in all the 4 divisions. Besides, a similar trend showed up in 
12 out of 22 products. However, the regression analysis told another story: the increase of 
the penetration rate was only confirmed in one division (B) and in 4 products (B.1, C.1, 
C.7, and D.1), and in none of those instances could the effect be attributed directly to the 
program. 
As previously noted, some authors who support the NBD-Dirichlet theory believe 
that relationship marketing programs can only impact positively the market share of a 
brand by increasing its penetration rate. Clearly this has not been the case with XXX’s 
relationship program. There are of course many possible explanations for this. Let us 
discuss briefly some of the most relevant ones. 
According to the NBD-Dirichlet theory, a brand usually grows by acquiring more 
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customers, that is, by increasing its penetration rate. Therefore, the marketing strategies and 
tactics of a brand should be designed with this purpose in mind, and that is precisely what 
advertising and sales promotions usually do by increasing salience, promoting trial, 
reinforcing prevailing attitudes and stimulating repeat-buying. Admittedly, the impact of 
advertising depends essentially on two factors: 
a) The quality of the communication efforts; and  
b) The quantity of the impacts provided by the media schedule. How did the 
relationship program under analysis fare on these accounts? 
Given that the members of the test group where exposed to additional 
communications on top of those received by the control group, some extra results should 
be expected in terms of penetration rate. We therefore face two possibilities: either the 
content of the relation program (i.e., the quality of the communication) was inadequate, or 
the extra number of exposures created by the program was too small to produce any 
significant results. Starting with the second possibility, it is very likely that the very low 
frequency of extra contact with the customers provided by the program explains the 
inability of the program to generate increasing penetration. In fact, besides the magazine 
being published and distributed only four times a year, each individual product or brand 
had on top of that to share the attention of the enrolled customers with all the remaining 
participating products and brands. Regarding the first possibility, suffice it to say that, since 
the program was conceived with the main purpose of developing loyalty, it is only natural 
that strategies and tactics oriented to increase penetration might have been overlooked. In 
other words, initiatives designed to increase awareness and generate trial were probably 
given insufficient attention given the program’s initial intentions. 
In this respect, the choice of the core brands participating in the program should in 
itself be considered significant, since as a rule they already commanded very high 
penetration rates to begin with. If we accept as natural that the rule of diminishing returns 
might be at work here, any effort to reach additional penetration rates would possibly be 
too costly to justify itself. A strategy designed to increase penetration should instead have 
focused on improving the situation of weaker brands or on supporting the launch by the 
corporation of new products or brand extensions. This orientation would have amounted 
to a kind of large-scale cross-selling operation where stronger products and brands of the 
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XXX’s portfolio would support and finance the growth of the weaker or newer ones. But, 
clearly, this was not the option of the managers who designed and launched this 
relationship marketing program. 
7.2.3 – Impact of relationship marketing on the buying rate 
As stressed in previous chapter, the buying rate may be considered a synthetic 
indicator of loyalty. The performance of the program on this account is therefore very 
important to evaluate its usefulness. The trend analysis suggested that there might have 
been an increase of the buying rate in the cases of 1 division (A) and 10 products (A.1, A.4, 
B.2, C.2, C.7, D.3, D.4, D.5, and D.6). The regression analysis, however, only confirmed 
the existence of a definite change of the buying rate in the case of 3 products (A.4, B.3, and 
C.3), with the aggravating circumstance that in 2 of these 3 cases the program had a 
negative impact on the buying rate, not a positive one. 
The immediate conclusion is that we could identify no significant impact of the 
program on customer loyalty, its declared main purpose and justification. In general terms, 
this result appears to vindicate the opinion of those authors who interpret the 
phenomenon of double jeopardy as meaning that any marketing initiatives designed to 
improve loyalty are doomed to failure. 
7.2.4 – Impact of relationship marketing on the purchase frequency 
The preliminary analysis of comparative trends in the test group versus the control 
group showed the possibility that the purchase frequency might have increased in division 
A, and in 2 of the 7 products where enough information was available. But the regression 
analysis confirmed none of those possibilities. 
The impossibility of increasing significantly the purchase frequency of a brand 
above its “natural” value defined by the theoretical value determined by the Dirichlet 
distribution is a direct prediction of the NBD-Dirichlet theory of purchase behavior. 
Apparently, the NBD-Dirichlet theory is thus corroborated, while the Howard-Sheth 
theory is invalidated. 
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7.2.5 – Impact of relationship marketing on purchase per occasion 
No impact whatsoever of the program on the purchase per occasion was found. 
The stability of the purchase per occasion in repeat-buying situations is a very well 
established fact and a prediction of the NBD-Dirichlet theory. As such, this result was 
hardly surprising. 
7.2.6 – Time-pattern of the impact of relationship marketing 
A complementary purpose of our investigation was to enquire how fast and how 
regularly do relationship marketing effects on the studied behavioral variables show up 
after the start of a program. The obtainment of useful information regarding this specific 
hypothesis was of course conditioned by the confirmation of a positive effect of the 
program on customer’s behavior in the test group.  Since no relevant effects of the 
program were identified, this research issue obviously became meaningless. 
7.3 – CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE RESEARCH PROBLEM 
The NBD-Dirichlet theory seems to be a better guide to relationship marketing 
strategies than the alternative Howard-Sheth theory. This is an important conclusion, since 
the overwhelming majority of the authors who have written on relationship marketing have 
ignored the ideas developed by Ehrenberg and other researchers of similar inclinations and 
disregarded its main consequences. 
In fact, as we repeatedly noted, the standard relationship marketing theory takes for 
granted that loyalty is a sound business purpose irrespective of industry, market and 
prevailing general competitive conditions (v.g., Reichheld, 1996). As we have seen, the 
NBD-Dirichlet theory suggests otherwise, based on an impressive amount of quantitative 
research collected in extremely various situations and mostly based on panel data. The 
rarity of sole-brand buyers, the double jeopardy phenomenon and the duplication of 
purchase law, among other well-established facts, all point to the difficulty of changing the 
patterns of repeat-buying that prevail in a given market by resorting to loyalty programs 
(Dowling and Uncles, 1997; Dowling, 2002). 
As predicted by the NBD-Dirichlet theory, our research found no signs of 
increased loyalty as a consequence of the XXX relationship marketing. Besides, although 
the theory allows for the occurrence of larger penetration levels, this did not happen either. 
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7.4 – IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY 
The investigations on the results of relationship marketing programs are still very 
scarce, although huge and growing sums are being spent on such marketing schemes. 
Serious empirical studies of relationship marketing based on hard data in markets for fast-
moving consumer goods are even harder to find, either because the necessary data do not 
exist or because interested researchers were not given access to them by the companies that 
launched such relationship programs. A major exception is Meyer-Waarden (2002). 
As soon as this problem is subjected to serious research, attention must necessarily 
be paid to the body of findings on the patterns of repeat-buying research that have been 
unearthed by Ehrenberg and other authors. Therefore, our first contribution was to bring 
together the parent theory of relationship marketing (Gronroos, 2000) with the focal 
theory of buyer behavior developed by Ehrenberg and others (Ehrenberg, Uncles and 
Goodhart, 2002). In the process, we confronted systematically two alternative theories of 
buyer behavior – the Howard-Sheth theory on one side, the NBD-Dirichlet theory on the 
other – and deduced the consequences of each of them for relationship marketing practice. 
As a consequence, definite predictions of each of them regarding the outcome of 
relationship marketing strategies were laid down and turned into research hypotheses. 
Finally, the conclusions of our research established the conditions under which 
relationship marketing programs may or may not be expected to work in markets for fast-
moving consumer goods. 
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7.5 – IMPLICATIONS FOR MANAGEMENT PRACTICE 
Relationship marketing is still a relatively new idea for manufacturers of fast-
moving consumer goods, a situation that creates some uncertainty and confusion regarding 
the conditions and the scope of its applicability (Reinartz, Krafft and Hoyer, 2004; Reinartz 
and Kumar, 2000; Reinartz and Kumar, 2002; Reinartz, Thomas and Kumar, 2005). 
Moreover, managers trained in the conventional marketing wisdom that prevails in 
management circles in a general way and especially in companies operating in such specific 
markets usually find the main concepts of relationship marketing difficult to understand 
and to implement. As such, a strong need for guidance is currently felt as the threats that 
low-involvement consumer industries face induces them to try and test continuously new 
ideas and new territories (Baker, 2003). 
In this situation, managers working in consumer industries feel inclined to look for 
guidance in the experience of other industries, namely business-to-business and service 
industries (Ford et ali., 2000; Gummesson, 2002b). Many of them take for granted that 
concepts and techniques similar to the ones used in those industries will help increase 
customer retention and profitability in markets for fast-moving consumer goods as well 
(Fournier, 1998; Sheth and Parvatiyar, 2000). As we have seen, this is far from being 
guaranteed, since the patterns of buyer behavior universally observed in panel data make it 
obvious that: a) sole-brand behavior is an exceptional phenomenon; b) repertory buying 
suggests that consumers want variety for variety’s sake; and c) loyalty is strongly correlated 
to penetration (Ehrenberg, 1988). Besides, it is not at all clear that consumers in low-
involvement markets wish to engage into long-term and time-consuming relationships with 
companies or brands (Dowling and Uncles, 1997; Dowling, 2002). 
Our investigation strengthens such suspicions regarding the relevance of 
relationship marketing concepts and practices for fast-moving consumers goods, since no 
effects on market share, buying rate, penetration or frequency of purchase were identified 
either at the corporate, divisional or brand level. Given the number of customers and 
brands involved, the variety of categories and brands, the length of the experience and the 
nature of the evaluation metrics, such results cannot be dismissed as irrelevant. 
In such conditions, we feel entitled to ask if there is a future at all for relationship 
marketing in fast-moving consumer goods, and what kind of future this might be. This 
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matter will be discussed in some detail in the following sections. 
7.5.1 – Motivation for relationship marketing  
As we have seen, the main motivation for investing in relationship marketing 
programs, whether in consumer industries or in other industries, has been the purpose of 
increasing customer loyalty (Reichheld, 1996). Whatever the definition of customer loyalty, 
the NBD-Dirichlet theory predicts, and our investigation seems to confirm, that loyalty is 
not a proper goal to pursue in fast-moving consumer goods, for the very simple reason that 
consumers do not wish to attach themselves exclusively to a single brand; apparently, they 
do not even wish to reduce variety (as measured by the number of brands they regularly 
purchase), except possibly if the incentives to do so offered by the supplier are so large that 
the operation becomes unprofitable for him (Dowling, 2002). 
So, the question naturally arises whether relationship marketing can serve any 
useful purpose whatsoever. In theory at least that are other reasons besides building loyalty 
for companies to engage in relationship marketing strategies. Among them have been cited: 
a) Defensive strategies designed to protect a customer base from the in-roads of 
the competition, especially when an incumbent has reasons to fear the threat of 
new entrants; 
b) The attempt to lock-in customers by increasing switching costs in markets where 
low-differentiation and high sensitiveness to price prevail; and 
c) Differentiation through service in order to increase value for the customers and 
thwart price competition. 
How compelling may these motivations be for manufacturers of fast-moving 
consumer goods? Relationship programs have been used as a defensive weapon by airlines, 
petrol companies and rent-a-cars, among others (Dowling, 2002). Although these programs 
are very often considered unprofitable, the competitors in a given market are afraid to 
simply scrap them, since an unilateral move would very likely benefit the companies that 
would decide to keep theirs. Thus, although the industry players would probably be better 
off if no loyalty programs existed, no one dares to take the first step to eliminate them. 
This is a completely different situation from the one we have at hand, since the existence of 
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such programs does not seem to translate into a competitive advantage in markets for fast-
moving consumer goods. 
The second motivation does not seem very strong either, except if a company is 
prepared to adhere to an altogether new business model. Lock-in consists in the creation of 
a situation where customers incur in significant to very high costs when they trade a brand 
for another. This is very common in high-involvement business-to-business markets (v.g. 
packaging systems, or computer operating systems), and also in a number of service 
markets (v.g. banking, telecommunications, or professional services), but rather unusual in 
low-involvement consumer services. The Nespresso system developed by Nestlé and built 
around an espresso machine that can only operate with Nespresso capsules is one of the 
few instances where a manufacturer of low-involvement goods has managed successfully to 
lock-in customers that choose this particular brand. 
The third motivation – differentiation by adding service to the product – raises the 
same kind of problems. Ordinary fast-moving consumer brands often do not care to 
provide additional services to their customers aside from bringing the product nearer to 
them by ensuring a proper distribution system of the goods, possibly because they fear that 
their business might become unprofitable if they engaged in other risky service 
innovations. Once again, Nespresso – whose underlying idea really was to change their 
business model by transforming a product into a service – should be seen as an exception, 
since very few attempts have been undertaken along these lines by other consumer brands. 
Even so, Procter & Gamble, Unilever, Nestlé and other major manufacturers of consumer 
goods have in recent years conducted some (mostly failed) experiences whose main 
purpose was to emancipate themselves from the growing and tyrannical bargaining power 
of all-powerful large retailers (Baker, 2003). 
Thus, the possibility of applying the key ideas of relationship marketing to this 
industry seems to be dependent on a radical change of the prevailing business model whose 
main feature would be its transformation from a product industry into a service industry. 
Can this be taken to mean that, except for such extreme change, fast-moving consumer 
goods industries have no use for relationship marketing strategies? 
In order to answer properly that question, we will have to examine a last possibility, 
which will be that, while more or less useless regarding the objective of increasing loyalty, 
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relationship marketing might serve the useful purpose of protecting and increasing a 
brand’s penetration rate. It should be remembered that this hypothesis was explicitly put 
forward by Dowling (2002), and that, although some authors seem to have found some 
confirmation of it, our investigation did not. Does our result provide a reason to abandon 
this hypothesis once and for all? We believe not, as will be explained in the next section. 
7.5.2 – Objectives and strategies 
Let us suppose that we were instructed to conceive a relationship marketing 
program for fast-moving consumer goods with the explicit purpose of increasing brand 
penetration. How should we go about it, that is, how should we specifically design it in 
order to fulfill that purpose? 
The first thing to note is that this would only make sense in the context of a multi-
brand program. Whenever an individual brand tries to acquire new customers, it resorts to 
traditional advertising and promotion techniques with the aim of increasing awareness and 
trial. It can even use some kind of targeted communications like direct mail by taking 
advantage of rented lists. One thing however is certain: it cannot strengthen a relationship 
that does nor yet exist. On the other hand, a multi-brand company can use a relationship 
marketing program in such a way that its stronger brands introduce its weaker brands to its 
customer base. This would translate into a kind of cross-selling scheme: consumers who 
already buy habitually brand A are invited to try brand B and then include it in their brand 
repertory. Thus, large multi-brand manufacturers of consumer goods can create a new 
competitive advantage out of their large portfolio of brands by cross-fertilizing their 
customer base and using their present large brands to help promising but struggling 
younger brands to become large and strong too. 
In principle, at least, the relationship program of XXX could have done this. 
However the objectives assigned to it, the overall strategic choices and the way the 
program was conceived determined that the purpose of increasing the penetration of the 
relatively smaller brands of its portfolio was not given due priority. The origin of the 
problem can partly be found in the way the program was funded. Specifically, both the 
costs of the program and the weight given to each XXX brand were allocated as a 
proportion to its present value sales. As a consequence, stronger brands received much 
more support than weaker brands. But, as a rule, stronger brands already commanded very 
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high penetration rates; any further progress would always have been difficult and probably 
too costly. On the other hand, brands with weaker penetration rates, and specially new 
products, could not get the minimum visibility and support levels they needed in order to 
take-off. 
What this means is that a program designed to further increase penetration rates 
demands a different definition of objectives and strategies from the ones used in this case. 
Once this is understood, it starts to become clear why no significant effects could 
reasonably be expected from the program of XXX regarding this behavioral variable. Very 
simply, this specific program was not properly designed to deliver improved penetration 
levels to the participating products and brands. 
Now, even if the marketing effort had been concentrated on weaker brands as 
suggested, there would be a need to ensure that the effort was strong enough to generate 
the desired aim. The problem is that, as a matter of fact, a mere additional four contacts 
per year would probably be below the minimum required frequency to have an impact in 
penetration rate. Media planning experience suggests that it is not sensible to expect that 
such low frequency levels can impact penetration – that is, stimulate trial and adoption – in 
any meaningful and lasting way (Broadbent, 1999). This in turn poses another problem: in 
this type of industry even the Most Valuable Customers display low lifetime value since 
fast-moving consumer goods typically generate very low unit margins; as a consequence, 
relationship programs can easily become uneconomical if the frequency and the cost of 
customer contacts is not carefully controlled. Jumping from four to five contacts a year 
may thus be sufficient to destroy the profit contribution of the individual consumers 
involved and jeopardize the efficiency of the program, while clearly not enough to make a 
difference as far as the consumer’s behavior is concerned. 
So, on one hand we need extra contacts in order to improve penetration, while on 
the other hand these extra contacts might increase the costs of the program to the point 
where the customer lifetime value becomes negative. Given its very low cost per contact, 
the only acceptable solution should probably be looked for in online communications. The 
use of the Internet to communicate with customers in the context of relationship 
marketing programs is however conditioned by the limited coverage of households that 
this medium allows, since, at the present time, no more than a fifth of them are connected 
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to it in our country. Besides, middle-aged housewives, the main target of marketing 
communications in fast-moving consumer goods, have below-average habits of using the 
Internet as a source of information and entertainment. To summarize, online marketing 
communications have for the time being serious drawbacks regarding its relevance as a 
relationship marketing tool, but strong progress should be expected in the near future. 
It should be noted that the development of online communications will create a 
new situation where the rationale to focus relationship marketing efforts on a small target 
group of Most Valuable Customers or Most Growable Customers (Peppers and Rodgers, 
2004) will probably have to be revised. In fact, the main reason to restrain the number of 
customers enrolled in such programs is that the profit generated by the vast majority of 
them is so low that even a very small communication cost should be avoided. When, as is 
the case with online communications, the cost to reach an individual customer approaches 
zero, there is no reason why relationship programs in markets for fast-moving consumer 
goods should not cover every household or customer irrespective of its individual value. 
The last point to stress is that, if the main benefit to expect from relationship 
marketing in this type of markets is to be found in the increase of the penetration rate, 
large multi-brand companies will be those that will stand to gain the most from this 
approach. In other words, relationship marketing programs might contribute to create a 
new kind of competitive advantage to very large companies based on the economies of 
scale that they command, especially regarding their ability to manage large customer bases 
and develop sophisticated customer-knowledge systems. 
7.5.3 – Metrics and evaluation 
Our research demonstrates how important it is to design and implement systems 
that allow managers to evaluate to what extent relationship marketing programs are 
performing as expected. In the case of the program under analysis special care was taken 
previously to its launch to ensure that it would be possible to monitor its evolution. Even 
so, in the course of our investigation we were confronted with several limitations that 
could have been avoided through more careful planning of the monitoring system. Several 
types of problems, including insufficient time coverage of the pre-launch period, low 
representativeness of the test group, unsatisfactory choice of the control variables, and a 
break in the time-series after the first nine quarters of the experience, caused these 
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limitations. We will next briefly discuss each of them in turn. 
Before/ after purchase data 
A basic requirement of a proper quasi-experimental design is a clear distinction 
between what goes on “before” and “after” the beginning of the experiment. As explained 
in Chapter 5, this condition was duly fulfilled. However, the preprogram observation was 
restricted to one single period, an unfortunate choice since we cannot be certain that the 
behavior of the consumers was not affected by some unusual influence on this particular 
period, such as, for instance, demand fluctuation, competitive promotional activity or 
seasonal factors. For greater accuracy, the preprogram observations should have covered at 
least a full year (that is, four quarters) preceding the start of the program, because that 
would have helped researchers to identify data trends in case they existed. It should be 
noted that it would have been perfectly possible to do this within the frame of the data 
collected by the consumer panel. The only reason why it was not done was that the 
importance of this decision was not understood at the time the program began. 
Sample dimension of the test group 
Over and over, we found out that the sample dimension of the test group was too 
small to provide accurate information whenever we tried to analyze consumer behavior 
regarding low-penetration categories or brands. This is not an easy problem to solve. Since 
the sample representing the test group was chosen by finding households that were 
simultaneously present in the program database and in the panel database, a larger sample 
would inevitably mean larger program coverage, that is, the enrolment of a larger number 
of households into the program, which in turn would be the cause of increasing costs. A 
practical solution would have been to recruit consumers directly from the panel members. 
However, that would violate both the rules of the panel (information on panel members 
cannot be disclosed to third parties) and its representativeness (the recruiting of panel 
members would introduce an unacceptable bias into the panel sample). For those reasons, 
this suggestion was dropped. 
Our recommendation is that a careful assessment of the costs and benefits involved 
should be carried beforehand. If the program managers are only interested in evaluating its 
aggregate results (v.g., the global ROI of the program) and in understanding how behavior 
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is being influenced in some major categories, the sample dimension of the test group does 
not have to be very large to provide the needed information. If, however, they want to 
know what is going on in lesser categories and brands – and it is difficult to understand 
why they should not be interested in such information in case the program intends to 
promote cross-selling, for instance – due consideration should be given to the possibility of 
enlarging the number of households involved in the relationship program. 
Problems with the panel data 
At the date this program started, only one consumer panel was available in 
Portugal. As indicated, it was operated as a diary panel, a notoriously unreliable technique 
for reasons that have also been explained at length in Chapter 5. If some consumers 
inaccurately register their purchases through lack of time or patience, and if inertia induces 
them to report past behavior instead of the current one, changes of behavior will tend to 
be underestimated when we analyze panel data. Scanner-based consumer panels should of 
course be preferred whenever available, as we have every reason to believe that the 
information they provide is much more accurate and believable. At the time of the writing 
of this report, TNS and Nielsen are both already operating in Portugal consumers panels 
based on the electronic reading of product codes, something that will help improve the 
reliability of future research in this area. 
Choice of control variables 
Traditional marketing metrics emphasize variables such as sales growth, market 
share, penetration rate, buying rate, purchase frequency, and expense per occasion for 
purposes of the evaluation of market performance. Of course, the control of these 
variables will remain important to monitor the performance of brands, products, and firms 
in a given geographical setting. However, managers should acknowledge that new metrics 
have been developed to evaluate performance based on the value each individual buyer 
brings to the consumer base (Gupta and Lehmann, 2005; Peppers and Rodgers, 2005). 
These specifically customer-centric variables include, for instance, share of category 
requirements, size of wallet, and share of wallet, all of them invaluable measures when it 
comes to monitor customer loyalty in fast-moving consumer goods categories. These 
variables have been disregarded in the case at hand, although it would have been perfectly 
possible to calculate them using the rough data collected by the consumer panel. 
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What to do when panel data is not available 
A final question might be asked regarding what can be done to evaluate relationship 
marketing programs when panel data either is not available or is uneconomical to purchase. 
In this all too common situation, the NBD-Dirichelet suggests a way out. As noted in 
Chapter 3, given the penetration rate of a product category, the purchase frequency for the 
category as a whole, the number of competing brands, and the market shares of the 
individual brands, the Dirichlet distribution provides us the theoretical (or expected) values 
for penetration, purchase frequency, sole buyers, sole buyer purchase frequency, and 
proportions of buyers at different frequencies for each specific brand (Ehrenberg, 1988). 
Since we expect “normal” purchase patterns to be displayed by repeat-buying markets, the 
success of a loyalty program should entail a violation of at least some of those patterns. For 
instance, for a program to be successful in increasing loyalty toward a given brand, the 
usual correlation between penetration and purchase frequency known as “double jeopardy” 
should cease to apply by virtue of the relationship program. So, in order to test the ability 
of a relationship strategy to disturb the purchase patterns, all we have to do is observe 
penetration and frequency for all competitive brands in a given market both pre and post-
program and see if the empirical data deviate from those predicted by the Dirichlet 
distribution (Ehrenberg, Uncles, and Goodhart, 2002). If they do not, we can be sure that, 
no matter what the appearances to the contrary, nothing substantial really happened. 
Conversely, if they do, we will have some clues as to what might have happened and we 
will know how large the deviation was. Furthermore, there will probably be room for 
further investigations to the causes of this special phenomenon. 
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7.6 – LIMITATIONS 
Our investigation focused from the start in the specific area of fast-moving 
consumer goods. We intended to clarify whether relationship marketing thinking applies to 
this type of markets, and, in case it does, how consumer behavior might be meaningfully 
affected in order to retain customers and increase customer value. Hence, the choice of 
fast-moving consumer goods should not in itself be regarded as a limitation of the research. 
On the other hand, the fact that a large number of different categories were covered by the 
investigation also tends to strengthen the validity of its conclusions. Given that we studied 
a multi-brand program, we have gone much farther than a single market analysis would 
allow us. 
However, limitations do show up when we try to draw general conclusions from 
the analysis of the chosen program. In fact, it cannot be inferred from the failure of this 
particular program to produce significant results that relationship marketing is useless in 
fast-moving consumer goods – only that this one was. It goes without saying that other 
approaches and other initiatives in different market and competitive contexts should be 
investigated before such a conclusion could be warranted. 
Finally, we have already pointed out the problems we were confronted with while 
analyzing the data. These had mainly to do with the fact that we could not influence 
beforehand the strategy for both the collection and the treatment of data. Even considering 
the need to adapt to the existing situation, the fact that we were given access to such a 
comprehensive and rich pool of data allowed us to go beyond any known to us previous 
research conducted on the impact of relationship marketing programs in fast-moving 
consumer goods – all things considered a good enough reason for having undertaken this 
research. 
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7.7 – IMPLICATIONS FOR METHODOLOGY 
In itself, the methodology used here was not particularly innovative. Consumer 
panels have been used for a long time, even if their importance as a source of valuable data 
to the understanding of consumer behavior has not yet been fully understood, especially in 
this country. On the other hand, we used rather elementary statistical tools, that is, 
correlation and regression analysis. There is however no need to apologize for that given 
that they seemed perfectly adequate to the task and the data at hand. 
The main conclusion regarding methodology is that the development of more 
accurate, more comprehensive, and possibly also less expensive consumer panels due to 
improvements in methodology and technology hold large promise regarding the future of 
the research of consumer behavior in general, and relationship marketing programs in 
particular. 
7.8 – FURTHER RESEARCH 
The need for further research on these issues covered by our investigation is self-
evident. First, there is an obvious need to replicate this type of analysis. This replication 
should of course cover other markets and other countries, but the main need is no doubt 
to scrutinize other types of relationship programs and models. It would be specially 
relevant to study large-scale relationship marketing programs based on alternative strategic 
and tactic orientations. We believe it would be particularly useful to test programs that 
differ from this one regarding: 
1. Types of incentives offered (v.g., hard promotional offers versus soft value 
propositions based on recognition and relationship enhancement) 
2. Product modification through enlarged offer, namely including special 
service features 
3. Enrollment in the program conditional to certain desired behaviors 
4. Higher communication frequency with the target consumers 
5. Use of online communications 
Second, another recommendable line of investigation would consist in integrating 
 245 
attitudinal and behavioral loyalty measures in order to understand how each of them 
influences the other. For instance, our literature review mentioned the ongoing debate on 
the relative importance of attitude and behavior for the attainment of marketing objectives. 
Does attitude precede behavior, or is it the other way round? Which comes first? Is it 
necessary to generate favorable attitudes first among the participants of a relationship 
program if we want to generate loyalty? In our investigation we chose to focus exclusively 
on behavior, but there is definitely a need to know whether constructs such as sympathy, 
trust, bonding, and allegiance toward brands can in the long term induce the desired 
behaviors. This would be especially enlightening because the very relevance of building 
relationships in low-involvement markets for goods such as these is far from warranted. 
Third, as we tried to explain in this chapter, the proper purposes of relationship 
marketing strategies are themselves open to discussion. It has been currently accepted 
knowledge that relationship marketing and loyalty marketing are synonymous. But both the 
NBD-Dirichlet theory and other research mentioned by us suggest that loyalty might not 
be the best objective to pursue. On the contrary, some authors believe that penetration 
might be a more suitable purpose. The explanation for this is that the existence of a 
relationship program (v.g., an incentive program) can be viewed as an improvement of the 
value offer that, as a consequence, attracts more customers). On the other hand, a multi-
brand program designed to promote cross-selling is in fact intended to increase penetration 
in those areas where the company is initially weaker. In this context, it would be interesting 
to compare the relative efficiency of several relationship programs as a function of their 
stated objectives, given that some commonly used objectives may be unrealistic and 
therefore condemned to failure. 
Fourth, and last, there is a need to know whether different customers respond 
differently to relationship programs and to understand what demographic or psychographic 
variables might explain such differences. To begin with, we are especially interested in the 
retention of high-value customers. It is therefore important to know whether they are eager 
to engage in a relationship and to change their behavior accordingly. This is an important 
question to ask, since there are reasons to believe that the profile of the most valuable 
customers does not necessarily match the profile of the more engaged customers, the 
second being biased toward less affluent and less active persons. 
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1 – DIVISION A 
1.1 – General A 
The global market share of A in its served markets averaged 38.7% in the period at 
hand taking as a reference the control group. In the test group the estimated market share 
was even higher: 42.19%. This is the strongest of XXX’s divisions in Portugal, as can be 
seen by comparing its market share with the overall group’s market share. However there 
has been a continuous loss of market power in the recent years that is well documented in 
the data of Table 6.2. 
The penetration rate is also very high, as should be expected: 43.44% in the control 
group and 49.34% in the test group. But it has been faltering of late, and the loss of 
penetration seems to be the main negative force driving market share down. 
The value buying rate amounts to 12.66 euros per quarter in the control group and 
15.25 euros in the test group, which means that nearly half the money consumers spend on 
XXX’s products are in fact spent on A’s brands. Purchase frequency shows somewhat 
divergent average values in both groups: 2.06 purchase occasions per quarter in the case of 
the test group, a figure 20.5% higher than the 1.71 purchase occasions per quarter found in 
the control group. The average expense per occasion is 7.42 euros in the control group and 
7.33 euros in the test group. 
Table 1 
Division A – Evolution of Behavioral Variables 
 Market share Penetration Buying rate     
(value) 
Purchase frequency Expense per 
occasion (value) 
 Test Control Test Control Test Control Test Control Test Control 
IV - 2000 45.30 39.46 53.8 46.9 13.1 10.5 2.2 1.8 5.95 5..84 
I - 2001 42.87 40.49 55.7 43.4 12.1 12.4 1.9 1.8 6.39 6.86 
II - 2001 36.12 37.47 49.6 45.4 12.3 11.3 1.7 1.6 7.23 7.09 
III - 2001 41.04 38.64 50.9 52.0 17.1 12.8 2.2 1.8 7.77 7.11 
IV - 2001 42.57 43.04 47.8 44.4 15.9 13.8 1.9 1.8 8.36 7.64 
I - 2002 40.27 38.83 43.9 43.0 15.5 12.9 2 1.7 7.77 7.59 
II - 2002 45.77 37.32 44.9 40.3 17.9 13.0 2.3 1.7 7.77 7.64 
III - 2002 47.93 36.68 47.1 39.8 17.8 12.9 2.4 1.7 7.40 7.58 
IV - 2002 41.69 38.73 48.6 41.2 15.9 13.0 2.2 1.7 7.21 7.62 
I – 2003 38.29 36.33 52.0 38.0 15.0 14.1 1.8 1.7 8.34 8.29 
Average 42.19 38.70 49.43 43.44 15.25 12.66 2.06 1.73 7.42 7.33 
Standard 
deviation 3.55 1.99 3.76 4.05 2.12 1.05 0.23 0.07 0.77 0.66 
% sd 8.41 5.15 7.60 9.33 13.92 8.33 11.26 3.90 10.42 8.95 
Source: TNS. 
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Market share 
The market share of Division A has been falling consistently, as shown by the data 
of the control group. In the period of analysis, it fell globally –2.87%. On the other hand, 
the test group appears to perform rather well. Although the data sequence appears 
somewhat irregular, there is no downward or upward trend, suggesting that among this 
group A managed to sustain its market share. Overall, the test group appeared to gain 
+2.84 percent points of market share during the period when compared with the control 
group. 
However, the regression analysis does not confirm this hypothetical impact of the 
program on A’s market share. 
Figure 1 
Division A - Market Share 
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Penetration rate 
The fall of market share seems to be strongly correlated with a sustained fall in the 
penetration rate of A brands: -8.72% in the covered period. Penetration also falls, although 
less, in the test group. Thus, there is apparently a comparative gain of the test group over 
the control group of 3.26 percent points in penetration rate. Unfortunately, this is not 
confirmed by the regression analysis. 
Figure 2 
Division A – Penetration 
 
y = -0,6079x + 52,773
R2 = 0,2399
y = -0,9697x + 48,773
R2 = 0,5244
30,0
35,0
40,0
45,0
50,0
55,0
60,0
IV -
2000
I -
2001
II -
2001
III -
2001
IV -
2001
I -
2002
II -
2002
III -
2002
IV -
2002
I -
2003
Teste Controlo Linear (Teste) Linear (Controlo)
 
Source: Author. 
 251 
Buying rate 
The test group and the control group also move in the same direction in the case of 
the value buying rate, but this time the trend is a positive one. In the control group there is 
a total increase of 2.39 euros per customer. In the test group the growth is even larger, 
reaching 3.96 euros per customer. All in all, the program would seem to have generated an 
additional sales value of 1.57 euros per customer. But the results of the regression 
performed on the data do not confirm this idea. 
Figure 3 
Division A - Buying Rate (Value) 
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Purchase frequency 
Purchase frequency moves in the right direction in the test group, while staying flat 
or going down a little in the control group. In fact, the number of purchase occasions 
decreased marginally in the control group (-0.08), but it increased +0.13 in the test group. 
We therefore identified a possible positive effect of the program on purchase frequency, 
increasing it by 0.21 when the behavior of both groups is compared. Once again, however, 
the regression analysis does not confirm this gain. 
Figure 4 
Division A - Purchase Frequency 
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Purchase per occasion 
Purchase per occasion evolved favorably in both groups. It increased 1.50 euros in 
the test group and 1.71 in the control group. Therefore, no positive effect of the program 
was found on this account. Both data series follow a very similar trend, with the test group 
data appearing more irregular, no doubt because of the smaller dimension of the sample 
used to estimate its behavior. The regression analysis strengthened the conclusion that the 
program had no effect on this account. 
Figure 5 
Division A - Purchase per occasion (value) 
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1.2 – Product A.1 
A.1 is one of the main brands of A and the XXX Group, accounting for about 70% 
of the total sales of A and 24% of the total sales of XXX in Portugal. Anything that 
happens to it therefore strongly affects the profitability of the group. It is no doubt a huge 
brand, both in terms of sales volume and of its status among consumers, being in some 
way an icon of the company. Table 6.3 shows that absolute penetration in the control 
group is estimated to have been on average 29.76 % in the period under consideration. 
This translated into a 43.09% market share, making A.1 the leading brand in its category. 
The A.1 brand includes a number of product forms and special purpose variants. 
Since the penetration of the product category among Portuguese households is already very 
large, further growth will come mainly from the launch of new products designed to solve 
special problems. 
The buying rate, the purchase frequency and the expense per occasion were all 
clearly higher in the test group than in the control group, probably meaning that heavy 
users were over-represented in the sample of the test group. Given the high penetration of 
A.1, an average of 68 surveyed consumers bought the brand in any given quarter. 
Table 2 
Product A.1 – Evolution of Behavioral Variables 
 Market share Penetration Buying Rate 
(value) 
Purchase 
frequency 
Expense per 
occasion (value) 
 Test Control Test Control Test Control Test Control Test Control 
IV – 2000 44.1 43.90 35.3 31.0 12.7 11.8 1.7 1.6 7.48 7.40 
I – 2001 44.10 45.30 37.7 30.8 12.5 13.2 1.5 1.5 8.37 8.82 
II – 2001 40.00 40.50 37.2 28.8 12.9 13.4 1.4 1.5 9.21 8.90 
III – 2001 39.60 43.40 34.4 36.9 16.7 14.0 1.9 1.6 8.81 8.74 
IV – 2001 47.40 48.10 38.7 31.7 14.0 14.7 1.6 1.5 8.77 9.78 
I – 2002 43.00 43.60 29.3 30.6 17.1 13.9 1.7 1.6 10.05 8.71 
II – 2002 49.80 42.00 31.0 27.5 18.9 14.4 1.9 1.6 9.94 8.99 
III – 2002 52.20 41.40 31.7 27.3 18.9 14.1 1.9 1.6 9.94 8.79 
IV – 2002 43.30 42.20 31.1 27.3 17.6 14.6 1.8 1.5 9.79 9.76 
I – 2003 41.20 40.50 32.2 25.7 17.7 16.4 1.6 1.5 11.06 10.91 
Average 44.47 43.09 33.86 29.76 15.91 14.04 1.70 1.55 9.34 9.08 
Standard 
deviation 
4.15 2.34 3.26 3.21 2.58 1.17 0.18 0.05 1.02 0.92 
% sd 9.33 5.43 9.63 10.78 16.22 8.30 10.38 3.40 10.94 10.09 
Source: TNS. 
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Market share 
The market share decreased in the control group by a total of –3.08 percent points 
between the last quarter of 2000 and the first quarter of 2003. On the contrary, it increased 
by +3.04 percent points in the test group. Therefore, the program would seem to have 
accounted a total gain of market share in the test group over the control group of +6.12 
percent points, a very significant performance. At closer inspection, however, we can see 
that the anomalous levels displayed by the test group’s market share in just two quarters 
create this impression. Probably for this reason, the regression analysis does not uphold the 
hypothesis that the program had a favorable impact on A.1’s market share. 
Figure 6 
Product A.1 - Market Share 
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Penetration rate 
The penetration rate decreased in both the control and the test group at a similar 
rate. In fact, in the control group the loss amounted to -5.95 percent point, while in the test 
group it reached –6.61 percent points. As can be seen, the test group performed slightly 
worse, loosing -0.66 percent points relative to the control group. The regression analysis 
confirms that there was no impact of the program on the penetration rate. 
Figure 7 
Product A.1 - Penetration 
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Buying rate 
The buying rate increased in both groups, but significantly more in the test group 
than in the control group, apparently as a result of the program. The increase in the control 
group was 2.97 euros, being surpassed by the increase in the test group, which reached 6.52 
euros. All in all, the relationship program would seem to have generated a relative gain of 
3.55 euros, 22.33% more than the average value of the test group. 
However, the regression analysis does not confirm this impression. On the 
contrary, it even suggests that the program in itself could have had a negative impact on the 
buying rate. 
Figure 8 
Product A.1 - Buying Rate 
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Purchase frequency 
The purchase frequency stayed essentially flat at around 1.55 purchase occasions 
per quarter in the control group, since no upward or downward trend is apparent. On the 
other hand, it improved somewhat in the test group where it grew 0.21 occasions during 
this period of ten quarters. The comparisons between both groups shows an overall 
increase of 0.22 occasions in the test group relative to the control group, an improvement 
of 12.94% relative to the average of the period. This suggestion of a positive effect on 
loyalty is, however, not confirmed by the regression analysis. 
Figure 9 
Product A.1 - Purchase Frequency 
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Expense per occasion 
The expense per occasion again increased in both groups. The improvement was 
marginally higher in the test group (+2.75 euros) than in the control group (+2.03 euros). 
The gain in the consumer group exposed to the program amounted to no more than +0.72 
euros, but still represents an increase of 7.7% relative to the period average. 
On the other hand, according to the regression analysis, neither the dummy variable 
nor the time variable had a positive effect on the expense per occasion. 
Figure 10 
Product A.1 - Expense per occasion 
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1.3 – Product A.2 
The penetration of the category is low (7.5% in the control group over the period). 
Although the penetration among the consumer households integrating the test group was 
somewhat higher (10.18%), this means that no more than an average of 20 consumers 
bought product A.2 in any given quarter. We therefore worked with a very small sample, a 
situation common to most of the brands covered by this study that of course limits our 
confidence in the calculated averages as unbiased estimates of the universe. 
A.2 commands a strong and leading position in its served market, as can be seen by 
its market share, estimated to be as high as 48.31% in the control group and even higher 
(52.72%) in the test group. The buying rate was on average 7.60 euros in the control group 
and 8.85 euros in the test group. 
The fact that the sample is so small made it impossible to obtain reliable estimates 
of the purchase frequency and the expense per occasion in some quarters. Thus, no 
estimates are available for the second and fourth quarters of 2001, and for the first quarter 
of 2002. Since the basic event of consumer panel estimates is the purchase occasion, no 
estimate is provided when the number of purchase occasions registered during a quarter is 
less than 30. 
Table 3 
Product A.2 – Evolution of Behavioral Variables 
 Market share Penetration Buying rate 
(value) 
Purchase 
frequency 
Expense per 
occasion (value) 
 Test Control Test Control Test Control Test Control Test Control 
IV - 2000 47.06 41.67 6.5 5.2 10.2 6.9 1.6 1.3 6.36 5.33 
I - 2001 45.85 44.45 8.1 6.4 9.1 6.8 1.5 1.1 6.08 6.15 
II - 2001 37.16 54.42 3.5 8.3 8.1 6.9 na 1.2 ns 5.74 
III - 2001 64.43 62.21 16.9 8.2 6.4 7.6 1 1.3 6.43 5.84 
IV - 2001 51.62 49.90 9.7 9.1 8.8 7.6 na 1.2 ns 6.31 
I - 2002 57.08 47.75 6.2 7.9 13.1 7.8 na 1.3 ns 6.03 
II - 2002 66.58 47.91 13.5 7.3 8.6 8.1 1.4 1.3 6.15 6.26 
III - 2002 67.65 44.94 13.8 7.8 8.8 7.8 1.4 1.3 6.30 6.03 
IV - 2002 52.89 46.48 11.5 8.4 8.5 7.8 1.3 1.3 6.56 6.02 
I - 2003 36.87 43.34 12.1 6.4 6.9 8.6 1.1 1.4 6.31 6.13 
Average 52.72 48.31 10.18 7.50 8.85 7.60 na 1.27 na 5.98 
Standard 
deviation 
11.28 6.07 4.13 1.18 1.82 0.59 na 0.08 na 0.29 
% sd 21.39 12.57 40.54 15.71 20.54 7.72 na 6.48 na 4.84 
Source: Author. 
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Market share 
Market share trends in both the control and the test group are nor very clear, since 
data move up and down in a somewhat irregular fashion. Fitting linear trends, market share 
in the control group seems to move down while moving up in the test group. The loss in 
the control group is as high as –3.44 percent points, compared with a gain of +6.65 percent 
points in the test group. Therefore, the total gain of the latter relative to the former is 
highly significant: no less then 10.09 percent points. Overall, it would appear that the 
consumers exposed to the program performed much better than those not exposed, since, 
taking as a reference the average market share in the test group, sales grew by 19.13% over 
the period. 
Because of the irregularity of the observed data, the regression analysis does not 
confirm the existence of a positive impact on A.2’s market share. 
Figure 11 
Product A.2 - Market Share 
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Penetration rate 
At the root of the improved performance of market share in the test group is the 
increase in penetration. As can be seen in the Figure 6.17, the penetration rate decreased by 
-3.45% percent points in the control group, while increasing +6.65 percent points in the 
test group. As a consequence, the gain in the test group relative to the control group 
amounted to a remarkable 10.1 percent points. 
It should however be noted that the trends do not show up very clearly. As should 
be expected, the regression analysis confirms this general impression of the irrelevance of 
the program on the penetration level of A.2. 
Figure 12 
Product A.2 – Penetration 
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Buying rate 
The buying rate increased steadily by +1.59 euros (+20.9% over the period average) 
in the control group. On the contrary, it declined by –1.02 euros (-11.53% over the period 
average) in the control group. On the whole, the exposed consumers behavior was worse 
than that of the non-exposed, generating a total loss of –2.61 euros. Using the buying rate 
as a synthetic loyalty measure, no positive effect was found on this account. This is 
confirmed by the regression analysis. 
Figure 13 
Product A.2 - Buying rate 
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1.4 – Product A.3 
A.3 is another low penetration brand of XXX. In the control group, the average 
penetration was slightly over 7%. In the test group it was 8.7%, which means that only 
between 16 and 18 consumer households represented in the panel bought A.3 in any given 
quarter. Once again, we are working with a very small sample on a quarter basis. As a 
consequence, no estimates are available for the second, third and fourth quarters of 2001 
regarding purchase frequency and expense per occasion. 
A.3 is an ailing brand, as becomes immediately clear from the inspection of the 
market share figures. On average, the market share in the control group was only 17.86% 
and declined continuously over the period. It was higher in the test group (24.10%) as a 
consequence of also higher penetration and buying rates. 
Table 4 
Product A.3 – Evolution of Behavioral Variables 
 Market share Penetration 
Buying rate 
(value) 
Purchase 
frequency 
Expense per occasion 
(value) 
 Test Control Test Control Test Control Test Control Test Control 
IV – 2000 36.68 20.3 16.0 10.2 3.8 2.8 1.2 1.1 3.14 2.55 
I – 2001 35.88 21.27 12.9 7.7 3.9 4.1 1.3 1.3 3.00 3.13 
II – 2001 19.52 14.61 4.3 5.5 6.4 3.6 na 1.3 na 2.77 
III – 2001 15.83 16.61 6.6 8.0 5.3 3.6 na 1.3 na 2.78 
IV – 2001 17.59 21.71 5.7 8.0 8.1 4.1 na 1.5 na 2.73 
I – 2002 24.04 13.20 1.5 5.3 4.1 4.1 1.5 1.3 2.72 3.15 
II – 2002 22.69 21.11 5.7 7.8 6.3 4.4 2.1 1.3 2.99 3.40 
III – 2002 24.19 21.50 6.2 7.4 6.4 4.7 2.1 1.4 3.04 3.38 
IV – 2002 19.59 15.43 6.7 5.8 6.1 3.5 2.1 1.2 2.89 2.94 
I – 2003 25.00 12.87 11.4 5.9 5.0 3.3 1.7 1.2 2.95 2.71 
Average 24.10 17.86 8.70 7.16 5.53 3.82 na 1.29 na 2.95 
Standard 
deviation 
7.09 3.66 3.92 1.53 1.37 0.57 na 0.11 na 0.30 
% sd 29.40 20.52 45.02 21.37 24.80 14.94 na 8.53 na 9.99 
Source: TNS. 
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Market share 
Market share declined swiftly in both the control and the test group. Thus, the 
decrease in the control group reached –3.73% over the period. It was even higher in the 
test group, where it declined by as much as –9.20%. The net loss of the test group was –
5.47%. Very clearly, A.3 did not benefit at all from the relationship program, as the 
regression analysis confirms. 
Figure 14 
Product A.3 - Market Share 
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Penetration rate 
A.3 lost penetration in both the control and the test group. Once again, the test 
group performed even poorly than the control group. Witness the loss in the control group 
(-2.50 percent points over the period) and in the test group (-3.94 percent points). The net 
loss in the test group is therefore estimated at –1.44 percent points. Compared to the 
average penetration rate of the period, the decrease was –16.55%. Neither the F-test nor 
the t-tests allowed the identification of any kind of effect on the penetration rate. 
Figure 15 
Product A.3 – Penetration 
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Buying rate 
The buying rate also shows a downward trend in both the control and the test group. 
In the control group, it decreased by –2.50 euros in a period of ten quarters, compared 
with an even stronger decrease of –3.94 euros in the test group. We thus find a net fall of –
1.44 euros in the test group relative to the control group. Compared with the average value 
of the period, the decrease amounted to -26.04%. Once again, the regression analysis 
confirms the ineffectiveness of the program regarding A.3’s buying rate. 
Figure 16 
Product A.3 - Buying Rate 
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1.5 – Product A.4 
A.4 is a low penetration brand, bought by just 8.3% of Portuguese households 
according to the estimate of the control group. Once again, we obtain a larger estimate in 
the test group (9.41%). A.4 is not a major player in the category: its market share is small 
(12.08% over the period) and is still suffering some erosion. 
Only some 18 consumer households surveyed by the panel and exposed to the 
program bought A.4 in any given quarter. With such a small sample, it is no wonder that no 
reliable estimates could be obtained for the purchase frequency and the expense per 
occasion in the second, third and fourth quarters of 2001 and in the first quarter of 2002. 
Therefore, it was impossible to determine the trend for those two variables. 
Table 5 
Product A.4 – Evolution of Behavioral Variables 
 Market share Penetration Buying rate 
(value) 
Purchase 
frequency 
Expense per 
occasion (value) 
 Test Control Test Control Test Control Test Control Test Control 
IV – 2000 12.47 16.61 9.0 12.0 3.23 2.74 1.9 1.4 1.70 1.96 
I – 2001 11.16 12.72 12.8 8.4 1.76 2.73 1.1 1.5 1.60 1.82 
II – 2001 6.06 14.81 8.3 10.5 1.99 2.58 na 1.3 na 1.98 
III – 2001 8.91 14.86 8.5 11.8 2.88 2.74 na 1.4 na 1.96 
IV – 2001 3.56 12.26 3.9 6.6 1.92 3.01 na 1.3 na 2.32 
I – 2002 5.92 9.65 5.9 6.7 1.94 2.25 na 1.2 na 1.88 
II – 2002 12.61 9.27 10.7 6.7 2.89 2.41 1.6 1.3 1.80 1.86 
III – 2002 14.20 9.04 12.2 6.5 2.97 2.40 1.6 1.3 1.86 1.84 
IV – 2002 18.28 12.69 12.5 7.4 2.78 2.71 1.8 1.2 1.55 2.26 
I – 2003 13.71 8.90 10.3 6.4 2.62 2.25 1.3 1.2 2.02 1.87 
Average 10.69 12.08 9.41 8.30 2.50 2.58 na 1.31 na 1.97 
Standard 
deviation 4.53 2.78 2.91 2.27 0.54 0.25 na 0.10 na 0.17 
% sd 42.34 23.01 30.92 27.37 21.54 9.64 na 7.59 na 8.85 
Source: TNS. 
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Market share 
The market share decreased in the control group but increased in the test group. The 
decrease in the control group was sustained during the ten quarters covered by the analysis, 
recording a total loss of –6.42 percent points. Inversely, the market share increased by 
+6.28 percent points in the test group. When we compare the behavior of both groups, we 
find that market share apparently increased by a total of +12.70 percent points in the test 
group relative to the control group. This would more than double the average market share 
during the period, which stood at just 10.69% in the test group. 
The regression analysis was unable to identify a direct effect of the program on A.4’s 
market share, since the t-test shows that the coefficient associated to the dummy variable is 
not significantly different from zero. On the other hand, there is a definite connexion 
between the time variable and the brand’s market share, and the F-test is also positive. 
Figure 17 
Product A.4 - Market Share 
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Penetration rate 
The increase of the market share was in a large measure driven by the growth of 
the penetration rate in the test group. Once again the control and the test groups diverged 
markedly, with the former falling while the latter raised. In fact, we can see that there was a 
total loss of –5.05 percent points in the penetration rate of the control group. In the same 
period, however, there seemed to be a gain of +2.06 percent points in the test group. 
Therefore, the gain of the test group relative to the control group would have reached 
+7.11 percent point, amounting to an increase of 75.6% over the average penetration rate 
in the period. This is not however confirmed by the regression analysis performed on the 
data. 
Figure 18 
Product A.4 – Penetration 
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Buying rate 
Concerning the buying rate, the performance of the test group was clearly positive 
when compared with that of the control group. In fact, the buying rate declined –0.39 
euros in the control group while at the same time increasing +0.36 euros in the test group, 
thus creating a net gain of +0.75 euros. This synthetic loyalty measure improved +30% 
during the period, suggesting that the relationship program raised the performance of the 
brand. The regression analysis identifies the impact of the time variable on A.4’s buying 
rate, but is unable to relate this change to the program, since the t-test associated to the 
coefficient of the dummy variable shows it is not significantly different from zero. 
Figure 19 
Product A.4 - Buying Rate 
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2 – DIVISION B 
2.1 – General B 
Globally, the weighted market share of B in the categories where it competes 
reached an average of 20.01% in the control group and 23.76% in the test group. Unlike 
Division A, B has not been loosing market share to retailer own brands, which are not 
major players in these categories, possibly because the main producers have managed to 
innovate continuously, thus reducing the opportunities for me-too brands. The penetration 
rate is even higher: 36.81% in the control group and 41.4% in the test group. However, the 
penetration rate in then control group has fallen significantly in the last few years. 
Therefore, the stability of the market shared is owed to the increase in the value buying rate 
that compensated the loss of customers. The purchase frequency is relatively low: a mere 
average of 1.75 occasions per quarter, considerably less than in the case of A. Concurrently, 
the expense per occasion is also small (only 3.25 euros per occasion) given that most 
product sold by B are rather inexpensive. 
Table 6 
Division B – Evolution of Behavioral Variables 
 Market share Penetration Buying rate     
(value) 
Purchase frequency Expense per 
occasion (value) 
 Test Control Test Control Test Control Test Control Test Control 
IV – 2000 20.83 19.15 37.4 37.4 5.7 4.9 2.4 1.8 2.39 2.71 
I – 2001 20.49 19.51 37.9 35.6 5.0 5.5 1.6 1.7 3.14 3.23 
II – 2001 22.50 20.73 34.6 38.1 5.1 5.6 1.5 1.8 3.41 3.12 
III – 2001 24.67 20.32 45.4 41.6 7.4 6.4 2.1 2 3.54 3.21 
IV – 2001 35.10 20.00 38.1 36.0 11.1 6.0 2.4 1.8 4.63 3.32 
I – 2002 23.04 21.37 40.7 39.0 5.6 5.7 1.8 1.7 3.11 3.32 
II – 2002 22.04 19.79 44.8 35.7 5.6 5.6 1.9 1.7 2.97 3.30 
III – 2002 21.58 19.53 44.1 35.3 5.9 5.5 2 1.7 2.95 3.23 
IV – 2002 22.48 20.13 45.7 34.8 5.6 5.9 1.7 1.7 3.32 3.47 
I – 2003 24.88 19.57 44.9 34.6 6.2 5.8 1.6 1.6 3.89 3.64 
Average 23.76 20.01 41.36 36.81 6.34 5.68 1.90 1.75 3.33 3.25 
Standard 
deviation 4.24 0.66 4.10 2.22 1.80 0.40 0.32 0.11 0.60 0.24 
% sd 17.83 3.31 9.92 6.03 28.40 7.05 17.01 6.17 18.12 7.42 
Source: TNS. 
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Market share 
B’s market share looks mainly flat. The adjusted trend shows a slight increase of 
market share over the period of 0.11 percent points in the control group. The trend is more 
favorable in the test group, leading to an increase of 1.41 percent points. This translates 
into a gain of 1.3 percent point of the test group over the control group. It should be 
noted, however, that the test group data series shows a clear outlier in the fourth quarter of 
2001, thus diminishing our confidence in the relevance of the identified trend. This 
suspicion is confirmed by the regression analysis, according to which the program had no 
impact on B’s market share. 
Figure 20 
Division B - Market Share 
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Penetration rate 
The penetration rates show very divergent trends when we compare the test 
group with the control group. The penetration rate is falling rapidly in the control group, 
translating into a cumulative loss of -3.25 percent points over the period. Meanwhile, the 
test group exhibits a very positive trend leading to a gain of +9.29 percent points. The net 
gain of the test group over the control group thus amounts to a very significant difference 
of +12.54 percent points. The regression analysis displays a significant F statistic. Besides, 
the time variable is positive and significantly different from zero, although the dummy 
variable is not. 
Figure 21 
Division B - Penetration Rate 
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Buying rate 
The value buying rate per customer increased somewhat in both the control and 
the test group, although more in the former (0.44 euros) than in the latter (0.1 euros). A 
very anomalous value was found in the test group during the fifth quarter, for which there 
is no satisfactory explanation. The fact remains that no effect of the program on the value 
buying rate of the Division B could be identified, a conclusion that is reinforced by the 
regression analysis. 
Figure 22 
Division B - Buying Rate (value) 
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Purchase frequency 
The purchase frequency of B brands was a bit reduced during the period in both 
groups. Once again, the general trend is similar in both of them, with the test data 
displaying more variation around the mean. The number of purchase occasions per 
customer in the control group was decreased by –0.18 weeks in the control group, while in 
the test group the equivalent figure was –0.28. The test group therefore showed a net loss 
of –0.1 occasions per customer. No positive effect of the relationship program on the 
enroled participants could therefore be identified. The regression analysis points in the 
same direction. 
Figure 23 
Division B - Purchase Frequency 
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Purchase per occasion 
The purchase per occasion moved in the same direction in both groups and even 
the dimension of the change was not significantly different. According to the trend 
equations, the expense per purchase occasion increased 0.59 euros in the control group and 
0.50 euros in the test group. Given the results of the regression analysis, we can 
comfortably reject the hypothesis that the program managed to change the purchase per 
occasion of B’s customers. 
Figure 24 
Division B - Purchase per occasion (value) 
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2.2 – Product B.1 
B.1 competes against stronger brands than itself. As a consequence, and in spite of 
all its efforts, it is not a major player. Table 6.8 shows that, in the control group, B.1’s 
penetration was on average only 7.76% during the analyzed period. Likewise, the brand’s 
market share was not very significant either, standing at just 8.57% and showing a clear 
tendency to decrease. On both accounts, the test group started below the control group but 
finished above. The number of purchase occasions in the test group was large enough to 
provide estimates of all the variables in all the time periods considered. 
Table 7 
Product B.1 – Evolution of Behavioral Variables 
 Market share Penetration Buying rate 
(value) 
Purchase 
frequency 
Expense per 
occasion (value) 
 Test Control Test Control Test Control Test Control Test Control 
IV - 2000 8.54 12.67 9.1 10.8 3.91 4.70 1.5 1.4 2.61 3.36 
I – 2001 11.79 10.19 8.5 8.7 4.84 4.65 1.5 1.3 3.23 3.58 
II – 2001 19.33 10.61 7.5 9.5 7.35 4.89 1.5 1.3 4.90 3.76 
III - 2001 13.75 9.06 12.1 8.7 6.03 5.28 1.6 1.4 3.77 3.77 
IV - 2001 14.28 7.57 12.1 7.3 5.56 4.51 1.6 1.3 3.48 3.47 
I – 2002 14.29 6.17 13.9 6.3 4.46 4.10 1.3 1.3 3.43 3.15 
II - 2002 9.20 7.05 12.7 6.0 3.33 4.96 1.1 1.3 3.02 3.81 
III - 2002 8.51 6.51 12.1 5.6 3.36 4.79 1.2 1.3 2.80 3.68 
IV - 2002 9.49 6.89 12.7 6.4 3.26 4.63 1.1 1.2 2.96 3.86 
I – 2003 13.23 9.02 14.0 8.3 4.52 4.63 1.2 1.2 3.77 3.85 
Average 12.24 8.57 11.47 7.76 4.66 4.71 1.36 1.30 3.40 3.63 
Standard 
deviation 3.44 2.11 2.28 1.71 1.33 0.31 0.20 0.07 0.66 0.24 
% sd 28.09 24.63 19.86 22.02 28.59 6.55 14.79 5.13 19.30 6.54 
Source: TNS. 
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Market share 
B.1 generally performed poorly during the ten observed quarters. As we can see, 
the market share fell by –4.57 percent points in the control group. It also fell in the test 
group but only by half, that is – 2.27 percent points. This means there was a net gain of the 
test group against the control group of +2.30 percent points, an increase of +18.79% 
relative to the average of the period. According to the regression analysis, the program 
seems in fact to have had a positive effect on B.1’ market share.  We will see next what 
factors were responsible for this change. 
Figure 25 
Product B.1 - Market Share 
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Penetration rate 
The test group and the control group followed different ways regarding the 
penetration rate. While the control group lost –3.67 percent points, the test group gained 
+5.46 percent points. The increase of the test group when compared to the control group 
amounted therefore to +9.13 percent points. Relative to the average penetration of the test 
group, this represents a 74.59% improvement. The regression analysis shows that the 
coefficient of the time variable is positive and significantly different from zero. However, 
the coefficient of the dummy variable is not, meaning that the upward evolution of the 
penetration rate cannot be attributed to the program. 
Figure 26 
Product B.1 – Penetration 
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Buying rate 
The buying rate tended to stay flat or decline a little in the control group for the 
period as a whole: overall, it decreased by a mere -0.15 euros. In the test group, it raised 
swiftly in the first two quarters, then fell consistently in the next seven quarters, so that, all 
in all, it came down by -1.89 euros. Therefore, the test group registered a loss of –1.74 
euros relative to the control group, thus allowing us to conclude that the program did not 
improve globally the loyalty of B.1’ customers. The regression analysis estimated a negative 
coefficient for the time variable, but no effect could be attributed to the program itself. 
Figure 27 
Product B.1 - Buying Rate 
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Purchase frequency 
The test group did not fare well either concerning purchase frequency. Although 
both groups exhibited declining purchase frequency, things were worse in the test group 
than in the control group. In the former there was a loss of –0.48 purchase occasions per 
quarter, while in the latter it was restricted to a mere –0.15. As a consequence, the net loss 
amounted to –0.33 purchase occasions in the test group, in relative terms a fall of 24.26% 
as a proportion of the quarter average value. Again, in the performed regression, the 
coefficient of the time variable is negative and significantly significant from and zero. 
However, the hypothesis that the program had no impact whatsoever on purchase 
frequency cannot be rejected. 
Figure 28 
Product B.1 - Purchase Frequency 
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Expense per occasion 
The performance of the test group was also unsatisfactory regarding the expense 
per occasion, because it fell a little while going up in the control group. In fact, we can see 
that the expense per occasion increased by +0.32 euros in the control group, but decreased 
by –0.23 euros in the test group. This means that the test group might lost –0.55 euros 
during the period relative to the control group, a fall of –6.70% as a proportion of the 
average of the period. Yet, the regression analysis suggests that the program had no impact 
on the expense per occasion. 
Figure 29 
Product B.1 - Expense per occasion 
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2.3 – Product B.2 
This is a declining category. We can see that B.2 was on average only bought by 
8.15% of the consumers of the control panel, and that in the test group this proportion 
was even lower (7.49%). B.2 is an important but not leading brand in this crowded 
category: its market share stood at 23.23% during the period under consideration. The 
expense per occasion was just 1.91 euros in the control group, and the brand was bought 
an average of 1.82 times per quarter. This means that, besides being a very low cost item, it 
is not bought very frequently either. 
The low penetration rates coupled with the infrequency of purchase had the result 
that in a total of 6 quarters it was impossible to get minimally accurate estimates of both 
the purchase frequency and the expense per occasion. 
Table 8 
Product B.2 – Evolution of Behavioral Variables 
 Market share Penetration Buying rate 
(value) 
Purchase 
frequency 
Expense per 
occasion (value) 
 Test Control Test Control Test Control Test Control Test Control 
IV - 2000 29.89 23.28 11.0 9.0 3.68 2.89 1.8 1.8 2.05 1.60 
I – 2001 28.67 26.17 11.0 9.6 2.36 3.45 1.3 1.7 1.82 2.03 
II - 2001 11.59 25.90 5.1 10.0 1.50 3.03 na 1.6 na 1.89 
III - 2001 7.22 22.60 3.7 9.3 1.63 4.04 na 2.1 na 1.92 
IV - 2001 10.31 27.18 3.0 9.9 1.69 3.64 na 1.9 na 1.92 
I – 2002 33.64 27.70 5.7 8.6 5.25 3.75 na 1.8 na 2.08 
II - 2002 30.65 20.51 11.4 6.5 3.34 3.59 1.3 1.9 2.57 1.89 
III - 2002 30.24 19.88 11.8 6.2 3.21 3.63 1.3 2 2.47 1.82 
IV – 2002 29.01 17.77 7.7 6.5 4.38 3.01 na 1.7 na 1.77 
I – 2003 21.86 21.29 4.5 5.9 3.99 3.63 na 1.7 na 2.13 
Average 23.31 23.23 7.49 8.15 3.10 3.46 1.43 1.82 na 1.91 
Standard 
deviation 9.89 3.40 3.51 1.67 1.28 0.37 0.25 0.15 na 0.16 
% sd 42.44 14.64 46.87 20.51 41.17 10.72 17.54 8.51 na 8.15 
Source: TNS. 
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Market share 
Figure 6.35 shows that market share has tended to fall in the control group by a 
total of -6.14 percent points. On the contrary, we found an upward trend in the test group. 
The market share fell abruptly during the first year. Then, after rising to a maximum in the 
first quarter of 2002, started going down again, but this time more slowly. Overall, the 
linear trend displays an increase of +6.38 percent points. Even if the irregularity of the data 
does not allow us to put much faith in the trend of the test group, its total gain during the 
period over the control group was an impressive +12.52 percent points. Apparently, the 
program had a positive impact on the sales of B.2 to the exposed consumers, with a gain of 
+53.71% over the average of the period. However, the regression analysis does no uphold 
this hypothesis. 
Figure 30 
Product B.2 - Market Share 
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Penetration rate 
Penetration falls in both the control and the test group. The case of the control 
group seems very clear: the trend is easily detected by visual inspection of Figure 6.36, and 
the high correlation coefficient seems to confirm it. As we can see, the penetration rate 
decreased steadily in the control group by –4.27 percent points. Things do not appear so 
clear in the test group. No doubt because of the small sample available the data oscillate 
cyclically going down in the beginning, then up, then down again. If we trust the fitted 
linear trend, however, it tells us that the penetration rate decreased in the test group slower 
than in the control group: no more than –1.22 percent points over the period. This means 
that, by delaying the general negative trend of B.2, the program might have accounted for a 
net gain of +3.05 percent points. As a proportion of the period average this would translate 
into a huge gain of +40.72%. 
A closer inspection of the data shows a wide fluctuation of the penetration rate of 
the test group from period to period. Such instability makes it impossible to confirm the 
hypothesis that the program had a positive impact on the penetration rate, as the regression 
analysis makes it clear. 
Figure 31 
Product B.2 – Penetration 
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Buying rate 
The program also appears to have had a positive impact on the buying rate. This 
time, however, the analyzed variable showed a favorable evolution in both groups. It 
increased by +0.29 euros in the control group, and even more in the test group, where the 
again amounted to +1.86 euros. The net gain of the exposed group is therefore estimated 
at 1.57 euros, an increase of +50.65% over the average buying rate of the period in the test 
group. This is one more case when the time variable presents a positive coefficient, while 
the dummy variable presents a negative one. This means that the buying rate in fact 
increases with time, but this increase cannot be attributed to the relationship program. 
Figure 32 
Product B.2 - Buying Rate 
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2.4 – Product B.3 
B.3 is a distant third brand in its category, suffering also strong competition from 
retailer’s own brands. Its penetration rate was on average a meager 6.42% during the 
period, meaning that as a rule no more than 13 people bought it at a given quarter. The 
combination of weak penetration and infrequent purchase meant that, as a consequence, 
we have no accurate estimate for the second quarter of 2001. 
B.3’s market share stood on average at 6.77% in the control group and 8.83% in 
the test group. The buying rate, however, is higher in the control group (2.93 euros) then in 
the test group (2.40 euros). Unlike most other analyzed brands, the test group seems in this 
case to include a smaller proportion of heavy users. 
Table 9 
Product B.3 – Evolution of Behavioral Variables 
 Market share Penetration Buying rate 
(value) 
Purchase 
frequency 
Expense per 
occasion (value) 
 Test Control Test Control Test Control Test Control Test Control 
IV - 2000 8.30 5.44 6.9 6.5 3.0 2.1 1.6 1.3 1.90 1.60 
I – 2001 8.42 7.64 9.2 7.3 2.3 2.8 1.2 1.4 1.89 2.02 
II – 2001 10.40 8.39 9.3 7.7 2.3 2.9 na 1.3 na 2.21 
III – 2001 7.44 7.55 13.2 7.9 1.8 3.2 1.2 1.5 1.48 2.13 
IV – 2001 12.56 6.40 14.3 6.8 2.5 2.6 1.2 1.3 2.11 2.01 
I – 2002 6.38 7.48 8.5 6.1 2.0 3.3 1.1 1.4 1.86 2.39 
II – 2002 8.29 6.28 9.9 6.1 2.5 2.7 1.3 1.3 1.92 2.10 
III – 2002 6.53 5.97 9.6 5.7 2.1 2.7 1.3 1.3 1.60 2.10 
IV – 2002 12.05 6.38 10.8 5.2 3.0 3.3 1.6 1.2 1.88 2.76 
I – 2003 7.87 6.21 8.5 4.9 2.4 3.6 1.2 1.4 2.02 2.54 
Average 8.83 6.77 10.02 6.42 2.40 2.93 na 1.34 na 2.19 
Standard 
deviation 2.15 0.93 2.23 1.02 0.40 0.43 na 0.08 na 0.32 
% sd 24.35 13.67 22.26 15.81 16.75 14.85 na 6.29 na 14.64 
Source: Author. 
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Market share 
Although moving up and down all the time, on average the market share stayed 
essentially flat in the test group. In the control group, however, it decreased slowly but 
steadily, loosing –0.91 percent points during the period. Comparing the test group with the 
control group, we find that the former gained +0.99 percent points over the latter. When 
we relate this figure to the period average, we estimate a relative gain of 11.21% in the 
market share of the test group. 
The regression analysis does not confirm this hypothesis. Since none of the 
coefficients is significantly different from zero, we can safely conclude that the program 
had no clear impact on the market share of B.3. 
 
Figure 33 
Product B.3 - Market Share 
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Penetration rate 
The gain in market share is attributable to the change in the penetration rate, since 
it declined in the control group and declined in the test group. Specifically, there was a loss 
of –2.47 percent points in the control group and a small gain of +0.62 percent points in the 
test group. This translates into a relative gain of the test group over the control group in 
the order of +3.09 percent points. Comparing the figure with the average penetration of 
the period in the test group, we find a significant overall increase of +30.84%. This is not, 
however, confirmed by the regression analysis, no doubt as a consequence of the 
irregularity of the data of the test group. 
Figure 34 
Product B.3 – Penetration 
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Buying rate 
As in the previously analyzed variables, the buying rate also remained basically 
unchanged in the test group. This time, however, it grew in the control group by +0.84 
euros, a significant result since the average over the period in this group was just 2.93 
euros. The conclusion is that the program did not manage to impact positively the loyalty 
of B.3 customers exposed to it. In fact, the regression analysis suggests that the program 
was responsible for the decrease of the buying rate. 
Figure 35 
Product B.3 - Buying Rate 
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2.5 – Product B.4 
B.4 is not a strong brand: its market share amounted on average to no more than 
16.49% in the control group and 14.85% in the test group. The brand’s absolute 
penetration rate is also small: 5.89% in the control group and a little bit more (6.27%) in 
the test group. Once again, this made it impossible to compute accurate estimates of the 
purchase frequency and the expense per occasion in four consecutive quarters. The average 
buying rate is very similar in both groups: 5.56 euros in the control group and 5.47 in the 
test group. Stability seems to be the distinguishing feature of the brand and its market. 
Table 10 
Product B.4 – Evolution of Behavioral Variables 
 Market share Penetration Buying rate 
(value) 
Purchase 
frequency 
Expense per 
occasion (value) 
 Test Control Test Control Test Control Test Control Test Control 
IV – 2000 18.86 14.60 5.9 5.5 5.6 4.4 1.5 1.2 3.73 3.64 
I – 2001 11.11 13.54 4.1 4.2 5.5 5.5 na 1.3 na 4.20 
II – 2001 17.53 18.58 6.0 6.3 5.9 5.1 na 1.3 na 3.91 
III – 2001 17.09 12.39 8.0 6.9 8.2 4.7 na 1.3 na 3.59 
IV – 2001 5.05 17.12 3.2 6.4 5.3 5.2 na 1.3 na 4.03 
I – 2002 19.79 19.98 7.0 6.2 3.8 6.1 1.1 1.4 3.48 4.34 
II – 2002 19.86 18.13 8.4 6.2 5.2 8.7 1.5 1.3 3.43 6.68 
III – 2002 19.54 19.49 9.1 6.8 5.2 5.1 1.5 1.3 3.48 3.92 
IV – 2002 10.14 18.07 5.5 5.0 5.2 6.3 na 1.5 na 4.21 
I – 2003 9.57 13.04 5.5 5.4 4.7 4.7 1.4 1.3 3.37 3.59 
Average 14.85 16.49 6.27 5.89 5.47 5.56 na 1.32 na 4.21 
Standard 
deviation 5.37 2.83 1.87 0.85 1.12 1.26 na 0.08 na 0.91 
% sd 36.18 17.16 29.89 14.44 20.46 22.57 na 5.98 na 21.59 
Source: TNS. 
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Market share 
There is a loss of market share in the test group and a gain in the control group, but 
the low correlation coefficients show that the trends are not very clear. B.4’s market share 
increased in the control group by +2.31 percent points, while decreasing in the test group 
by –3.12 percent points. Overall, the test group lost –5.43 percent points when compared 
with the control group. This is a significant loss of –36.57% over the average of the period. 
In fact, the regression analysis shows that the relationship program did not impact either 
way B.4’s market share. 
Figure 36 
Product B.4 - Market Share 
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Penetration rate 
The correlation coefficients are again very low. In this case, however, both trends 
point upwards, even if the penetration rate rises faster in the test group. The increase in the 
control group during the period is indeed very small: just +0.27 percent points. Meanwhile, 
in the control group, it increased by +1.46 percent points. Therefore, the gain of the test 
group over the control group might have amounted to +1.19 percent points. Yet, the fact 
is that the regression analysis performed on the observed data was unable to confirm such 
effect. 
Figure 37 
Product B.4 - Penetration Rate 
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Buying rate 
The data appears very irregular, something clearly indicated by the low correlation 
coefficients. The fitted trends point in opposite directions, with the control group going up 
and the test group going down. We can see that the buying rate increased by +1.18 euros in 
the control group while decreasing by –1.30 euros in the test group. The net result was a 
loss of –2.48 euros in the group exposed to the program, which therefore was found to 
have no effect on the loyalty of B.4’s customers. The regression analysis shows no positive 
or negative impact of the program on B.4’s buying rate. 
Figure 38 
Product B.4 - Buying Rate 
 
y = -0,1441x + 6,2596
R2 = 0,1521
y = 0,1311x + 4,8436
R2 = 0,0999
2,0
3,0
4,0
5,0
6,0
7,0
8,0
9,0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Test Control Linear (Test) Linear (Control)
 
Source: Author. 
 
 
 296 
3 – DIVISION C 
3.1 – General C 
C is the food division of XXX in Portugal. The main products sold by C are C.1, 
C.2, C.3, C.4, C.5 and C.6. C has the highest penetration rate (83.00%) of any XXX 
division in Portugal, thanks to some very popular brands in its portfolio. Its general market 
share (27.23%) is actually lower than Division A’s (38.70%), but increased steadily during 
the period under consideration. Customers buy on average 9.67 euros of C’s products per 
quarter. They do it an average of 3.6 times in each quarter but only spend 2.68 euros on 
each purchase occasion, since the unit prices are very low. 
Table 11 
Division C – Evolution of Behavioral Variables 
 Market share Penetration Buying rate     
(value) 
Purchase frequency Expense per 
occasion (value) 
 Test Control Test Control Test Control Test Control Test Control 
IV – 2000 24.19 25.69 84.6 83.6 9.9 8.2 3.6 3.5 2.76 2.36 
I – 2001 27.72 25.06 83.7 84.3 11.3 8.2 4 3.3 2.81 2.49 
II – 2001 27.55 27.05 80.6 84.4 10.2 9.3 3.6 3.5 2.84 2.65 
III – 2001 28.35 27.43 91.1 86.0 14.3 12.2 4.7 4.3 3.03 2.83 
IV – 2001 28.00 27.75 78.8 81.5 12.9 10.1 4.1 3.6 3.16 2.80 
I – 2002 26.47 28.71 85.8 80.8 9.4 9.8 3.5 3.6 2.68 2.73 
II – 2002 28.10 27.74 86.9 82.9 11.1 9.8 3.9 3.7 2.86 2.66 
III – 2002 27.41 27.72 86.0 82.8 11.5 9.6 4.1 3.7 2.81 2.58 
IV – 2002 29.30 27.58 92.1 82.0 12.1 9.9 3.6 3.4 3.35 2.90 
I – 2003 24.26 27.54 84.3 81.7 8.7 9.6 3.3 3.4 2.65 2.82 
Average 27.13 27.23 85.39 83.00 11.14 9.67 3.84 3.60 2.89 2.68 
Standard 
deviation 1.69 1.07 4.10 1.59 1.67 1.10 0.41 0.28 0.22 0.17 
% sd 6.24 3.93 4.80 1.92 15.01 11.38 10.57 7.75 7.62 6.35 
Source: TNS. 
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Market share 
As mentioned before, the market share of Division C grew during the period by a 
total of 2.15 percent points in then control group. A look at Figure 6.44 suggests that the 
test group was also growing at approximately the same rate during the first nine quarters. 
However, a sudden fall in the last quarter contradicted this general trend. All in all, the test 
group appears to have lost –1.68 percent points when compared with the control group. 
The regression analysis performed on the data did not allow us to identify any impact 
whatsoever of the program on C’s market share. 
Figure 39 
Division C - Market Share 
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Penetration rate 
The penetration rate of the control group declined by 2.79 percent points during 
the period under scrutiny. On the other hand, it increased notoriously in the test group by 
4.23 percent points. The combined effect of those opposed trends means that the 
penetration in the test group grew by 7.02 percent points when compared with the control 
group. The coefficient associated by the regression analysis to the dummy variable is not 
statistically significant, which means that we were not able to identify a positive impact of 
the program on the penetration rate. However, the penetration rate did increase with time. 
Figure 40 
Division C - Penetration Rate 
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Buying rate 
The buying rate increased in the control group, but decreased in the test group. 
The increase of the buying rate in the control group was strong enough to compensate for 
the previously mentioned loss in penetration and thus ensure an increase in market share. 
On the other hand, the buying rate remained more or less stationary in the test group 
during most of the period under analysis, but then fell suddenly in the last quarter. As 
noted above, this was enough to reverse the upward trend of the market share. In 
consequence, the average purchase per customer in the test group appears declined 1.60 
euros in the period when compared with the control group. However, the regression 
analysis suggests that we cannot trust this result since the coefficients associated to both 
the dummy variable and the time variable are not statistically significant. 
Figure 41 
Division C - Buying Rate (value) 
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Purchase frequency 
The purchase frequency moved downwards in both groups, but more negatively 
in the test group (-0.63 weeks per quarter) than in the control group (-0.15 weeks per 
quarter).  As a result, the average in the test group was above the control group when the 
program started, but finished bellow in the last period. Therefore, the purchase frequency 
in the test group declined by 0.48 weeks relative to the control group. This means that no 
effect of the program was identified concerning this loyalty variable, a conclusion that was 
confirmed by the regression analysis. 
Figure 42 
Division C - Purchase Frequency 
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Purchase per occasion 
The purchase per occasion increased somewhat in the control group, while 
remaining essentially flat in the test group. These are the relevant figures: an increase of 
0.33 euros in the purchase per occasion in the control group, compared with a barely 
noticeable increase of 0.09 euros in the test group. Once again, no loyalty effect was found 
on this account, something that the regression analysis bears out. 
Figure 43 
Division C - Purchase per occasion (value) 
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3.2 – Product C.1 
C.1 is the second best-selling brand in the XXX portfolio in Portugal after A.1. The 
data on Table 6.13 show that it is bought by nearly one in every three households on any 
given quarter. In spite of being positioned in the top segment of the market, it commands a 
30% market share. It is bought on average on two occasions per quarter, and the expense 
on each occasion is estimated in 4.37 euros in the control group. The brand has been under 
strong pressure because of growing competition from lower priced brands, and especially 
from retailer’s own brands. 
Table 12 
Product C.1 – Evolution of Behavioral Variables 
 Market share Penetration Buying rate  
(value) 
Purchase 
frequency 
Expense per 
occasion (value) 
 Test Control Test Control Test Control Test Control Test Control 
IV – 2000 42.89 31.59 36.9 25.8 9.5 8.2 1.9 2 .01 4.08 
I – 2001 30.34 26.87 35.0 27.3 9.5 7.8 2.2 2 4.30 3.90 
II – 2001 28.21 31.76 33.9 26.6 7.2 8.9 2.1 2.1 3.42 4.22 
III – 2001 32.19 36.19 36.2 32.7 11.9 10.9 2.9 2.4 4.09 4.56 
IV – 2001 32.32 29.17 31.6 29.8 11.3 9.0 2.2 2 5.14 4.51 
I – 2002 25.31 32.39 29.8 29.6 7.1 8.8 1.6 2 4.42 4.38 
II – 2002 25.62 29.62 28.9 25.8 9.0 9.4 2 2.2 4.51 4.26 
III – 2002 24.21 29.10 29.9 25.4 8.8 9.3 2 1.9 4.40 4.88 
IV – 2002 32.74 29.47 38.0 31.4 11.6 8.8 2 2 5.79 4.40 
I – 2003 28.49 27.89 32.7 29.1 7.8 8.6 1.8 1.9 4.31 4.55 
Average 30.23 30.40 33.29 28.35 9.35 8.96 2.07 2.05 4.54 4.37 
Standard 
deviation 5.41 2.67 3.22 2.55 1.77 0.84 0.34 0.15 0.65 0.28 
% sd 17.91 8.78 9.66 8.98 18.88 9.40 16.59 7.36 14.25 6.34 
Source: TNS. 
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Market share 
Market share declines in both the control group and the test group, but strongly in 
the test group. The decrease in the control group in the whole period amounted to –2.45 
percent points. It was apparently much worse in the test group, where it decreased by –8.70 
percent points. There was therefore a total loss of –11.15 percent points in the test group 
relative to the control group. According to the data, the program would have had a 
negative impact on the exposed customers, a result that is very difficult to account for. The  
regression analysis shows a significant F-test value, and the t statistic of the dummy variable 
is negative and also significant. This supports the conclusion that the program did have a 
negative impact on C.1’s market share. 
Figure 44 
Product C.1 - Market Share 
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Penetration rate 
The loss in the penetration rate appears to be the main explanation for the poor 
performance of C.1 among the exposed customers. As we can see, it increased in the 
control group (+1.72 percent points) while decreasing in the test group (-3 .30 percent 
points), implying a total loss of the latter over the former of no less than –5.02 percent 
points. Taking as a reference the average penetration of the period in the test group, it fell 
by 17.62%. The regression analysis showed a significant F-value, but none of the t statistics 
supports the conclusion that any of the coefficients associated to the two variables 
considered is significantly different from zero. 
Figure 45 
Product C.1 - Penetration 
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Buying rate 
The buying rate increased a bit in the control group and decreased a bit in the test 
group. The increase in the control group is estimated in +0.45 euros, while the decrease in 
the test group might have reached –0.31 euros. The loss of the test group when compared 
to the control group was –0.76 euros, a relative fall of 8.13% as a proportion of the average 
of the period. Thus, no loyalty gain was apparent among the exposed customers. The 
regression analysis confirms this impression. 
Figure 46 
Product C.1 - Buying Rate 
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Purchase frequency 
Purchase frequency fell in both the control and the test group, but somewhat faster 
in the test group. The decline in the control group was indeed very small, barely –0.23 
purchase occasions per quarter. The negative difference was more important in the test 
group, leading a loss of –0.59 purchase occasion. Relative to the control group, the total 
decline in the test group appears to have stood at –0.36 purchase occasions. However, the 
regression analysis does not support the existence of any kind of positive or negative 
impact of the program on purchase frequency. 
Figure 47 
Product C.1 - Purchase Frequency 
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Expense per occasion 
The expense per occasion followed parallel trends in both groups. As the increase 
in the control group (+0.54 euros) was only slightly stronger than in the test group (+0.52 
euros), the difference among them was in fact minimal (-0.02 euros). Once again no impact 
of the program was detected, a conclusion borne out by the regression analysis. 
Figure 48 
Product C.1 - Expense per occasion 
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3.3 – Product C.2 
C.2 one of the oldest brands in the XXX’s portfolio and also one of the strongest. 
It is bought by more than one in every three households on any given quarter, and its 
market share reached an average of 61.82% in the control group during the period under 
analysis. The buying rate was however, only 2.13 euros in the control group, since this 
product is a low cost item bought on average twice in a quarter. 
Like many other XXX brands, C.2 has lately been suffering increasing competition 
from retailer’s own brands. As a consequence, it has lost penetration and market share. 
Table 13 
Product C.2 – Evolution of Behavioral Variables 
 Market share Penetration Buying rate 
(value) 
Purchase 
frequency 
Expense per 
occasion (value) 
 Test Control Test Control Test Control Test Control Test Control 
IV – 2000 41.87 70.16 33.0 35.3 1.85 1.93 2.1 2 0.88 0.97 
I – 2001 52.31 64.21 31.7 36.9 2.30 2.14 2.1 2 1.09 1.07 
II – 2001 50.94 61.64 26.7 35.5 2.48 2.05 2 1.9 1.24 1.08 
III – 2001 54.03 60.90 44.2 36.2 2.55 2.37 2 2.3 1.28 1.03 
IV – 2001 47.80 60.87 32.5 37.3 3.00 2.29 2.6 2.1 1.15 1.09 
I – 2002 59.13 61.40 30.7 33.3 2.34 2.18 2.1 2.1 1.12 1.04 
II – 2002 68.92 58.73 38.5 33.3 2.14 2.03 2.1 2 1.02 1.01 
III – 2002 66.77 58.11 37.4 32.0 2.10 2.01 2.2 2 0.96 1.01 
IV – 2002 68.75 62.57 35.0 33.2 3.01 2.12 2.4 2 1.25 1.06 
I – 2003 50.28 59.56 33.5 29.8 2.09 2.15 2.1 2.1 0.99 1.02 
Average 56.08 61.82 34.32 34.28 2.39 2.13 2.17 2.05 1.10 1.04 
Standard 
deviation 9.42 3.44 4.82 2.37 0.38 0.13 0.19 0.11 0.14 0.04 
% sd 16.79 5.56 14.03 6.91 16.11 6.22 8.70 5.27 12.34 3.69 
Source: Author. 
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Market share 
The trend toward a declining market share in the control group seems to have been 
effectively countered by the program, since a clear improvement is apparent in the test 
group. In fact the market share decreased in the control group by –7.12 percent points 
while at the same time increasing by +17.78 percent points in the test group. The relatively 
significant correlation coefficients make us more confident in these results. We thus found 
a strong gain of +24.90 percent points in the test group over the control group, translating 
into a relative growth of +44.40% when we take as a reference the average of the period in 
the test group. 
The regression analysis launches does not confirm this idea. Although the F statistic 
is significant, the t statistics associated to both variables are not. This is possibly a result of 
the sudden fall of market share in the test group during the last quarter under 
consideration, a factor that was in itself strong enough to disturb the fit of the equation to 
the data. 
Figure 49 
Product C.2 - Market Share 
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Penetration rate 
The penetration rate started lower in the test group than in the control group but 
finished higher. This inversion signals a positive trend in the former that contrasts with a 
negative one in the latter. The penetration rate in fact decreased by –5.76 percent points in 
the control group while increasing in the same period by +3.39 percent points in the test 
group. The net gain of the test group over the control group reached +9.15 percent points, 
signaling a growth of +26.66% relative to the average penetration of the period in the test 
group. At first sight, he program thus seems to have strongly impacted the penetration 
among the exposed customers. However, as a consequence of the irregular component of 
the available data, the regression analysis does not support this hypothesis. 
Figure 50 
Product C.2 - Penetration Rate 
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Buying rate 
The buying rate shows no definite trend in the control group. Besides the 
correlation coefficient being extremely low, the slope of the fitted equation indicates that 
the increase in the buying rate has not exceeded +0.02 euros. The correlation coefficient is 
also very low in the test group, but the increase in the buying rate might have been +0.18 
euros. The gain if the test group over the control group is therefore estimated at +0.16 
euros. This appears to have translated into a growth of 6.69% over the average value of the 
period. 
After fitting our chosen equation to the data, however, we found no proof of any 
impact of the program on the buying rate. 
Figure 51 
Product C.2 - Buying Rate 
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Purchase frequency 
Once again we find very low correlation coefficients in both groups. The purchase 
frequency appears steady in the control group, since it increased by a mere +0.03 occasions 
per quarter. On the other hand, it progressed somewhat (+0.16) in the control group. The 
net gain of the test group over the control group appears to have equaled +0.13 occasions, 
that is, 6.0% more than the average of the period. But this conclusion is not supported by 
the regression analysis. 
Figure 52 
Product C.2 - Purchase Frequency 
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Expense per occasion 
Extremely low correlation coefficients and nearly zero slopes of the trend equations 
confirm that the expense per occasion remained stationary in both groups in spite of some 
random variation in the observed data. We can conclude that the program was ineffective 
regarding the expense per occasion, something that the regression analysis confirmed.  
Figure 53 
Product C.2 - Expense per occasion 
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3.4 – Product C.3 
C.3 and C.4 are two different products sold under the same brand. C.3 is the less 
important of them. Absolute penetration is very low (on average 5.79% in the control 
group), and so is market share (12.45% in the same group). It is also an infrequently bought 
and low-priced item. As a consequence, the buying rate is on average a mere 2.63 euros per 
quarter. The combination of low penetration and infrequent purchase made it impossible 
to obtain trustworthy estimates of purchase frequency and expense per occasion on six 
different quarters. 
Table 14 
Product C.3 – Evolution of Behavioral Variables 
 Market share Penetration Buying rate 
(value) 
Purchase 
frequency 
Expense per 
occasion (value) 
 Test Control Test Control Test Control Test Control Test Control 
IV – 2000 36.17 11.21 10.5 4.8 5.02 2.27 1.8 1.6 2.79 1.42 
I – 2001 24.14 11.87 13.0 7.4 2.58 1.97 1.5 1.3 1.72 1.52 
II – 2001 30.87 13.47 9.1 6.9 4.41 2.31 na 1.6 na 1.44 
III – 2001 28.05 15.53 13.7 8.3 4.28 2.64 na 1.8 na 1.47 
IV – 2001 30.46 12.31 15.3 7.4 4.06 2.33 na 1.5 na 1.56 
I – 2002 5.86 13.08 4.5 5.6 1.58 2.77 na 1.7 na 1.63 
II – 2002 7.08 12.11 5.6 4.5 1.51 3.09 1.1 1.9 1.37 1.63 
III – 2002 7.12 12.21 5.5 4.4 1.52 3.08 1.2 1.8 1.27 1.71 
IV – 2002 13.64 11.85 9.0 4.1 2.32 3.24 na 1.7 na 1.91 
I – 2003 5.27 10.84 4.0 4.5 1.83 2.59 na 1.5 na 1.73 
Average 18.86 12.45 9.02 5.79 2.91 2.63 na 1.64 na 1.60 
Standard 
deviation 12.24 1.33 4.07 1.56 1.38 0.42 na 0.18 na 0.15 
% sd 64.88 10.69 45.12 26.91 47.41 15.83 na 10.83 na 9.50 
Source: TNS. 
 315 
Market share 
Market share has fallen somewhat in the control group (-1.05 percent points), 
although the very low correlation coefficient raises suspicions on the reality of the fitted 
trend. As to the test group, we can see that the market share started above the control, but 
ended clearly below. There was apparently a strong decrease of –30.43 percent points 
during the period. The loss of the test group relative to the control group reached –29.38 
percent points, a change whose magnitude is best understood by comparing it with the 
average market share of just 18.86% in the test group. It is very difficult to understand 
what might be the explanation for such a strong variation, except as a sampling error 
caused by its very small size. In fact, in some quarters only 4 or 5 consumer households 
represented in the test group bought C.3. 
The regression analysis confirms that the time variable had a negative impact on 
market share, but not that the program was in any way responsible for its downward trend. 
Figure 54 
Product C.3 - Market share 
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Penetration rate 
There is a fall in the penetration rate in both groups. However, this fall is relatively 
moderate in the control group (-2.81 percent points) and abrupt in the test group (-7.61 
percent points). The combined effect of those trends meant that the net loss of the test 
group over the control group appears to have reached –4.80 percent points. The 
correlation coefficients would seem to give some credence to this estimate, but then the 
regression analysis does not confirm this. 
Figure 55 
Product C.3 - Penetration Rate 
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Buying rate 
The buying rate increased steadily in the control group by +0.95 euros during the 
period under analysis. We find an opposite trend in the test group, since the buying rate 
decreased consistently by –3.04 euros. The net loss of the test group when compared to the 
control group was therefore –3.99 euros, a very significant change since the average buying 
rate in the test group during the period was just 2.91 euros. If we are to believe in the data, 
this means that loyalty actually decreased in the exposed group as a consequence of its 
participation in the XXX’s relationship program. 
The regression analysis shows a significant F statistic and also a significant t test 
statistic associated to the time variable. But the negative trend cannot be attributed to the 
program, since the coefficient associated to the dummy variable is not significantly 
different from zero. 
Figure 56 
Product C.3 - Buying Rate 
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3.5 – Product C.4 
C.4 is one of the strongest products in the XXX portfolio. Penetration and market 
share both tend to grow as a consequence of favorable trends in its marketing 
environment. We can see that on average the absolute penetration was 26.02% while the 
buying rate stood at 4.68 euros per quarter. 
Table 15 
Product C.4 – Evolution of Behavioral Variables 
 Market share Penetration Buying rate 
(value) 
Purchase 
frequency 
Expense per 
occasion (value) 
 Test Control Test Control Test Control Test Control Test Control 
IV – 2000 11.71 15.67 18.9 24.5 4.03 3.35 2.6 2.3 1.55 1.46 
I – 2001 18.63 16.02 24.7 25.8 5.31 3.78 2.7 2.3 1.97 1.64 
II – 2001 16.99 18.49 24.3 25.5 3.79 4.24 2.2 2.3 1.72 1.84 
III – 2001 17.56 18.00 30.0 26.4 4.62 4.99 2.3 2.8 2.01 1.78 
IV – 2001 25.60 18.57 26.7 24.4 7.20 4.61 3.1 2.5 2.32 1.84 
I – 2002 22.45 22.47 27.3 26.8 5.29 4.74 2.5 2.4 2.12 1.98 
II – 2002 22.99 23.11 33.9 26.2 4.34 5.20 2.2 2.6 1.97 2.00 
III – 2002 22.58 22.96 33.4 25.5 4.41 5.22 2.3 2.6 1.92 2.01 
IV – 2002 24.23 23.80 32.2 26.1 5.35 5.31 2.2 2.4 2.43 2.21 
I – 2003 22.71 25.13 27.1 29.0 5.26 5.38 2.3 2.4 2.29 2.24 
Average 11.71 15.67 27.85 26.02 4.96 4.68 2.44 2.46 2.03 1.90 
Standard 
deviation 11.71 15.67 4.66 1.30 0.97 0.69 0.29 0.16 0.27 0.24 
% sd 11.71 15.67 16.75 4.99 19.65 14.83 11.94 6.69 13.40 12.72 
Source: TNS. 
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Market share 
The market share increased steadily and in parallel in both groups. It grew by +9.89 
percent points in the control group and by +9.78 percent points in the test group. There 
was therefore no significant overall difference between the buying behavior of the exposed 
and the non-exposed consumers. The program had no visible impact at this level, a 
conclusion that the regression analysis confirmed. 
Figure 57 
Product C.4 - Market Share 
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Penetration rate 
The penetration rate moved upwards in both groups, but much more strongly in 
the test group, as can be seen in the Graphic below. In the control group it improved by 
just +2.42 percent points, while in the test group it progressed by as much as +10.04 
percent points. The new gain of the latter over the former thus amounted to +7.62, a 
change of +27.36% over the average of the period in the exposed group. Thus, although 
nothing happened at the market share level, the program seemed to improve the 
penetration rate among the participating customers. However, this hypothesis is not 
confirmed by the regression analysis. 
Figure 58 
Product C.4 - Penetration Rate 
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Buying rate 
The favorable evolution of the penetration rate in the test group was countered by 
a negative one regarding the buying rate. In fact, this time the test group grew much less 
(+0.64 euros) than the control group (+1.89 euros), which means that it lost in comparison 
–1.25 euros. Thus, the program would seem to have had a negative impact on this account, 
but the regression analysis does not confirm it. 
Figure 59 
Product C.4 - Buying Rate 
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Purchase frequency 
The decrease in the buying rate was caused by a fall in the purchase frequency. The 
data show that, while it increased by +0.13 buying occasions per quarter in the control 
group, it decreased by –0.36 occasions in the test group. The net effect apparently was a 
decline of –0.49 occasions when the test group compared with the control group. The 
regression analysis, however does not confirm this. 
Figure 60 
Product C.4 - Purchase Frequency 
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Expense per occasion 
Both groups showed a similar trend regarding the expense per occasion, even if the 
test group grew slightly less. Thus, we see the control group growing by +0.69 euros and 
the test group growing by +0.57 euros, a difference of just –0.12 euros between one and 
the other. The program did not a have a significant impact on this account, a conclusion 
that the regression analysis supports. 
Figure 61 
Product C.4 - Expense per Occasion 
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3.6 – Product C.5 
C.5 is mainly consumed out of home, a segment of the demand not covered by the 
consumer panel data, which registers only goods bought in all kinds of retail shops for 
consumption a home. 
Average absolute penetration stayed at around 20% during the period. The market 
share fluctuated widely around the average 9.23% in the control group. The brand was 
purchased 2.38 times in each given quarter and the average expense per occasion was 2.41 
euros, generating a buying rate of 5.73 euros. 
Table 16 
Product C.5 – Evolution of Behavioral Variables 
 Market share Penetration Buying rate 
(value) 
Purchase 
frequency 
Expense per 
occasion (value) 
 Test Control Test Control Test Control Test Control Test Control 
IV – 2000 7.07 10.47 22.6 24.2 5.52 5.78 2.4 2.4 2.30 2.41 
I – 2001 9.84 6.53 15.5 16.2 8.83 4.78 3.6 2.1 2.45 2.28 
II – 2001 12.03 9.43 31.5 24.0 5.30 5.40 2.2 2.3 2.41 2.35 
III – 2001 9.09 11.06 37.6 29.2 5.07 7.06 2.1 2.6 2.41 2.71 
IV – 2001 7.40 8.36 14.9 21.0 7.53 4.93 2.6 2.2 2.90 2.24 
I – 2002 9.07 8.44 13.2 16.6 9.46 6.22 2.6 2.6 3.64 2.39 
II – 2002 10.68 10.15 19.0 24.0 8.96 5.69 2.1 2.5 4.27 2.28 
III – 2002 9.92 10.20 18.6 23.3 9.01 5.61 2.1 2.5 4.29 2.24 
IV – 2002 5.62 9.96 15.4 20.5 5.45 6.06 1.5 2.4 3.63 2.53 
I – 2003 4.89 7.69 13.6 15.2 4.66 5.82 1.4 2.2 3.33 2.64 
Average 8.56 9.23 20.19 21.42 6.98 5.73 2.26 2.38 3.16 2.41 
Standard 
deviation 2.26 1.42 8.21 4.41 1.95 0.65 0.62 0.18 0.78 0.17 
% sd 26.45 15.44 40.64 20.60 27.95 11.31 27.37 7.36 24.52 7.01 
Source: TNS. 
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Market share 
The evolution of the market share in the control group appears very irregular. For 
this reason, the correlation coefficient associated with the essentially flat linear trend is 
practically nil. On the contrary, the market share declined by –2.90 percent points in the 
test group. The overall picture is rather but, interestingly, the regression analysis helps make 
things much clearer. The F statistic is significant, as well as both t statistics associated to 
the dummy variable and the time variable. Time had a negative impact on C.5’s market 
share in the test group, although the program in itself seems to have had a positive impact. 
Once again, it is not very easy to make sense from these results. 
Figure 62 
Product C.5 - Market Share 
y = -0,3227x + 10,338
R2 = 0,186
y = 0,0015x + 9,2217
R2 = 1E-05
4,00
5,00
6,00
7,00
8,00
9,00
10,00
11,00
12,00
13,00
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Test Control Linear (Test) Linear (Control)
Source: Author. 
 326 
Penetration rate 
The penetration rate fell in both groups, but more in the test group. The decline 
was –4.06 percent points in the control group and –11.11 percent points in the test group. 
As a result there was a net loss of –7.05 percent points when we compare the latter with 
the former. In proportion to the average penetration during the period, this would 
represent a very significant –34.92% fall, but the regression analysis does not confirm it. 
Figure 63 
Product C.5 - Penetration Rate 
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Buying rate 
The buying rate did not change at all in the test group, but it did increase by +0.41 
euros in the control group. In relative terms, this would represent a loss of –5.87% in the 
test group relative to the period’s average. Once more, this was not borne out by our 
regression analysis. 
Figure 64 
Product C.5 - Buying Rate 
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Purchase frequency 
The purchase frequency remained practically unchanged in the control group, but 
declined by –1.32 purchase occasions in the test group, a relative fall of –58.42% when we 
take the average value of the period as a reference. The F-test was significant, and we also 
found that the regression coefficient associated to the time variable was negative and 
signficantly different from zero. 
Figure 65 
Product C.5 - Purchase Frequency 
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Expense per occasion 
Regarding the expense per occasion, the test group performed much better than the 
control group, something that reveals itself immediately through a visual inspection of the 
Graphic below. As we can see, in the control group the expense barely increased by +0.12 
euros, while it grew by +1.81 euros in the test group. The net gain of the test group thus 
reached +1.69 euros, in relative terms an improvement of +53.48% over the period’s 
average. Although the equation adjustment did not pass the F-test, there was definitely a 
positive effect of the time variable on the expense per occasion. No direct impact of the 
program was found. 
Figure 66 
Product C.5 - Expense per Occasion 
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3.7 – Product C.6 
After XXX sold a brand that competed in this category, until then the market 
leader in Portugal, C.6 took its place and started a steady ascent with the purpose of 
becoming number one. The market share in the control group averaged 35.44%, and the 
absolute penetration stood at 8.09%. This product in purchased rather infrequently (1.33 
occasions per quarter), and the expense per occasion is low (3.39 euros). The low 
penetration rates mean that in some quarters it was bought by no more than 13 households 
in the test group. The combination of the low sample with the low number of purchases 
precluded the estimation of the purchase frequency and the expense per occasion in two 
quarters of the period (first and fourth quarter of 2001). 
Table 17 
Product C.6 – Evolution of Behavioral Variables 
 Market share Penetration Buying rate 
(value) 
Purchase 
frequency 
Expense per 
occasion (value) 
 Test Control Test Control Test Control Test Control Test Control 
IV – 2000 26.89 22.42 10.0 5.2 1.60 4.31 1.3 1.4 1.23 3.08 
I – 2001 41.98 32.66 10.0 6.2 2.36 5.27 NS 1.2 na 4.39 
II – 2001 45.11 32.77 12.5 8.2 1.44 4.00 1 1.4 1.44 2.85 
III – 2001 61.99 31.76 24.2 10.4 2.94 3.05 2.2 1.4 1.34 2.18 
IV – 2001 35.56 37.03 6.7 7.9 1.27 4.69 NS 1.2 na 3.91 
I – 2002 34.90 43.22 9.5 8.8 1.67 4.91 1.6 1.2 1.05 4.09 
II – 2002 44.51 39.92 15.1 9.8 1.40 4.07 1.1 1.3 1.27 3.13 
III – 2002 40.40 42.47 14.8 10.0 1.42 4.25 1.1 1.4 1.29 3.03 
IV – 2002 30.30 34.80 8.1 6.3 2.06 5.52 1.3 1.4 1.59 3.95 
I – 2003 23.12 37.36 9.6 8.1 1.37 4.61 1.1 1.4 1.25 3.29 
Average 38.48 35.44 12.05 8.09 1.75 4.47 1.34 1.33 na 3.39 
Standard 
deviation 11.09 6.10 5.05 1.75 0.54 0.70 0.40 0.09 na 0.68 
% sd 28.83 17.20 41.94 21.64 30.73 15.77 29.62 7.13 na 19.93 
Source: TNS. 
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Market share 
The market share of the control group showed a very positive evolution of +12.47 
percent points. However, it went the opposite way in the test group, where it decreased by 
as much as –10.49 percent points. Thus the net loss of the test group when compared with 
the control group was –22.96 percent points, which should be compared with an average 
38.48% market share during the period. This means there was a –59.67% relative fall. 
According to the regression analysis performed on the data, this decrease is not attributable 
to the program itself. 
Figure 67 
Product C.6 - Market Share 
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Penetration rate 
We can see in the Figure below that growing penetration, which progressed by 
+1.90 percent points during the period, mainly drove the increase of market share in the 
control group. On the other hand, it declined by –1.63 percent points in the test group. It 
must however be noticed that the correlation coefficients are very low. The net loss in the 
test group was estimated to be –3.53 percent points, that is –29.29% of the average 
penetration rate doing the period. But the regression analysis did not identify any impact, 
whether positive or negative. 
Figure 68 
Product C.6 - Penetration Rate 
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Buying rate 
Once again, the test group shows a worse performance than the control group 
regarding the buying rate. In fact, the former declined by –0.45 euros while the latter 
improved by +0.48 euros. If the correlation coefficients were found to be significant, this 
would translate into a net loss of +0.93 euros in the test group relative to the control 
group. As it is, our conclusion is that no significant change could be detected either in the 
test or in the control group. The regression analysis pointed in the same direction. 
Figure 69 
Product C.6 - Buying Rate 
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3.8 – Product C.7 
C.7 is the best-selling brand in its category in the Portuguese market. We can see 
that the competition has not hurt it much, since C.7 not only commanded an average 
market share of 44.61% as managed to increase it even further. However the absolute 
penetration is so low that in the third quarter of 2001 only 2 persons in the sample 
representing the test group bought it. Since the brand is purchased rather infrequently (1.25 
times per quarter on average during the period) no estimates are available regarding 
purchase frequency and expense per occasion in the test group in four successive quarters. 
As can be seen in the Table 6.19 below, this is also a low priced item. 
Table 18 
Product C.7 – Evolution of Behavioral Variables 
 Market share Penetration Buying rate 
(value) 
Purchase 
frequency 
Expense per 
occasion (value) 
 Test Control Test Control Test Control Test Control Test Control 
IV – 2000 22.90 39.62 3.3 5.2 1.82 1.62 1.6 1.2 1.14 1.35 
I – 2001 35.20 47.40 5.2 7.7 1.34 1.52 na 1.2 na 1.27 
II – 2001 19.92 42.69 5.5 6.1 1.01 1.80 na 1.2 na 1.50 
III – 2001 5.64 49.69 0.9 7.0 2.48 2.32 na 1.5 na 1.54 
IV – 2001 19.58 41.86 6.3 5.9 1.27 1.63 na 1.3 na 1.25 
I – 2002 56.59 48.60 6.5 7.7 1.66 1.55 1.3 1.2 1.28 1.30 
II – 2002 60.78 43.13 10.7 7.9 1.72 1.56 1.1 1.2 1.56 1.30 
III – 2002 60.25 43.38 12.5 7.4 1.75 1.56 1.1 1.2 1.59 1.30 
IV – 2002 49.15 42.27 11.0 6.2 1.41 1.38 1.1 1.2 1.28 1.15 
I – 2003 56.18 47.48 8.6 6.6 1.87 1.77 1.4 1.3 1.34 1.36 
Average 38.62 44.61 7.05 6.77 1.63 1.67 na 1.25 na 1.33 
Standard 
deviation 20.44 3.38 3.65 0.91 0.41 0.26 na 0.10 na 0.12 
% sd 52.92 7.59 51.71 13.47 24.94 15.38 na 7.77 na 8.74 
Source: TNS. 
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Market share 
The market share grew in the control group (+1.38 percent points), and even more 
so in the test group (+4.37 percent points). The correlation coefficient is very low in the 
control group, but not in the test group. The net gain of the test group over the control 
group amounted to +2.99 percent points, an increase of +7.74% over the average market 
share in the test group in the period under analysis. The F-test shows that the regression is 
meaningful, but the positive variation of the market share must be attributed to the time 
variable. The t-statistics associated to the dummy variable is too low; therefore the program 
seems to have had no significant impact on the brand’s market share. 
Figure 70 
Product C.7 - Market Share 
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Penetration rate 
The penetration rate rose in both groups, but specially in the test group. In fact, the 
growth was very moderated (+0.71 percent points) in the control group, and explosive 
(+8.34 percent points) in the test group. Besides, the correlation coefficient is much more 
meaningful in the test group than in the control group. The net gain of the penetration rate 
in the test group over the control group reached +9.05 percent points. In relative terms, 
this represents a growth of +107.06% relative to the average penetration in the period. 
Once again, the regression analysis shows that this variation cannot be attributed to the 
program. In fact, the F-test is significant, but the t-statistic associated to the dummy 
variable is not. Therefore, although the improvement of the penetration rate is correlated 
with the time variable, it bears no relation to the relationship program itself. 
Figure 71 
Product C.7 - Penetration Rate 
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Buying rate 
The linear trend of the buying rate appears essentially flat in both groups. Given the 
extraordinarily low correlation coefficients, we conclude that there were no changes during 
the period either in the test or in the control group. The regression analysis confirms this. 
Figure 72 
Product C.7 - Buying Rate 
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4 – DIVISION D 
4.1. – D general 
D is the only division of XXX serving markets that on the whole are not stationary. 
On the contrary, most of its products and brands have been growing very fast, as they have 
the potential to simultaneously penetrate more households and increase the average buying 
rate per consuming household. There is however a very clear tendency to a strong and 
continuous loss of market share of Division D during this period, following closely the 
decline of the relative penetration of its brands. These products have relatively high prices 
in comparison to other divisions. For this reason, the average expense per purchase 
occasion for the whole period was 9.26 euros in the control group. On the other hand, 
these are not very frequently purchased items, as they were only bought on average 2.34 
times in each quarter. 
Table 19 
Division D – Evolution of Behavioral Variables 
 Market share Penetration Buying rate     
(value) 
Purchase frequency Expense per 
occasion (value) 
 
Test Control Test Control Test Control Test Control Test Control 
IV – 2000 25.84 27.34 58.2 49.8 11.4 10.3 2.9 2.4 3.91 4.27 
I – 2001 21.51 19.84 41.8 36.3 14.9 11.5 2.5 2.5 5.97 4.61 
II – 2001 32.94 19.63 45.9 35.9 24.2 14.8 2.3 2.4 10.53 6.15 
III – 2001 18.99 17.60 44.8 36.0 22.5 29.1 2.8 2.6 8.05 11.19 
IV – 2001 15.12 17.01 39.2 33.5 16.8 24.5 2.4 2.2 6.99 11.15 
I – 2002 24.50 17.76 31.5 30.1 25.5 26.4 2.7 2.3 9.45 11.47 
II – 2002 19.39 18.60 32.7 30.9 17.5 26.4 2.5 2.3 7.00 11.48 
III – 2002 20.24 18.35 34.9 29.9 28.4 15.4 2.6 2.3 10.92 6.70 
IV – 2002 23.36 13.55 42.8 28.8 14.4 28.1 2 2.2 7.20 12.78 
I – 2003 23.17 18.38 36.8 27.8 20.0 28.2 2.5 2.2 8.00 12.80 
Average 22.51 18.81 40.86 33.90 19.57 21.46 2.52 2.34 7.80 9.26 
Standard 
deviation 4.81 3.47 7.85 6.41 5.50 7.54 0.26 0.13 2.11 3.41 
% sd 21.35 18.45 19.22 18.91 28.09 35.11 10.21 5.77 27.06 36.83 
Source: TNS. 
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Market share 
D’s market share has being falling at a fast pace in the last years, as can be seen in 
the control group, where a dramatic reduction of -6.94 percent points was found in a short 
time period of two years and a half. This declined in market share was concentrated in the 
first year, after which it tended to stabilize. Market share also decreased in the test group (-
3.49 percent points), but half as slowly as in the control group. At first sight, this appears to 
suggest the relationship program had an overall positive effect, as the market share in the 
test group grew by +3.45 percent points when compared with the control group. However, 
the regression analysis does not uphold this conclusion. 
Figure 73 
Division D - Market Share 
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Penetration rate 
The penetration rate followed parallel and strongly declining trends in both the 
control and the test group. The fall of penetration in the control group was -16.29 percent 
points, while in the test group it mounted to a barely smaller negative change of –15.52 
percent points. As the regression analysis confirms, the program had no measurable impact 
on the division’s penetration. 
Figure 74 
Division D - Penetration Rate 
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Buying rate 
The buying rate per household has increased significantly, reflecting the fact that 
most product categories served by D are still at an early stage of its life cycle. In the control 
group, it increased by 14.95 euros during period, three times as much as in the test group, 
where the corresponding increase did not exceed 4.83 euros. Thus, overall, no loyalty effect 
is apparent in the available data on the behavior of the customers recruited to participate in 
XXX’s relationship marketing program, an impression that was confirmed by the 
regression analysis. 
Figure 75 
Division D - Buying Rate (value) 
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Purchase frequency 
Once again, purchase frequency rates followed very similar and declining trends in 
both the control and the test group. The purchase frequency decreased by –0.28 purchase 
occasions per quarter in the control group and –0.34 purchase occasions per quarter in the 
test group. After performing the regression analysis, it becomes clearer that the program 
had no impact on this account. 
Figure 76 
Division D - Purchase Frequency 
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Purchase per occasion 
The purchase per occasion increased on both groups, but significantly more so in 
the control group. In the control group the value purchase per occasion improved by 7.52 
euros, while in the test group the gain stood at 2.54 euros. We conclude therefore that the 
customers participating in the program performed poorly than those not participating in it, 
a result that is hard to understand. However, the regression analysis shows that we have no 
grounds to attribute the change to the program. 
Figure 77 
Division D - Purchase per occasion (value) 
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4.2 – Product D.1 
D.1 is not a market leader, since its share stood on average only at 14.41% during 
the period while the absolute penetration rate was 12.37%. This category is still in its 
growth stage, inducing a continuing increase in the buying rate, which reached 8.58 euros. 
The product was bought rather infrequently, on average just 1.68 times in a quarter. For 
that reason, it was impossible to get an estimate of the purchase frequency and the expense 
per occasion in the fourth quarter of 2001. 
Table 20 
Product D.1 – Evolution of Behavioral Variables 
 Market share Penetration Buying rate 
(share) 
Purchase 
frequency 
Expense per 
occasion (value) 
 Test Control Test Control Test Control Test Control Test Control 
IV – 2000 11.19 7.56 13.8 7.2 7.41 6.11 1.4 1.4 5.30 4.37 
I – 2001 17.10 14.32 14.7 12.5 12.29 8.39 1.8 1.5 6.83 5.59 
II – 2001 25.88 15.58 12.5 11.2 16.30 9.14 1.4 1.7 11.64 5.38 
III – 2001 7.89 10.82 13.8 11.3 8.08 8.87 1.5 1.9 5.39 4.67 
IV – 2001 6.71 10.93 13.2 12.8 6.42 7.34 na 1.6 na 4.59 
I – 2002 19.58 14.87 12.9 13.8 10.49 8.49 1.9 1.6 5.52 5.31 
II – 2002 16.99 17.90 16.2 13.2 7.71 8.81 1.6 1.7 4.82 5.18 
III – 2002 17.95 18.28 18.3 13.4 7.60 8.82 1.6 1.7 4.75 5.19 
IV – 2002 17.70 10.04 12.9 11.4 11.71 7.84 1.9 1.7 6.16 4.61 
I – 2003 19.52 16.91 16.0 11.7 10.84 9.53 2.1 1.7 5.16 5.60 
Average 16.05 14.41 14.50 12.37 10.16 8.58 na 1.68 na 5.11 
Standard 
deviation 5.84 3.15 1.97 0.99 3.08 0.66 na 0.11 na 6.08 
% sd 36.39 21.83 13.56 8.04 30.33 7.74 na 6.51 na 1.19 
Source: TNS. 
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Market share 
The market share showed a parallel upward trend in both groups. It increased by 
+5.07 percent points in the control group and somewhat less (+4.35 percent points) in the 
test group. The correlation coefficient of the trend equation is however insignificant in the 
test group owing to the variation of the quarterly data. Overall, no significant change in 
market share emerged as a result of the program. The regression analysis confirms this 
conclusion. 
Figure 78 
Product D.1 - Market Share 
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Penetration rate 
Regarding penetration, there is a much more clear trend in the test group than the 
one found when we analyzed the evolution of the market share. We see that, once again, 
both groups followed a similar positive trend. Likewise, the increase was also stronger in 
the control group (+2.75 percent points) than in the test group (+2.35 percent points). So 
there might have been a net loss of –0.40 percent points in the test group relative to the 
control group. The regression analysis attributes this negative variation entirely to the 
dummy variable, that is, to the program itself, a conclusion that it is hard to account for. 
Figure 79 
Product D.1 - Penetration Rate 
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Buying rate 
As previously indicated, the buying rate tended to grow in the control group, but 
not in the test group. Thus we find an increase of +1.43 euros in the former and a decrease 
of –0.75 euros. Note, however, that the correlation coefficient is practically zero in the test 
group. The net loss of the test group in comparison with the control group reached –2.18 
euros. Relative to the average of the period, this is a fall of 21.46%. However, the 
coefficients of the regression analysis performed on the data are not significant, which 
means that the program had no impact, whether positive or negative. 
Figure 80 
Product D.1 - Buying Rate 
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4.3 – Product D.2 
D.2 commands a 19.81% market share and a 7.16% absolute penetration rate in the 
control group. The position of the brand has been deteriorating at a very fast rate, as can 
be seen by inspecting the data in the Table below. The purchasing rate is very low, a mere 
1.37 occasions per quarter on average during the period. For this reason, the number of 
purchase occasions in the fourth quarter of 2001 was low to allow reliable estimates of the 
purchase frequency and the expense per occasion. 
Table 21 
Product D.2 – Evolution of Behavioral Variables 
 Market share Penetration Buying rate 
(value) 
Purchase 
frequency 
Expense per 
occasion (value) 
 Test Control Test Control Test Control Test Control Test Control 
IV – 2000 22.04 27.10 11.9 8.4 3.56 5.26 1.1 1.4 3.24 3.76 
I – 2001 21.56 20.73 10.6 8.7 5.19 4.68 1.4 1.4 3.71 3.34 
II – 2001 47.97 19.42 18.0 8.2 9.62 5.14 1.7 1.3 5.66 3.96 
III – 2001 38.52 21.79 20.6 9.5 7.73 6.00 2.3 1.4 3.36 4.28 
IV – 2001 35.87 20.53 12.3 6.5 8.40 5.24 na 1.3 na 4.03 
I – 2002 24.83 22.76 9.7 5.6 5.64 7.02 1.8 1.7 3.13 4.13 
II – 2002 17.27 18.97 7.9 7.3 4.78 4.30 1.6 1.3 2.99 3.31 
III – 2002 16.84 19.86 8.4 7.7 4.87 4.28 1.6 1.3 3.04 3.29 
IV – 2002 17.99 13.49 9.0 5.1 4.63 4.64 1.5 1.3 3.09 3.57 
I – 2003 20.51 13.45 8.2 4.6 5.99 4.79 2.1 1.3 2.85 3.68 
Average 26.34 19.81 11.66 7.16 6.04 5.14 na 1.37 na 3.75 
Standard 
deviation 10.68 4.06 4.34 1.65 1.92 0.84 na 0.13 na 6.69 
% sd 40.56 20.50 37.20 23.02 31.78 16.31 na 9.14 na 1.79 
Source: TNS. 
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Market share 
The market share decreased very clearly in both groups. In the control group, it 
declined by –9.68 percent points. In the test group, the declining trend was even steeper, 
implying a fall of –14.68 percent points. The net loss of market share in the test group 
relative to the control group thus reached –5.00 percent points. As a proportion of the 
average market share of the period, this means a fall of –18.98%. Therefore, no positive 
overall impact of the program on the market share of D.2 in this category was identified, a 
conclusion that the regression analysis confirmed. 
Figure 81 
Product D.2 - Market Share 
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Penetration rate 
The decline of the penetration rate in both groups is apparent through a simple 
visual inspection of Figure 6.87. This decline was even stronger in the test group (-7.27 
percent points) than in the control group (-3.79 percent points). The net loss of the test 
group relative to the control group would then have reached –3.48, a fall of –29.85% as a 
proportion of the average of the period. However, the regression analysis does not confirm 
this. 
Figure 82 
Product D.2 - Penetration Rate 
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Buying rate 
The buying rate shows declining rates in both groups, although the correlation 
coefficients are practically zero. Therefore the impact of the program on this behavior 
variable seems to have either negative or non-existing. The coefficients estimated by the 
regression analysis are all non significant, which means that the program had no impact on 
the buying rate. 
Figure 83 
Product D.2 - Buying Rate 
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4.4 – Product D.3 
D.3 commands a large market share in the category (31.13% on average), although 
its absolute penetration rate is still very small (3.39% on average). D.3’s position in this 
market appears essentially stable, although its buying rate tended to fall. The combination 
of a very low penetration rate (in some quarters, only 6 members of the sample 
representing the test group bought the brand) with a low purchase frequency prevented 
adequate estimates of the purchase frequency and of the expense per occasion in all 
quarters of the period. 
Table 22 
Product D.3 – Evolution of Behavioral Variables  
 Market share Penetration Buying rate 
(value) 
Purchase 
frequency 
Expense per 
occasion (value) 
 Test Control Test Control Test Control Test Control Test Control 
IV – 2000 37.64 47.25 4.6 5.7 9.37 9.04 3.1 1.8 3.02 5.02 
I – 2001 34.88 18.61 3.9 2.1 13.27 7.70 na 2.1 na 3.66 
II – 2001 32.68 29.00 3.8 1.5 6.36 17.33 na 2.5 na 6.93 
III – 2001 38.30 28.82 3.0 3.5 10.21 7.17 na 1.5 na 4.78 
IV – 2001 27.83 32.62 3.3 3.7 5.69 5.32 na 1.4 na 3.80 
I – 2002 28.45 30.49 3.3 3.7 7.83 6.35 na 1.4 na 4.53 
II – 2002 39.48 25.29 2.8 2.7 7.51 5.66 na 1.5 na 3.78 
III – 2002 48.84 27.55 3.4 2.8 8.25 5.89 na 1.4 na 4.21 
IV – 2002 43.26 37.19 6.5 4.2 4.97 5.52 na 1.3 na 4.25 
I – 2003 59.15 34.44 8.8 4.0 9.78 6.34 na 1.4 na 4.53 
Average 39.05 31.13 4.34 3.39 8.32 7.63 na 1.63 na 4.68 
Standard 
deviation 9.53 7.63 1.90 1.18 2.45 3.59 na 0.39 na 9.24 
% sd 24.39 24.51 43.67 34.94 29.48 47.08 na 23.86 na 1.97 
Source: TNS. 
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Market share 
The market share remained basically unchanged in the control group, but increased 
significantly in the test group. In fact, the data show a mere increase of +0.28 percent 
points that compares with a steep improvement of +18.39 percent points in the test group. 
Thus, we found a net gain of +18.11 percent points in the test group over the control 
group. In relative terms, this is an increase of +46.38% taking as a reference the average of 
the period. We would therefore tend to conclude based on this information that the 
program appears to have had a very positive impact on this category, but the fact is that the 
regression analysis suggests otherwise, since the F and t-tests showed that the coefficients 
associated to the variables are not significantly different from zero. 
Figure 84 
Product D.3 - Market Share 
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Source: Author. 
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Penetration rate 
The previously noted gain of market share in the test group was mainly caused by 
an improvement in penetration. This behavioral variable improved in both groups. 
However, the growth in the control group was very small (+0.19 percent points) and the 
correlation coefficient associated to the equation trend is insignificant, while the increase in 
the test group was large (+2.91 percent points) and the correlation coefficient is clearly 
higher. The gain of the test group over the control group reached in this case +2.72 
percent points. This translates into an increase of +62.67% relative to the average of the 
period, but the fact is that the regression analysis found no significant coefficients attached 
to both explanatory variables under consideration. 
Figure 85 
Product D.3 - Penetration Rate 
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Buying rate 
The buying rate decreased in both groups, but less so in the test group. We thus 
found a decline of –5.46 euros in the control group and –2.78 euros in the test group. This 
means that the test group in fact performed better than the control group, and that this 
translated into a gain of +2.68 euros. Relative to the average of the group, this variable 
would have improved +32.21%. Once again, however, the regression analysis does not 
confirm the existence of any kind of impact of the regression on the brand’s buying rate. 
Figure 86 
Product D.3 - Buying Rate 
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4.5 – Product D.4 
D.4 is the best-selling product of the brand under which name it is marketed. Its 
absolute penetration rate reached on average 15.98% in the control group and the brand 
commended a 30.24% market share. The brand was bought 1.87 times a quarter, and given 
that the expense per occasion was a mere 2.24 euros, the buying rate did not exceed 4.20 
euros per quarter. The share of D.4 appears stationary, but beneath its surface we find 
contradictory movements, since penetration decreases while the buying rate simultaneously 
increases. 
Table 23 
Product D.4 – Evolution of Behavioral Variables 
 Market share Penetration Buying rate 
(value) 
Purchase 
frequency 
Expense per 
occasion (value) 
 Test Control Test Control Test Control Test Control Test Control 
IV – 2000 39.97 24.65 25.0 16.5 4.18 2.76 2.1 1.5 1.99 1.84 
I – 2001 31.92 34.01 20.1 19.7 4.43 4.68 2.2 2.2 2.01 2.13 
II – 2001 37.12 30.80 26.7 20.3 4.28 3.94 1.7 1.9 2.52 2.08 
III – 2001 34.32 29.74 21.1 18.3 3.62 4.09 2.3 2 1.58 2.04 
IV – 2001 32.92 30.72 20.9 16.0 3.90 3.97 2 1.9 1.95 2.09 
I – 2002 36.85 29.78 14.9 13.8 5.63 4.15 2.4 1.8 2.35 2.30 
II – 2002 34.46 30.45 17.9 14.3 3.55 4.10 2.2 1.8 1.61 2.28 
III – 2002 35.32 31.21 19.1 14.1 3.45 4.30 2.2 1.9 1.57 2.26 
IV – 2002 38.94 29.56 21.7 14.3 4.52 4.12 1.7 1.8 2.66 2.29 
I – 2003 35.67 31.44 16.6 12.5 4.69 5.92 1.9 1.9 2.47 3.12 
Average 35.75 30.24 20.40 15.98 4.23 4.20 2.07 1.87 2.07 2.24 
Standard 
deviation 2.53 2.34 3.59 2.67 0.65 0.78 0.24 0.18 0.41 0.34 
% sd 7.08 7.74 17.60 16.71 15.48 18.51 11.62 9.45 19.82 15.19 
Source: TNS. 
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Market share 
The slopes of the equations indicate that the market share might have increased by 
+1.81 percent points in the control group, and a bit less (+0.32 percent points) in the test 
group. This would imply a relative fall of –1.49 percent points in the test group when 
compared to the control group, a decline of –4.17% as a proportion of the period average. 
However, the correlation coefficients are very low on both the control and the test groups, 
suggesting that not much changed during the period as a consequence of the program. 
Nevertheless, no doubt as a consequence of the very low value of the market share of the 
control group in the zero period, the regression identifies a negative impact of the program 
on the brand’s market share. 
Figure 87 
Product D.4 - Market Share 
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Penetration rate 
The penetration rate fell simultaneously and in parallel in both groups. The decline 
amounted to –6.49 percent points in the control group and –6.44 percent points, practically 
the same, in the test group. Once again, the anomalous value of the control group in the 
period zero caused a negative and significant coefficient associated to the dummy variable, 
something that would lead us to conclude that the program was responsible for a fall of the 
brand’s penetration rate. 
Figure 88 
Product D.4 - Penetration Rate 
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Buying rate 
The first and the last observations in the control group clearly stand out from the 
rest. The first one is much lower than the average while the last one is much higher. As a 
consequence, the trend equation is tilted upwards, showing an increase of +1.45 euros in 
the buying rate in the period. On the contrary, the test group remains stationary, as 
suggested by the very low correlation coefficient and the nearly zero equation slope, 
according to which the increase could at most have been +0.14 euros. Thus the net loss in 
the test group relative to the control group stood at –1.31 euros, showing a decline in the 
synthetic loyalty indicator. However, the coefficients estimated by the regression analysis 
are not significantly different from zero. 
Figure 89 
Product D.4 - Buying Rate 
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Purchase frequency 
The purchase frequency showed no definite trend either in the control or the test 
group. In the control group it started very low, then moved suddenly up and afterwards 
started a slow down movement. In the test group the data appear very irregular and do not 
seem to move up or down. We find therefore that the purchase frequency remained 
unaffected by the program, a conclusion that the regression analysis bears out. 
Figure 90 
Product D.4 - Purchase Frequency 
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Expense per occasion 
The expense per occasion increased in the control group by a total of +0.79 euros, 
but most of this variation was concentrated in the observed quarter. In the test group the 
data appear very irregular, but the expense per occasion also seem to move up in the last 
two quarters. As a occasion, the slope of the equation suggests an increase, although 
minimal, of +0.25 euros in the quarter. Confronting both groups, we see a net decline –
0.54 euros in the test group relative to the control group. As a consequence, no positive 
effect of the program was found regarding the expense per occasion. Once again, the 
regression analysis supports this finding. 
Figure 91 
Product D.4 - Expense per Occasion 
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4.6 – Product D.5 
This product category is still at a growing stage: absolute penetration is low (7.90 % 
on average) and the buying rate tends to increase. D.5 holds a strong position in this 
market, which translates into a 35.87% share. This product category is on average bought 
very infrequently, no more than 1.54 occasions per quarter. For this reason, it was 
impossible to obtain an estimate of the purchase frequency and the expense per occasion in 
the fourth quarter of 2001. 
Table 24 
Product D.5 – Evolution of Behavioral Variables 
 Market share Penetration Buying rate 
(value) 
Purchase 
frequency 
Expense per 
occasion (value) 
 Test Control Test Control Test Control Test Control Test Control 
IV – 2000 29.47 42.60 14.6 8.6 4.09 5.42 1.5 1.4 2.73 3.87 
I – 2001 36.06 40.51 15.1 8.5 5.11 7.43 1.4 1.6 3.65 4.64 
II – 2001 48.77 37.91 20.0 9.1 10.77 5.67 1.7 1.6 6.33 3.54 
III – 2001 31.18 40.67 19.1 12.1 5.09 5.43 1.1 1.5 4.63 3.62 
IV – 2001 30.11 38.80 11.0 9.2 11.91 6.44 na 1.6 na 4.03 
I – 2002 47.51 35.00 11.8 7.6 6.69 6.30 1.4 1.5 4.78 4.20 
II – 2002 51.34 31.94 8.0 6.1 8.63 7.25 1.8 1.6 4.80 4.53 
III – 2002 51.28 31.36 8.4 5.7 9.07 7.35 1.9 1.6 4.78 4.59 
IV – 2002 55.64 25.67 14.2 5.7 7.99 6.08 1.4 1.5 5.71 4.05 
I – 2003 42.39 34.26 7.4 6.4 9.91 7.56 1.5 1.5 6.61 5.04 
Average 42.37 35.87 12.96 7.90 7.93 6.49 na 1.54 na 4.21 
Standard 
deviation 9.92 5.23 4.44 2.02 2.62 0.85 na 0.07 na 0.48 
% sd 23.40 14.57 34.27 25.62 33.07 13.09 na 4.54 na 11.45 
Source: Author. 
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Market share 
Market share moved in opposite directions in the two groups. While it fell in the 
control group by –13.18 percent points, it increased by +18.75 percent points in the test 
group. This means that the net gain in the test group when compared to the control group 
was as large as +31.93 percent points. Relative to the average of the period, the market 
share thus grew by +75.36%. Nevertheless, the regression analysis suggests that this cannot 
be attributed to the program, since the t-test shows that the coefficient associated to the 
dummy variable is not significantly different from zero. 
Figure 92 
Product D.5 - Market Share 
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Penetration rate 
In this case, the gain of market share was not induced by a gain in penetration. On 
the contrary, since, while decreasing by –4.15 percent points in the control group, the 
penetration rate decreased even faster in the test group by as much as –8.81 percent points. 
This amounts to a net decreased of –4.66 percent points in the test group in relation to the 
control group, a proportional loss of –35.96% when compared to the average of the 
period. In spite of this strong variation, the regression analysis leads us to conclude that ir 
cannot be attributed to the relationship program. 
Figure 93 
Product D.5 - Penetration Rate 
 
y = -0,9794x + 18,347
R2 = 0,4457
y = -0,4606x + 10,433
R2 = 0,47462,0
4,0
6,0
8,0
10,0
12,0
14,0
16,0
18,0
20,0
22,0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Test Control Linear (Test) Linear (Control)
 
Source: Author. 
 365 
Buying rate 
We found upward trends in both the control and the test group, in spite of low 
correlation coefficients. The equation slope indicates that the buying rate grew by +0.96 
euros in the control group. The increase was however, even stronger in the test group: 
+2.84 euros, which means that the net gain over the control group reached +1.88 euros. 
All in all, this would imply an increase of 23.70% over the period average. However, the 
regression analysis shows that neither the F nor the t-tests identified coefficients 
significantly different from zero. As a consequence, we can safely infer that the program 
had no impact whatsoever on the brand’s buying rate. 
Figure 94 
Product D.5 - Buying Rate 
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4.7 – Product D.6 
D has been loosing market position in this category. On average, its share stood at 
13.31% in the period, but a look at Table 6.26 below instantly reveals that it has been 
falling steadily. The penetration of the category is very low, and so is of course the absolute 
penetration of D.6: in fact, no more than 2.44% on average. In one quarter, only three 
members of the sample of the test group bought it and, since the purchase frequency is 
generally so small, no estimates of the purchase frequency and the expense per occasion 
could be obtained for the entire period. 
Table 25 
Product D.6 – Evolution of Behavioral Variables 
 Market share Penetration Buying rate 
(value) 
Purchase 
frequency 
Expense per 
occasion (value) 
 Test Control Test Control Test Control Test Control Test Control 
IV – 2000 23.12 12.18 2.9 2.6 8.38 4.77 2.5 1.3 3.35 3.67 
I – 2001 15.93 17.42 4.5 4.2 4.22 4.67 na 1.3 na 3.59 
II – 2001 14.41 16.38 3.8 3.1 2.17 5.34 na 1.6 na 3.34 
III – 2001 64.84 21.63 4.1 4.7 4.28 6.99 na 1.7 na 4.11 
IV – 2001 10.51 12.83 4.3 1.7 4.34 6.38 na 1.5 na 4.25 
I – 2002 36.95 11.55 4.2 2.2 10.07 5.60 na 1.5 na 3.73 
II – 2002 13.75 15.78 2.9 1.7 5.33 10.35 na 1.9 na 5.45 
III – 2002 15.16 8.50 3.4 1.5 5.26 6.11 na 1.6 na 3.82 
IV – 2002 14.19 8.24 1.4 1.2 13.12 6.23 na 1.4 na 4.45 
I – 2003 6.38 8.61 2.0 1.5 3.19 4.05 na 1.3 na 3.12 
Average 21.53 13.31 3.35 2.44 6.04 6.05 na 1.51 na 3.95 
Standard 
deviation 17.33 4.69 1.09 1.28 3.52 1.80 na 0.19 na 0.69 
% sd 80.53 35.22 32.56 52.44 58.37 29.78 na 12.82 na 17.57 
Source: TNS. 
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Market share 
D lost market share in the control group during the period: a total of –8.44 percent 
points. The trend equation suggests that it might have felt even faster in the test group (-
15.59 percent points) but the correlation coefficient is so low, that this figure is in fact 
meaningless. We can see that, in fact, two quarters display outliers that seem to bear no 
relationship to the other observed values. As such, we conclude that there was no 
significant effect of the program on the overall market share in this category. The 
regression analysis confirmed this impression. 
Figure 95 
Product D.6 - Market Share 
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Penetration rate 
The penetration rate fell simultaneously in both groups, but faster in the control 
group. Furthermore, the correlation coefficients suggest some consistency in the trends. As 
the penetration rate declined by –2.59 percent points in the control group and by –1.94 
percent points in the test group, the net gain of the former over the latter reached +0.65 
percent points, a significant increase of +19.40% relative to the average of the period. 
However, the regression analysis does not confirm the existence of an impact of the 
program on the penetration rate of the test group. 
Figure 96 
Product D.6 - Penetration Rate 
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Buying rate 
In spite of some irregular movements in the data the test and the control group did 
not move either way, as the very low correlation coefficients testify. No impact could be 
found of the program on the synthetic loyalty indicator, a finding that the regression 
analysis supports. 
Figure 97 
Product D.6 - Buying Rate 
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4.8 – Product D.7 
D.7 leads its category with an average 56.49% market share, which looks quite 
steady. The penetration fluctuates widely due to seasonal factors, declining to very low 
levels during the autumn and winter quarters. In the fourth quarter of 2001, the number of 
purchases was too small to allow estimates of purchase frequency and expense per 
occasion in the test group. 
Table 26 
Product D.7 – Evolution of Behavioral Variables 
 Market share Penetration Buying rate 
(value) 
Purchase 
frequency 
Expense per 
occasion (value) 
 Test Control Test Control Test Control Test Control Test Control 
IV – 2000 54.35 59.61 32.7 29.6 8.49 7.69 2.1 1.9 4.04 4.05 
I – 2001 53.76 56.00 18.6 11.4 6.05 5.06 1.5 1.5 4.03 3.37 
II – 2001 66.73 56.29 37.1 26.3 9.26 7.27 2.1 1.8 4.41 4.04 
III – 2001 69.48 56.27 42.4 37.1 11.18 10.02 2.5 2.3 4.47 4.35 
IV – 2001 80.30 48.34 11.3 11.3 18.59 6.76 na 1.7 na 3.98 
I – 2002 85.59 56.91 15.2 10.7 8.67 6.06 2.1 1.5 4.13 4.04 
II – 2002 67.85 58.72 22.8 22.2 10.49 7.83 2.4 2 4.37 3.91 
III – 2002 68.98 58.60 24.4 21.4 10.92 7.86 2.5 2 4.37 3.93 
IV – 2002 73.74 51.82 17.5 10.9 8.13 6.62 2.1 1.8 3.87 3.68 
I – 2003 73.01 62.31 13.9 8.4 6.19 7.68 1.6 1.8 3.87 4.27 
Average 69.38 56.49 23.59 18.93 9.80 7.29 na 1.83 na 3.96 
Standard 
deviation 9.96 3.97 10.53 9.85 3.56 1.32 na 0.24 na 0.28 
% sd 14.36 7.02 44.64 52.03 36.35 18.05 na 13.15 na 7.02 
Source: TNS. 
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Market share 
Market share increases in both groups, but the upward slope is steeper in the test 
group. According to our data, market share increased by +1.23 percent points in the 
control group. On the other hand it went up by +17.43 percent points in the test group, 
translating into a very significant differential gain of +16.20 percent points. Apparently, the 
program had a very positive impact on D.7. 
Figure 98 
Product D.7 - Market Share 
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Source: Author. 
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Penetration rate 
The penetration rate follows a similar declining trend in both groups. It falls by –
14.40 percent points in the control group and by –16.11 percent points in the test group. 
This translates into a differential loss of –1.71 percent points in the test group, a –7.25% 
decrease as a proportion of the average penetration of the period. Therefore, the increased 
market share in the test group is not explained in this case by growing penetration. 
Figure 99 
Product D.7 - Penetration Rate 
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Source: Author. 
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Buying rate 
The correlation coefficients associated to the trend equations are virtually zero. 
This means that we have no grounds to identify either an increase or a decrease of the 
buying rate in any of the two groups under analysis. For this reason, the increased market 
share in the test group remains unexplained since no impact of the program on the 
exposed group of consumers was found. 
Figure 100 
Product D.7 - Buying Rate 
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Corporation 
XXX   
      
         
         
SUMMARY OUTPUT - MARKET 
SHARE        
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,444770318        
R Square 0,197820636        
Adjusted R Square -0,031373468        
Standard Error 1,423443176        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 3,497666667 1,748833333 0,863114 0,462328003    
Residual 7 14,18333333 2,026190476      
Total 9 17,681          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept 1 1,423443176 0,702521897 0,505038 -2,365905848 4,36590585 -2,365905848 4,365905848 
Dummy 1,883333333 1,759422855 1,070426775 0,319941 -2,277037642 6,04370431 -2,277037642 6,043704309 
Time 0,016666667 0,183765724 0,090695187 0,930275 -0,41786991 0,45120324 -0,41786991 0,451203243 
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SUMMARY OUTPUT - PENETRATION        
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,609542822        
R Square 0,371542452        
Adjusted R Square 0,191983153        
Standard Error 2,67167387        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 29,53911111 14,76955556 2,069191 0,196773139    
Residual 7 49,96488889 7,13784127      
Total 9 79,504          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept 1,1 2,67167387 0,4117269 0,692854 -5,217500307 7,41750031 -5,217500307 7,417500307 
Dummy -2,255555556 3,302277286 -0,683030333 0,516549 -10,06419493 5,55308381 -10,06419493 5,553083814 
Time 0,686666667 0,344911614 1,990848205 0,086783 -0,128919116 1,50225245 -0,128919116 1,502252449 
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SUMMARY OUTPUT - BUYING RATE        
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,26535616        
R Square 0,070413892        
Adjusted R Square -0,195182139        
Standard Error 2,338764088        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 2,900277778 1,450138889 0,265117 0,774486207    
Residual 7 38,28872222 5,46981746      
Total 9 41,189          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept 5,5 2,338764088 2,351669426 0,050962 -0,030294325 11,0302943 -0,030294325 11,03029433 
Dummy 1,919444444 2,890789782 0,663986173 0,527956 -4,916182291 8,75507118 -4,916182291 8,755071179 
Time -0,181666667 0,301933145 -0,601678449 0,566357 -0,895624594 0,53229126 -0,895624594 0,532291261 
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SUMMARY OUTPUT - PURCHASE FREQUENCY       
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,253210848        
R Square 0,064115734        
Adjusted R Square -0,203279771        
Standard Error 0,29456721        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 0,041611111 0,020805556 0,239779 0,793007896    
Residual 7 0,607388889 0,086769841      
Total 9 0,649          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept 0,7 0,29456721 2,376367688 0,049144 0,00345973 1,39654027 0,00345973 1,39654027 
Dummy -0,236111111 0,364094816 -0,648487978 0,537354 -1,097057928 0,62483571 -1,097057928 0,624835706 
Time 0,005 0,038028463 0,131480464 0,899094 -0,084922962 0,09492296 -0,084922962 0,094922962 
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SUMMARY OUTPUT - PURCHASE PER OCCASION       
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,319833623        
R Square 0,102293546        
Adjusted R Square -0,154194012        
Standard Error 0,511497611        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 0,208688802 0,104344401 0,398825 0,685441217    
Residual 7 1,831408641 0,261629806      
Total 9 2,040097443          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept 0,46877193 0,511497611 0,916469442 0,389902 -0,74072686 1,67827072 -0,74072686 1,67827072 
Dummy 0,559717836 0,632227968 0,885310149 0,405372 -0,93526268 2,05469835 -0,93526268 2,054698352 
Time -0,037163448 0,066034058 -0,562792134 0,591137 -0,193309071 0,11898217 -0,193309071 0,118982174 
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Division A   
      
         
         
SUMMARY OUTPUT - MARKET SHARE        
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,465498446        
R Square 0,216688803        
Adjusted R Square -0,007114396        
Standard Error 3,939616915        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 30,05440703 15,02720351 0,9682114 0,425373245    
Residual 7 108,64407 15,52058143      
Total 9 138,6984771          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept 5,844407944 3,939616915 1,48349651 0,1815109 -3,47129909 15,16011498 -3,47129909 15,160115 
Dummy -5,77373825 4,869496834 -1,185695041 0,2744263 -17,2882603 5,740783819 -17,2882603 5,74078382 
Time 0,630860683 0,508602357 1,240380966 0,2547948 -0,57179192 1,833513289 -0,57179192 1,83351329 
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SUMMARY OUTPUT - PENETRATION        
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,324093818        
R Square 0,105036803        
Adjusted R Square -0,150666968        
Standard Error 5,01264433        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 20,64277778 10,32138889 0,4107753 0,678138058    
Residual 7 175,8862222 25,12660317      
Total 9 196,529          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept 6,9 5,01264433 1,376518968 0,2110759 -4,95301187 18,75301187 -4,95301187 18,7530119 
Dummy -3,877777778 6,195794216 -0,625872591 0,5512515 -18,5284926 10,772937 -18,5284926 10,772937 
Time 0,573333333 0,6471296 0,885963697 0,4050433 -0,95688392 2,103550585 -0,95688392 2,10355059 
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SUMMARY OUTPUT - BUYING RATE        
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,353555641        
R Square 0,125001591        
Adjusted R Square -0,124997954        
Standard Error 1,842241553        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 3,393903314 1,696951657 0,5000073 0,626650545    
Residual 7 23,75697758 3,39385394      
Total 9 27,1508809          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept 2,578530608 1,842241553 1,399670202 0,2043357 -1,77767533 6,934736545 -1,77767533 6,93473655 
Dummy -1,170409776 2,277071503 -0,513997814 0,6230769 -6,55482442 4,214004872 -6,55482442 4,21400487 
Time 0,237823058 0,237832362 0,99996088 0,3506343 -0,32456071 0,800206826 -0,32456071 0,80020683 
         
 
 384 
 
SUMMARY OUTPUT - PURCHASE FREQUENCY       
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,450622878        
R Square 0,203060979        
Adjusted R Square -0,024635885        
Standard Error 0,229094144        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 0,093611111 0,046805556 0,891804 0,451843275    
Residual 7 0,367388889 0,052484127      
Total 9 0,461          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept 0,4 0,229094144 1,746007088 0,124315 -0,14172118 0,941721182 -0,14172118 0,94172118 
Dummy -0,269444444 0,283167941 -0,951535839 0,373023 -0,93902975 0,400140857 -0,93902975 0,40014086 
Time 0,038333333 0,029575927 1,296099139 0,2360354 -0,03160257 0,108269237 -0,03160257 0,10826924 
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SUMMARY OUTPUT - PURCHASE PER OCCASION       
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,204891831        
R Square 0,041980663        
Adjusted R Square -0,231739148        
Standard Error 0,433787205        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 0,057720027 0,028860014 0,1533709 0,860617085    
Residual 7 1,317199373 0,188171339      
Total 9 1,3749194          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept 0,109622633 0,433787205 0,252710619 0,8077521 -0,91612038 1,135365643 -0,91612038 1,13536564 
Dummy 0,135229727 0,536175335 0,252211764 0,8081226 -1,13262257 1,403082021 -1,13262257 1,40308202 
Time -0,030925034 0,056001687 -0,552216106 0,5979813 -0,16334789 0,10149782 -0,16334789 0,10149782 
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Product A.1   
      
         
         
SUMMARY OUTPUT - MARKET SHARE       
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,495202285        
R Square 0,245225303        
Adjusted R Square 0,029575389        
Standard Error 4,37158665        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 43,4634473 21,73172365 1,137145 0,37356026    
Residual 7 133,7753889 19,11076984      
Total 9 177,2388362          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept 0,165357586 4,37158665 0,037825531 0,970883 -10,1717948 10,50251 -10,1717948 10,50251 
Dummy -2,829246475 5,403425717 -0,523602363 0,616718 -15,6063088 9,94781588 -15,6063088 9,947815877 
Time 0,835 0,56436941 1,47952739 0,182537 -0,49952064 2,16952064 -0,49952064 2,169520639 
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SUMMARY OUTPUT - PENETRATION       
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,064806352        
R Square 0,004199863        
Adjusted R Square -0,280314461        
Standard Error 4,023538875        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 0,477944444 0,238972222 0,014762 0,98537749    
Residual 7 113,3220556 16,18886508      
Total 9 113,8          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept 4,3 4,023538875 1,068710937 0,320663 -5,21415079 13,8141508 -5,21415079 13,81415079 
Dummy 0,202777778 4,973227153 0,040773882 0,968615 -11,5570273 11,9625829 -11,5570273 11,9625829 
Time -0,085 0,519436635 -0,163638824 0,87464 -1,31327159 1,14327159 -1,31327159 1,143271586 
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SUMMARY OUTPUT - BUYING RATE       
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,593578719        
R Square 0,352335695        
Adjusted R Square 0,167288751        
Standard Error 1,899607311        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 13,74144444 6,870722222 1,904034 0,21863761    
Residual 7 25,25955556 3,608507937      
Total 9 39,001          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept 0,9 1,899607311 0,473782131 0,650076 -3,5918543 5,3918543 -3,5918543 5,391854303 
Dummy -1,222222222 2,347977478 -0,520542566 0,61874 -6,77430274 4,32985829 -6,77430274 4,329858292 
Time 0,46 0,245238249 1,875726977 0,102809 -0,1198959 1,0398959 -0,1198959 1,039895897 
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SUMMARY OUTPUT - PURCHASE FREQUENCY      
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,553991793        
R Square 0,306906907        
Adjusted R Square 0,108880309        
Standard Error 0,135342012        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 0,056777778 0,028388889 1,549827 0,27718549    
Residual 7 0,128222222 0,01831746      
Total 9 0,185          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept 0,1 0,135342012 0,738868872 0,484019 -0,22003278 0,42003278 -0,22003278 0,420032776 
Dummy -0,094444444 0,167287205 -0,564564664 0,589994 -0,49001554 0,30112665 -0,49001554 0,301126654 
Time 0,03 0,017472579 1,716976101 0,129687 -0,01131605 0,07131605 -0,01131605 0,071316054 
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SUMMARY OUTPUT - PURCHASE PER OCCASION      
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,350890866        
R Square 0,1231244        
Adjusted R Square -0,127411486        
Standard Error 0,767610186        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 0,57914277 0,289571385 0,491444 0,63136856    
Residual 7 4,124577781 0,589225397      
Total 9 4,703720552          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept 0,084559159 0,767610186 0,110158986 0,915375 -1,7305492 1,89966752 -1,7305492 1,899667522 
Dummy -0,278708945 0,948791583 -0,293751494 0,777466 -2,52224293 1,96482504 -2,52224293 1,964825037 
Time 0,09522492 0,099098049 0,960916195 0,368603 -0,13910456 0,3295544 -0,13910456 0,329554402 
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Product A.2   
      
         
         
SUMMARY OUTPUT - MARKET SHARE       
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,368057017        
R Square 0,135465967        
Adjusted R Square -0,111543756        
Standard Error 12,05398377        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 159,3702867 79,68514333 0,548423623 0,600810244    
Residual 7 1017,089673 145,2985248      
Total 9 1176,45996          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept 5,39 12,05398377 0,447155074 0,6682713 -23,11312196 33,89312196 -23,11312196 33,89312196 
Dummy -9,208333333 14,8991227 -0,61804534 0,556111609 -44,439135 26,02246833 -44,439135 26,02246833 
Time 1,624333333 1,556162613 1,043806939 0,331275781 -2,055403889 5,304070556 -2,055403889 5,304070556 
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SUMMARY OUTPUT - PENETRATION       
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,435184589        
R Square 0,189385626        
Adjusted R Square -0,042218481        
Standard Error 4,185459524        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 28,6495 14,32475 0,817712729 0,47956784    
Residual 7 122,6265 17,51807143      
Total 9 151,276          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept 1,3 4,185459524 0,310599109 0,765149535 -8,597032015 11,19703201 -8,597032015 11,19703201 
Dummy -1,791666667 5,173366432 -0,3463251 0,739274951 -14,02472564 10,44139231 -14,02472564 10,44139231 
Time 0,665 0,540340501 1,230705451 0,258178966 -0,612701339 1,942701339 -0,612701339 1,942701339 
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SUMMARY OUTPUT - BUYING RATE       
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,459702796        
R Square 0,211326661        
Adjusted R Square -0,014008579        
Standard Error 2,015690401        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 7,620839688 3,810419844 0,937832275 0,435652349    
Residual 7 28,44105455 4,063007793      
Total 9 36,06189424          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept 3,246153846 2,015690401 1,610442677 0,151336517 -1,52019315 8,012500842 -1,52019315 8,012500842 
Dummy -1,051448021 2,491460017 -0,42202083 0,685668845 -6,942810585 4,839914543 -6,942810585 4,839914543 
Time -0,231789371 0,260224512 -0,89072843 0,402650255 -0,847122122 0,383543381 -0,847122122 0,383543381 
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Product A.3   
      
         
         
SUMMARY OUTPUT - MARKET SHARE       
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,518062322        
R Square 0,26838857        
Adjusted R Square 0,059356732        
Standard Error 6,669518353        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 114,2274594 57,1137297 1,28396 0,334951315    
Residual 7 311,3773254 44,48247506      
Total 9 425,6047848          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept 16,38074837 6,669518353 2,456061668 0,043717 0,609854807 32,15164193 0,609854807 32,15164193 
Dummy -11,3078105 8,24374532 -1,371683629 0,212508 -30,80115666 8,185535664 -30,80115666 8,185535664 
Time 0,008433988 0,861031117 0,009795219 0,992458 -2,027579616 2,044447592 -2,027579616 2,044447592 
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SUMMARY OUTPUT - PENETRATION       
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,419137222        
R Square 0,175676011        
Adjusted R Square -0,059845129        
Standard Error 3,77485099        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 21,2575 10,62875 0,745903 0,508560688    
Residual 7 99,7465 14,2495      
Total 9 121,004          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept 5,8 3,77485099 1,53648449 0,168301 -3,126097813 14,72609781 -3,126097813 14,72609781 
Dummy -5,408333333 4,665840701 -1,15913373 0,28441 -16,44128552 5,624618849 -16,44128552 5,624618849 
Time 0,135 0,487331167 0,277019015 0,789767 -1,017354272 1,287354272 -1,017354272 1,287354272 
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SUMMARY OUTPUT - BUYING RATE       
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,266670256        
R Square 0,071113025        
Adjusted R Square -0,194283253        
Standard Error 1,361469268        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 0,993344766 0,496672383 0,26795 0,772449427    
Residual 7 12,97518998 1,853598569      
Total 9 13,96853475          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept 0,964828431 1,361469268 0,708667066 0,501443 -2,254532515 4,184189378 -2,254532515 4,184189378 
Dummy 0,423294083 1,682821055 0,251538381 0,808623 -3,555942547 4,402530713 -3,555942547 4,402530713 
Time 0,079959599 0,175764927 0,454923521 0,662937 -0,335658112 0,49557731 -0,335658112 0,49557731 
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Product A.4   
      
         
         
SUMMARY OUTPUT - MARKET SHARE       
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,792003401        
R Square 0,627269387        
Adjusted R Square 0,520774926        
Standard Error 3,955644826        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 184,3281434 92,16407168 5,8901597 0,031614238    
Residual 7 109,5298819 15,64712599      
Total 9 293,8580253          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept -4,134563393 3,955644826 -1,045231201 0,3306614 -13,48817039 5,219043603 -13,48817 5,219043603 
Dummy -5,51771186 4,889307863 -1,128526167 0,2962853 -17,07907954 6,043655815 -17,07908 6,043655815 
Time 1,712607796 0,510671551 3,353638542 0,0121899 0,505062326 2,920153267 0,5050623 2,920153267 
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SUMMARY OUTPUT - PENETRATION       
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,633420437        
R Square 0,40122145        
Adjusted R Square 0,230141865        
Standard Error 3,327103703        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 51,92166667 25,96083333 2,3452328 0,166123786    
Residual 7 77,48733333 11,06961905      
Total 9 129,409          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept -3 3,327103703 -0,90168515 0,3971868 -10,86734447 4,867344474 -10,867344 4,867344474 
Dummy 0,85 4,112410241 0,206691441 0,8421344 -8,874298032 10,57429803 -8,874298 10,57429803 
Time 0,743333333 0,429527241 1,730584844 0,1271417 -0,272336471 1,759003138 -0,2723365 1,759003138 
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SUMMARY OUTPUT - BUYING RATE       
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,752963219        
R Square 0,56695361        
Adjusted R Square 0,44322607        
Standard Error 0,462771854        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 1,962659751 0,981329876 4,582275 0,053440496    
Residual 7 1,499104522 0,214157789      
Total 9 3,461764274          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept 0,491666667 0,462771854 1,06243857 0,3233097 -0,6026141 1,585947433 -0,6026141 1,585947433 
Dummy -1,454479658 0,572001321 -2,542790734 0,0385068 -2,807046885 -0,10191243 -2,8070469 -0,101912431 
Time 0,163034687 0,059743589 2,728906791 0,029385 0,021763648 0,304305726 0,0217636 0,304305726 
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Division B   
      
         
         
SUMMARY OUTPUT - MARKET SHARE       
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,173478912        
R Square 0,030094933        
Adjusted R Square -0,247020801        
Standard Error 4,693030589        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 4,783755358 2,391877679 0,108600593 0,898570794    
Residual 7 154,1717528 22,02453611      
Total 9 158,9555082          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept 1,684397163 4,693030589 0,358914593 0,730240538 -9,412848843 12,7816432 -9,41284884 12,78164317 
Dummy 2,160701428 5,80074106 0,372487137 0,720551893 -11,55586175 15,8772646 -11,5558617 15,8772646 
Time 0,026865837 0,605867644 0,044342749 0,965869623 -1,405782462 1,45951414 -1,40578246 1,459514136 
         
 401
 
         
SUMMARY OUTPUT - PENETRATION       
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,870342532        
R Square 0,757496122        
Adjusted R Square 0,6882093        
Standard Error 2,744385322        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 164,6834444 82,34172222 10,9327589 0,007022883    
Residual 7 52,72155556 7,531650794      
Total 9 217,405          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept -1,26319E-15 2,744385322 -4,60281E-16 1 -6,489435445 6,48943544 -6,48943544 6,489435445 
Dummy -2,627777778 3,392151045 -0,774664142 0,46389619 -10,64893467 5,39337911 -10,6489347 5,39337911 
Time 1,536666667 0,354298622 4,337207579 0,003407681 0,698884153 2,37444918 0,698884153 2,37444918 
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SUMMARY OUTPUT - BUYING RATE       
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,069064509        
R Square 0,004769906        
Adjusted R Square -0,279581549        
Standard Error 1,869479613        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 0,117253512 0,058626756 0,016774686 0,98340463    
Residual 7 24,46467817 3,494954024      
Total 9 24,58193168          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept 0,85026738 1,869479613 0,454815005 0,66301173 -3,570346289 5,27088105 -3,57034629 5,270881049 
Dummy -0,037698179 2,310738647 -0,016314341 0,987438873 -5,501722913 5,42632656 -5,50172291 5,426326555 
Time -0,035493429 0,24134878 -0,147062805 0,88722848 -0,606192199 0,53520534 -0,6061922 0,535205342 
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SUMMARY OUTPUT - PURCHASE FREQUENCY       
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,582941703        
R Square 0,339821029        
Adjusted R Square 0,151198466        
Standard Error 0,265069622        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 0,253166667 0,126583333 1,80159268 0,233784601    
Residual 7 0,491833333 0,070261905      
Total 9 0,745          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept 0,6 0,265069622 2,263556248 0,058026255 -0,026789609 1,22678961 -0,02678961 1,226789609 
Dummy -0,608333333 0,327634822 -1,856741995 0,105715868 -1,383066025 0,16639936 -1,38306603 0,166399359 
Time 0,021666667 0,034220341 0,633151686 0,546754752 -0,059251524 0,10258486 -0,05925152 0,102584857 
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SUMMARY OUTPUT - PURCHASE PER OCCASION       
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,372498054        
R Square 0,138754801        
Adjusted R Square -0,107315256        
Standard Error 0,527561154        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 0,31388088 0,15694044 0,56388332 0,59284867    
Residual 7 1,948245397 0,278320771      
Total 9 2,262126277          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept -0,323083779 0,527561154 -0,6124101 0,559626499 -1,570566785 0,92439923 -1,57056678 0,924399227 
Dummy 0,683402748 0,652083038 1,048030248 0,329456561 -0,858527515 2,22533301 -0,85852752 2,225333012 
Time -0,047235471 0,068107852 -0,693539286 0,510321837 -0,208284835 0,11381389 -0,20828483 0,113813892 
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Product B.1   
      
         
         
         
SUMMARY OUTPUT - MARKET SHARE       
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,756810962        
R Square 0,572762832        
Adjusted R Square 0,45069507        
Standard Error 2,785821829        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 72,8300343 36,41501715 4,69217115 0,050973165    
Residual 7 54,32562286 7,760803265      
Total 9 127,1556572          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept -4,129111139 2,785821829 -1,482187804 0,1818488 -10,71652828 2,458306 -10,7165283 2,458306007 
Dummy 10,14881239 3,443367939 2,94735055 0,0214876 2,006546877 18,291078 2,00654688 18,2910779 
Time -0,297425216 0,359648052 -0,826989648 0,43552328 -1,147857112 0,5530067 -1,14785711 0,553006681 
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SUMMARY OUTPUT - PENETRATION       
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,84273656        
R Square 0,71020491        
Adjusted R Square 0,627406313        
Standard Error 2,23786321        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 85,91277778 42,95638889 8,57749932 0,013101426    
Residual 7 35,05622222 5,008031746      
Total 9 120,969          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept -1,7 2,23786321 -0,759653223 0,4722647 -6,991701832 3,5917018 -6,99170183 3,591701832 
Dummy 1,294444444 2,766072959 0,46797191 0,65402527 -5,246274076 7,835163 -5,24627408 7,835162965 
Time 0,943333333 0,288906898 3,265181065 0,01376557 0,260177564 1,6264891 0,26017756 1,626489102 
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SUMMARY OUTPUT - BUYING RATE       
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,685004002        
R Square 0,469230483        
Adjusted R Square 0,31758205        
Standard Error 1,068218773        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 7,061528194 3,530764097 3,09419934 0,10893587    
Residual 7 7,987639434 1,141091348      
Total 9 15,04916763          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept -0,791615792 1,068218773 -0,741061486 0,48276996 -3,317550002 1,7343184 -3,31755 1,734318419 
Dummy 2,462193212 1,320353742 1,864798148 0,10447288 -0,659945033 5,5843315 -0,65994503 5,584331457 
Time -0,327940125 0,137906451 -2,377989744 0,0490268 -0,65403683 -0,0018434 -0,65403683 -0,001843421 
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SUMMARY OUTPUT - PURCHASE FREQUENCY       
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,73675308        
R Square 0,5428051        
Adjusted R Square 0,412177986        
Standard Error 0,126239883        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 0,132444444 0,066222222 4,15537849 0,064618195    
Residual 7 0,111555556 0,015936508      
Total 9 0,244          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept 0,1 0,126239883 0,792142689 0,4542803 -0,198509674 0,3985097 -0,19850967 0,398509674 
Dummy 0,188888889 0,156036671 1,210541649 0,2653542 -0,180078943 0,5578567 -0,18007894 0,557856721 
Time -0,046666667 0,016297499 -2,86342508 0,02421864 -0,0852041 -0,0081292 -0,0852041 -0,008129233 
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SUMMARY OUTPUT - PURCHASE PER OCCASION       
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,58150587        
R Square 0,338149077        
Adjusted R Square 0,149048813        
Standard Error 0,592699821        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 1,256364508 0,628182254 1,78819992 0,235863439    
Residual 7 2,459051546 0,351293078      
Total 9 3,715416054          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept -0,751729752 0,592699821 -1,268314457 0,24523608 -2,15324112 0,6497816 -2,15324112 0,649781617 
Dummy 1,207433468 0,732596586 1,648156012 0,14331114 -0,524880947 2,9397479 -0,52488095 2,939747883 
Time -0,126373525 0,076517218 -1,651569787 0,1426047 -0,307307865 0,0545608 -0,30730786 0,054560814 
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Product B.2  
      
         
         
SUMMARY OUTPUT - MARKET SHARE       
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,597366106        
R Square 0,356846265        
Adjusted R Square 0,173088054        
Standard Error 10,27072535        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 409,7006284 204,8503142 1,941934 0,21335449    
Residual 7 738,4145939 105,4877991      
Total 9 1148,115222          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept 6,612665052 10,27072535 0,643836227 0,540195 -17,6737238 30,8990539 -17,6737238 30,89905391 
Dummy -19,54365414 12,6949563 -1,539481798 0,16758 -49,5624342 10,4751259 -49,5624342 10,47512591 
Time 2,457306854 1,325944941 1,853249542 0,106259 -0,67805247 5,59266617 -0,67805247 5,592666174 
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SUMMARY OUTPUT - PENETRATION       
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,459649804        
R Square 0,211277942        
Adjusted R Square -0,014071217        
Standard Error 4,399254085        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 36,28994444 18,14497222 0,937558 0,435746546    
Residual 7 135,4740556 19,35343651      
Total 9 171,764          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept 2 4,399254085 0,454622525 0,663144 -8,40257546 12,4025755 -8,40257546 12,40257546 
Dummy -6,397222222 5,437623582 -1,1764739 0,277859 -19,2551496 6,46070517 -19,2551496 6,460705173 
Time 0,688333333 0,56794126 1,211979797 0,264837 -0,65463338 2,03130005 -0,65463338 2,03130005 
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SUMMARY OUTPUT - BUYING RATE       
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,699117115        
R Square 0,488764741        
Adjusted R Square 0,342697524        
Standard Error 1,111975827        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 8,27499619 4,137498095 3,346163 0,095537263    
Residual 7 8,655431674 1,236490239      
Total 9 16,93042786          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept 0,792929293 1,111975827 0,713081412 0,498871 -1,83647383 3,42233242 -1,83647383 3,422332419 
Dummy -2,965392893 1,374438907 -2,157529794 0,067855 -6,21542214 0,28463635 -6,21542214 0,284636355 
Time 0,33649405 0,143555462 2,344000327 0,051541 -0,00296043 0,67594853 -0,00296043 0,675948534 
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Product B.3   
      
         
         
SUMMARY OUTPUT - MARKET SHARE       
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,246424431        
R Square 0,060725        
Adjusted R Square -0,207639286        
Standard Error 2,566747805        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 2,981530107 1,490765053 0,226278247 0,80310933    
Residual 7 46,11736007 6,588194295      
Total 9 49,09889017          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept 2,859040964 2,566747805 1,113876852 0,302111506 -3,210348802 8,92843073 -3,2103488 8,92843073 
Dummy -1,866379112 3,172585198 -0,58828337 0,574823447 -9,368345645 5,635587422 -9,36834564 5,635587422 
Time 0,194014733 0,331365717 0,58550032 0,576591759 -0,589540116 0,977569583 -0,58954012 0,977569583 
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SUMMARY OUTPUT - PENETRATION       
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,583668205        
R Square 0,340668573        
Adjusted R Square 0,152288165        
Standard Error 1,960346989        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 13,89927778 6,949638889 1,808407664 0,232735814    
Residual 7 26,90072222 3,842960317      
Total 9 40,8          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept 0,4 1,960346989 0,204045509 0,844123381 -4,235480716 5,035480716 -4,23548072 5,035480716 
Dummy 2,530555556 2,423053729 1,044366258 0,331034394 -3,199051956 8,260163067 -3,19905196 8,260163067 
Time 0,205 0,253079708 0,810021481 0,444587634 -0,393437987 0,803437987 -0,39343799 0,803437987 
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SUMMARY OUTPUT - BUYING RATE       
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,754897537        
R Square 0,569870292        
Adjusted R Square 0,44697609        
Standard Error 0,516184075        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 2,471063021 1,23553151 4,637080362 0,052191291    
Residual 7 1,865121994 0,266445999      
Total 9 4,336185015          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept 0,966555184 0,516184075 1,872500976 0,103297667 -0,254025325 2,187135693 -0,25402532 2,187135693 
Dummy -1,637612661 0,638020593 -2,56670816 0,037185964 -3,146290548 -0,12893477 -3,14629055 -0,128934774 
Time -0,003817418 0,066639078 -0,057284978 0,955919097 -0,161393684 0,153758848 -0,16139368 0,153758848 
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Product B.4   
      
         
         
SUMMARY OUTPUT - MARKET SHARE        
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,432112571        
R Square 0,186721274        
Adjusted R Square -0,045644076        
Standard Error 5,322545383        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 45,5293213 22,76466065 0,803568 0,485107447    
Residual 7 198,3064255 28,32948936      
Total 9 243,8357468          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept 4,258602711 5,322545383 0,800106416 0,449945 -8,327208179 16,8444136 -8,32720818 16,8444136 
Dummy -4,865548503 6,57884217 -0,739575198 0,483616 -20,42202712 10,6909301 -20,4220271 10,69093011 
Time -0,337969734 0,687137654 -0,491851569 0,637872 -1,962790933 1,28685147 -1,96279093 1,286851466 
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SUMMARY OUTPUT - PENETRATION        
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,307762635        
R Square 0,09471784        
Adjusted R Square -0,163934206        
Standard Error 1,659556261        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 2,017111111 1,008555556 0,366198 0,705901115    
Residual 7 19,27888889 2,754126984      
Total 9 21,296          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept 0,4 1,659556261 0,241028285 0,816441 -3,524224175 4,32422417 -3,52422417 4,324224175 
Dummy -0,938888889 2,051266439 -0,457711817 0,661028 -5,789359787 3,91158201 -5,78935979 3,911582009 
Time 0,183333333 0,214247792 0,85570699 0,420482 -0,323281829 0,6899485 -0,32328183 0,689948496 
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SUMMARY OUTPUT - BUYING RATE        
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,432893718        
R Square 0,187396971        
Adjusted R Square -0,044775323        
Standard Error 1,969175468        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 6,259663736 3,129831868 0,807146 0,483698264    
Residual 7 27,14356417 3,877652024      
Total 9 33,4032279          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept 1,229583975 1,969175468 0,624415648 0,552154 -3,426772761 5,88594071 -3,42677276 5,885940712 
Dummy -0,135682877 2,433966021 -0,055745592 0,957102 -5,891093841 5,61972809 -5,89109384 5,619728087 
Time -0,267787507 0,25421946 -1,053371393 0,327167 -0,868920576 0,33334556 -0,86892058 0,333345563 
         
 
 419
 
Division C   
      
         
         
SUMMARY OUTPUT - MARKET SHARE       
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,600255262        
R Square 0,360306379        
Adjusted R Square 0,177536774        
Standard Error 1,638733987        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 10,58802344 5,294011722 1,9713692 0,20936403    
Residual 7 18,79814357 2,685449081      
Total 9 29,38616701          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept -1,129414601 1,652333673 -0,683526953 0,5162535 -5,03656008 2,77773088 -5,03656008 2,777730878 
Dummy 3,434545322 2,02552942 1,695628456 0,1337762 -1,35506724 8,22415788 -1,35506724 8,224157883 
Time -0,373754428 0,211559648 -1,766662176 0,1206231 -0,87401314 0,12650429 -0,87401314 0,126504288 
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SUMMARY OUTPUT - PENETRATION       
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,61271384        
R Square 0,37541825        
Adjusted R Square 0,196966322        
Standard Error 3,682575876        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 57,05944444 28,52972222 2,10375 0,192558421    
Residual 7 94,92955556 13,56136508      
Total 9 151,989          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept 0,043333333 3,713137195 0,011670275 0,9910143 -8,73683465 8,82350131 -8,73683465 8,823501314 
Dummy -3,238888889 4,551785606 -0,711564465 0,4997538 -14,0021438 7,52436604 -14,0021438 7,524366044 
Time 0,956666667 0,475418501 2,012262174 0,0840847 -0,16751865 2,08085198 -0,16751865 2,08085198 
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SUMMARY OUTPUT - BUYING RATE       
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,459511381        
R Square 0,211150709        
Adjusted R Square -0,014234802        
Standard Error 1,295360975        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 3,143968335 1,571984167 0,9368424 0,43599262    
Residual 7 11,7457204 1,677960057      
Total 9 14,88968873          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept 1,916837656 1,306111043 1,467591646 0,1856563 -1,17162198 5,0052973 -1,17162198 5,005297295 
Dummy 0,896590051 1,601109018 0,559980639 0,5929521 -2,88942845 4,68260855 -2,88942845 4,682608555 
Time -0,227036509 0,167230383 -1,357627158 0,216721 -0,62247325 0,16840023 -0,62247325 0,168400227 
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SUMMARY OUTPUT - PURCHASE FREQUENCY       
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,564461363        
R Square 0,31861663        
Adjusted R Square 0,123935667        
Standard Error 0,242474021        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 0,192444444 0,096222222 1,6366091 0,261138169    
Residual 7 0,411555556 0,058793651      
Total 9 0,604          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept 0,153333333 0,244486288 0,62716537 0,5504512 -0,42478446 0,73145113 -0,42478446 0,731451125 
Dummy 0,422222222 0,299705911 1,408788437 0,201734 -0,28646914 1,13091358 -0,28646914 1,130913581 
Time -0,053333333 0,031303261 -1,703762828 0,1322037 -0,12735373 0,02068706 -0,12735373 0,020687065 
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SUMMARY OUTPUT - PURCHASE PER OCCASION      
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,453395391        
R Square 0,20556738        
Adjusted R Square -0,021413368        
Standard Error 0,196725194        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 0,070099535 0,035049768 0,90566 0,446889076    
Residual 7 0,270905614 0,038700802      
Total 9 0,341005149          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept 0,425978625 0,198357796 2,147526508 0,0688647 -0,04306269 0,89501995 -0,04306269 0,895019945 
Dummy -0,103489741 0,243158848 -0,425605493 0,6831747 -0,67846864 0,47148916 -0,67846864 0,471489156 
Time -0,022008648 0,025397113 -0,866580683 0,4148855 -0,08206323 0,03804594 -0,08206323 0,038045939 
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Product C.1   
      
         
         
SUMMARY OUTPUT - MARKET SHARE       
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,724358893        
R Square 0,524695805        
Adjusted R Square 0,388894607        
Standard Error 4,353139903        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 146,4330928 73,2165464 3,863705 0,074028809    
Residual 7 132,6487891 18,94982702      
Total 9 279,0818819          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept 11,30510002 4,389266165 2,57562417 0,036706 0,926142227 21,6840578 0,926142227 21,68405782 
Dummy -12,76086849 5,380624927 -2,371633159 0,049487 -25,48401558 -0,0377214 -25,48401558 -0,037721404 
Time 0,001069152 0,561987945 0,001902446 0,998535 -1,327820221 1,32995852 -1,327820221 1,329958525 
         
 425
 
         
SUMMARY OUTPUT - PENETRATION       
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,700892322        
R Square 0,491250047        
Adjusted R Square 0,345892918        
Standard Error 2,609092769        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 46,01244444 23,00622222 3,379608 0,093921568    
Residual 7 47,65155556 6,807365079      
Total 9 93,664          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept 11,35333333 2,630745363 4,315633696 0,003499 5,132613499 17,5740532 5,132613499 17,57405317 
Dummy -5,577777778 3,224924975 -1,729583733 0,127327 -13,20350813 2,04795257 -13,20350813 2,047952572 
Time -0,253333333 0,336832428 -0,75210494 0,476511 -1,049814892 0,54314823 -1,049814892 0,543148225 
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SUMMARY OUTPUT - BUYING RATE       
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,215931422        
R Square 0,046626379        
Adjusted R Square -0,225766084        
Standard Error 1,797112598        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 1,105648742 0,552824371 0,171174 0,846098566    
Residual 7 22,60729583 3,22961369      
Total 9 23,71294457          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept 1,389482564 1,812026651 0,766811329 0,468261 -2,895276535 5,67424166 -2,895276535 5,674241663 
Dummy -0,887223884 2,221290622 -0,399418192 0,701491 -6,139737801 4,36529003 -6,139737801 4,365290033 
Time -0,036202171 0,232006239 -0,156039644 0,880406 -0,584809357 0,51240502 -0,584809357 0,512405015 
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SUMMARY OUTPUT - PURCHASE FREQUENCY       
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,448819395        
R Square 0,201438849        
Adjusted R Square -0,02672148        
Standard Error 0,251850296        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 0,112 0,056 0,882883 0,455070439    
Residual 7 0,444 0,063428571      
Total 9 0,556          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept -0,06 0,253940375 -0,236275936 0,819983 -0,660473141 0,54047314 -0,660473141 0,540473141 
Dummy 0,333333333 0,311295297 1,070794633 0,319787 -0,402762549 1,06942922 -0,402762549 1,069429215 
Time -0,04 0,032513733 -1,23024937 0,258339 -0,116882707 0,03688271 -0,116882707 0,036882707 
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SUMMARY OUTPUT - PURCHASE PER OCCASION      
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,448370338        
R Square 0,20103596        
Adjusted R Square -0,02723948        
Standard Error 0,701055486        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 0,865663964 0,432831982 0,880673 0,455874516    
Residual 7 3,440351559 0,491478794      
Total 9 4,306015523          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept 0,866404335 0,706873473 1,225685172 0,25995 -0,805084628 2,5378933 -0,805084628 2,537893297 
Dummy -1,149763206 0,866527772 -1,326862499 0,226198 -3,198774325 0,89924791 -3,198774325 0,899247913 
Time 0,060556786 0,090505874 0,669092331 0,524882 -0,153455445 0,27456902 -0,153455445 0,274569018 
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Product C.2   
      
         
         
SUMMARY OUTPUT - MARKET SHARE       
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,792496085        
R Square 0,628050044        
Adjusted R Square 0,521778628        
Standard Error 8,163039089        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 787,6105611 393,8052805 5,909868 0,031383096    
Residual 7 466,4464502 66,63520717      
Total 9 1254,057011          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept -30,22171932 8,230783314 -3,671791392 0,007945 -49,68441523 -10,7590234 -49,6844152 -10,75902341 
Dummy 15,44707176 10,08978636 1,530961232 0,169635 -8,41146469 39,3056082 -8,41146469 39,3056082 
Time 1,923959962 1,053843815 1,82565949 0,110647 -0,567982898 4,415902821 -0,5679829 4,415902821 
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SUMMARY OUTPUT - PENETRATION       
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,579651462        
R Square 0,335995817        
Adjusted R Square 0,146280336        
Standard Error 5,123047828        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 92,96466667 46,48233333 1,771051 0,238560125    
Residual 7 183,7193333 26,24561905      
Total 9 276,684          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept -3,503333333 5,165563477 -0,678209328 0,519422 -15,71794127 8,711274599 -15,7179413 8,711274599 
Dummy -3,416666667 6,332256592 -0,539565417 0,606226 -18,39006346 11,55673013 -18,3900635 11,55673013 
Time 1,203333333 0,661382631 1,819420828 0,111663 -0,360586956 2,767253623 -0,36058696 2,767253623 
         
 431
 
         
SUMMARY OUTPUT - BUYING RATE       
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,374072534        
R Square 0,139930261        
Adjusted R Square -0,105803951        
Standard Error 0,337949494        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 0,130070741 0,065035371 0,569437 0,5900215    
Residual 7 0,799469023 0,11420986      
Total 9 0,929539764          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept -0,079255633 0,340754102 -0,232588932 0,822735 -0,88501047 0,726499204 -0,88501047 0,726499204 
Dummy 0,399913409 0,417716754 0,957379384 0,370265 -0,587829052 1,387655869 -0,58782905 1,387655869 
Time -0,00427085 0,043629092 -0,097889967 0,924764 -0,107437186 0,098895485 -0,10743719 0,098895485 
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SUMMARY OUTPUT - PURCHASE FREQUENCY      
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,217423988        
R Square 0,047273191        
Adjusted R Square -0,224934469        
Standard Error 0,243600636        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 0,020611111 0,010305556 0,173666 0,84409116    
Residual 7 0,415388889 0,05934127      
Total 9 0,436          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept 0,081666667 0,245622253 0,332488876 0,749255 -0,499137253 0,662470587 -0,49913725 0,662470587 
Dummy -0,069444444 0,301098445 -0,230637008 0,824192 -0,781428619 0,642539731 -0,78142862 0,642539731 
Time 0,018333333 0,031448707 0,582959847 0,578209 -0,056030988 0,092697655 -0,05603099 0,092697655 
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SUMMARY OUTPUT - PURCHASE PER OCCASION      
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,549728136        
R Square 0,302201024        
Adjusted R Square 0,102829888        
Standard Error 0,104302568        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 0,032980227 0,016490114 1,515771 0,283828595    
Residual 7 0,07615318 0,010879026      
Total 9 0,109133407          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept -0,073221105 0,105168164 -0,696228805 0,508736 -0,321904119 0,175461908 -0,32190412 0,175461908 
Dummy 0,224442058 0,128921424 1,740921331 0,12524 -0,080408451 0,529292566 -0,08040845 0,529292566 
Time -0,01255368 0,013465404 -0,932291414 0,382217 -0,044394277 0,019286917 -0,04439428 0,019286917 
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Product C.3  
      
         
         
SUMMARY OUTPUT - MARKET SHARE       
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,836724814        
R Square 0,700108414        
Adjusted R Square 0,614425104        
Standard Error 7,429284096        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 901,9718611 450,9859306 8,1708843 0,014769812    
Residual 7 386,3598353 55,19426219      
Total 9 1288,331696          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept 27,90025857 7,490938964 3,724534228 0,00741177 10,1870153 45,6135018 10,1870153 45,61350184 
Dummy -5,879985446 9,182840913 -0,640323131 0,54234639 -27,59393823 15,8339673 -27,5939382 15,83396734 
Time -2,944037575 0,959116453 -3,069530886 0,01807943 -5,211985976 -0,67608917 -5,21198598 -0,67608917 
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SUMMARY OUTPUT - PENETRATION       
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,529793157        
R Square 0,280680789        
Adjusted R Square 0,075161015        
Standard Error 2,934865671        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 23,52694444 11,76347222 1,36571184 0,315664546    
Residual 7 60,29405556 8,613436508      
Total 9 83,821          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept 6,228333333 2,959221821 2,104719994 0,07335814 -0,769109343 13,225776 -0,76910934 13,22577601 
Dummy -0,102777778 3,627591058 -0,028332239 0,978188 -8,680661433 8,47510588 -8,68066143 8,475105877 
Time -0,528333333 0,378889529 -1,394425797 0,20584552 -1,424264061 0,36759739 -1,42426406 0,367597395 
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SUMMARY OUTPUT - BUYING RATE       
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,814714827        
R Square 0,66376025        
Adjusted R Square 0,56769175        
Standard Error 1,094807617        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 16,56287968 8,28143984 6,90923924 0,02204305    
Residual 7 8,390226024 1,198603718      
Total 9 24,9531057          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept 3,152433815 1,103893313 2,855741382 0,02448636 0,542142783 5,76272485 0,542142783 5,762724847 
Dummy -0,719395824 1,353218432 -0,531618405 0,61143683 -3,919246657 2,48045501 -3,91924666 2,480455008 
Time -0,404219529 0,141339056 -2,859928047 0,0243401 -0,738433049 -0,07000601 -0,73843305 -0,07000601 
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Product C.4  
      
         
         
SUMMARY OUTPUT - MARKET SHARE       
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,569678131        
R Square 0,324533173        
Adjusted R Square 0,131542651        
Standard Error 2,78657527        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 26,11527891 13,05763946 1,68160162 0,253287692    
Residual 7 54,35501213 7,765001733      
Total 9 80,47029105          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept -3,600455078 2,809700772 -1,281437196 0,24085278 -10,24433691 3,04342675 -10,24433691 3,043426755 
Dummy 6,315141546 3,444299216 1,833505497 0,10938176 -1,829326084 14,4596092 -1,829326084 14,45960918 
Time -0,35618807 0,35974532 -0,990111754 0,35510181 -1,20684997 0,49447383 -1,20684997 0,49447383 
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SUMMARY OUTPUT - PENETRATION       
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,660338005        
R Square 0,43604628        
Adjusted R Square 0,274916646        
Standard Error 3,824371512        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 79,16027778 39,58013889 2,70618302 0,134695203    
Residual 7 102,3807222 14,62581746      
Total 9 181,541          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept -6,145 3,856109579 -1,593575046 0,15505988 -15,2632437 2,9732437 -15,2632437 2,973243704 
Dummy 5,530555556 4,727049703 1,169980411 0,280297 -5,647132815 16,7082439 -5,647132815 16,70824393 
Time 0,545 0,493724239 1,103855061 0,30615082 -0,622471474 1,71247147 -0,622471474 1,712471474 
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SUMMARY OUTPUT - BUYING RATE       
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,394183208        
R Square 0,155380402        
Adjusted R Square -0,085939483        
Standard Error 1,143897851        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 1,68502991 0,842514955 0,64387732 0,553750384    
Residual 7 9,159516062 1,308502295      
Total 9 10,84454597          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept 0,833936644 1,153390942 0,723030339 0,49310606 -1,893397599 3,56127089 -1,893397599 3,561270888 
Dummy 0,348217469 1,413895586 0,246282309 0,8125296 -2,995111931 3,69154687 -2,995111931 3,691546869 
Time -0,158502026 0,147676578 -1,073305115 0,31873471 -0,507701393 0,19069734 -0,507701393 0,190697341 
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SUMMARY OUTPUT - PURCHASE FREQUENCY       
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,464692536        
R Square 0,215939153        
Adjusted R Square -0,008078231        
Standard Error 0,362935562        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 0,253944444 0,126972222 0,96393927 0,426799778    
Residual 7 0,922055556 0,131722222      
Total 9 1,176          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept 0,348333333 0,365947527 0,951866887 0,37286628 -0,516994445 1,21366111 -0,516994445 1,213661112 
Dummy -0,113888889 0,448600361 -0,253876053 0,80688693 -1,174659423 0,94688165 -1,174659423 0,946881645 
Time -0,048333333 0,04685478 -1,031556092 0,33659792 -0,159127202 0,06246054 -0,159127202 0,062460536 
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SUMMARY OUTPUT - PURCHASE PER OCCASION      
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,293000054        
R Square 0,085849032        
Adjusted R Square -0,175336959        
Standard Error 0,205068897        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 0,027644905 0,013822453 0,32868927 0,73040331    
Residual 7 0,294372768 0,042053253      
Total 9 0,322017674          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept 0,11256309 0,206770743 0,544385964 0,60307693 -0,376371673 0,60149785 -0,376371673 0,601497854 
Dummy 0,144688543 0,253471941 0,570826668 0,58596697 -0,454676926 0,74405401 -0,454676926 0,744054013 
Time -0,020891936 0,026474281 -0,789140846 0,45592193 -0,083493618 0,04170975 -0,083493618 0,041709745 
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Product C.5   
      
         
         
SUMMARY OUTPUT - MARKET SHARE       
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,788641501        
R Square 0,621955417        
Adjusted R Square 0,513942679        
Standard Error 1,754075372        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 35,43323272 17,71661636 5,7581673 0,033220072    
Residual 7 21,53746287 3,076780411      
Total 9 56,97069559          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept -2,721040309 1,768632264 -1,538499757 0,1678161 -6,90318806 1,4611074 -6,90318806 1,461107442 
Dummy 6,394796642 2,168095187 2,949499949 0,0214221 1,268069852 11,521523 1,26806985 11,52152343 
Time -0,67292132 0,226450157 -2,971608984 0,0207603 -1,20839047 -0,1374522 -1,20839047 -0,137452171 
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SUMMARY OUTPUT - PENETRATION       
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,555710404        
R Square 0,308814053        
Adjusted R Square 0,111332354        
Standard Error 4,859522643        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 73,85627778 36,92813889 1,5637604 0,274525157    
Residual 7 165,3047222 23,61496032      
Total 9 239,161          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept -0,491666667 4,899851323 -0,100343181 0,9228853 -12,07796565 11,094632 -12,0779656 11,09463231 
Dummy 5,952777778 6,006530745 0,991050913 0,3546739 -8,25040033 20,155956 -8,25040033 20,15595589 
Time -1,108333333 0,627361676 -1,766657698 0,1206239 -2,591806905 0,3751402 -2,5918069 0,375140238 
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SUMMARY OUTPUT - BUYING RATE       
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,31210368        
R Square 0,097408707        
Adjusted R Square -0,16047452        
Standard Error 2,437854343        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 4,489729606 2,244864803 0,3777241 0,69858457    
Residual 7 41,60193657 5,943133796      
Total 9 46,09166618          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept -0,072441638 2,458085846 -0,029470752 0,9773118 -5,884886884 5,7400036 -5,88488688 5,740003608 
Dummy 2,576757313 3,013268615 0,855136943 0,4207771 -4,548485633 9,7020003 -4,54848563 9,702000258 
Time -0,182293972 0,314725642 -0,579215506 0,5805966 -0,926501326 0,5619134 -0,92650133 0,561913382 
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SUMMARY OUTPUT - PURCHASE FREQUENCY      
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,762339012        
R Square 0,58116077        
Adjusted R Square 0,461492418        
Standard Error 0,506998638        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 2,496666667 1,248333333 4,8564283 0,047551666    
Residual 7 1,799333333 0,257047619      
Total 9 4,296          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept 0,203333333 0,511206168 0,397752113 0,7026637 -1,005476304 1,412143 -1,0054763 1,412142971 
Dummy 0,883333333 0,626667089 1,409573519 0,2015113 -0,598497802 2,3651645 -0,5984978 2,365164469 
Time -0,203333333 0,065453243 -3,10654331 0,0171641 -0,358105548 -0,0485611 -0,35810555 -0,048561119 
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SUMMARY OUTPUT - PURCHASE PER OCCASION      
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,683130726        
R Square 0,466667589        
Adjusted R Square 0,314286901        
Standard Error 0,689455725        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 2,911524621 1,455762311 3,0625114 0,11078805    
Residual 7 3,327444374 0,475349196      
Total 9 6,238968995          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept -0,29259735 0,695177447 -0,420895918 0,6864524 -1,936429624 1,3512349 -1,93642962 1,351234925 
Dummy 0,025453065 0,852190084 0,029867826 0,9770062 -1,989654832 2,040561 -1,98965483 2,040560963 
Time 0,186457512 0,089008351 2,094831656 0,0744371 -0,024013644 0,3969287 -0,02401364 0,396928668 
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Product C.6  
      
         
         
SUMMARY OUTPUT - MARKET SHARE       
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,702527036        
R Square 0,493544236        
Adjusted R Square 0,348842589        
Standard Error 10,06626203        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 691,2244138 345,6122069 3,4107714 0,09244753    
Residual 7 709,3074193 101,3296313      
Total 9 1400,531833          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept 7,856629764 10,14980091 0,774067377 0,4642269 -16,14381845 31,857078 -16,14381845 31,85707798 
Dummy 15,34883212 12,44223288 1,233607527 0,2571599 -14,07235243 44,770017 -14,07235243 44,77001668 
Time -3,388553874 1,29954884 -2,60748482 0,0350413 -6,46149638 -0,3156114 -6,46149638 -0,31561137 
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SUMMARY OUTPUT - PENETRATION       
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,307829747        
R Square 0,094759153        
Adjusted R Square -0,163881089        
Standard Error 4,376985264        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 14,038 7,019 0,3663744 0,70578837    
Residual 7 134,106 19,158      
Total 9 148,144          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept 5,27 4,413309416 1,194115233 0,2713232 -5,165811009 15,705811 -5,165811009 15,70581101 
Dummy 1,416666667 5,410098582 0,26185598 0,8009706 -11,37617449 14,209508 -11,37617449 14,20950783 
Time -0,47 0,565066368 -0,831760704 0,4329983 -1,806168681 0,8661687 -1,806168681 0,866168681 
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SUMMARY OUTPUT - BUYING RATE       
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,387320065        
R Square 0,150016833        
Adjusted R Square -0,0928355        
Standard Error 1,012345096        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 1,26614917 0,633074585 0,6177286 0,566156031    
Residual 7 7,173898152 1,024842593      
Total 9 8,440047322          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept -2,566787548 1,020746444 -2,514618163 0,040125 -4,980467618 -0,1531075 -4,980467618 -0,15310748 
Dummy 0,723006396 1,251292028 0,577807882 0,5814958 -2,235826963 3,6818398 -2,235826963 3,681839755 
Time -0,145266377 0,13069319 -1,111506859 0,3030628 -0,454306442 0,1637737 -0,454306442 0,163773688 
         
 
 450 
 
Product C.7  
      
         
         
SUMMARY OUTPUT - MARKET SHARE       
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,723079962        
R Square 0,522844631        
Adjusted R Square 0,386514525        
Standard Error 16,11064599        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 1990,841966 995,420983 3,835137 0,075042856    
Residual 7 1816,870399 259,5529142      
Total 9 3807,712365          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept -22,29411144 16,24434659 -1,372422788 0,212289 -60,70585986 16,11763698 -60,7058599 16,11763698 
Dummy -15,94223021 19,9132914 -0,800582379 0,449687 -63,02964831 31,14518788 -63,0296483 31,14518788 
Time 5,572233289 2,079875454 2,679118732 0,03158 0,654112869 10,49035371 0,654112869 10,49035371 
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SUMMARY OUTPUT - PENETRATION       
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,761566669        
R Square 0,579983792        
Adjusted R Square 0,459979161        
Standard Error 2,558986655        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 63,29711111 31,64855556 4,833012 0,048020997    
Residual 7 45,83888889 6,548412698      
Total 9 109,136          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept -2,883333333 2,580223423 -1,117474289 0,300672 -8,984587848 3,217921181 -8,98458785 3,217921181 
Dummy -2,494444444 3,162992159 -0,788634407 0,456199 -9,973727062 4,984838173 -9,97372706 4,984838173 
Time 0,983333333 0,330363757 2,976516987 0,020616 0,202147742 1,764518925 0,202147742 1,764518925 
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SUMMARY OUTPUT - BUYING RATE       
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,615820805        
R Square 0,379235263        
Adjusted R Square 0,20187391        
Standard Error 0,286417653        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 0,350815907 0,175407954 2,138207 0,188471043    
Residual 7 0,574245503 0,082035072      
Total 9 0,92506141          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept 0,133784292 0,288794603 0,463250663 0,657243 -0,549105943 0,816674526 -0,54910594 0,816674526 
Dummy -0,613907742 0,354021694 -1,734096391 0,126493 -1,451035426 0,223219942 -1,45103543 0,223219942 
Time 0,069012911 0,03697636 1,8664063 0,104226 -0,018422224 0,156448046 -0,01842222 0,156448046 
         
 
 453
 
Division D   
      
         
         
SUMMARY OUTPUT - MARKET SHARE       
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,37311026        
R Square 0,139211266        
Adjusted R Square -0,106728372        
Standard Error 5,19649372        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 30,57008623 15,28504312 0,566038 0,59174965    
Residual 7 189,0248289 27,00354698      
Total 9 219,5949151          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept -1,593536655 5,239618889 -0,304132169 0,769869 -13,98325769 10,796184 -13,98325769 10,7961844 
Dummy 5,305314433 6,423038144 0,825982084 0,436058 -9,882746467 20,493375 -9,882746467 20,4933753 
Time 0,094333333 0,670864455 0,140614595 0,892135 -1,492007891 1,6806746 -1,492007891 1,68067456 
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SUMMARY OUTPUT - PENETRATION       
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,20856425        
R Square 0,043499046        
Adjusted R Square -0,22978694        
Standard Error 4,271430562        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 5,808166667 2,904083333 0,15917 0,855852504    
Residual 7 127,7158333 18,24511905      
Total 9 133,524          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept 8,158333333 4,306878727 1,894256572 0,100047 -2,025809267 18,342476 -2,025809267 18,3424759 
Dummy -2,808333333 5,279629479 -0,53191864 0,61124 -15,29266431 9,6759976 -15,29266431 9,67599764 
Time 0,241666667 0,551439314 0,438247075 0,674413 -1,062279177 1,5456125 -1,062279177 1,54561251 
         
 455
 
         
SUMMARY OUTPUT - BUYING RATE       
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,406053068        
R Square 0,164879094        
Adjusted R Square -0,073726879        
Standard Error 8,956892129        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 110,8738081 55,43690405 0,69101 0,532258671    
Residual 7 561,5814163 80,22591661      
Total 9 672,4552244          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept 2,392064156 9,031224459 0,264865984 0,798743 -18,96337294 23,747501 -18,96337294 23,7475013 
Dummy 3,157085965 11,07101498 0,285166805 0,783769 -23,02168581 29,335858 -23,02168581 29,3358577 
Time -1,296858591 1,156329802 -1,121530025 0,299056 -4,031142127 1,4374249 -4,031142127 1,43742494 
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SUMMARY OUTPUT - PURCHASE FREQUENCY       
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,554267109        
R Square 0,307212029        
Adjusted R Square 0,109272608        
Standard Error 0,207727691        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 0,133944444 0,066972222 1,552051 0,276758638    
Residual 7 0,302055556 0,043150794      
Total 9 0,436          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept 0,481666667 0,209451602 2,29965616 0,055019 -0,013607316 0,9769406 -0,013607316 0,97694065 
Dummy -0,447222222 0,256758298 -1,741802409 0,12508 -1,054358686 0,1599142 -1,054358686 0,15991424 
Time 0,018333333 0,02681753 0,683632445 0,516191 -0,045080002 0,0817467 -0,045080002 0,08174667 
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SUMMARY OUTPUT - PURCHASE PER OCCASION      
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,478018001        
R Square 0,228501209        
Adjusted R Square 0,008072983        
Standard Error 3,684816535        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 28,15030028 14,07515014 1,036624 0,403341932    
Residual 7 95,04511027 13,5778729      
Total 9 123,1954105          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept 0,309273766 3,715396449 0,083241121 0,93599 -8,476236498 9,094784 -8,476236498 9,09478403 
Dummy 2,122615753 4,554555135 0,466042388 0,655339 -8,64718807 12,89242 -8,64718807 12,8924196 
Time -0,668472142 0,475707769 -1,405215945 0,20275 -1,793341465 0,4563972 -1,793341465 0,45639718 
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Product D.1 
      
         
         
         
SUMMARY OUTPUT - MARKET SHARE       
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,099612861        
R Square 0,009922722        
Adjusted R Square -0,2729565        
Standard Error 5,151893787        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 1,86205959 0,931029795 0,035078 0,965699103    
Residual 7 185,7940671 26,54200959      
Total 9 187,6561267          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept 3,624974963 5,194648825 0,697828686 0,507794 -8,65840884 15,9083588 -8,65840884 15,90835877 
Dummy -1,431607385 6,367911151 -0,224815854 0,828544 -16,48931375 13,626099 -16,48931375 13,62609898 
Time -0,001347365 0,665106628 -0,002025789 0,99844 -1,574073503 1,57137877 -1,574073503 1,571378772 
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SUMMARY OUTPUT - PENETRATION       
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,71013029        
R Square 0,504285029        
Adjusted R Square 0,362652181        
Standard Error 1,775119044        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 22,43866667 11,21933333 3,560509 0,085765401    
Residual 7 22,05733333 3,151047619      
Total 9 44,496          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept 6,326666667 1,789850575 3,534745725 0,009537 2,094345619 10,5589877 2,094345619 10,55898771 
Dummy -5,833333333 2,194105861 -2,658638053 0,032531 -11,02156555 -0,64510112 -11,02156555 -0,645101116 
Time 0,273333333 0,229166883 1,192726146 0,271833 -0,268559848 0,81522652 -0,268559848 0,815226515 
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SUMMARY OUTPUT - BUYING RATE       
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,331922009        
R Square 0,11017222        
Adjusted R Square -0,144064288        
Standard Error 2,959671423        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 7,591912247 3,795956123 0,433345 0,664616104    
Residual 7 61,31758453 8,759654934      
Total 9 68,90949678          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept 1,656030461 2,984233433 0,554926583 0,596223 -5,400555239 8,71261616 -5,400555239 8,712616161 
Dummy 2,046945507 3,658251789 0,559541996 0,593236 -6,603439203 10,6973302 -6,603439203 10,69733022 
Time -0,354098094 0,382091938 -0,926735319 0,384902 -1,25760131 0,54940512 -1,25760131 0,549405122 
         
 
 461
 
Product D.2 
      
         
         
SUMMARY OUTPUT - MARKET SHARE       
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,568618633        
R Square 0,32332715        
Adjusted R Square 0,129992049        
Standard Error 9,915358884        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 328,8352283 164,4176141 1,672367 0,254874057    
Residual 7 688,2003925 98,31434179      
Total 9 1017,035621          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept -3,332856071 9,99764543 -0,3333641 0,748622 -26,973514 20,3078019 -26,973514 20,30780186 
Dummy 21,52945558 12,25571159 1,756687519 0,122393 -7,450676534 50,5095877 -7,45067653 50,5095877 
Time -1,729660579 1,280067328 -1,351226253 0,218664 -4,75653666 1,2972155 -4,75653666 1,297215502 
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SUMMARY OUTPUT - PENETRATION       
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,460857314        
R Square 0,212389464        
Adjusted R Square -0,012642118        
Standard Error 3,551164575        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 23,80461111 11,90230556 0,943821 0,433601035    
Residual 7 88,27538889 12,61076984      
Total 9 112,08          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept 4,115 3,580635326 1,149237391 0,288206 -4,351851071 12,5818511 -4,35185107 12,58185107 
Dummy 4,186111111 4,389356892 0,953695772 0,372002 -6,193061219 14,5652834 -6,19306122 14,56528344 
Time -0,615 0,458453375 -1,341466838 0,221655 -1,699069194 0,46906919 -1,69906919 0,469069194 
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SUMMARY OUTPUT - BUYING RATE       
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,604022499        
R Square 0,364843179        
Adjusted R Square 0,183369802        
Standard Error 1,700585586        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 11,62840884 5,814204418 2,01045 0,204212998    
Residual 7 20,24393934 2,891991335      
Total 9 31,87234818          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept -1,437666154 1,714698571 -0,838436667 0,429483 -5,492281079 2,61694877 -5,49228108 2,616948771 
Dummy 4,199443042 2,101980041 1,997851054 0,085891 -0,770946384 9,16983247 -0,77094638 9,169832469 
Time -0,261213398 0,219544655 -1,189796205 0,272911 -0,780353642 0,25792685 -0,78035364 0,257926847 
         
 
 464 
 
Product D.3  
      
         
         
SUMMARY OUTPUT - MARKET SHARE       
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,627861447        
R Square 0,394209997        
Adjusted R Square 0,221127139        
Standard Error 10,02547239        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 457,8395035 228,9197518 2,27758 0,17303237    
Residual 7 703,5706762 100,5100966      
Total 9 1161,41018          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept -10,9977324 10,10867276 -1,087950186 0,312651 -34,90092805 12,90546325 -34,90092805 12,9054632 
Dummy 12,52211946 12,39181553 1,010515322 0,345896 -16,77984709 41,82408601 -16,77984709 41,824086 
Time 1,391947376 1,29428292 1,075458352 0,317834 -1,668543215 4,452437967 -1,668543215 4,45243797 
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SUMMARY OUTPUT - PENETRATION       
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,525200977        
R Square 0,275836066        
Adjusted R Square 0,068932085        
Standard Error 1,76125181        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 8,270944444 4,135472222 1,33316 0,323168573    
Residual 7 21,71405556 3,102007937      
Total 9 29,985          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept -1,345 1,775868258 -0,757376001 0,473543 -5,544258146 2,854258146 -5,544258146 2,85425815 
Dummy 1,052777778 2,176965501 0,483598742 0,643431 -4,094923958 6,200479513 -4,094923958 6,20047951 
Time 0,245 0,227376631 1,07750739 0,316979 -0,292659911 0,782659911 -0,292659911 0,78265991 
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SUMMARY OUTPUT - BUYING RATE       
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,221564596        
R Square 0,04909087        
Adjusted R Square -0,222597453        
Standard Error 4,934918874        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 8,800752123 4,400376062 0,180688 0,83846813    
Residual 7 170,47397 24,35342429      
Total 9 179,2747221          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept -0,045390948 4,975873259 -0,009122207 0,992976 -11,81145311 11,72067122 -11,81145311 11,7206712 
Dummy -1,501082182 6,099722981 -0,246090222 0,812672 -15,92462475 12,92246039 -15,92462475 12,9224604 
Time 0,379868446 0,637095287 0,596250598 0,569779 -1,126621443 1,886358334 -1,126621443 1,88635833 
         
 
 467
 
Product D.4   
      
         
         
SUMMARY OUTPUT - MARKET SHARE       
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,820528511        
R Square 0,673267037        
Adjusted R Square 0,579914762        
Standard Error 2,975596475        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 127,7145896 63,85729478 7,212112 0,019937712    
Residual 7 61,97922066 8,854174379      
Total 9 189,6938102          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept 14,73250683 3,000290645 4,910359887 0,001733 7,637951885 21,82706 7,637951885 21,82706177 
Dummy -13,84353862 3,677935679 -3,763942555 0,007038 -22,5404683 -5,14661 -22,5404683 -5,146608937 
Time 0,589036492 0,384147853 1,533358804 0,169055 -0,31932819 1,497401 -0,319328187 1,497401172 
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SUMMARY OUTPUT - PENETRATION       
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,6522096        
R Square 0,425377363        
Adjusted R Square 0,261199466        
Standard Error 2,230305339        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 25,77616667 12,88808333 2,590954 0,143826714    
Residual 7 34,81983333 4,974261905      
Total 9 60,596          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept 8,151666667 2,248814414 3,624873006 0,008455 2,834069369 13,46926 2,834069369 13,46926396 
Dummy -6,275 2,75673118 -2,276246609 0,056951 -12,7936287 0,243629 -12,79362874 0,24362874 
Time 0,348333333 0,287931181 1,209779823 0,265629 -0,33251523 1,029182 -0,332515233 1,0291819 
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SUMMARY OUTPUT - BUYING RATE       
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,59582225        
R Square 0,355004154        
Adjusted R Square 0,170719626        
Standard Error 0,821903246        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 2,602651073 1,301325537 1,926392 0,215500962    
Residual 7 4,72867462 0,675524946      
Total 9 7,331325693          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept 1,509837581 0,828724137 1,821881992 0,111261 -0,44978221 3,469457 -0,449782209 3,46945737 
Dummy -1,14113169 1,015899601 -1,123272111 0,298364 -3,54335081 1,261087 -3,543350806 1,261087427 
Time -0,083413338 0,106107253 -0,786122871 0,457577 -0,33431694 0,16749 -0,334316942 0,167490266 
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SUMMARY OUTPUT - PURCHASE FREQUENCY       
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,505219669        
R Square 0,255246914        
Adjusted R Square 0,042460317        
Standard Error 0,276772785        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 0,183777778 0,091888889 1,199544 0,356486502    
Residual 7 0,536222222 0,076603175      
Total 9 0,72          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept 0,59 0,279069694 2,114167222 0,072342 -0,06989449 1,249894 -0,069894495 1,249894495 
Dummy -0,494444444 0,342100318 -1,445320036 0,191605 -1,30338258 0,314494 -1,303382575 0,314493686 
Time 0,01 0,035731213 0,279867354 0,787669 -0,07449083 0,094491 -0,074490832 0,094490832 
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SUMMARY OUTPUT - PURCHASE PER OCCASION      
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,427574185        
R Square 0,182819683        
Adjusted R Square -0,050660407        
Standard Error 0,440452309        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 0,303809169 0,151904585 0,78302 0,493301732    
Residual 7 1,357987655 0,193998236      
Total 9 1,661796824          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept 0,20968857 0,444107577 0,472157155 0,651179 -0,84045823 1,259835 -0,840458226 1,259835367 
Dummy -0,083200737 0,544413625 -0,152826332 0,882847 -1,37053348 1,204132 -1,370533476 1,204132001 
Time -0,055691456 0,056862149 -0,979411748 0,360005 -0,19014898 0,078766 -0,190148976 0,078766063 
         
 
 472 
 
Product D.5  
      
         
         
SUMMARY OUTPUT - MARKET SHARE       
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,737587869        
R Square 0,544035865        
Adjusted R Square 0,413760398        
Standard Error 11,26191155        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 1059,30034 529,6501699 4,176042 0,06401141    
Residual 7 887,8145629 126,8306518      
Total 9 1947,114903          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept -16,37212446 11,355373 -1,441795391 0,192562 -43,22329564 10,47905 -43,22329564 10,47904672 
Dummy 5,598164244 13,92009524 0,40216422 0,69956 -27,31760699 38,51394 -27,31760699 38,51393548 
Time 3,243076311 1,45390653 2,230594777 0,060917 -0,194863869 6,681016 -0,194863869 6,681016491 
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SUMMARY OUTPUT - PENETRATION       
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,511128063        
R Square 0,261251897        
Adjusted R Square 0,05018101        
Standard Error 3,189015124        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 25,17527778 12,58763889 1,237745 0,346527197    
Residual 7 71,18872222 10,16981746      
Total 9 96,364          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept 6,635 3,215480433 2,063455256 0,077966 -0,968397574 14,2384 -0,968397574 14,23839757 
Dummy 2,130555556 3,94172819 0,540513058 0,605606 -7,190143847 11,45125 -7,190143847 11,45125496 
Time -0,635 0,411700082 -1,542384924 0,166885 -1,608515302 0,338515 -1,608515302 0,338515302 
         
 474 
 
         
SUMMARY OUTPUT - BUYING RATE       
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,417520518        
R Square 0,174323383        
Adjusted R Square -0,061584222        
Standard Error 2,585904437        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 9,882541401 4,9412707 0,738948 0,511487412    
Residual 7 46,80831229 6,686901756      
Total 9 56,69085369          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept -1,481920064 2,607364592 -0,568359357 0,587552 -7,647353201 4,683513 -7,647353201 4,683513074 
Dummy 2,309552863 3,196263428 0,72257901 0,493367 -5,248403747 9,867509 -5,248403747 9,867509474 
Time 0,152356509 0,333838827 0,456377438 0,661941 -0,637046314 0,941759 -0,637046314 0,941759331 
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Product D.6   
      
         
         
SUMMARY OUTPUT - MARKET SHARE       
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,160841224        
R Square 0,025869899        
Adjusted R Square -0,252452986        
Standard Error 16,92261045        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 53,23662711 26,61831356 0,092949 0,912345578    
Residual 7 2004,623211 286,3747444      
Total 9 2057,859838          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept 11,80580074 17,06304946 0,691892781 0,511294 -28,54187095 52,15347243 -28,54187095 52,15347243 
Dummy 1,297342335 20,91690633 0,062023624 0,952278 -48,16324627 50,75793094 -48,16324627 50,75793094 
Time -0,865710007 2,184699615 -0,396260429 0,703714 -6,031700003 4,300279988 -6,031700003 4,300279988 
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SUMMARY OUTPUT - PENETRATION       
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,250123963        
R Square 0,062561997        
Adjusted R Square -0,205277432        
Standard Error 1,08860257        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 0,553611111 0,276805556 0,23358 0,797625343    
Residual 7 8,295388889 1,185055556      
Total 9 8,849          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept 0,251666667 1,097636771 0,229280463 0,825206 -2,343830005 2,847163339 -2,343830005 2,847163339 
Dummy 0,436111111 1,345548789 0,324113934 0,755321 -2,745603911 3,617826133 -2,745603911 3,617826133 
Time 0,048333333 0,140537987 0,343916504 0,741008 -0,283985962 0,380652629 -0,283985962 0,380652629 
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SUMMARY OUTPUT - BUYING RATE       
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,473101116        
R Square 0,223824666        
Adjusted R Square 0,002060285        
Standard Error 3,783574421        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 28,89686369 14,44843185 1,00929 0,411964155    
Residual 7 100,2080478 14,3154354      
Total 9 129,1049115          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept 3,121699558 3,814973917 0,818275466 0,440162 -5,899273832 12,14267295 -5,899273832 12,14267295 
Dummy -6,467645181 4,676623149 -1,382973349 0,209177 -17,52609378 4,590803422 -17,52609378 4,590803422 
Time 0,488380018 0,488457357 0,999841665 0,350688 -0,666637269 1,643397304 -0,666637269 1,643397304 
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Product D.7   
      
         
         
SUMMARY OUTPUT - MARKET SHARE       
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,573129023        
R Square 0,328476877        
Adjusted R Square 0,136613127        
Standard Error 11,09933033        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 421,82802 210,91401 1,712032 0,248149498    
Residual 7 862,3659369 123,1951338      
Total 9 1284,193957          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept -6,228219557 11,19144254 -0,556516243 0,595193 -32,69175706 20,2353179 -32,6917571 20,23531795 
Dummy 15,36443612 13,71913947 1,119927103 0,299694 -17,07615058 47,8050228 -17,0761506 47,80502281 
Time 0,961980791 1,432917384 0,671344211 0,52353 -2,426327983 4,35028956 -2,42632798 4,350289565 
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SUMMARY OUTPUT - PENETRATION       
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,35772806        
R Square 0,127969365        
Adjusted R Square -0,121182245        
Standard Error 3,39356534        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 11,83 5,915 0,51362 0,619242988    
Residual 7 80,614 11,51628571      
Total 9 92,444          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept 3,49 3,42172819 1,019952435 0,341701 -4,601095673 11,5810957 -4,60109567 11,58109567 
Dummy 3,683333333 4,194559023 0,878121708 0,409005 -6,235215561 13,6018822 -6,23521556 13,60188223 
Time -0,39 0,438107401 -0,890192676 0,402919 -1,425958645 0,64595865 -1,42595865 0,645958645 
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SUMMARY OUTPUT - BUYING RATE       
         
Regression Statistics        
Multiple R 0,266547821        
R Square 0,071047741        
Adjusted R Square -0,19436719        
Standard Error 3,849053213        
Observations 10        
         
ANOVA         
  df SS MS F Significance F    
Regression 2 7,931635504 3,965817752 0,267686 0,772639458    
Residual 7 103,7064744 14,81521063      
Total 9 111,6381099          
         
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0% 
Intercept 1,079336918 3,880996111 0,278108219 0,788965 -8,097754041 10,2564279 -8,09775404 10,25642788 
Dummy 3,297459667 4,757557102 0,693099336 0,510582 -7,952367187 14,5472865 -7,95236719 14,54728652 
Time -0,279229471 0,496910633 -0,561930964 0,591693 -1,454235564 0,89577662 -1,45423556 0,895776622 
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